of an armed neutrality, announccing to him, at the fame time, that the fecurity of these countries was the motive in which the measures referred to had originated. Subftance of the Reply made to the above Note by the Court of Vienna.

HIS Imperial majefty, as fupreme head of the empire, cannot doubt that the ftates are obliged to concur in a war, rendered neceffary from the preffure of circumstances, and formally declared with all their force, for the common defence. This obligation is derived from the principle of individual and general fecurity, which is the moft facred and the most effential bafis of every confiitution. It is in a particular manner blended with the fubftance of the Germanic conftitution, and is recognized by feveral of its laws in the moft pofitive terms.

Such is the refult dictated by the spirit of our conftitution, which fubjects all the refpective ftates, and all the means of defence, to the general controul of the fovereign power of the Germanic empire. Such is the refult of the oath of fealty, which the electors, princes, and ftates of the empire, in order to ftrengthen the focial bond, .take in their capacity of vatials, by which they fwear actively to concur in every ftep which can tend to the honour, to the advantage, and to the profperity of his Imperial majefty and of the empire, and which, by confequence, impofes upon them an obligation to fecond, with all their might, the meafures adopted by the chief and the ftates of the empire, to avert the danger which threatens them with total deftruction.

VOL. XXXVIII,

His Imperial majefty fees with pain that the appearances of the war by no means anfwer the expectation which he had been led to entertain; but in confidering the fundamental laws of every well organized conftitution, and the principles recognized in the moft pofitive terms in the laws of the empire, full of anxiety for the good of the country, his majefty cannot refrain from manifefting a defire that the corps, affembled at a 'crifis the most alarming and the moft dangerous, may be employed rather in aiding a moft juft defence, by oppofing the common enemy, than in ftopping an invafion ftill at a diftance, and of which we apprehend only the poffibility.

Thefe measures of fecurity, confidered in themfelves, do not appear to be contrary to the bafis and the fpirit of the conftitution, provided that the arrangements, for the fafety and the particular defence of the north of Germany, are not founded upon illegal impofitions, and provided they are not employed to fanction the unconftitutional pretext of freeing them from the obligations binding upon them by the register of the refolutions of the empire, decreed for the purpofe of the general fecurity of Germany.

If his Imperial majefty on the prefent occation were to grant to this measure of fecurity, as it is termed in the circular letter of the Pruflian minifter, in the letters of convocation, and in the declarations of the plenipotentiaries of the king, an unlimited approbation, all who fhould compare it with the tenor of the decree of ratification of the 29th of July, 1795, would accufe him of adopting contradice U

tory

tory measures, and of making an arbitrary ufe of his power as head of the empire, fince the laws renewed in the present war forbid the ftates to separate, on any occafion, from the general affociation, and any armament, under the title of an armed neutrality, during the continuance of a war of the empire, and interdict them in the moft pofitive manner from arbitrarily renouncing obligations formerly impofed upon them for the common defence.

His Imperial majefty, in virtue of the facred duties impofed upon him by his high office as fupreme head of the empire, on the other hand, being called upon to defend the rights of the Germanic conftitution against every step and every principle incompatible with their fafety, to preferve to the empire, and to every particular ftate, its immunities entire, and to guard them against the prejudices which may arife from thefe measures, will be difpofed in the mean time to grant them his approbation, if they are confined to the legal defence of the countries, and if they do not depart from the principles, the forms, and the obligations, prefcribed by the laws and the conftitution.

Meffage of the Prefident of the United States of America to Congress, Jan. 4, 1796.

Gentlemen of the Senate, and of the House of Reprefentatives,

A LETTER from the minifter plenipotentiary of the French republic, received on the 22d of laft month, covered an addrefs, dated the 2ft of October, 1795, from the

committee of public fafety, to the reprefentatives of the United States in congrefs; and alfo informed me, that he was inftructed by the committee to prefent to the United States the colours of France; I therefore propofed to receive them laft Friday, the first day of the new year, a day of general joy and congratulation. On that day the minifter of the French republic delivered the colours, with an addrefs, to which I returned an anfwer.

By the latter the houfe will fee that I have informed the minifter, that the colours will be depofited with the archives of the United States. But it feemed to me proper to exhibit to the two houses of congrefs, thefe evidences of the continued friendship of the French republic, together with the sentiments expreffed by me on the occafion, in behalf of the United States. They are herewith communicated.

GEORGE WASHINGTON. United States, Jan. 4, 1796.

Anfwer of General Washington to a Refolution paffed by the House of Reprefentatives which had for its Object to procure a Copy of the Inftructions granted to Mr. Jay, relative to the treaty with Great Britain.

