The therefore William Scarborough could not make that he gave any reason for declining. any conveyance to Robert Isaac; and that he parties present, when the deed was executed, always held the premises subject to the mar. were the complainant's father and mother, and riage settlement, and that they have always the witnesses. I did not see or hear the comheard it in the family, and so believe, that the plainant read the deed, but I was then, and still complainant executed the deed freely and vol-am, satisfied that she knew the contents, and untarily, with a view to carry out the wishes approved of it. and intentions of her uncle, which would have "To the sixth cross-interrogatory the witness otherwise been defeated. They further allege answering saith: I do not recollect the questhat no marriage settlement between the com- tion being put to the complainant, whether she plainant and her husband was ever executed, knew the contents of the deed, nor do I recoland he having been recently declared bankrupt, lect whether any consideration money was ofany interest which she may have in the prop-fered; if there was, it was a piece of coin, proberty, or any claim against them, belongs to the ably a dollar, in the usual way, in such cases; said James Taylor, or his assignee in bank-I think I was in William Scarborough's house ruptcy. The answer then explains the defend- about two hours previous to signing the deed, ant Godfrey Barnsley's actings and doings with and left soon after. respect to the property. The answer of James Taylor, the husband of the complainant, admitted all the material | facts charged in the bill, and stated that before the marriage he had advised her not to execute the deed, believing, from her representations, that she was unkindly treated by the family; that he had been requested by William Scarborough to be a witness to the execution of the deed, but declined to be so, and that his belief of the unhappy situation of the complainant operated upon him in a great measure to consummate his engagement to marry her twelve months prior to the period before intended. Several witnesses were examined on the parts of the complainant and defendants. The fol194] lowing were the answers of the subscribing witnesses to the deed, viz., Andrew Low and John Guilmartin, touching its execution. Andrew Low: "To the fourth direct interrogatory the witness answering saith: I was intimate in the family of the late William Scarborough, both before, in, and after 1828; I was a subscribing witness to the signing of the deed, and after it was signed the complainant expressed to me that she was then satisfied, and was glad that she had done it, or words to that effect. "To the fifth direct interrogatory the witness answering saith: I was present, as stated before, at the execution of the deed; it is impossible, at this distance of time, to remember all that then transpired, but this I am certain of, that the complainant knew the contents of the deed, and approved of it; in fact, as I have before said, she herself told me so. "To the fourth cross-interrogatory the witness answering saith: I became acquainted | with the circumstances I have stated, relative to the property, from my personal intimacy with William Scarborough and his family, and upon my connection in business with the late Robert Isaac. I was a subscribing witness to the deed at the instance of William Scarborough. "To the fifth cross-interrogatory the witness answering saith: I do not know by whom the deed was drawn; the other subscribing witness was Mr. Guilmartin; he was requested to be so by William Scarborough. There was a change of one of the witnesses of the deed, in consequence of James Taylor, who had previously arranged to be a witness, declining to be so after his arrival at William Scarborough's house, for that purpose. I do not remember "To the seventh cross-interrogatory the witness answering saith: James Taylor, now the husband of the complainant, had been asked by Mr. Scarborough to attest the deed as a witness, and he consented to go with me to the house for that purpose; *after closing [*195 our place of business, I asked him to accompany me; he said he would soon follow me, which he did; he did not express himself opposed to the execution of the deed, that I am aware of; I certainly never heard him. It was not known or understood by me, that he was under an engagement to marry the complainant; the previous year there was something of the kind spoken of, but he and the complainant had disagreed, and I was given to believe that it was all broken off. At the dissolution of the partnership of Low, Taylor & Company, in 1834 or 1835, James Taylor was largely indebted on private account to the said firm; and sometime in 1835 I granted him a discharge from the said debt, in consideration of his giving up to me every description of property belonging to himself and his wife, except his household furniture, which I allowed him to retain; he did not at this time mention to me that he or his wife had any claim to the property in question, or I should have claimed it in conformity with our agreement. I had never heard of his making any claim to the property conveyed by the said deed, or any part of it, until advised of it by William Robertson, under date of the 16th February, 1844." John