which requires, if it does not exceed, the greateft abilities. Thus much, however, may be eftablished as certain; it is better that many things thould be concealed which might be communicated, than that even a few thould be communicated which ought to be withheld. It is abfolutely neceffary to take every precaution against this dangerous class of men. The eloquence of a writer is as powerful as that of an orator, is more extenfive in its effects, and full as likely to be made an engine to introduce defpotifm into the bofom of liberty.' The 5th chapter of this work treats of luxury; by which term the author means that exceflive appetite for enjoyment of any kind, mental or corporeal, active or paffive, which leads a man to neglect his duties, and to injure himself or others, in order to obtain the object of his defire. Mr. M. unequivocally denies that luxury, which is a vice in those who are addicted to it, is productive of good to others; and-hear it, ye financiers, who look to luxury for the chief fource of revenue; hear it, ye manufacturers, who are engaged in thofe branches by which luxury is fed, and the kingdom, it is faid, is enriched he maintains that no national advantage whatever can jufly be afcribed to luxury. Chapter VI. contains a differtation on the law of Primogeniture; which Mr. M. feems to confider as unjuft, but which he would not venture to abolith, because he thinks the abolition would be attended with fome collateral injurious circumftances, more than counterbalancing the good that might be expected from it. An equal right of inheritance would tend, in his opinion, to fupport that natural nobleffe, without which all legal inftitutions would foon be abolished or become nugatory; more members of opulent families would marry, and fewer families would become extin&t.' He then proceeds to fhew that the accumulation of landed property might arrive at a moft pernicious excefs, without the operation of the law of primogeniture. To abolish this law (fays he,) would not therefore enfure the removal of the evil, while the most preponderating genius could not pretend to foresee the probable confequences of a fudden and violent abrogation of a custom that has grown with our growth, and ftrengthened with our ftrength, and actually pervades, like a vital principle, the whole fyftem of our jurifprudence, legiflation, and manners In chapter VII. Mr. M. enters at large into the difcuffion of the much agitated quefiion, which ought moft to be encouraged, great or fmall farms?" and on this fubject he difplays much knowledge and ability: but we cannot pretend to give a fummary of his different arguments, the matter branching out into a great variety of collateral confiderations, such as poor's rates, new inclofures, &c. In the agitation of this important question, he has principally in his eye Mr. Arthur Young's Syftem of Agriculture, which he in many inftances ftrongly condemns. Chapter VIII. treats of the Game laws. However they might have been originally introduced, Mr. M. is of opinion that in fome countries in Europe they are oppreflive, and perhaps abfurd in 1 England; England: but he does not allow, with modern reformers, that every one thould have a right to kill game wherever he can find it' After all, Mr. M. recommends a material alteration in the whole fyftem of game laws, and thinks it would be better for the public that game should be made private pro perty. From game the author proceeds to the confideration of the tithe laws. He pronounces the opinion to be ill founded, which ftates tithes to be a heavy burthen on the farmer; whofe fituation would, according to him, be precifely the fame, whether a tenth, a fifth, or a twentieth of the produce of the land were levied for the fupport of the clergy. He contend that this tax falls folely on the landlord who is obliged to let his land proportionably lower on account of the tithes.-he how. ever, admits the tax to be impolitic, for this plain reafon, that it is a continually varying one, on the produce of kill and labour, and on the uncertain bounty of nature; and confequently that it is always galling and vexatious. infinitely greater diftance than with it, between the rich and the poor; he infifts that populatiou is increased by an inflitution which contributes to render marriages more frequent in the higher claffes of fociety, becaufe, wherever birth, without, any other recommendation, is a pafiport into fociety, celibacy will be lefs frequent; that it checks the rage of appearance, the vanity of fhew, and removes one great temptation to expence, the chief caufe of venality; that it brings forwards to public life that defcription of men by whom the nation has the beft chance of being ferved; that it renders manners more amiable and fociable; and finally, that almost all the objections, which are urged against the inftitution of nobility, may be equally if not more juftly urged against wealth; the abolition of which would convulse and defiroy fociety. The difcuffion of this fubje&t, together with that of the form of government, is carried on through the first five chapters of the fecond book, and branches out into a very