We structed in High Church or Low founders of churches, the distri- Dare to be true; nothing can need a lie, says old George Herbert. It can- There cannot be a greater contrast between two works on the same subject than exists between two lately published books for boys, each of which is very popular. Both detail the life of a schoolboy, his temptations and his trials, and both are truthful in their way; ; but while Tom Brown's Schooldays remind one of a showerbath, Eric has the effect of a vapour-bath. The one invigorates, the other enervates. The system of our schools may, and does, want much revision, but such as it is it is an ordeal through which the present generation of boys at least are destined to pass, and of which they must make the best they can. Surely therefore it is better to set before them for imitation the virtues of truth, endurance, forbearance, and honesty, by the practice of which they may, by God's help, face their trials manfully, than to write as if their moral ruin were an inevitable consequence of their position, from which nothing short of a miracle could save them. That such a miracle is required is true; but it is the daily-recurring marvel of the grace of God, who will not suffer us to be tempted above that we are able, and not a special interposition of Providence. Boys are more the creatures of impulse, and more easily acted upon by indirect influences even than women. They are hero-worshippers in the simplest form of that faith, idolizers of personal strength, fortitude, generosity, full of a wild spirit of adventure, utterly destitute of forethought, and almost as incapable of reflection. In dealing with them, the mood of the moment is the only one which you can touch; and in writing for them, a consistent tone of reverence and a constant implied reference to a standard higher than mere human opinion, will have more weight than any ostensibly religious instruction. With great apparent openness, nothing is more reserved than a boy. His higher aspirations and deeper feelings remain unspoken, save perhaps to some one intimate friend, or to his mother; but it does not follow that he possesses no such feelings, or that an appeal to them would be useless. Dr. Arnold, twenty years ago, attributed the desultory habits of thought and the inattention which prevailed among the boys under his care to the number of exciting works of fiction which they read out of school, and which gave them a distaste for the routine of education. In these days the number 1860.] The Novel's part in Education. of story books is much increased, and the mode of instruction is drier than ever. The consequence is, that not only boys, but men, are only to be enticed into reading for pleasure by a novel, and writers are as it were forced to become novelists, using the story merely as a peg whereon to hang their pet moral, social, or political theories. Mr. Disraeli tells us fairly, in his preface to Coningsby, that he had not originally intended to adopt the form of fiction, but that upon reflection he resolved to avail himself of a method which in the temper of the times offered the best chance of influencing opinion." This is attributing to novels an influence which they ought not to possess. They should be simply read as a relaxation to minds wearied with more important studies, not looked upon as substitutes for such. But as long as the ordinary routine of education remains so uninviting, we scarcely see how we are to hope for improvement. In these examination days, a familiarity with certain branches of knowledge is required of every boy in whatever profession he may intend to embrace, and this necessity has led to a system of cramming which is not only injurious but defeats its own object. As long as history is made to consist of a series of dates, geography of an enumeration of names, and the study of languages is a mere question of moods and tenses, those acquirements will be considered as 217 necessary evils by the rising generation. Of course a boy who has been for seven or eight years at school ought to be able to go up at once and pass the required ordeal without the intervention of a 'crammer;' but practically this is not the case; whether from the superhuman difficulty of the examínation or the utter ignorance of the candidates, is a vexed question, parents inclining to the one view, examiners to the other. Let our schoolmasters look to it. It is now July, and if we are to have any summer this year (which is still very doubtful) it must come soon; when it does, we shall be grateful for some pleasant storybook to be our companion as we lie on the grass or saunter on the sands. We trust that some one has beguiled the dreary months that have passed in writing such an one, and we promise to read it gratefully when we meet with it; but it must be written in good English, contain no impossible characters, impossible incidents, or impossible dialogues. It must not depend for its interest upon a fall from a horse or a brain fever, and none of the characters may on any pretence keep a diary. If these provisos are complied with, and if the author will kindly ab stain from writing instructively, we shall owe him or her our thanks, and will generously leave the profession of the hero and the complexion of the heroine to his or her discretion. M— M. THE PROPOSED NATIONAL DEFENCES.* THE HE title of the Report quoted at the foot of this page is of a scope and importance to insure for it serious attention not only among ourselves, but in foreign countries. It is to be regretted, however, that the Report itself does not correspond to the comprehensive title which has been given to it, The Report of Commissioners appointed to consider the Defences of the United Kingdom. It is rather a report on the weakness of the United Kingdom, as the first few pages contain a careful and elaborate argument to demonstrate the absurdity of trusting to any of the existing means, or even to all combined, for the purpose of defending the United Kingdom. The Report is ably drawn up, and with all the prestige of authority demolishes any vain reliance which Englishmen might have reposed in their insular position and in England's wooden walls. To use the words of the Commissioners, the fleet alone is insufficient for the defence of the kingdom;' and 'we can no longer rely upon being able to prevent the landing of a hostile force in the country.' Having thus shown the inadequacy of all existing means to prevent a landing, the Commissioners go on to inform the world that the measure of the resources possessed by any nation for resisting an enemy established within its frontiers is the numerical strength of the forces which can be brought into the field; that the regular standing army of the country must always be small as compared with those maintained by the military Powers of Europe,' which is carefully illustrated by statistics of our present numbers, and estimates for increasing the regular army. The Commissioners then pay a just tribute to the success of the volunteer movement, which has been more than borne out by the very impressive display in Hyde-park, and declare that if continued with the spirit with which it has commenced, this movement will go far to obliterate this numerical disparity; but after carefully weighing' the whole subject, they are of opinion that neither our fleet, nor our standing army, nor our volunteer forces, nor even the three combined, can be relied on as sufficient in themselves for the security of the kingdom against invasion.' We have that now therefore declared by authority of a Royal Commission to which the thoughts of many had already pointed; it is far from consolatory, however, to have it thus authoritatively announced to the world at large immediately after the great efforts made in raising the volunteers, and after votes to the amount of thirty million pounds have been agreed to as our annual contribution for maintaining forces which are now declared by a Royal Commission to be totally inadequate for the purpose for which the people of England fondly hoped they had liberally and amply provided. The arguments and facts adduced by the Commissioners are so strong that they must carry conviction of the truth of their conclusions not only to ourselves but to our allies,and -if we unhappily possess themto our enemies, and will not improbably be reflected in our political relations with foreign Powers. The strength of our alliances will be weakened, and in like proportion * Report of the Commissioners appointed to consider the Defences of the United Kingdom presented to both Houses. 