Guilmartin: "To the first direct interrogatory the witness answers and says, that his name and handwrit ing is to the instrument as a witness, and that he subscribed as a witness, at the instance of William Scarborough, the deed now presented to him, being the original deed from complainant to Wm. Taylor, in trust. "To the second direct interrogatory the witness answers and says, he cannot say positively he does, but it strikes him that there was a question or two asked Miss Charlotte Scarborough, viz., whether it was with a free will; he does not recollect the time; but that he does not recollect that Andrew Low, senior, was present when he came in; Mr. Scarborough said he had sent for witness, as such to a deed from Miss Scarborough to her mother, of property, which as a dutiful child she had made. Wit ness asked Miss Scarborough if it was her voluntary act. Mr. Lowe replied, that witness was called in to witness the deed, and for no other purpose; she did not read the deed, or hear it read in witness's presence. at Mr. Scarborough's house, in West Broad Street." At the April adjourned Term of 1846, the cause came up for argument before the Circuit Court, when the bill was dismissed. It was executed | tween actual and constructive fraud. There is no difference, legally, in the degree of the fraud, and the distinction is between the same kind of fraud, one supported by evidence of actual imposition, and the other being inferred from circumstances. In neither case does the court regard the morality or immorality of the transaction. Ex-parte Bennett, 10 Ves. 393; 8 Wheat. 463. All such cases are forbidden by "the morality and policy of the law, as it is administered in courts of equity." Michoud v. Girod, 4 Howard, 503. The complainant appealed to this court. It was argued by Mr. Holmes for the appelant, and Mr. Johnson (Attorney-General) for the appellee. 196*] *Mr. Holmes first remarked upon the lapse of time, which he contended was not sufficient to bar a recovery. 3 Atk. 558; 2 Eden, 285; 2 Story's Eq. secs. 1520, 1521; 1 Howard, 189; 4 Howard, 560. The points raised by the pleadings in behalf of complainant, for cancellation of the deed, were: 1. Duress. 2. Want of consideration 3. Fraud, growing out of the relation of the parties as parent and child, trustee and cestui que trust. 1. Duress. [Mr. Holmes commented upon the evidence in the case, to establish this.] 2. Want of consideration. It is admitted that mere inadequacy of price is not of itself a distinct ground of relief in equity. But, under peculiar circumstances, it may amount to such fraud as will be relieved against. 1 Story's Eq. sec. 246; 1 Desaus. Eq. Rep. 651; 11 Wheat. 124. 3. The relation of the parties; and, The whole doctrine on this subject has been condensed and illustrated by this court, in the case of Michoud v. Girod, 4 Howard, 503. The case is too recent to require any particular examination. There the executors, being themselves co-heirs and legatees, bought the estate of their testator at a public sale judicially ordered, denied any fraud in fact or intention, declared that the purchases were rightfully made for a fair price, and yet this court say, in reference to such a transaction, that "an executor or administrator is in equity a trustee for the next of kin, legatees, and creditors, and that we have been unable to find any one well considered decision, with other cases, or any one case in the books, to sustain the right of an executor to become the purchaser of the property which he represents, or any portion of it, though he has done so for a fair price, without fraud, at a public sale." Ibid. 553, 1st. Of parent and child. All contracts and 557. This language covers the whole ground conveyances, whereby benefits are secured by contended for, though the purchase in that children, to their parents, are objects of jeal-case having been per interposition personam ousy. 1 Story's Eq. Jur. sec. 310; 2 Atk. 85, was the reason, probably, why the court de258; 4 Wash. C. C. 397; 12 Peters, 253; 2 clared that it "carries fraud on the face of it." Johns. C. 252. And in the same case this court, commenting 2d. The relation of trustee and cestui que upon Davoue v. Fanning, said: "The inquiry trust. Taylor, the grantee in trust, and Scar-in such a case is not whether there was or borough, were two of the executors of the will of Isaac. The will was proved only five days before the execution of the deed. Executors are trustees for legatees. 1 P. Wms. 544, 575; 1 Story's Eq. sec. 322; 7 Ves. 166; 1 Story's Eq. sec. 423; 10 Peters, 639. Both executors and ordinary trustees are prohibited by the rules of courts of equity, from considerations of general policy, from dealing with those whose interests are intrusted, during the continuance of the fiduciary relation. 1 Story's Eq. secs. 321, 322; Hatch v. Hatch, 9 Ves. 292; 1 Johns. Ch. 497, 620; 4 Johns. Ch. 303; 7 Johns. Ch. 174; Lewin on Trustees, 376, Willis on Trustees, 163; Fonbl. Eq. book 2, sec. 7, and notes; 1 Madd. Ch. 110 et seq. 2 Madd. Ch. 132; Sugden on Vendors, 421 to 436; Wormley v. Wormley, 8 Wheat. 421; 1 Peters, C. C. 364; 4 Desaus. 