Italy and the army which had conquered under him and which adored him: he assured us that] nothing could be more unfounded than the conjecture, that Bonaparte had for more than ten days left Italy for Rastadt, to preside over the congress which was formed for adjusting the affairs of the empire. He said that Pitt himself was so confident of the absolute necessity of peace, that after the naval victory over the Dutch, he had signified his readiness to treat on the same terms which he had offered before that action: we could not then rely on the assistance of England. What, he asked, would be our situation if peace should be made with England before our difference with France would be accommodated? But, he continued, if even England should be able to continue the war, and America should unite with her, it would not be in our power to injure France. We might, indeed, wound her ally; but if we did it would be so much the worse for us. After having stated the dangers attending us, if we should engage in the war, he proceeded to the advantages we might derive from a neutral situation: and insisted at large on the wealth which would naturally flow into our country from the destruction of England. He next proceeded to detail the propositions which are in substance in the paper annexed, marked (A.) except that he insisted that. we should engage to use our influence with our government for the loan. He stated expressly, that the propositions were to be considered as made by us; that M. Talleyrand would not be responsible for the success of any one of them; he would only undertake to use his influence with the Directory in support of them. The proposition, he said, concerning a suspension of hostilities on the part of France, was one which proceeded entirely from himself; M. Talleyrand had not been consulted upon it; and he could not undertake to say, that that gentleman would consent even to lay it before the Directory. The proposition for an advance to the government of France of as inuch money as was due from it to our citizens on contract, and as might be determined to be due for vessels improperly captured and condemned, was, he said, indispensable: unless we made that it was unnecessary to make any other; for the others would not be received. He expatiated on the vast advantages we should derive from delay; it was, he said, absolutely to gain our cause. He returned to the danger of our situation and the policy of mak-` ing with France any accommodation which France would assent to. “ Perhaps," said he, "you believe that in returning "and exposing to your countrymen the unreasonableness of

H 4

"the

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"the demands of this government, you will unite them in "their resistance to those demands: you are mistaken: you ought to know that the diplomatic skill of France and "the means she possesses in your country, are sufficient to "enable her, with the French party in America, to throw "the blame which will attend the rupture of the negotiations

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on the Federalists," as you term yourselves, but on the British party, as France terms you; and you may assure yourselves this will be done. He concluded with declarations. of being perfectly disinterested; and declared that his only motives for speaking thus freely were his friendship for M. Talleyrand, and his wish to promote the interests and peace of the United States. We told him that the freedom with which he had spoken, and which was agreeable to us, would induce us to speak freely also; and for once to accompany our view of the present state of things with a retrospect of the past that America was the only nation upon earth which felt and had exhibited a real friendship for the Republic of France: that among the empires round her, which were compelled to bend beneath her power and to obey her commands, there was not one which had voluntarily acknowledged her government, or manifested for it, spontaneously, any mark of regard: America alone had stepped forward and given the most unequivocal proofs of a pure and sincere friendship, at a time when almost the whole European world, when Austria, Germany, Prussia, Russia, Spain, Sardinia, Holland, and Britain, were leagued against France: when her situation was in truth hazardous, and it was dangerous to hold even friendly intercourse with her, America alone stood forward, and openly and boldly avowed her enthusiasm in favour of the Republic, and her deep and sincere interest in its fate. From that time to the present, the government and people of the United States have uniformly manifested a sincere and ardent friendship for France, and have, as they conceive, in no single instance given to this Republic just cause of umbrage: if they have done so, they wish it to be pointed out to them. After the determination of France to break off all regular intercourse with them, they have sent three Envoys Extraordinary to endeavour to make such explanations as might produce reconciliation: these envoys are prepared to investigate, and wish to investigate any measures which may have given offence; and are persuaded that they can entirely justify the conduct of their government. To this distant, unoffending, friendly Republic, what is the conduct and the language of Fiance? Wherever

