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be understood as an exclusive power. There cannot at least be any doubt, that on the first emergency, each state enjoys a similar power, of which no act of congress can deprive them. For the principle of the constitution is not to deny to the states the right of selfprotection in such cases, but to co-operate with the collective force of the Union in aid of the state.
Uniformity in the organization and discipline of the militia should extend through the Union. The imbecility of the confederation in this respect, together with the variety of the periods of service for which the militia were engaged, produced considerable inconvenience during the war of the revolution. Hence congress is further empowered to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States. This power cannot be considered as infringing the rights and privileges of the states, since, however necessary, it cannot effectually be vested elsewhere, and since it is accompanied with an express reservation to them of the appointment of the officers, and of the authority of training the militia, according to the discipline prescribed by congress. This subject will be hereafter resumed.
The last enumerated power is to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatever over such district, not exceeding ten miles square, as may by cession of particular states and the acceptance of congress, become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings. The necessity of such powers at the seat of government carries its own evidence with it. Otherwise, the public authority
might be insulted, and its proceedings interrupted. If the members of the general government were obliged to depend on a state for protection, it might bring on the national councils an imputation of influence or of awe, equally dishonourable to the government, and dissatisfactory to other parts of the Union. The extent of the district thus appropriated is too small to excite a jealousy of an opposite nature. (46)
This authority has been executed by the cession and acceptance of a tract of land on the river Potowmack, partly from the state of Virginia, and partly from the state of Maryland. The inhabitants generally were satisfied. But some consequences, that perhaps were not fully foreseen, have flowed from it. The inbabitants of the District of Columbia, are no longer in all res. pects, citizens of a state, although they are unquestion. ably, to a certain extent, citizens of the United States. As such, they are entitled to the benefit of all commercial or political treaties with foreign powers, and to the protection of the Union at home. But they have no representatives in the senate; they cannot partake in the election of members of the house of representatives, or of electors of president and vice president. The judiciary power between citizens of different states does not extend to them,(47) in which respect they are more unfavourably situate than aliens, but suitable courts of justice, and certain adequate provisions for its local government have been made by congress. The immediate residence of government has greatly contributed to its prosperity, and its political anomaly has produced no general inconvenience. Under a subsequent head some remarks will be made on the judicial relations affecting this and other separated districts.
(47) 2 Cranch, 452.
(46) Federalist, No. 42.
The enumeration closes with a declaration of the powers of congress, to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all others vested by the constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof..
It is impossible not to perceive in this, as in so many other instances, the circumspection that confined the legislature to its proper bounds; the wisdom that, within those bounds, left nothing unsupplied.
The specific enumeration might have been constru. ed by a morbid jealousy, to imply that congress posseșsed no other powers of legislation, and some parts of the executive duties might have doubtfully rested only on the general description in the constitution. Even the functions of the judicial tribunals require legislative development and assistance. All necessary power, and no power that is not necessary, is contained in this final provision.
Of the restrictions on the Powers of Congress-and
on the Executive and Judicial Authorities--Restrictions on the Powers of States and Security to the Rights of Individuals.
THE restrictions on the powers of congress contained in the original text are few. The general principle on which it is constructed being declared and manifest throughout, it follows that to no purpose inconsistent with or extending beyond that principle, can its power of legislation be carried. Yet it was expedient in some instances to introduce positive exceptions, in some, to qualify powers enumerated or implied, and in others to secure by explicit declarations both the republican foundation and the equality of the states in all points within the sphere of the general government.
The first class of these restrictions relates to com. merce.
“No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state."
It has been repeatedly observed, that the leading principle of the whole constitution is uniformity in respect to the several states, as far as it can be obtained. The natural or artificial products of states are different-to lay a general duty on the exports of rice or cotton, or tobacco, would affect only the southern states; on flour or grain only the central states, and on the domestic manufactures would operate chiefly on the northern and eastern states engaged in them-yet with out this restriction perhaps it might have been done.
A restriction both as to exports and imports is sub
sequently extended to the states themselves, except what may be absolutely necessary to execute their own inspection laws; and to prevent evasion under colour of only securing the right of inspection, it is provided that the net produce of all duties and imposts laid by any state on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States, and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of congress.
On the same principle it is provided in general terms, that no preference shall be given by any regulations of commerce or revenue to the ports of one state over those of another, nor shall vessels bound from one state be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another. A vessel bound to or from Philadelphia, shall not be obliged to enter or pay duties in the state of Delaware or New Jersey. It is not however probable that congress, although unrestrained, would make such regulations.
These are all the restrictions immediately relating to commerce, but one of some importance was omitted; the danger of introducing contagious diseases, has suggested to commercial countries the propriety of interposing the utmost care in regard to the admission of vessels from şuspected places. In the Mediterranean, where on account of the frequency of the plague, the practice began, it was required that such vessels should ride at anchor forty days without intercourse with the shore. Hence the term quarantine has been introduced, although the limitation of time is varied according to circumstances. The state or port at which the vessel immediately arrives being the first in danger, has the most immediate interest in taking proper precautions according to its situations and means of enforcing them. But it escaped express notice in framing the constitution, and congress with a