654; Ex-parte Bennett, 10 Ves. 381, 385, 386; 14 Ves. 91, 273; 13 Ves. 47. The case of Hatch v. Hatch, 9 Ves. 292, proves that the rule of prohibition extends to conveyances without consideration of money, as for friendship, kindness, and regard, etc., etc. And it is settled in Ex-parte Bennett, 10 Ves. 393, that, in order to set aside the sale, it is not necessary to show that the trustee has made any advantage. And see 1 Story's Eq. sec. 322. 197*] *The conduct of the executors having been a breach of trust, it is unnecessary to consider the distinction, if any really exists, be was not fraud in fact. The purchase is void, and will be set aside at the instance of the cestui que trust, and a resale ordered, on the ground of the temptation to abuse, and of the danger of imposition inaccessible to the eye of the court." Ibid. 557. It would be difficult in principle to recognize a distinction between Davoue v. Fanning and the case at bar. In that case a purchase was made per interposition personam for the wife of the executor; here a voluntary conveyance (by which is meant a conveyance without consideration) is taken to one executor for the benefit of the wife of another-that is, for the benefit of that other, and who himself procured the conveyance to be made. If Scarborough had taken the conveyance directly to himself, or through Taylor, the executor, for his own benefit, such a transaction [*198 could not stand. Will it be permitted to stand, his wife being the cestui que trust for life? [Mr. Holmes then argued that the marriage settlement, which was stated in the deed to be one of the considerations thereof, had been treated by all parties for a long time as a void instrument; and then proceeded to examine the doctrine of estoppel as applicable to the case.] If, then, for any of the reasons assignedduress, the relation of the parties, fraud actual or constructive-the deed of complainant cannot be upheld as a family compromise, between which and the present case there is not the 3. To an account of the rents and profits of the real estate from the executors of William Taylor, the trustee, and 4. To a settlement of the entire fund upon trustees for her separate use during life, and after her death to her children, or such other equitable settlement as the court may decree. Mr. Johnson, for the appellees, contended: 1. That, as it is now admitted that complainant was of age at the time the deed of 22d January, 1828, was executed by her to William Taylor, the character of the said deed takes it out of the principles by which, in certain cases, deeds are in equity considered void, because of the relations of the parties to the same. Pratt v. Barker, 1 Sim. 1; 2 Cond. Eng. Ch. 1; Hunter v. Atkyns, 8 Cond. Eng. Ch. 303, 313, 321; Tendril v. Smith, 2 Atk. 85; Manners v. Banning, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 282; Smith v. Low, 1 Atk. 490; Cory v. Cory, 1 Ves. Sen. 19; Brown v. Carter, 5 Ves. 876; Hotchkiss v. Dickson, 2 Bligh. 348; Tweddell v. Tweddell, 11 Cond. Eng. Ch. 1-8; Jenkins v. Pye, 12 Pet. 241, 253. as to her filial duties, and her rights to the property left her by her uncle; and of extreme urgency and harsh treatment on the part of her parents, to procure its execution; and of the hope, by a compliance with their importunities, of reconciling her parents to her marriage with her husband, which marriage they had thereto. fore opposed. The objection of non-age must be surrendered in this investigation, it being ascertained that the complainant was some few months over majority when the deed was executed. The other allegations, as resting upon the proofs in the cause, and upon the law as applicable to them, remain for consideration. The rules of law supposed to control the contracts of parties who do not stand upon a perfect equality, but who deal at a disadvan tage on the one side, whether applicable to the relations of parent and child, trustee, and cestui que trust, attorney and client, or principal and agent, have been laid down in various cases in the courts both of England and of our own country. To trace these rules to the several cases by which they have been propounded would be an undertaking rather of curiosity, than of necessity or usefulness here, as the extent to which this court has applied them, or is disposed to apply them in cases resembling the present, may be found within a familiar and direct range of inquiry. They are aptly exemplified by the late Justice Story, in his treatise on Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. I. sec. 307, where, speaking of frauds which "arise from some peculiar confidence or fiduciary relation between the parties," he re- [*200 marks: "In this class of cases there is often found some intermixture of deceit, imposition, II. That if the deed was at any time within such principle, the long acquiescence, with knowledge, derives the grantor of the right to avoid it on that ground. Peck v. Randall, 1 Johns. 165; Mooers v. White, 6 Johns. Ch. 372; 2 Story's Eq. 736; Elmendorff v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 168, 169, 171; Bank of United States v. Daniels, 12 Pet. 32; Foster v. Hodg-overreaching, unconscionable advantage, or son, 19 Ves. 185; Gregory v. Gregory, Coop. 201; Prevost v. Gratz, 6 Wheat. 