and the same is made perpetual; and it is further ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the plaintiffs recover the costs of suit, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to any action he may think proper. From this decree Ford appealed to this court. The cause was argued by Mr. Bibb for the appellant, and Mr. Meredith for the appellees. Mr. Bibb examined the facts very minutely as they were presented in the record, with a view of sustaining the charge of fraud, and then proceeded: The appellant assigns the errors following, as appellant on the record: 1. The judge erred in sustaining the exception to the answer, and also in giving relief upon the bill; thereby, in effect, decreeing that the plaintiffs could, as complainants in equity, ask the court to aid them in consummating their unfair practice of frauds, appearing on the face of their bill and exhibit referred to as part of their bill. 2. The judge erred in adjudging that the matters of fraud and collusion, alleged in the answer of the defendant, now the appellant, were not defenses competent, fit and proper, legal and equitable, to be inquired into in the suit prosecuted by the plaintiffs, now appel lees. 3. The court erred in sustaining the bill, and in giving any relief to the complainants upon the bill. 4. The court erred in the nature and extent of the relief given to the said complainants. 5. Upon the face of the bill and exhibit referred to, as the evidence of the title claimed by the plaintiffs, it appears that the plaintiffs had no title, had not capacity to become purchasers, that they had paid no consideration, and that the proceedings in the Parish Court were had, done, and procured by fraud and collusion, and combination between the said 148] Emeline and Archibald Douglas, Stephen Douglas, the executor of the will and testament of James S. Douglas, and others, with intent and for the purpose of delaying, hindering, and defrauding the creditors of said testator, James S. Douglas, and Christopher Ford in particular; and therefore the bill should have been dismissed. 6. Upon the bill and transcript of the proceedings in the Parish Court of Madison, Louisiana, exhibited by the plaintiffs in the court below, as the evidence of their title, it appears that the title pretended by the said plaintiffs is invalid, prohibited by the policy of the law, denounced and interdicted by the principles of equity; and therefore the bill should have been dismissed. 7. The bill does not contain any equity; made no case proper for the aid of a court of equity. Having set forth the facts which are relied on in the answer, most of which are proved by recorded proceedings in the two courts respectively-the Court of Probate, in Mississippi, and the Parish Court of Louisiana-it remains to inquire whether these matters of fact were admissible defenses for the defendant against the bill and relief prayed. The property levied upon by the marshal was confessedly of the estate of the testator, James S. Douglas, at the time of his death, and liable to the satisfaction of the executions against Stephen Douglas, executors of James S. Douglas, unless the complainants, Emeline Douglas, one of the testamentary executors, now Emeline Bland, and Archibald Douglas, they being the tutrix or guardian and underguardian of the infants, have, by color of the sales and purchases had and contrived by fraud and collusion, and without ever making payment, under their collusive fraudulent doings, changed the title, and are above the powers of a court of equity in relation to the frauds. At the threshold these questions are presented: Does a report that a person was the best bidder for lands and slaves at public auction, advertised for sale for cash, change the title and vest it in the bidder, without any report of payment of the price, without any receipt for the purchase or evidence of payment, without payment made, and without ability in the bidder to make payment of the price? Does the report of a sale of lands and slaves, as having been made by a parish judge in the State of Louisiana, to a bidder at the price of $83,000, shield and defend the bidder from all inquiries as to his fraud, collusion, art, and part in procuring a fraudulent judgment and order of sale; and also as to the facts of nonpayment of the purchase money, his inability to pay, and that the bidder had never been let into possession? The complainants, Archibald and Emeline, to maintain their bill, and their exception to the answer of the defendant, Chrisopher Ford, are under the necessity to assert the affirmative of these propositions. *The record of the proceedings in [*149 the Parish Court of Louisiana, offered by complainants in equity as evidence of their title to the property levied upon by the marshal to satisfy the executions, contains no report of the payment of the prices which they bid; the complainants offer no proof of payment; their bill does not allege payment; the sum was above their circumstances and ability to pay in cash; the record abounds with evidence of fraud and collusion; the answer charges, that the design, end, and aim