long, interefting, and ingenious differtation refpecting a flanding army; for which Mr. M is a firenuous advocate. He does not argue for a ftanding army as a mere machine of government, calculated Chapter I. of Book II. opens with the important queftions, whether there ought to be allowed, in a tiate, a distinction of orders among its citizens; and which form of go-to enable the crown to enforce vernment is preferable, a monar chical or a republican. For his arguments on thefe topics we muft refer to the chapter itself, which contains much found fenfe and able reafoning. We thall content ourfelves with ftating that he is decidedly for the existence of a body of nobility; without which, he maintains, there would be an measures dangerous to or incom patible with a free conftitution,-but, for a standing army modelled on principles that would make it a guardian and firm fupport of the constitutional liberty of the subject; a body fo organized and officered as that, though the crown might at all times look for its co-operation in all conftitutional pursuits, elective, and to what in a monarchy the prince, in a republic the fenate, fhould nominate.' ît would be the last part of the community from which the government would dare to afk for or expect affiftance, when the fervice, The queftion of fuffrage natuin which it was to be employed rally leads to that of r prefentation. would be attended with injury or The author gives an hiftorical aceven danger to the liberty of the count of the manner in which it country. was introduced into our conftitution, and then obferves that the idea of it became at last fo cherished by the people, that reprefentation was with them a fynonimous term for liberty; fo that those who were not reprefented were confidered as not free. Mr. M. infifts that this opinion is founded in error; or that it must be admitted that women, minors, and foreigners, refiding among us are flaves; for they are not reprefented by any one deputed by them to appear and act for them. Mr. Michell fuggefts feveral improvements refpecting the age at which gentlemen fhould be allowed to fit in parliament. At 21 he thinks a man cannot be properly qualified for the important duties of a legiflator; and therefore he is of opinion that he ought not to be eligible by law for a feat in the legillature, before he has attained the age of 30 years. In chapter VI. Mr M. fpeaks of the qualification of electors; and, inftead of extending the right of fuffrage to every male of the age of 21, he contends moft ftrenuoufly for withholding it from all thofe who poffefs not fixed property, but who are altogether dependent for their fubfiftence on the wages of their daily labour; and he maintains that, without this restriction, it is impoffible that the conftitution fhould be fecure. Mr. M. would disfranchife only the populace, and would communicate the right of voting to all above that clafs, with the double view of preventing an ariftrocratic tyranny, and fpreading as widely as poflible an intereft in the public welfare. To mark the line of difcrimination is the bufinefs, (fays he,) of a legiflator occupied in framing a particular conftitution, and must he adapted to the manners of each particular people. It belongs to him alfo to afcertain what are the offices which may be rendered He concludes the chapter with fome very handfome compliments to the British Houfe of Commons; from which, he fays, conftituted as it always has been, the nation has derived great happiness, wealth and glory. The VIth chapter treats of a monarchical and a republican form of government, and gives to the former a decided preference. In chapter VIII. he treats of the nature and extent of power that ought to be trufted to the king. He remarks that, if a fovereign does not poffefs fufficient legal power to enforce a vigorous and effective government, he must obtain it through influence, or anarchy will enfue. In chapter IX. he inveftigates the origin, progrefs, and decay of abfolute power in France; and this difcuflion leads him to fearch for the foundation of British free dom, dom, and the caufes of the real danger that threatens our conftitution. In the beginning of the Xth and laft chapter our author is impartial enough to acknowledge that, though the British conftitution be in its nature calculated to preferve the fabric of liberty in this country, it does not follow that any other ftate would to a certainty a&t wifely in adopting it. The bleffing of freedom, (he fays,) depends chiefly on the manners of a people; its existence therefore is compatible with almost every form of government; and perhaps it will be found that every community, far advanced in civilization, or long eftablished, contains within itfelf fuch remnants of paft, or fuch feeds of future freedom, in cuftoms and prejudices, which have crept in by degrees, that an enlightened patriotic legiflator will always adopt the maxim of Tacitus-the fecret of fitting up a new ftate confifts in retaining the image of the old. Obferving, next, that the British parliament is the only fenate that ever was able to reftrain the power of kings, without annihilating monarchy, and to effect