all determined to cultivate the army more than we had done, in case we should go on a horse-marine excursion. Admiral [David D.] Porter, Incidents and Anecdotes of the Civil War (New York, D. Appleton & Co., 1885), 137-172 passim. The Mobile Advertiser, controlled by John Forsyth, was very zealous for the southern cause both before and during the Civil War, and was rather more enterprising than other prominent papers in the South, in having its own correspondents at the front. Correspondents for southern papers were often soldiers, but in this case the man was sent by the paper to the front at Jackson. The account from which this extract is taken is a fair example of the news furnished from unofficial sources to the southern reader. — Bibliography as in No. 118 above. [May 23.] TH HE enemy having moved from Jackson directly to the Big Black and after the disasters of Saturday [May 16], or more particularly that of Sunday, threw his columns across the river and commenced extending his lines around Vicksburg. Our forces evacuated Snyder's Bluff, destroying the works. This opened up the Yazoo to the enemy, who immediately availed himself of the advantage, and entering the river ascended it to Yazoo City and took possession, our forces destroying the navy yard and the two embryo gunboats in course of construction there, and which would have been finished in some six or eight months. This enables Grant to supply his army without the necessity of using his wagon road from Milliken's Bend to Carthage, or of the gunboats running the gauntlet of the Vicksburg batteries, as the transports can go up the Yazoo and safely land whatever is needed. Vicksburg being nearly or completely invested, you will see that it is with much difficulty that any information can be obtained from that point. . . . Procrastination is the thief of time, says the poet, and I might add that he who dallies is damned. The golden moment for taking Vicksburg has passed, and future events rapidly culminating will soon settle the question of its future destiny - either of its being the strongest stronghold of the Confederacy or a Federal garrison. If Grant, after compelling Pemberton to abandon the indecisive field of Baker's Creek and then forcing him to hurriedly throw the Big Black in his rear -I say if he had followed up his advantage by advancing his fresh troops, he might have gone pell mell into Vicksburg with a large portion of Pemberton's discomfited soldiers. The point at which he made his attack on Tuesday was the most vulnerable, and on Sunday night it is my opinion that Grant could have carried it like a "flash," but he dallied until Tuesday. Meanwhile Pemberton eat no "idle bread." It was dig, work, work; and by the time General Grant was ready to "go and see Gen. Pemberton," his house had been set in order, and he was prepared to "receive company," and Grant received one of the most bloody entertainments of modern history. Right gallantly did Grant's men rush to the chargethey had been flushed with an ephemeral success, the booty of Jackson and an abundant supply of whiskey, and forward they dashed with an energy worthy of a better cause. But all in vain - they were numbered with the dead and with all of their freshly committed crimes suddenly ushered into the presence of God. The robbers of Jackson have met with speedy bloody deaths, but no Christian burial — their bodies are the food of beasts and birds of prey. I have not learned whether Grant wanted to bury his dead or not. If he had Pemberton would not have permitted it, for it would require stouter hearts than there are in Grant's army to march or charge over the Golgotha in front of the Vicksburg batteries. [June 10.] The enemy having become tired of directly carrying the place by assault, has set himself down before its fortifications, awaiting reinforcements, and has gone to digging up the big hills of Vicksburg. It is a gigantic undertaking, but I imagine he will ultimately succeed in his approaches to our works, but will be again foiled and driven back with heavy slaughter. By day and by night the enemy is constantly shelling, and strange to say, does but very little damage. This will be the story for several days yet. . . . - [July 2.] . . . All eyes are now turned towards Vicksburg, but when Johnston will move and strike his blow, is known only to himself. It is the opinion of many that he is fighting Grant daily by giving him a "terrible letting alone," and after all it may be the safest and surest way of whipping Grant. With the Navigation of the Mississippi closed, his supplies cut off, and harassed and menaced at every point, he will have but one alternative, that of raising the siege and giving Johnston battle on his own ground. . . . Grant has fortified himself well in his rear against attack, and if Pemberton is well supplied with provisions, the longer a battle is de ferred may possibly be for the better. At night Grant works his men on his entrenchinents, and perfects them as much as possible for offensive and defensive purposes. If Johnston cuts his supplies off, his only chance of escape will be by the way of Grand Gulf, and down the Mississippi river to New Orleans, a retrograde movement that must be attended with immense loss and almost entire destruction of his army, but then we must have Grant cut off and whipped first, before all this disaster can Occur. [July 8.] What judgment the people will pass upon the unfortunate result of affairs in this department and the loss of Vicksburg, I feel confident will be correct, and although the blow has been heavy and is a great disaster, instead of "crying over spilt milk," we should be but the more strongly nerved and determined to win back, not only that which has been lost, but to gain all for which we have been so long bloodily contending. Let us throw aside all bickerings, forget everything save the precious boon for which we are contending, and rally to the defense of our country, our liberties and our homes. All the fault-finding and croaking that may be done will not cap a gun or let slip one of the bull dogs of war. Let the brave man remain determined the irresolute take courage, and the timid take heart, and all rally together and strike for their "altars and their fires.” Vicksburg is lost to us, and that stronghold has passed into the possession of the enemy. The hour of misfortune has come, and let us rise above the storm-cloud