of the whole proceeding to judgment and sale was by a sham sale and colorable purchase, to protect the property from the creditors of the testator, whilst Stephen Douglas yet is the possessor of the estate as before the pretended sale. The transcript of the proceedings in the Probate Court of Claiborne County, Mississippi, corroborates and multiplies the acts of fraud and collusion; and the averments in the answer of Christopher Ford, if true, leave no room to doubt the fraud. Shall these pass without inquiry, without examination, without trial, upon a bill brought by two of the confederates in the fraud and collusion, asking a court of equity to call its their confederate in the fruits of the fraud? moral powers into activity to protect them and By the exception to the answer, and the decision of the judge below, the frauds are said not to be proper subjects of inquiry "in the present suit or proceedings instituted by the said plaintiffs." The exception, as taken and sustained, implies that the matters and things set forth in I propose to comprise my argument, as to the principles of law and equity which should rule the decision of this appeal, under these general heads: the answer may be inquired into in some other | an unfair nature; in this case it was to have an suit, in some other proceeding. allowance for attending at auctions to enhance Does the attitude of Mrs. Douglas and Archi- the price of goods; nor will equity suffer them bald Douglas, as complainants in equity, to be set off against fair and just demands; and ensconce them from reprobation for having a cross bill for that purpose was dismissed art and part in the fraudulent and covinous with costs." 13 Viner, p. 544, pl. 13. proceedings which they make the ground- In chancery, between Richard Fermor, work and gravamen of their accusation and plaintiff, and Thomas Smith, defendant, to set prayer for relief? The maxim in equity is, aside a fine levied by said Smith, by fraud and a complainant must come into the court with covin, to bar the plaintiff of his inheritance. clean hands. The proclamations and five years had past; Smith, the tenant for years, all the time continuing in possession, and paying rent until his term expired, and then he claimed the inheritance, and to bar the plaintiff by force of the said fine and proclamations and five years. On the hearing of the case, the Lord Keeper of the Great Seal, because it was a case of great importance, and considering that fines with proclamations were general assurances of the realm, referred the case to all the justices of England and the barons of the Exchequer, all of whom met (except two) and consulted, and resolved that the plaintiff was not barred, because of the fraud and covin. And it was said *that the common law "doth so abhor [*151 fraud and covin, that all acts, as well judicial as others, and which of themselves are just and lawful, yet, being mixed with fraud and deceit, are in judgment of law wrongful and unlawful." And various examples and precedents of decisions are cited. Fermor's case, 3 Coke, 77, 78. 1. The effect of fraud in contaminating and avoiding all proceedings and acts, as well semijudicial as judicial, had and done, contrived and procured, by fraud. 2. That the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, to carry into execution and full effect their judgments and decrees, is plenary; and that the jurisdiction of the court of the United States, to execute the judgments in favor of said Ford, the appellant, is not to be remitted and referred to the tribunals of the State of Louisiana, to give him execution and satisfaction of these judgments. 3. That, upon the face of the transcript of the proceedings in the Parish Court, as exhibited by the plaintiffs, now appellees, they were 150*] *incapable, and prohibited by the policy of the law, and the established principles of equity, to become purchasers at the sales therein mentioned, and by their own showing have not the title to the property mentioned in their bill. 1. As to the effect of fraud. Lord Chief Justice De Grey, in delivering the answer of the judges to a question put to them in the Duchess of Kingston's case, expressed the opinion of the judges thus: "Fraud is an extrinsic, collateral act, violating the most solemn proceedings of courts of justice; as Lord Coke says, avoiding all judicial acts, ecclesiastical and temporal." The Duchess of Kingston's case, 20 Harg. State Trials, 602, Cobbett's ed. 594. A decree of Exchequer, that a will was duly proved which was obtained by fraud, relieved against in chancery, by Lord Hardwicke. Barnsley v. Powel, 1 Ves. Sen. 120; and Ibid. 286, 287. Where a fine and non-claim is levied by fraud, a court of equity will relieve against the fine; per Lord Hardwicke. Cartwright v. Pultny, 2 Atk. 381. An original bill to set aside a decree obtained by gross fraud, sustained by Lord Chancellor Macclesfield. Loyd Mansell, 2 P. Williams, 74, Chancellor Kent, in the case of Reigal v. Wood, 1 Johns. Ch. Rep. 406, said: "It is a well settled principle in this court, that relief is to be obtained, not only against writings, deeds, and