Natural Reasons: Personality and PolityOxford University Press, 1989 - 462 Seiten Hurley here revives a classical idea about rationality in a modern framework, by developing analogies between the structure of personality and the structure of society in the context of contemporary work in philosophy of mind, ethics, decision theory and social choice theory. The book examines the rationality of decisions and actions, and illustrates the continuity of philosophy of mind on the one hand, and ethics and jurisprudence on the other. A major thesis of the book is that arguments drawn from the philosophy of mind may be used to undermine widely held subjectivist positions in ethics and politico-economic theory. The work is inspired by the philosophies of Wittgenstein and Davidson, but goes on to connect their arguments about interpretation with formal work in decision theory and social choice theory, and with the theory of adjudication. |
Inhalt
INTRODUCTION | 3 |
OBJECTIVITY | 9 |
centralism about colour law and logic and some preliminary | 15 |
A coherence account and the threats of overdetermination and | 28 |
The antecedence doctrine and substantive disagreement disagreement | 38 |
Conceivably contestable concepts | 45 |
PREFERENCE | 55 |
An intuitive introduction to the general idea of independence | 64 |
Coherence and the role of theory | 193 |
The practice of theorizing | 200 |
the deliberative matrix | 211 |
deductive practical theoretical | 217 |
COHERENCE | 225 |
The analogues of conditions P and D | 231 |
The analogue of singleprofile neutrality | 241 |
The analogues of Roberts singleprofile conditions | 248 |
Mutual Preferential Independence and the individuation of criteria | 69 |
The argument yet again this time concerning Independence | 76 |
CHAPTER 5 | 84 |
the rejection | 90 |
Causal relations causal explanations and rational explanations | 96 |
CHAPTER 6 | 102 |
Substantive constraints on extended preference human nature | 112 |
Disagreement and democracy | 120 |
the relational form vs the indexed form | 128 |
AKRASIA | 136 |
The irrationality of taking the unit of agency as fixed | 145 |
Collective action selfdetermination and ethics | 156 |
the warming | 163 |
COGNITIVISM | 171 |
The independence of Freges argument from the availability | 180 |
Rationality in the Face of Conflicting Reasons | 187 |
COMMENSURABILITY | 254 |
Conflict transitivity as coherence and selfdetermination | 260 |
SKEPTICISM | 273 |
various suppositions about explanatory primacy | 279 |
explanatory primacy and debunking explanations | 287 |
the problematic status | 294 |
the counterfactual | 302 |
Discriminating debunking and selective skepticism | 309 |
The cognitive value of democracy | 322 |
Tracking debunking and the democratic division of epistemic labour | 333 |
Democracy and autonomy | 348 |
the convergence to full structure | 356 |
Epilogue | 383 |
Bibliography | 437 |
455 | |
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agents akrasia all-things-considered alternatives analogous apply argue argument assumption attitudes attribute autonomy axioms behaviour beliefs best theory causal explanation Chapter characteristics claim cognitivism coherence account coherence function colour concern constitutive counterfactual criteria Davidson debunking decision theory deliberation democracy democratic Deontic Logic depend determine disagreement distinction domain Dworkin editors epistemic essentially contested concepts evaluative example expected utility theory extended preference favour given human impossibility results independent individual inference intrapersonal involve irrationality issue judgments kind liberal Liberal Democracy logical matter modus ponens Moral nature non-cognitivism non-cognitivist objection particular persons Philosophical possible practices principle probability problem question rational Rawls reasons for action relation relationships relevant requires respect risk role rule self-determination sense skepticism social choice social choice theory social welfare function someone subjectivism substantive constraints subsystems suggests supervenience suppose theoretical things considered truth unit of agency Utilitarianism voting Wittgenstein
Verweise auf dieses Buch
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Frank Jackson Keine Leseprobe verfügbar - 2000 |