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However combinations or affociations of the above defcription may, now and then, anfwer popular ends, they are likely, in the courfe of time and things, to become potent engines, by which cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men will be enabled to fubvert the power of the people, and to ufurp for themselves the reins of government; deftroying afterwards the very enemies which have lifted them to unjuft dominion.

Towards the prefervation of your government, and the permanency of your prefent happy ftate, it is requifite, not only that you fteadily discountenance irregular oppofitions to its acknowledged authority, but alfo, that you refift with care the fpirit of innovation upon its principles, however fpecious the pretexts. One method of affault may be to effect, in the forms of the conftitution, alterations which will impair the energy of the fyftem, and thus to undermine what cannot be directly overthrown. In all the changes to which you may be invited, remember that time and habit are at leaft as ncceflary to fix the true character of governments as of other human inftitutions-that experience is the fureft standard by which to teft the real tendency of the exifting conftitution of a country -that facility in changes, upon the credit of mere hypothefis and opinion,expofes to perpetual change, from the endless variety of hypothefis and opinion; and remember, efpecially, that for the efficient management of your common interefts, in a country fo extenfive as our's, a government of as much vigour as is confiftent with the perfect fecurity of liberty is indifpenfable. Liberty itself will find in fuch a go

vernment, with powers properly diftributed and adjutted, its furett guardian. It is, indeed, little elfe than a name, where the government is too feeble to with ftand the enterprizes of faction, to confine each member of the fociety within the limits prefcribed by the laws, and to maintain all in the secure and tranquil enjoyment of the rights of perfons and property.

I have already intimated to you the danger of parties in the ftate, with the particular reference to the founding of them on geographical difcriminations. Let me now take a more comprehenfive view, and warn you in the moft. folemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of party generally.

This fpirit, unfortunately, is infeparable from our nature, having its roots in the ftrongeft paffions of the human mind. It exifts under different shapes in all governments, more or less ftifled, controuled, or oppreffed; but in those of the popular form it is feen in its greatest rankness, and it is truly their worst ́ enemy.

The alternate dominion of one faction over another, fharpened by the fpirit of revenge natural to party diffention, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the moft horrid enormities, is itfelf a moft horrid defpotism. But this leads at length to a more formal and permament defpotifm. The diforders and miferies which refult, gradually incline the minds of men to feek fecurity and repose in the abfolute power of an individual; and, fooner or later, the chief of fome prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than

his competitors, turns this difpofition to the purposes of his own ele

vation,

vation, on the ruins of public li. berty.

Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind (which nevertheless ought not to be entirely out of fight) the common and continued mifchiefs of the fpirit of party are fufficient to make it the intereft and duty of a wife people to difcourage and reftrain it."

It ferves always to diftract the public councils and enfeeble the public administration. It agitates the community with ill-founded jealoufies and falfe alarms; kindles the animofity of one part against another, foments occafionally riot and infurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption which find a facilitated accefs to the government itself through the channels of party paffions. Thus the policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and will of another.

There is an opinion that parties in free countries are useful checks upon the adminiftration of the government, and ferve to keep alive the fpirit of liberty. This within certain limits is probably true; and in governments of a monarchical caft, patriotifm may look with indulgence, if not with favour, upon the spirit of party. But in thofe of the popular character, in governments purely elective, it is a fpirit not to be encouraged. From their natural tendency, it is certain there will always be enough of that spirit for every falutary purpose. And there being conitant danger of excefs, the effect ought to be, by force of public opinion, to mitigate and ailuage it.

A fire not to be quenched: it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame,

left, inftead of warming, it should confume.

It is important likewife, that the habits of thinking in a free country fhould infpire caution in those entrufted with its adminiftration, to confine themfelves within their refpective conftitutional spheres, avoiding in the exercife of the powers of one department to encroach upon another. The spirit of encroachment tends to confolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real defpotifm. A juft estimate of that love of power, and pronenefs to abufe it, which predominates in the human heart, is fufficient to fatisfy us of the truth of this pofition. The neceffity of reciprocal checks in the exercise of political power, by dividing and diftributing it into different depofitories, and conftituting each the guardian of the public weal against invafions by the others, has been evinced by experiments ancient and modern; fome of them in our country, and under our own eyes. To preferve them must be as neceffary as to inftitute them. If, in the opinion of the people, the diftribution or modification of the conftitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way which the conftitution defignates. But let there be no change by ufurpation; for though this, in one inftance, may be the inflrument of good, it is the cuftomary weapon by which free governments are deftroyed. The precedent muft always greatly over-balance in permanent evil any partial or tranfient benefit which the ufe can at any time yield.

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Of all the difpofitions and habits which lead to political profperity, religion and morality are indifpenfable fupports. In vain would that man clain the tribute of patriotifm who fhould labour to fubvert thefe great pillars of human happiness, thefe firmeft props of the duties of men and citizens. The mere politician, equally with the pious man, ought to refpect and to cherith them. A volume could not trace all their connection with private and public felicity. Let it fimply be afked, where is the fecurity for property, for reputation, for life, if the fenfe of religious obligation defert the oaths, which are the inftruments of inveftigation in courts of juftice? And let us with caution indulge, the fuppofition that morality can be maintained without religion. What every may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar ftructure, reafon and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclufion of religious principle.

It is fubftantially true, that virtue or morality is a neceffary fpring of popular government. The rule indeed extends with more or lefs force to every fpecies of free government. Who that is a fincere friend to it can look with indifference upon attempts to thake the foundation of the fabric?

Promote, then, as an object of primary importance, infiitutions for the general diffufion of knowledge. In proportion as the ftructure of government gives force to public opinion, it is effential that public opinion fhould be enlightened.