the most solemn assurances, dut against judgments and decrees, if obtained by fraud and imposition." In the case of Kennedy v. Daley, 1 Schoale & Lefroy, 355, Chancellor Redesdale relieved against a decree obtained by fraud and imposition, and declared it should have no effect. And that a fine levied and non-claim, by a trustee to a person having notice of the trust, shall not bar the cestui que trust. And in the case of Giffard v. Hort, Ibid. 386, he held a decree, obtained without making parties of those persons who were known to have rights in the estate, to be fraudulent and void as to those not made parties, and a purchaser under the decree, with notice of the defect, not to be protected by it. The fraudulent decree was in the Exchequer. Lord Redesdale laments numerous proceedings in the Exchequer, at a time when that court was oppressed with business, and could not take time for full investigation and right decision, whereby advantage was taken by such proceedings to defraud persons of property to which they were entitled. "It was one of the crying grievances of time. A systematic use has been made of the decrees of a court for the purpose of effecting fraud; and it has been as much a swindling contrivance to deprive a family of its estate, as any of those contriv. ances which swindlers practice upon unwary young men. I shall therefore think myself bound to struggle to the utmost of my power to relieve against such oppressive combinations." Giffard v. Hort, 1 Scho. & Lef. 396. Certain it is that distant creditors, legatees, and heirs have had as ample cause to lament fendant, had caused the marshal to levy the that a systematic use has been made of the executions upon the property alluded to in the parish courts of Louisiana for effecting fraud proceedings in the Parish Court, as exhibited and swindling, as Lord Redesdale had for by the complainants, neither purged the prolamenting such like uses made of the Court of ceedings of the fraud, covin, and collusion, nor Exchequer in Ireland. deprived the Circuit Court of the United States of its powers, duties, and dignity as a court of equity. The cases which I have cited show the active relief given upon bills to annul those fraudulent judicial proceedings. The courts of equity, true and consistent to the doctrine that "all acts, as well judicial as others, mixed with fraud and deceit, are in judgment of law wrongful and unlawful," have ever refused to grant any relief to a party who comes into a court of equity as plaintiff, asking to have advantage of fraudulent or unfair proceedings. The maxim in equity is, "He that hath committed iniquity shall not have equity." Francis's Maxims, II. old ed. p. 5, new ed. p. 7. 152*] *Under that maxim, various examples are given of plaintiffs whose suits were dismissed because the subjects of the bill were founded in fraud or unfair dealing. The plaintiff upon a loan of £90 got a bond for £800, and had judgment. Thereupon he brought a bill to subject to the satisfaction of the debt certain lands of the defendant in right of his wife, estated to trustees for her benefit. "But the security being gotten from the defendant when he was drunk, the lord keeper would not give the plaintiff any relief in equity, not so much as for the principal he had really lent, and so the bill was dismissed." Rich v. Sydenham, 1 Cases in Ch. 202. Upon a bill to have the benefit of articles of marriage, which had been reduced to writing but not sealed, containing an extreme portion for the married daughter, more than would be left to her father and mother, and two other daughters not provided for, the Lord Chancellor would not decree the agreement, but left the plaintiff to recover at law if he could. Anonymous, 2 Cases in Ch. 17. The powers and jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States were prescribed and conferred by the Constitution and laws of the *United States, not by the will and [*153 convenience of the complainants in that bill. Are the proceedings of the Parish Court of Madison, in the State of Louisiana, final and conclusive against all persons, parties, and those not parties? Are the frauds by which those judgments in favor of the executor, Stephen Douglas, and in favor of Mrs. Emeline Douglas, and the fraudulent, collusive, and covinous proceedings under those judgments, final, conclusive, sacred; beyond the power of all courts to overhaul them for fraud, deceit, and covin? No such sanctity can be ascribed to them. Being liable to be impeached and avoided for fraud and covin, the complainants, who have carried a transcript of those proceedings into the Circuit Court of the United States, and therein made those proceedings the substratum of their bill in equity and prayer for relief, have thereby subjected those proceedings to the examination in that court, sitting as a court of equity. But such jurisdiction of the Circuit Court did not depend upon the volition of the said Archibald and Emeline. II. The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, to carry into execution and full effect their judgments and decrees, is plenary, not to be