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I do; no person would be willing to go greater lengths than I shall, to accomplish it, if it shall be thought advisable; but if we have no powder to bombard with, nor ice to pass ou, we shall be in no better situation than we have been in all the year; we shall be in a worse, as their works are stronger.

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The fatal error of short enlistments into which both the continental and colonial governments had fallen, (had perhaps been driven by the temper and habits of the people,) had long been a subject of very deep concern to the Commander in Chief He at length determined to beg the serious attention of Congress to it. His letter on this occasion pourtrays in part the mischief resulting from this unfortunate, measure. "The disadvantages," he observed, attending the limited enlistment of troops, are too apparent to those who are eye-witnesses of them, to render any animadversions necessary; but to gentlemen at a distance, whose attention is engrossed by a thousand important objects, the case may be otherwise.

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"That this cause precipitated the fate of the brave and much to be lamented General Montgomery, and brought on the defeat which followed thereupon, I have not the most distant doubt; for had he not been apprehensive of the troops leaving him at so important a crisis, but continued the blockade of Quebec, a capitulation, from the best ac

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counts I have been able to collect, must inevitably have followed. And that we were not obliged, at one time, to dispute these lines, under disadvantageous circumstances, (proceeding from the same cause, to wit, the troops disbanding of themselves before the militia could be got in,) is to me a matter of wonder and astonishment, and proves that General Howe was either unacquainted with our situation, or restrained by his instructions from putting any thing to hazard till his reinforcements should arrive.

"The instance of General Montgomery (I mention it because it is a striking one, for a number of others might be adduced,) proves, that, instead of having meant to take advantage of circumstances, you are in a manner compelled, right or wrong, to make circumstances yield to a secondary consideration. Since the first of December I have been devising every means in my power to secure these encampments; and, though I am sensible that we never have since that period been able to act on the offensive, and at times not in a condition to defend; yet the cost of marching home one set of men, and bringing in another, the havoc and waste occasioned by the first, the repairs necessary for the second, with a thousand incidentalch a rges and inconveniences which have arisen, and which it is scarcely possible either to recollect or describe, amount to nearly as much as the keep

ing up of a respectable body of troops the whole time, ready for any emergency, would have done.

"To this may be added, that you never can have a well disciplined army.

"To make men well acquainted with the duties of a soldier requires time. To bring them under proper discipline and subordination, not only requires time, but is a work of great difficulty; and in this army, where there is so little distinction between officers and soldiers, requires an uncommon degree of attention. To expect then the same service from raw and undisciplined recruits, as from veteran soldiers, is to expect what never did, and perhaps never will, happen.

"Men who are familiarized to danger, approach it without thinking, whereas troops unused to service, apprehend danger where no danger exists.

"Three things prompt men to a regular discharge of their duty in time of action-natural bravery, hope of reward, and fear of punishment. The two first are common to the untutored and the disciplined soldier-but the last most obvious+ ly distinguishes one from the other. A coward taught to believe, that if he break his rank and abandon his colours he will be punished with death by his own party, will take his chance against the enemy; but the man who thinks little of the one, and is fearful of the other, acts from present feelings, regardless of consequences.

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"Again, men of a day's standing will not look forward; and from experience we find, that, as the time approaches for their discharge, they grow careless of their arms, ammunition, camp utensils, &c.; nay, even the barracks themselves have felt uncommon marks of wanton depredation, and we are laid under fresh trouble and additional expense in providing for every fresh party, at a time' when we find it next to impossible to procure the articles absolutely necessary, in the first instance. To this may be added the seasoning which new recruits must have to a camp, and the loss consequent thereupon.

"But this is not all. Men engaged for a short limited time only, have the officers too much in their power. To obtain a degree of popularity, in order to induce a second enlistment, a kind of familiarity takes place, which brings on a relaxation of discipline, unlicensed furloughs, and other indulgencies, incompatible with order and good government; by which means the latter part of the time for which the soldier was engaged, is spent in undoing what it required much labour to inculcate in the first.

"To go into an enumeration of all the evils we have experienced in this late great change of the army, and the expense incidental to it, to say nothing of the hazard we have run, and must run, between the discharging of one army and the enlistment

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listment of another, (unless an enormous expense of militia is incurred,) would greatly exceed the bounds of a letter. What I have already taken the liberty of saying, will serve to convey a general idea of the matter, and therefore I shall, with all due deference, take the freedom to give it as my opinion, that if Congress have any reason to believe there will be occasion for troops another year, and consequently for another enlistment, they would save money, and have infinitely better troops, if they were even at the bounty of twenty, thirty, or more dollars, to engage the men already enlisted till January next, and such others as may be wanted to complete the establishment, for and during the war. I will not undertake to say that the men may be had on these terms, but I am satisfied that it will never do to let the matter alone, as it was last year, till the time of service is near expiring. In the first place, the hazard is too great; in the next, the trouble and perplexity of disbanding one army and raising another at the same instant, and in such a critical situation as the last was, is scarcely in the power of words to describe, and such as no man, who has once experienced it, will ever undergo again."

Unfortunately, Congress did not feel so sensibly as their General, the incapacity of temporary armies to oppose those which are permanent. Nor were his officers of high rank, as yet, sufficiently impressed

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