and battle more resolutely than ever. Gen. Johnston could not by possibility, with the means at his command, have relieved Vicksburg. All that skill, energy and zeal could do, has been done, although his efforts have not resulted as we fondly anticipated. He had to create an army and all its appliances before he could move with any reasonable hope of success, and to have moved at an earlier day without adequate preparation for the emergency of the conflict, would have been but to expose his army to the blows of the enemy, with the certainty of its defeat; for to have attacked Grant would have resulted in the sacrifice of the only army which remains for the protection of the interior, while this sacrifice could not have saved Vicksburg. Grant occupied a country with double our numbers, over which an army could not have been marched in line of battle if there were no foe to meet and dispute its advance. . . . This position was obtained, fortified and defended in every possible way, before Johnston had an army with which he could commence offensive operations. The root of the disaster is twofold. First, Grant's flank movement by way of Port Gibson, which should have been checked at all hazards. This might have been done with competent and prompt action. It was not done, neither was it attempted. Grant was suffered, with but a feeble resistance by inadequate numbers, to move where he pleased, and secure all he desired. The second cause of disaster was, that Vicksburg had been supplied with but one month's scant rations to stand the siege with! This was the preparation of a year! All accounts, however, previous to the unfortunate capitulation, went to insure the belief that the garrison was amply supplied with provisions for a long time, and believing these assertions to be true, I so telegraphed and wrote. The garrison was starved out, and our glorious boys staggered from utter exhaustion when they left the trenches! What in Heaven's name has the commissariat been doing? I am reminded that last winter the garrison at one time were reduced to but four days' rations, and the "Southern Crisis" was so severe with its lash that an alarm prevailed, but which soon subsided when it was made known that provisions were being sent forward. That there has been a crying incompetency in the antecedent management of affairs is apparent to all. With the credit of the Government at command, an ample supply of provisions in the land, when speculators were brushed out of the way, I am at a loss to account for the shortness of supplies within the fortifications. Would to God the sugar and molasses crop had been sunk in the Mississippi river before ever it had been moved by way of Vicksburg. That Gen. Pemberton is disloyal to our cause no sensible man believes, and none will so assert who know anything about him or the affairs of the country. He has certainly done the best he knew how if he lacked capacity it was his misfortune and not his fault. The appointing power must take the responsibility before the country with respect to Vicksburg and the Trans-Mississippi Department. Our ablest men believe that we have magnified the importance of Vicksburg far beyond its intrinsic importance to the Confederacy in any military point of view. The army of Vicksburg is not lost to us, and in a few days these brave men will again be in our ranks; and the question of resisting Lee on the part of the enemy and of our strengthening Bragg must be settled. Those who calmly survey the field whose nerves do not sway like the aspen are to-day as hopeful, firm and confident of our glorious ultimate success and independence as at any time during the struggle. Mobile Advertiser and Register, May 26. June 4, 16, July 7, 11, 1863. 120. Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg (1863) BY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JAMES LONGSTREET (1895) Longstreet was Lee's best and hardest-fighting lieutenant. He never held an independent command; but after Gettysburg he was sent west to assist Bragg, and rejoined Lee in time for the Wilderness campaign. After the war he accepted reconstruction, and held offices under Republican presidents. The battle of Gettysburg and the capture of Vicksburg were the climax of the war, and the charge here described was the decisive feature of the battle. Bibliography: Abner Doubleday, Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, passim; J. F. Rhodes, History of the United States, IV, 298, note; Channing and Hart, Guide, § 210. ENERAL LEE has reported of arrangements for the day, GE "The general plan was unchanged. Longstreet, reinforced by Pickett's three brigades, which arrived near the battle-field during the afternoon of the 2d [July], was ordered to attack the next morning, and General Ewell was ordered to attack the enemy's right at the same time. . . ." This is disingenuous. He did not give or send me orders for the morning of the third day, nor did he reinforce me by Pickett's brigades for morning attack. As his head-quarters were about four miles from the command, I did not ride over, but sent, to report the work of the second day. In the absence of orders, I had scouting parties out during the night in search of a way by which we might strike the enemy's left, and push it down towards his centre. I found a way that gave some promise of results, and was about to move the command, when he rode over after sunrise and gave his orders. His plan was to assault the enemy's left centre by a column to be composed of McLaws's and Hood's divisions reinforced by Pickett's brigades. I thought that it would not do; that the point had been fully tested the day before, by more men, when all were fresh; that the enemy was there looking for us, as we heard him during the night putting up his defences; that the divisions of McLaws and Hood were holding a mile along the right of my line against twenty thousand men, who would follow their withdrawal, strike the flank of the assaulting column, crush it, and get on our rear towards the Potomac River; that thirty thousand men was the minimum of force necessary for the work; that even such force would need close co-operation on other parts of the line; that the column as he proposed to organize it would have only about thirteen thousand men (the divisions having lost a third of their numbers the day before); that the column would have to march a mile under concentrating battery |