remitted and referred to the tribunals of the States. The jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the To sustain the exception to the answer, or to United States in each particular case is not exgive relief upon the bill without an answer, hausted by the rendition of the judgment or upon the idea that the fraud was not a fit sub-decree, but continues until that judgment or ject of inquiry upon a bill by the actors, con- decree shall be satisfied. The beneficial exertrivers, and participators in the fraud and cise of the jurisdiction of the court to compel covin, was in contradiction to the established | satisfaction is not less important than the exerprinciples of equity. The complainants having brought their case into the Court of Equity for relief, it was open to every defense, to every objection which could have been made against it by a bill, on behalf of those prejudiced by the proceedings in the Parish Court, to have relief against the fraud and covin. If the Circuit Court of the United States had jurisdiction to hear and determine the complaint, as a matter cognizable in equity, it had jurisdiction to hear and determine the defense to the bill alleging the acts of fraud, collusion, and covin, charged in the answer, which, if true, avoided the proceedings relied upon as the foundation of the bill. cise of the jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or decree. The jurisdiction to enforce satisfaction by execution is a necessary incident to the jurisdiction to give the judgment or decree; it is expressly given in the acts of Congress establishing the courts and defining their jurisdiction. The execution and satisfaction of the judgment is the very "life of the law." But I need not labor this point; the doctrine is well settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 23; Bank of the United States v. Halstead, 10 Wheat. 64. The learned counselor who argued this case The cause which had moved the complain- for the appellees cited many decisions of the ants to come into equity for relief did not cur- State court of Louisiana, and passages of the tail the powers and jurisdiction of the court to Civil Code of Louisiana, to show that an exehear and determine any and every equitable cution, issuing from a State court of Louisiana, defense to the bill. Fraud, covin, and collu- could not have been levied upon this property sion in the plaintiffs, had and used in the pro- until, by some proceeding, the orders, judg ceedings on which they relied, was an equitable ments, and sales by the parish judge of Maddefense, a bar to the relief prayed by the bill.ison had been reversed, set aside, and annulled. That the judgment creditor, C. Ford, the de- The drift of that argument, and the exception taken to the answer of Ford, and the opinion of the judge in sustaining the exception, all seem intended to drive C. Ford into the State courts of Louisiana, to seek satisfaction of his 154] judgments rendered in the Circuit Court of the United States, to confine the process of execution to the mode of proceeding under the law of that State. To all those arguments and citations, I reply, that the State of Louisiana has rightful authority to regulate her own courts and modes of executing their judgments, but has no rightful authority to regulate the modes of proceeding and processes of execution of the courts of the United States. The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, and the process of execution of their judgments and decrees, depend upon the Constitution of the United States and the laws made by Congress in pursuance of the Constitution, not upon the laws of the States. The laws made by Congress in pursuance of the Constitution "shall be the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." So the Constitution of the United States (art. 6, sec. 2) declares. Any law of the State contrary to the law of the United States, or impliedly or expressly prohibiting the execution of the process of the courts of the United States within the State, in a manner different from that prescribed by the law of the State to her own courts, would be null and void. *The Judicial Department of the gov-[155 ernment of the United States, in relation to the extent of its jurisdiction, the distribution of its powers between the Supreme Court and the inferior courts, the supervising power over the decisions of the State courts in specified cases, the tenures of office of the judges, the provision for the adequate support of the judges, their responsibility, and the mode of appointment, was constructed with great wisdom, caution, and deliberation. Profiting by history and examples of the past, the sages who framed the Judiciary Department looked to the future with anxious desire to preserve the Union, to maintain peace at home and abroad. so far as an impartial and enlightened administration of justice can conduce to those ends. Considerations of the highest importance demand that the supremacy of the laws of the Union, and the judicial cognizance assigned to the courts of the United States, shall be maintained in their full extent and proper