497. III. That there is no evidence of duress in fact, or of undue influence, or of fraud; that the deed was in all respects a fair and proper deed, being supported by the consideration of love and affection; and if that of itself was not 199*] sufficient, it is valid *by reason of the marriage contract between the father and mother of the complainant, of the 18th April, 1805, which was omitted to be recorded in Georgia, where the property lay. Mr. Justice Daniel delivered the opinion of the court: The object of the complainant below (the appellant here), as disclosed in her bill, is to vacate the deed, executed on the 22d day of January, 1828, by her before her marriage, con veying to William Taylor in trust for the use of the mother of the grantor for life (exempt from the debts of her father), and after the death of her father and mother, for the use in equal portions of the said grantor, and of her brothers and sisters, all the property real and personal which was given to the said grantor by the will of her uncle Robert Isaac, whose will is made an exhibit in the cause and referred to in the deed. The grounds on which this deed is impeached are the following: "That it was founded on no real consideration; was executed during the non-age of the complainant, and whilst she was living in the family of her parents; that it was extorted from her by false representations, both other mark of direct and positive fraud. But the principle on which courts of equity act in regard thereto stands independent of any such ingredients, upon a motive of public policy; and it is designed in some degree as a protec tion to the parties against the effects of overweening confidence and self-delusion, and the infirmities of hasty and precipitate judgment. These courts will therefore often interfere in such cases, where, but for such peculiar rela tions, they would wholly abstain from granting relief, or grant it in a very modified and ab stemious manner." He proceeds (sec. 308): "It is undoubtedly true, that it is not upon the feelings which a delicate and honorable man must experience, nor upon any notion of dis cretion, to prevent a voluntary gift or other act of a man whereby he strips himself of his property, that courts of equity have deemed themselves at liberty to interpose in cases of this sort. They do not sit, nor affect to sit, in judgment upon cases as custodes morum, en forcing the strictest rules of morality. But they do sit to enforce what has not inaptly been called a technical morality. If confidence is reposed, it must be faithfully acted upon, and preserved from any intermixture of imposi tion. If influence is acquired, it must be kept free from the taint of selfish interests, and cunning, and overreaching bargains. If the means of personal control are given, they must be always restrained to purposes of good faith and personal good. Courts of equity will not, therefore, arrest or set aside an act or contract, merely because a man of more honor would not have entered into it. There must be some relation between the parties which compels the one to make a full discovery to the other, or to abstain from all selfish projects. But when such a relation does exist, courts of equity, acting upon this superinduced ground, in aid of general morals, will not suffer one party, standing in a situation of which he can avail himself against the other, to derive advantage from that circumstance." Applying the principles thus annunciated and drawn from an extensive collection of the English cases to the relation of parent and child, and to transactions occurring in that relation, the same author remarks (sec. 309): "The natural and just influence which a parent has over a child renders it peculiarly important for courts of justice to watch over and protect the interests of the latter; and therefore all contracts and conveyances, whereby benefits are secured by children to their parents, are objects of jealousy, and if they are not entered into with scrupulous good faith, and are not reasonable 201] under the circumstances, they will be set aside, unless third persons have acquired an interest under them." the just interpretation of the English decisions relied on, but declare that all the leading cases they have examined are accompanied with some ingredient showing undue influence exercised by the parent, operating upon the fears or hopes of the child; and showing reasonable grounds to presume that the act was not perfectly free and voluntary on the part of the child. But the court, whilst they deny that a deed from a child to a parent should prima facie be held absolutely void, as unequivocally declare that "it is undoubtedly the [*202 duty of courts of equity carefully to watch and examine the circumstances attending transactions of this kind, when brought under review before them, to discover if any undue influence has been exercised in obtaining the conveyance." Between the doctrine here ruled and the principles stated by Justices Story and Washington, no difference, much less any contradiction, can be perceived. For why this watchfulness, thus enjoined as a duty, this severe and peculiar scrutiny as applicable to contracts between parent and child, but that they are justly "objects of jealousy," rendered so by the relation of the contracting parties-a relation aptly and naturally productive of powerful influence on the one hand, and of submission on the othersubjecting such transactions to presumptions never attaching a priori to contracts between parties standing upon a perfect equality. And