1860. National Defence, with incidental Remarks on Fortifications, &c. By a General Officer. February, 1860. Notes on the Defences of Great Britain and Ireland. By Lieut.-General Shaw Kennedy, C.B.: and A Few More Notes. By the same Author. 1860.] The Defence of London. the force of our opponents will be strengthened, by this avowal by authority' that all our existing means combined are inadequate for defence; and therefore that we are not in a position to espouse the cause of an ally, if attacked by a State or by a combination of States having powerful maritime as well as land forces at their disposal. The Duke of Wellington in his famous letter to Sir J. Burgoyne emphatically asks, 'When did any man hear of allies of a country unable to defend itself? Galling as it must be to us to find that England has fallen, however little, from the lofty position in which our natural partialities had installed her, we may derive some consolation from considering that the loss of that position is the result of our own neglect, and not of a knock-down blow as we have lately seen in the case of Austria,— that the remedy is in our own hands, and that a short breathingtime, diligently employed, may restore this country to a position in which, humanly speaking, she may defy the efforts of all combinations against her. The Report of the Commissioners is above all valuable as pointing out the vital points,' to the defence of which the attention of the country ought more particularly to be directed. Pre-eminently as the most vital point-as the heart of the empire' -they place London. There can be no doubt,' they say, 'that the main object of an enemy invading the country would be to push for the capital, in the hope that if he succeeded in obtaining a command of it, such a disaster would result in our buying him off upon any terms he might think it expedient to exact; and they particularly call attention to an opinion of Lord Overstone, published in the Appendix, in which is displayed to view one of our richest capitalists aghast at the prospect. The Commissioners inform us that the sense of the vast importance of shielding the heart of the 219 empire has led military men, both English and foreign, to propose plans for defensive works round the metropolis; but unfortunately, to use their own words, 'the defence of London has NOT BEEN BROUGHT under the consideration of the Commissioners.' We cannot therefore but agree with the regret expressed by A General Officer' in the very able pamphlet on National Defence, quoted at the head of this article That the inquiries of the Defence Comexisting fortifications, and that a commission are limited to the sufficiency of mission was not appointed, with more extended powers, to inquire into the general question of the land defences of the country. The mere examination of the existing fortresses can never satisfy the requirements of public opinion, which demands a well-organized general system of defence for the whole country, which cannot be accomplished without securing the metropolis. After directing attention thus forcibly to the necessities of London, the Commissioners 'point out that its defence does not materially affect the conclusions they have arrived at with regard to the fortifications of the dockyards,' which are marked out as the most vital points' after the metropolis. On this subject they say that, by 'the system they propose for fortifying the dockyards and arsenals, the vital points of the empire would be protected against either capture or bombardment, and the manouvring army would thus be set free to operate against the enemy upon the coast, or upon his line of advance.' Here we most respectfully beg to join issue with the Commissioners. Upon examination of the report we find the following to be the enumeration of the defences proposed by them, with their cost of execution and the strength of their garrisons, which for the sake of argument we accept, although for our own parts we believe them to fall short of rather than to exceed what would be necessary for securing these positions, especially as regards men : To the above must be added, however, certain supplemental works pointed out by the Commission as necessary, though not included in their estimate. The Commissioners consider that there are other harbours which would afford an enemy facilities for landing guns, horses, and matériel, at which it appears advisable to have some degree of permanent defence in order to deny their use to him, and cause him delay by restricting his operations to the open beach until he had succeeded in capturing the defences; and that it is also desirable that works of defence should be provided for our commercial ports, the securing of which would be of the utmost moment to the trading interests of the country, and some of which have a military value in dependent of their commercial importance. It will probably not be an exaggeration to estimate these necessary defences at a further sum of about two millions, and as requiring an additional force of five thousand men for their occupation. A further addition must also be made to cover the cost of the great central depôt recommended to be formed on Cannock Chase as 'complementary' to the existing arsenal and depôt at Woolwich, which, including purchase of land, works of defence, storehouses, magazine, workshops, &c., may easily mount up to three millions. We thus arrive at an expendi 3721 69,000 ture of £17,000,000 for the works recommended by the Commission, which will require permanent garrisons of at least 70,000 men in addition to the manœuvring army, which they state will be set free by this enormous expenditure for the defence of the capital. As, however, a great portion of these works are always open to sudden attack by sea, their garrisons must be constantly present in them, ready for immediate action; and ought, as a general rule, to be in them even in peace time. Now, the condition of constant presence is incompatible with the volunteer system as at present constituted, for it cannot be reasonably expected, nor indeed would it be just to demand, from our patriotic volunteers any greater sacrifices than are necessary to accomplish the object for which the movement was originated, and their services have been accepted. The object of these great sacrifices in time, trouble, and expense, has been to resist any enemy who may be rash enough to invade our shores, and not to perform constant service in presence of an expected danger. The occupations of the great masses of the volunteers preclude the possibility of embodying them for constant service even in war time, as they are derived in great measure from that |