vigor. The jurisdiction in controversies between cit izens of different States, and in questions of conflict of State laws with the Constitution and laws of the United States, forms an important provision for establishing justice and preserving domestic tranquility. Past experience of "fraudulent laws, which had been passed in too many of the States" before the federal Constitution was proposed, taught the framers of that compact to apprehend that the spirit which had produced those would in future produce like instances, or assume new shapes with like evil tendencies; therefore the Constitution established particular guards against such evils, one of which is the jurisdic The differences between the process of execution of the judgments of the courts of the United States, as regulated by the laws of the United States, and the process of execution of the federal courts in controversies betion of the judgments of the State courts as regulated by State laws, have been the subjects of solemn argument, matured consideration, and decision in the Supreme Court of the United States. In the cases of Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1; The Bank of the United States v. Halstead, 10 Wheat. 54; Suydam v. Brodnax, 14 Peters, 67, the laws of the United States regulating the process of modes of executing the judgments of the courts of the United States were considered, expounded, and adjudged. In the two former, the certificates of the decisions and mandates expressly declare, "That the statutes of Kentucky in relation to executions, which are certified to this court, are not applicable to executions which issue on judgments rendered by the courts of the United States" (10 Wheat. 50); "cannot operate upon, bind the mode in which the venditioni exponas should be enforced by the marshal, and forbid a sale of the land levied upon, unless it commanded three fourths of its value." 10 Wheat. 65. The decision in Suydam v. Broadnax declared, that the law of the State of Alabama, which commanded that claims of creditors upon an estate declared to be insolvent should be prosecuted before the commissioners appointed to manage the estate, has no binding force whatever on the circuit courts of the United States; and the right of said circuit courts to take cognizance of claims against such an estate was undoubted, the statute of Alabama to the contrary notwithstanding. 14 Peters, 67. tween citizens of different States. Multiplied instances, which have occurred since the federal Constitution was adopted, attested by the records of this court, prove but too well that the apprehensions of the framers of the Constitution were not idle, nor their foresight and prudent provisions for arresting the evils unprofitable. III. Upon the bill and the transcript of the proceeding in the Parish Court, exhibited thereby to make title to the property claimed by the complainants, now appellees, by their own showing they have not the title to the property. They, said Emeline and Archibald, were in a fiduciary capacity, the one as tutrix (or guardian), the other sub-tutor (or under-guardian), and therefore not capable in law to become purchasers at those sales. The purchase money was not paid; no possession was delivered; the whole contrivances of debts claimed against the estate of her testator, the judgments in favor of Stephen Douglas and of said Emeline, respectively, were false, fraudulent, and covinous; the sales and pretended purchases were shams, simulations, deceitful, illegal, and passed no title to the said Emeline and Archibald. Upon this point I cite the case decided at the last term of this court, Michoud et al. v. Girod et al. 4 Howard, 553-555, etc. *That opinion is drawn with such [156 perspicuity, research, and demonstration, that nothing is left to be supplied by me. It is of itself an example of overhauling and relieving against the iniquities committed by | delivery and possession, where there was no the Court of Probate and Parish Court of Louisiana, in proceedings similar to those of the Parish Court of Madison relied on by the complainant. The incapacity of the tutor, or guardian, to purchase at such a sale is one of the points adjudged in that case. I have labored this case because of the value in controversy, but more on account of the consequences in all time to come, for good or for evil, which hang upon the decision of this appeal in this way or in that. Many things I have said which might perhaps have been well omitted. Some things I have intentionally omitted which might have been said, which will be supplied by the intelligence of the court. But, ex dictus, et ex non dictus, I pray the decree of this court for the appellant; that the injunction be dissolved and the bill dismissed, so that the appellant may have execution of his judgments. Mr. Meredith, for the appellees: adverse possession at the time of the sale. Such a possession is nowhere alleged or suggested in this case, and could not, indeed, have existed, because all the parties in interest were before the court when the decrees were made by the Court of Probates, as appears by the transcript of the