λαμβάνειν, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τῶν περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἠθῶν καὶ νομίμων διὰ τίνων τε καὶ πῶς εὐπορήσομεν... εἴρηται (1366a 17).

I may remark that the same language is used by Aristotle elsewhere, in Pol. VIII. 1, 1337* 14 (τὸ ἦθος τῆς πολιτείας ἑκάστης), as also by Demosthenes, 3. 25 (ἐν τῷ τῆς πολιτείας ἤθει μένοντες), and Plato, Rep. 549 A (τὸ ἦθος ἐκείνης τῆς πολιτείας). It seems to me, therefore, that throughout this chapter of the Rhetoric Aristotle must be thinking not of the eOn or consuetudines of each kind of polity, but of its eos, its indoles or, as we say, its 'character.'

Rhet. I. 9, 1366 36 : (καλὰ) καὶ ὅσα μὴ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα πράττει τις τῶν αἱρετῶν, καὶ τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά—ὅσα ὑπέρ τε πατρίδος τις ἐποίησεν παριδὼν τὸ αὑτοῦ, καὶ τὰ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθά—καὶ ἃ μὴ αὐτῷ ἀγαθά· αὑτοῦ γὰρ ἕνεκα τὰ τοιαῦτα.

I have deviated here to some slight extent from Roemer's punctuation, in order to make it clear that καὶ ἃ μὴ αὐτῷ ἀγαθά is the negative complement of τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά. Instead of ὑπέρ τε πατρίδος Roemer reads ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος, which must be admitted to be an extremely plausible correction, as πατρίς is a word which in a connexion like this may very well take the article. As an alternative, however, it has occurred to me that the Te after vπép may be simply misplaced, and that it would be better perhaps to read: ὅσα τε ὑπὲρ πατρίδος. With this reading the form of the statement will be just like that of a passage a little earlier in the chapter: ἀνάγκη ὅσα τε ἀνδρίας ἔργα ἢ σημεῖα ἀνδρίας ἢ ἀνδρείως πέπρακται καλὰ εἶναι, καὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ δικαίως ἔργα (1366b 29).

Rhet. I. 11, 1371* 21: καὶ τὸ θαυμάζεσθαι ἡδὺ δι' αὐτὸ τὸ τιμᾶσθαι.

Read: διὰ <τὸ> αὐτὸ τῷ τιμᾶσθαι, just as in Rhet. I. 7, 1365" 17 we have διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τῇ διαιρέσει.

Rhet. II. 2, 1378 23: ἔστι γὰρ ὕβρις τὸ βλάπτειν καὶ λυπεῖν ἐφ ̓ οἷς αἰσχύνη ἐστὶ τῷ πάσχοντι, μὴ ἵνα τι γένηται αὐτῷ ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι ἐγένετο, ἀλλ ̓ ὅπως ἡσθῇ.

Read : αὑτῷ, as the word refers back to the implied subject of βλάπτειν καὶ λυπεῖν.

Rhet. II. 6, 1383 28: καὶ δανείζεσθαι ὅτε δόξει αἰτεῖν, καὶ αἰτεῖν ὅτε ἀπαιτεῖν, καὶ ἀπαιτεῖν ὅτε αἰτεῖν, καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἵνα δόξῃ αὐτεῖν.

This is part of Aristotle's long enumeration of the things which are αἰσχρά, and therefore apt to produce a feeling of shame. ἵνα δόξῃ, as I learn from Roemer's note, has been questioned by Thurot; but the correction proposed by Thurot is to my mind too great a departure from the tradition. I would suggest ἃ δόξει, comparing the ὅτε δόξει ἀπαιτεῖν for this use of the future. The reading in the MSS. may have arisen from a very obvious kind of dittographia (ἐπαινεΙΝ INa, = ἐπαινεΙΝ &).

Rhet. II. 23, 1398 25: ὥσπερ τὸ [?] εἰς Μιξιδημίδην εἶπεν Αὐτοκλῆς, εἰ ταῖς μὲν σεμναῖς θεαῖς ἱκανῶς εἶχεν ἐν ̓Αρείῳ πάγῳ δοῦναι δίκην, Μιξιδημίδῃ δ ̓ οὔ.

Most, if not all, of the editions before Bekker's read this interrogatively (Μιξιδημίδῃ δ' οὔ;).

Rhet. II. 23, 1399 15: εἰ φεύγοντες μὲν ἐμαχόμεθα ὅπως κατέλθωμεν, κατελθόντες δὲ φευξόμεθα ὅπως μὴ μαχώμεθα.

This also is marked in the old editions as a question (μαχώμεθα;). In a passage in Dionysius Hal. (r. p. 52 Usener and Radermacher) the saying is quoted (from Lysias) in a somewhat different form: δεινὸν γὰρ ἂν εἴη, ὦ < ἄνδρες> ̓Αθηναῖοι, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν ἐφεύγομεν, ἐμαχόμεθα Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἵνα κατέλθωμεν, κατελθόντες δὲ φευξόμεθα, ἵνα μὴ μαχώμεθα. Aristotle may be speaking from memory; but the sense of the two quotations will hardly be the same, unless we read that in Aristotle as a question.