now let the character of the contract under consideration, and of the circumstances surrounding the execution of that contract, be subjected to the test rationally and justly imposed by the rules above stated. Thus The same principle has been clearly put by Justice Washington, in the case of Slocum and Wife v. Marshal, 2 Wash. C. C. 400, where, in stating that case, he remarks: "The grantor, a young lady who from her birth had not but on one occasion left the roof of her fatherbound to him by the strong ties of filial affection-accustomed to repose in his advice and opinion the most unbounded confidence, and to consider his request ever as equivalent to a command-is informed by him that a certain This is a contract between parent and child, portion of her property had been conveyed to operating by its terms exclusively for the benehim by her mother, but that the same, from fit of the former, and to the prejudice of the some legal objection, had failed to take effect. latter; for it transferred from her a valuable She is then requested to confirm this title, and interest, by the very terms of the transaction at the same time is assured by her father, that admitted to be legally and absolutely hers, and his design in obtaining this confirmation is to by the same terms transferred it without the promote her interest as well as his own. She shadow of an equivalent received or proffered; reflects upon the proposal, and, influenced by and for which, the testimony conclusively the double motive of promoting her own in-shows, none could possibly be given. terests and that of her father, and of fulfilling | far the provisions of the contract. the intentions of her dead mother, she makes With regard to the circumstances attending the conveyance." He proceeds: "A transac- and surrounding its execution. It is shown tion attended by such circumstances will natur-that the grantor in this deed, though of age, ally excite the suspicions of a court of equ-had little more than attained to majority; that ity." It has been insisted that, for the prin- she was living in the house with her parentsciples just stated, the sanction of this court cannot be avouched; but that, on the contrary, they have been weakened, if not rejected, by the doctrines ruled in the case of Jenkins v. Pye, 12 Peters, 241. The peculiar features of the last named case, which may in some respects distinguish it from the one now under consideration, and be thought to bring it less obviously within the principles above stated, need not be pointed out; but we inquire what are in truth the doctrines ruled in the case in 12 Peters; and whether they are not substan-ly creates, by commercial reverses been brought tially, nay literally, those propounded by Justices Story and Washington. In the case of Jenkins v. Pye, this court refuse to adopt the rule which they said had in the argument been assumed as the doctrine of the English Chancery, viz., that a deed from a child to a parent should, upon considerations of public policy arising from the relation of the parties, be deemed void. They deny, indeed. that this is her only home; and may fairly be presumed to have been liable to the influence of feelings and habits which, in the absence of contravening evidence, would control the depositions and conduct of a youthful female thus situated. She might be moulded to almost anything, in compliance with the earnest wishes (with her habitually yielded to as commands) of her parents. Those parents, who once had lived in affluence and luxury, had, with all the habits and necessities which such a condition natural to indigence; from the date of the purchase by Robert Isaac of the property in dispute, had been permitted by him to occupy and enjoy it. In fact, it was apparently their only means of shelter or support. In this state of the family Robert Isaac by his will bestowed the whole of this property upon the complainant; and it has been argued that, with her knowledge [*203 of the situation of her parents, the impulses of filial duty and affection might of themselves | impart to the above allegations a force equal, if have formed a sufficient groundwork for the not surpassing, that which an explicit narrative complainant's conveyance. However hazard-by witnesses could give them. And here it is ous it might be to prescribe, as a rule of right worthy of remark, that the will of Robert Isaac or of property, imperfect obligations which the contains no expression nor hint of a desire, or law does not originally enforce, this argument intention, that the property should go accordcan be deemed satisfactory in instances only in ing to the supposition assumed; or according to which the motives supposed to enter into such the provisions of the deed subsequently exeobligations are shown to have been free and cuted. This circumstance alone should be one unconstrained in their operation. In the pres- of controlling influence, even if the testator ent instance, too, independently of the influ- could be regarded as a person of a capacity ences which will be shown to have been and character of the most inferior grade. But brought to bear upon the transaction, it is none can fail to perceive, from the proofs in thought that the injunctions of filial duty and this cause, that the testator was a man of inaffection would have