Wherever our property can be found she seizes and takes it from us; unprovoked, she determines to treat us as enemies, and our making no resistance produces no diminution of hostility against us; she abuses and insults our govern ment, endeavours to weaken it in the estimation of the people, recalls her own minister, refuses to receive ours, and when extraordinary means are taken to make such explanations as may do away misunderstandings, and such alterations in the existing relations of the two countries as may be mutually satisfactory and may tend to produce harmony, the Envoys who bear these powers are not received; they are not permitted to utter the amicable wishes of their country; but, in the haughty style of a master, they are told that unless they will pay a sum to which their resources scarcely extend, that they may expect the vengeance of France, and like Venice be erased from the list of nations; that France will annihilate the only free Republic upon earth, and the only nation in the universe, which has voluntarily manifested for her a cordial and real friendship! What impression must this make on the mind of America, if without provocation France was determined to make war upon us, unless we purchased peace? We could not easily believe, that even our money would save us: our independence would never cease to give offence, and would always furnish a pretext for fresh demands. On the advantages of neutrality, it was unnecessary to say any thing: all the efforts of our government were exerted to maintain it; and we would never willingly part with it. With respect to a political connexion with Britain, we told him that America had never contemplated it. Whether the danger he represented that government to be in was or was not real, we should not undertake to decide: Britain we believed had much reason to wish for peace; and France had much reason to wish for peace also: if peace already existed, it would not change the course America would pursue. M. Y. manifested the most excessive impatience: he interrupted us and said, This eloquent dissertation might be true: America might have manifested, and he believed had manifested great friendship for France, and had just complaints against her; but he did not come to listen to those complaints. The Minister would, on our request, make for us certain propositions to the Directory; he had stated them to us; and all the answer he wished was, yes, or no; did we or did we not solicit the Minister to make the propositions for us? We told him, that without going further into the discussion, we choose to remark one or two things: they were, that the existing treaties gave

to

to France certain advantages which were very essential; that especially the American coast afforded a protection near two thousand miles in extent to the prizes made by France on her enemies, and refused that protection to the prizes taken from her; that she might be assured, that in case of war, these advantages would be lost for ever. We also told him, we were convinced that France miscalculated on the parties in America that the extreme injustice offered to our country, would unite every man against her. M. X. informed us, that M. Talleyrand would not consent even to lay this proposition before the Directory, without previously receiving the fifty thousand pounds, or the greater part of it. M. Y. left in writing, his propositions, and we returned the answer annexed and marked (B.)

November 1st.

It was at length agreed, that we would hold no more indirect intercourse with the government.

November 3d.

M. X. called on us, and told General Pinckney and General Marshall, (Mr. Gerry not being within) that M. Y. wished once more to see us. We answered, that we should at any time be glad to see M. Y. as a private gentleman: but that if his object was only to repeat his propositions for money, it was perfectly unnecessary to do so; because, on that subject, it was impossible for us to change the answer we had already given. We told him further, that we considered it as degrading our country, to carry on further, such an indirect intercourse as we had for some time submitted to, and had determined to receive no propositions, unless the persons who bore them had acknowledged authority to treat with us. He said, that perhaps M. Y. might have written powers from the Minister; and, we replied, that if he had, we should receive his communications with pleasure. He spoke of a probable peace with England, and, having requested us to be at home in the afternoon, left us.

About three o'clock he came, and, after some conversation, in which we repeated in substance, what is stated above, he shewed us a paper, which he said was a copy of a letter prepared for us, by M. Talleyrand, requesting an explanation of part of the President's speech, and which he said, would be sent, unless we came into the propositions which had been made us. We wished to take a copy of it, which he declined permitting, saying, he was forbidden to allow it. We spoke of the letter coming to us as a measure we had no expectation of preventing; and he said, he could not under

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stand that we wished it delayed. To which we answered, that the delay of a few days could not be desired, unless a hope existed, that the Directory might become more friendly to our country. He said, that intelligence had been received from the United States, that if Colonel Burr and Mr. Madison had constituted the mission, the differences between the two nations, would have been accommodated before this time, He added, as a fact, he was not instructed to communicate, that M. Talleyrand was preparing a memorial to be sent out to the United States, complaining of us as being unfriendly to an accommodation with France. We replied to his intelligence from the United States, that the Minister's correspondents in America, took a good deal on themselves, when they undertook to say, how the Directory would have received Colonel Burr and Mr. Madison; and that with respect to the memorial of M. Talleyrand, it would not be easy for him to convince our countrymen, that the statements we should make, were untrue: if, however, we were confident that our conduct would be condemned, M. Talleyrand might be assured, that the fear of censure would not induce us to deserve it but that we should act in a manner which our own judgments and consciences would approve of; and, we trusted, we should be supported by the great body of candid and honest men. In this conversation, we again stated, that America had taken a neutral position; that she had faithfully sought to preserve it; that a loan of money to one of the belligerent powers, was directly to take part in the war; and that to take part in the war, against her own judgment and will, under the coercion of France, was to surrender our independence.

EXHIBIT A.-[Enclosed in the Envoy's Letter of
November 8th, 1797. No.2.]

I. The American Envoys shall remain here for six months, in the same manner, and upon the same footing, with regard to etiquette, as did M. d'Aranjo, the envoy of Portugal.

II. There shall be named a commission of five members, agreeably to a form to be established, for the purpose of deciding upon the reclamations of the Americans, relative to the prizes made on them by the French privateers.

III. The American Envoys will engage, that their government shall pay the indemnifications, or the amount of the sums already decreed to the American creditors of the French Republic, and those which shall be adjudged to the claimants

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