Rhet. III. 11, 1412 34: ὥσπερ ἡ ἀνάλογον μεταφορά· οἷον ἡ ἀσπίς, φαμέν, ἐστὶ φιάλη ̓́Αρεως, καὶ τόξον φόρμιγξ ἄχορδος. Perhaps: καὶ <τὸ> τόξον.

Fragm. 142 (Teubner): διὰ τί ὁ ̓Αγαμέμνων ἀποπειρᾶται τῶν ̓Αχαιῶν; καὶ οὕτως ἔπραξεν ὥστε ὀλίγου τὰ ἐναντία

συμβῆναι ἡ ἐβουλεύετο, καὶ τὸ κώλυμα ἀπὸ μηχανῆς· ἡ γὰρ ̓Αθηνᾶ ἐκώλυσεν. ἔστι δὲ ἀποίητον τὸ μηχάνημα λύειν ἄλλως εἰ μὴ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ μύθου. φησὶ δ ̓ ὁ ̓Αριστοτέλης ποιητικὸν μὲν εἶναι τὸ μιμεῖσθαι τὰ εἰωθότα γίνεσθαι, καὶ ποιητῶν μᾶλλον τὸ κινδύνους παρεισάγειν.

This stands at the beginning of a long note of Porphyry's on Il. II. 73 in Schol. Ven. Β (= Porphyr. Q. Η. ad Iliadem, p. 24 Schrader). The note begins with the objections of the critics: (1) the device of Agamemnon, his temptation of the army to flight, is said to have involved too great a risk; and (2) the solution of the difficulty in the Homeric story is said to be inartistic, because it requires a miracle, the intervention of Athene. The Aristotelian part of the answer to these objections is supposed by both Heitz and Rose (comp. Aristot. Pseudep. p. 155) to end with κινδύνους παρεισάγειν—the rest of the answer (εἰκὸς δὲ καὶ ἐκ λοιμοῦ πεπονημένους καὶ τῷ μήκει τοῦ χρόνου ἀπαυδήσαντας...μὴ εὐθὺς παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἔξοδον, ἀλλὰ πειραθῆναι ἡγήσασθαι δεῖν εἰ οὕτως ἔχουσιν κτέ.) being supposed to be Porphyry's. It seems to me that, whatever liberties Porphyry may have taken with Aristotle's actual language, a statement very like that which follows the above extract (εἰκὸς δὲ κτέ) must have been added by Aristotle himself. How else can we account for his saying ποιητικὸν μὲν εἶναι κτέ, it is no doubt the artistic thing to represent only a certain kind of incident, unless he intended to balance this by a counter consideration such as we have in the sentence beginning with εἰκὸς δέ in the context? In the Greek of the above extract one or two small emendations seem to be required by the sense. (1) Instead of ἀποίητον τὸ μηχάνημα λύειν, we should perhaps restore: ἀποίητον μηχάνημα τὸ λύειν, and translate it thus: 'It is an inartistic device to bring about a dénonment (λύειν; comp. Poet. 18, 1456* 10) by means outside the story itself. (2) ποιητῶν has been questioned by Schrader, who suggests ποιητέων as an alternative. My own suspicion is that καὶ ποιητῶν represents κἀποίητον—ἀποίητον being the natural opposite of ποιητικόν; so that the sense of the clause as amended will be: it is inartistic to introduce hazardous situations.' The objection of the critics was that

Agamemnon, on the occasion described by Homer in Il. II. 73 sqq., was running too great a risk-ouтws πρаžev σте ὀλίγου τὰ ἐναντία συμβῆναι ἡ ἐβουλεύετο. Aristotle, while admitting the general validity of the principle underlying the objection, points out that there were in this instance circumstances which made the act of Agamemnon not so unreasonable as it might seem.

I. BYWATER.

THE TEXT OF THE HEBREW BIBLE IN

ABBREVIATIONS.

(Read before the Oriental Congress at Rome in 1899.)

The fact that not only are all the post-Biblical writings replete with abbreviations but that they are to be found on the Maccabean coins would of itself be sufficient evidence that they were used in Biblical Manuscripts of the pre-Christian era. We are however not confined to this inference alone. The testimony of the Septuagint establishes it beyond the shadow of a doubt. From a number of passages which exhibit discrepancies between the present Hebrew text and this Greek Version it is perfectly evident that the translators of the Septuagint had before them a Hebrew original in which half words and even single letters were used as abbreviations.

In illustration of this fact I will simply adduce here a few of the examples which I have given elsewhere.

In Gen. xlvii. 3 the quadriliteral which is in the textus receptus one word and is taken to denote his brethren was read by the Septuagint translators as an abbreviation of two words, viz.-"="" the brethren of Joseph, and this reading is attested by the Samaritan recension, the so-called Jonathan Targum and the Syriac. The same abbreviation occurs also in 2 Sam. iii. 27 where the received text reads it as one word, and where the Septuagint resolves it into two words viz. the brother of Joab.

In Levit. vi. 10 the quadriliteral WD which the received text reads as one word of my offerings, the Septuagint