As a very important fource of trength and fecurity, cherish pub lic credit. One method of prefer

ving it is to, ufe as fparingly as poffible; avoiding occafions of expence by cultivating peace, but remembering alfo that timely difburfements to prepare for danger, frequently prevent much greater difburtements to repel it; avoiding likewife the accumulation of debt, not only by fhunning occafions of expence, but by vigorous exertions in time of peace to discharge the debts which unavoidable wars may have occafioned, not ungenerously throwing upon poterity the burthen which we ourfelves ought to bear. The execution of thefe maxims belong to your representatives, but it is neceffary that public opinion fhould co-operate. To facilitate to them the performance of their duty, it is effential that you thould practically bear in mind, that towards the payment of debts there must be a revenue: that to have revenue there must be taxes; that no taxes can be devised which are not more or lefs inconvenient and urpleafant; that the intrinfic embarrafliment infeparable from the felection of the proper objects (which is always a choice of difficulties) ought to be a decifive motive for a candid conftruction of the conduct of the government in makingit,and for a fpirit of acquiefcence in the meafures for obtaining revenue, which the public exigencies may at any time dictate.

Obferve good faith and juftice towards all nations, cultivate peace and harmony with all; religion and morality enjoin this conduct: and can it be that good policy does not 'equally enjoin it? It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and at no great diftant period, a great nation, to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by

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an exalted juftice and benevolence. Who can doubt that in the courfe of time and things the fruits of fuch a plan would richly repay any temporary advantages, which might be loft by a steady adherence to it? Can it be that Providence has not connected the permanent felicity of a nation with its virtues? The experiment, at least, is recommended by every fentiment which ennobles human nature. Alas! is it rendered impoflible by its vices? In the execution of fuch a plan, nothing is more effential than that the permanent, inveterate antipathies again particular nations, and paffionate attachments for others, hould be excluded; and that in place of them, juft and amicable feelings towards all should be cultivated. The nation which indulges towards another an habitual hatred, or an habitual fondnefs, is in fome degree a flave. It is a flave to its animofity or to its affection, either of which is fufficient to lead it aftray from its duty and its intereft. Antipathy in one nation against another difpofes each more readily to offer in fult and injury, to lay hold of flight caufes of umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable, when accidental or trifling occafions of difpute occur. Hence frequent collifions, obftinate, envenomed, and bloody contefts. The nation, prompted by ill-will and refentment, fometimes impels to war the government, contrary to the best calculations of policy. The government fometimes participates in the national propenfity, and adopts, through paffion, what reafon would reject; at other times it makes the animofity of the na

tion fubfervient to projects of hoftility, inftigated by pride, ambition, and other finifter and pernicious motives. The peace often, fometimes, perhaps, the liberty of nations, has been the victim."

So, likewife, a paflionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favourite nation, facil tating the infufion of an imaginary common intereft, in cafes where no real common intereft exitis, and infufing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter, without adequate inducement or juftification. It leads alfo to conceffious to the favourite nation, of privileges denied to others, which is apt doubly to injure the nation making the conceflions; by unneceffarily parting with what ought to have been retained; and by exciting jealoufy, ill-will, and difpofition to retaliate, in the parties from whom, equal privileges are withheld and it gives to ambitious, corrupted, or deluded citizens, (who devote themselves to the favourite nation) facility to betray, or facrifice the interefts of their own country, without odium, fometimes even with popularity; gilding with the appearances of a virtuous fenfe of obligation, a commendable deference for public opinion, or a laudable zeal for public good, the bafe or foolish compliances of ambition, corruption, or infatuation.

As the avenues to foreign influence are in innumerable ways, fuch attachments are particularly alarm ing to the truly enlightened and independent patriot. How many opportunities

opportunities do they afford to tamper with domeftic factions, to practife the arts of feduction, to miflead public opinion, to influence or awe the public councils? Such an attachment of a small or weak, towards a great or powerful nation, dooms the former to be fatellite of the latter.

Against the infidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to believe me, fellow citizens) the jealousy of a free people ought to be conftantly awake; fince hiftory and experience prove, that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of a republican government. But that jealousy to be ufeful must be impartial; elfe it becomes the inftrument of the very influence to be avoided, inftead of a defence against it. Exceffive partiality for one foreign nation, and exceffive diflike of another, cause those whom they actuate to fee danger only on one fide, and ferve to veil and even fecond, the arts of influence on the other. Real patriots, who may refift the intrigues of the favourites, are liable to become fufpected and odious; while its tools and dupes ufurp the applaufe and confidence of the people, to furrender their interefts.

The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as poffible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith.-Here let us ftop.

Europe has a fet of primary interefts, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence the must be engaged in frequent controverfies, the caufes of which

are effentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwife in us to implicate ourfelves by artificial ties in the ordinary viciffitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collifions of her friendships or enmities.

Our detached and diftant fituation invites and enables us to purfue a different courfe. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take fuch an attitude as will caufe the neutrality we may at any time refolve upon to be fcrupuloufly refpected; when belligerent nations, under the impoflibility of making acquifitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our intereft, guided by juftice, fhal counfel.

Why forego the advantages of fo peculiar a fituation? Why quit our own to ftand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and profperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalfhip, intereft, humour, or caprice?

'Tis our true policy to fleer clear of permanent alliances, with any portion of the foreign world; fo far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me be not understood as capable of patronifing infidelity to exifting engagements. I hold the maxim no lefs applicable to public, than to private affairs, that honefty is always the beft policy. I repeat it, therefore, let thofe engagements be obferved, in their genuine fense.

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