1

Gentlemen of the House of Reprefentatives,

WITH the utmost attention I have confidered your refolution of the 24th inftant, requesting me to lay before your houfe a copy of the inftructions to the minifter of the United States, who negotiated the treaty with the King of Great Britain, together with the correfpondence and other documents

reltive

relative to that treaty, excepting fuch of the said papers as any exifting negotiaton may render improper to be disclosed.

In deliberating on this fubject, it was impoffible for me to lose fight of the principle which fome have avowed in its difcuffion, or to avoid extending my views to the confequences which muft flow from the admiffion of that principle.

I trust that no part of my conduc has ever indicated a difpofition to withhold any information which the conftitution has enjoined upon the prefident as a duty to give, or which could be required of him by either house of congrefs as a right; and with truth I affirm, that it has been, as it will continue to be while I have the honour to prefide in the government, my conftant endeavour to harmonize with the other branches thereof, fo far as the truft delegated to me by the people of the United States, and my fenfe of the obligation it impofes, to preserve, protect, and defend the conftitution,' will per

mit.

The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution; and their fucceffes must often depend on fecrecy, and even when brought to a conclufion, a full difelofure of all the measures, demands, or eventual conceffions which may have been proposed or contemplated, would be extremely impolitic; for this might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations, or produce immediate inconveniencies; perhaps danger and mifchief, in relation to other powers. The neceffity of fuch caution and fecrecy was one cogent

reafon for vefting the power of making treaties in the prefident, with the advice and confent of the fenate; the principle on which that body was formed confining it to a fmall number of members. To admit, then, a right in the houfe of reprefentatives to demand, and to have as a matter of course, all the papers refpecting a negotiation with a foreign power, would be to establish a dangerous precedent.

It does not occur that the infpection of the papers atked for can be relative to any purpofe under cognizance of the houfe of reprefentatives, except that of an impeachment, which the resolution has not expreffed. I repeat that I have no difpofition to withhold any information which the duty of my station will permit, or the public good fhall require to be disclosed; and, in fact, all the papers affecting the negotiation with Great Britain were laid before the fenate, when the treaty itself was communicated for their confideration and advice.

The course which the debate has taken on the refolution of the houfe, leads to fome obfervations on the mode of making treaties under the conftitution of the United States.

Having been a member of the general convention, and knowing the principles on which the conftitution was formed, I have never entertained but one opinion on this fubject; and from the first establifhment of the government to this moment, my conduct has exemplified that opinion, that the power of making treaties is exclufively vested in the prefident, by U z

and

and with the advice of the fenate, provided two-thirds of the fenators prefent concur; and that every treaty fo made and promulgated, thenceforward becomes the law of the land. It is thus that the treaty-making power has been underflood by foreign nations; and in all treaties made with them we have declared, and they have believed, that when ratified by the prefident, with the advice and confent of the fenate, they became obligatory. In this conftruction of the conftitution, every house of reprefentatives has heretofore acquiefced; and until the prefent time, not a doubt or fufpicion has appeared to my knowledge, that this conftruction was not a true one. Nay, they have more than ac quiefced; for until now, without controverting the obligation of fuch treaties, they have made all the requifite provifions for carrying them into effect.

There is alfo reafon to believe that this conftruction agrees with the opinions entertained by the ftate conventions, when they were deliberating on the conftitution, efpecially by thofe who objected to it, because there was not required in commercial treaties the confent of two-thirds of the whole fenate, instead of two-thirds of the fenators prefent; and becaufe in treaties refpecting territorial and certain other rights and claims, the concurrence of three-fourths of the whole number of the members of both houses respectively was not made neceffary.

ceffion. And it is well known, that under this influence the fmaller states were admitted to an equal reprefentation in the fenate with the larger ftates, and that this branch of the government was invefted with great powers, for on the equal participation of those powers the fovereignty and political fafety of the smaller states were deemed effentially to depend.

If other proofs than thefe, and the plain letter of the conftitution itself, be neceffary to ascertain the point under confideration, they may be found in the journals of the general convention, which I have depofited in the office of the department of fiate. In those journals it will appear that a propofition was made," that no treaty thould be binding on the United States which was not ratified by a law," and that the propofition was explicitly rejected.

As, therefore, it is perfectly clear to my understanding, that the affent of the house of reprefentatives is not neceffary to the validity of a treaty, as a treaty with Great Britain exhibits in itself all the objects requiring legislative provifion, and on which thefe papers called for can throw no light; and as it is effential to the due adminiftration of the government, that the boundaries fixed by the conftitution between the different departments fhould be preferveda juft regard to the conftitution, and to the duty of my office, under all the circumftances of this cafe forbid a compliance with your requeft.

GEORGE WASHINGTON.

Addrefs