demanded something less telligence and sagacity, extensively practiced in than the surrender of all possessed by the the business of life. He strongly declares his grantor; and would have been satisfied with a affection for his niece, and as clearly gives to concession, as to which there probably would her, and to her only, the property in dispute. never have existed a difficulty-one, indeed, What room is here for assuming, that others, that seems to have been assented to in practice and not this niece, were the chief objects of his -the occupation and enjoyment of the prop- bounty? Such an assumption is forbidden by erty during their lives, by the parents of the every rule of law, or of common sense; it goes grantor. Nay, it would seem that proper par- very far, of itself, to stamp with fraud and conental tenderness, and solicitude for the welfare trivance the means resorted to in order to diof the child, or the true principles of rectitude vert that bounty to other ends. and fairness, would have permitted nothing We will next consider the letter (Exhibit A, beyond this. And in the estimate of motives filed with the answer of Goodwin) addressed by which may have led to the transaction under the complainant, then Charlotte Scarborough, review, it should not be without weight, that to her father; concocted, as is alleged by the this same filial duty and affection, however complainant, between her parents, as preparcommendable in themselves, and however their atory and introductory to the wrong about to spontaneous action may be recognized and bind- be consummated; in which letter she professes ing, strengthen the probability of their being her readiness and her desire to settle the propconverted into means of wrong and oppres-erty derived from her uncle to the use of her sion; and this very probability it is which chal-parents for their lives, and after their deaths to lenges the duty of watchfulness and jealousy in the courts, in scanning the transactions of those whose peculiar situation exposes them to danger from such means. Immediately after the death of Robert Isaac, it seems that the various appliances designed to withdraw from the complainant the fruits of the bounty of her affectionate uncle were put into strikingly active operation. Directly following the death of Isaac, it is charged in the bill, came the urgency of the complainant's family, and their reproaches against her for | having intercepted, as they said, the bounty which but for her would have flowed to the family; and for having dictated to her uncle the disposition of his property; thereby having ruined their prospects, and broken the heart of complainant's father. The natural effects of such appeals upon the feelings of an affectionate and sensitive girl, or even upon a spirit awake to the impulses of pride alone, can easily be comprehended. Then, as is alleged, was the reluctance of the complainant to despoil herself of her property ascribed to the avarice 204*] of her intended husband; and then, too, amidst her perplexity and distress, upon consultation between both her parents, was suggested to her the device of a letter from her, declaring her belief of the wish of the testator, Isaac, to bestow the property for the benefit of the family; and asking the consent of the father of the complainant to a settlement of the property in conformity with such a wish. Although these allegations are not supported by direct statements of witnesses, yet the intrinsic evidence flowing from other conduct of the parties to these transactions, and that presented by the written documents in this cause, the use of all the children equally. The will of Robert Isaac was admitted to probate on the 9th day of January, 1828, and amongst the persons who qualified as executors of that will, were William Scarborough, the father of the complainant, and William Taylor, the trustee in the deed now sought to be vacated. These men, the depositaries of the solemn trust reposed in them by Isaac-fully capable of comprehending his will, and one of them sustaining the further obligation of a parent to protect the interests of this young woman-make [*205 themselves the ready instruments to betray this confidence, and this in violation of the clearest language in which their duty could possibly have been prescribed. How far this conduct can be excused or palliated under the pretext of duty to Mrs. Scarborough, founded on the alleged marriage contract, or on any supposed intention of Isaac flowing from the same source, will hereafter, be shown in the conduct of Scarborough and Taylor in reference to this very property, when dealing with it for their own personal advantage. This conduct will furnish a most efficient clew in unraveling the texture of the deed in question. On the 10th of January, 1828, the day sueceeding the probate of the will of Robert Isaac, was written the letter above mentioned from Charlotte Scarborough to her father. It seems impossible to resist the evidence furnished by this singular production, that it was a fabrication, designed to conceal the very facts and circumstances which it palpably betrays. In the first place, it may be inquired why such a letter should be written, and whether it would be usual or probable in a transaction between persons thus situated, if dictated solely by an |