this reftraint without tumult or violence, he fays, it is worth while to difcover, if poffible, what in reality are thofe peculiarities in its conftruction, to which we ought to afcribe its peculiar excellencies. This inveftigation forms the principal fubje&t of the Xth chapter, which touches on too great a variety of objects to be particularized by us. Some remarks, however, made by Mr. M. we cannot refrain from inferting here, as containing new ideas on fubjects already fo trite, that it might have been thought that nothing new could be faid on them. It has been a favourite meaíure with reformers to counteract the venality of rotten boroughs, either by admitting the inhabitants of the neighbouring hundreds to a right of voting equally with the burgeffes, or perfons holding by burgage tenure, or by entirely dif franchifing thofe boroughs, and granting to populous towns the right not now enjoyed by them, of fending members to parliament. Neither of these remedies would, in his opinion, remove the evil; for the venality, taking its rife from the corrupt manners of the people, cannot be remedied by a transfer of the franchise from one fet of electors to another, as both would inoft certainly act in the fame manner.' The expences attending elections he fays, are fuch, that gentlemen of moderate landed property are almoft excluded from the Houfe of Commons; and fuch land-owners as do take feats in it are poffeffed of eftates fo very large, as to be candidates for a peerage, and therefore are more open to corruption than men of moderate incomes. The number of merchants admitted into the Houfe of Commons he also confiders as highly dangerous to the conflitution; affuming it as a maxim that they attend more to their private intereft than to the public. weal. He alfo objects, in the following terms, to the admiffion of a great number of lawyers into the house. Lawyers muft be bad legiflators, unlefs to profeffional fkill they join a mass of general knowledge. This cannot be expected in men whofe time, from their youth up wards, wards, has been totally abforbed in the ftudies and practice of their profeffion, and this must be the cafe with all eminent lawyers, who alone can afford a feat in parliament. But if we also confider, that of late years the higheft honours, and the most lucrative offices of ftate, are prizes which every lawyer, who can join parliamentary confequence to profeffional eminence, is fure to obtain; we cannot be furprized if lawyers have, in general, proved themselves the moft zealous partifans of faction, the most fubfervient tools of government.' The conftitution is alfo in danger, he says, from the admiffion of too many military men; fince fuch members, in his opinion, for the moft part confider their feat in parliament as a step fubfervient to, perhaps neceffary for, their profeffional advancement, and therefore betray their duties as fenators. He then adds the following obfervation: If, in addition to this change in the character of the members, we alfo take into confideration the great increase of power that the fenate has neceffarily arrogated to itself, fince the crown was rendered entirely dependent on its good will; when we recollect that exceffive power corrupts the best difpofitions; that the actual exercife of what the house of commons poffefs, is incompatible with a mo narchical government; and that this defect in the conftitution can be palliated only by the general venality of individuals; we need not be at a loss to account for the degeneracy of parliament*.? Hence it is evident that our author is an advocate for reform but on principles very different from thofe on which reform has hitherto been defended: he would first reform the manners of the electors, as the best means of fecuring political integrity in the elected: he would then introduce a greater portion of the landed intereft into parliament, and confiderably leffen the number of profeffional men and merchants who fhould be admitted to fit in it; and he would extend the power of the crown, at the fame time that he would diminish that of the houfe of commons, by making the prince lefs dependent on it :-but it is not the lower house alone, according to Mr. M. that calls for reform; the house of lords, in his opinion, ftands in as much need of it. A moment's reflection (fays he) will ferve to convince us, that the political power vefted in the lords, enables them to perform but a fmall part of what is required of them; and unless this power, their titles of honor, and their infignia of rank, are united to great perfonal authority, derived from ample hereditary poffeffions, and to the refpect which is always paid to *Those who are advocates for the prefent fyftem of government, yet allow that it is fupported by influence, feem not aware that their arguments lead to an abfurdity. The power of influencing a preponderating part of the people vefted in the crown, is nugatory, unless there is alfo a difpofition in the people to be influ. enced. Such a difpofition implies a proportional annihilation of political inte grity. But where political integrity is in general extinct, the nation must de cline. honourable |