record exhibited with the bill. The bill itself avers that the appellees were in possession long before the issuing of the executions; and the only denial of the answer is as to the lawfulness of the possession. Upon this point, the case of Fortin v. Blount, 1 Martin, N. S. 179; 2 Cond. Rep. 429, was referred to. The first proposition, then, appeared to be clearly sustained under the Louisiana jurispru dence; that is to say, that the appellees were in possession of the property upon which the appellant's executions were levied by adjudications which passed the title to them. II. The second proposition, it was contended, was equally clear upon authorities. It is held Upon the facts disclosed by the record, the as settled, in the courts of Louisiana, that no counsel for the appellees, in the oral argument man can take the law into his own hands, and, which he had the honor of addressing to the ex mero motu, undertake to render himself juscourt, when the case was called in its order tice; that, however good his title may be, he upon the calendar at the present term, submit- cannot take possession of property without ted two propositions which he respectfully form of law; and that the courts will not, in a insisted were fully sustained by an uniform possessory action, investigate his title, but will series of decisions of the Supreme Court of restore the possession, and leave him to his Louisiana, establishing them as fixed rules of petitory action. It is equally well settled, that property in that State. They were the follow-what one cannot do by himself, he shall not be ing: permitted to do through the instrumentality of 1. That the appellees, at the time the execu- ja mere ministerial officer-such as a sheriff or tions were levied, were possessed of the prop- marshal-acting under his directions and orerty seized, under and by virtue of judicial sales, translative of title, as by public and authentic act. 2. That the appellees being so possessed the appellant had no right, on a suggestion of fraud, to treat the proceedings of the Probate Court as null and void, and cause his executions to be levied on the property; but that the fraud alleged by him could only be inquired into in an action to set aside the sales, under which the appellees claimed the possession and title; in which, if he should succeed, the prop-catory action to annul the title and subject it to erty would became liable to the operation of his judgments. Until when, the appellees had a right to be protected by injunction in the possession and enjoyment of the property. I. Upon the first proposition, as to the legal effect of the adjudications of the probate sales upon the title and possession, the counsel for the appellees referred to the following decisions: Zanico v. Habine, 5 Martin's Rep. 372; 1 Condensed Rep. 384; Bushnell v. Brown, 8 Mart. Rep. New Series, 157; 4 Cond. Rep. 466; Marigny v. Nivet, 2 Louisiana Rep. 498; De Ende v. Moore, 2 Mart. Rep. N. S. 336; 2 Cond. Rep. 675; La Fon's Executors v. Phillips, 2 Martin, N. S. 225; 2 Cond. Rep. 157] 644. *These cases all concur to show that in judicial sales the proces verbal is sufficient evidence of title; and that neither deed from the officer making the sale, nor act under the signatures of the parties, is necessary to perfect it. Such, indeed, are the express provisions of the Civil Code. See articles 2586, 2594, 2601. Further, the adjudication, being by public and authentic act, was complete evidence of ders, and under pretense of judicial authority, disturbing third parties in the possession and enjoyment of their property, leaving them to the uncertain and inadequate remedy of action for the trespass, against the officers, or to follow the execution creditor, perhaps into a distant State, in quest of satisfaction. If such creditor believes that the title of the party in possession is founded in fraud, and that the property is liable to his execution, the law imposes upon him the duty of bringing his revothe satisfaction of his judgment. This he is bound to do first; he cannot forestall or provoke the inquiry by a seizure under execution; and should he attempt to do so, the courts will enjoin the proceeding. This principle has its foundation in the Roman and Spanish laws, and has been the established jurisprudence in Louisiana from the earliest period, and is free from all doubt and conflicting decisions. It imposes no hardship on the plaintiff in the execution, because a "revocatory action for [*158 cause of fraud is one of the plainest and most simple remedies in practice in the courts of that State; in which, if the plaintiff succeeds, the sale is avoided, and the property restored and subjected to his claim. În such an action the parties are entitled to a jury. If the judgment be in a court of the United States, and the creditor prefer that jurisdiction, it is submitted that a bill on the equity side would afford every relief that his case would require. In support of this proposition and these views, the counsel for the appellees referred to the following decisions: St. Avid v. Wiempren der's Syndics, ♦ Martin, 648; 2 Cond. Rep. |