[1793-1805 A.D.] Up to the American revolution, every white inhabitant of America was a subject of some European country. The creation of the United States opened up a new problem of the transfer of allegiance from one nation to another, and it became a serious issue when Englishmen naturalised in the United States were "impressed" from the decks of American merchantmen by English cruisers. Such impressments were also a personal indignity which exasperated sailors, shipowners, and the American public. The French minister, Genet, by his attempt to make the United States a naval base for France, and by his violent attacks upon the administration in 1793, alienated the natural sympathy of many Americans with France; but England by refusing a commercial treaty, and by captures and impressments, offended so much more deeply that in 1794 our first provision was made for a navy. What seemed unavoidable trouble was averted by the negotiation of the Jay Treaty in 1794, which adjusted with England many of the pending questions of commerce of the rights of neutrals.

The pendulum now swung the other way; France, enraged at the Jay Treaty, grossly insulted a special commission sent over by President Adams in 1797, when certain unofficial go-betweens, known as X, Y, Z, demanded a bribe. The result was our only war with France, lasting from 1798 to 1800. The peace of 1800 with France included a commercial treaty; and the United States was now in more favourable relations with the world than ever before, for the Jay Treaty had settled most of the old difficulties with England, and a fortunate treaty with Spain in 1795 surrendered the Spanish claims north of the thirty-first parallel, and opened a long-desired commerce through New Orleans to the gulf. The Peace of Amiens of April, 1802, between France and England, seemed to promise a long period of commercial prosperity. These expectations were soon dispelled, for war soon began again in Europe. Yet questions of commerce and defence were for the moment set aside by the astounding news in 1802 that Louisiana had gone back to France. It was then that the peace-loving Jefferson declared that on "the day that France takes possession of New Orleans we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation." That the greatest military power of the time should be our near neighbour, and should sit athwart the streams which led from the interior to the gulf, was a danger which roused the nation, and caused the United States to resume the policy of territorial expansion. Threats of war were freely made, but a kaleidoscopic change in European politics caused Napoleon to give up his scheme of the restoration of the French colonial empire in America; and in 1803 he threw Louisiana into the lap of the United States with the same princely indifference with which the Caliph Haroun ar-Racshid would throw a purse of gold to a beggar in the streets. For a payment of about $12,000,000 the United States received the whole stretch of the western Mississippi valley, to the farthest tributaries of the Missouri, the Platte, and the Arkansas. Yet even this rich accession was incomplete, so long as we were shut off from the eastern gulf, and the United States never rested until West Florida was acquired by successive acts of armed occupation, and then reached out impatiently for East Florida and for Texas.

The energy of a Yankee skipper and the forethought of Jefferson now completed the arch of territory crossing the continent from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Captain Gray of Boston in 1792 discovered a great river in Oregon, which he named for his ship, the Columbia; and in 1805 the Lewis and Clark overland expedition sent out by Jefferson reached the Pacific. A third evidence of a purpose to keep Oregon was a little trading post at Astoria planted in 1810 by John Jacob Astor.

[1805–1814 A.D.]

DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1812 (1805-1815 A.D.)

No sooner was Louisiana fairly annexed than the commercial question again thrust its way to the front. At the renewal of the war in 1803 the British admiralty courts began to set up new and harsh principles as to neutral trade, especially the Rule of 1756; and refused to grant a satisfactory substitute for the expired Jay Treaty. Napoleon retorted with his Continental System intended to prevent the export of British goods to any territory controlled by or allied with France. Great Britain retaliated by "Orders in Council" in 1806 and 1807, aimed to cut off the trade of neutrals with France and her allies. France rejoined with equally furious and unprincipled "Decrees," and in the eleven years from 1803 to 1812 fifteen hundred American merchantmen were captured by the French and the British. At the same time the principle of impressments was pushed to the point of attacking the American frigate Chesapeake on the high seas and taking off certain British

deserters.

President Jefferson, although he had just successfully carried out a brilliant little naval war with the Barbary pirates, preferred commercial restriction to war; and congress enacted at various times laws of non-intercourse with offending powers, non-importation of their goods, and an embargo on the exportation of American products. The last-named measure Napoleon professed to like; to some degree it distressed the British merchants, but it proved so ruinous to American shipowners and exporters that it was given up after fourteen months' trial, in 1809. The next three years show a weak and fluctuating foreign policy, ineffectual against two powerful nations, each of which was perfectly willing to incur the ill-will of the United States if it could only damage its adversary. In the summer of 1812 the United States declared war on Great Britain. The official reasons for this war were: aggressions on neutral trade; British orders in council (though they were grudgingly withdrawn at the last moment); supposed influence of the British in Indian hostilities on the northwest frontier (an influence which is now disproved); and impressments. A deeper cause was a just indignation at the reckless and overbearing behaviour of the English government, English diplomats, and English squadrons in American waters.

The tactical object of the War of 1812 was the conquest of Canada; but owing to bad military organisation and the lack of able commanders, every attempt at permanent occupation of any part of Canada was an abject failure. On the contrary, the British occupied a large part of Maine, took and burned Washington, landed on the gulf coast, and occupied Astoria in Oregon. Nevertheless, the defeat of invading expeditions on Lake Champlain, and below New Orleans, by raw militia behind breastworks proved that a permanent conquest of America was impossible; while the unexpected victories of American ships of war in ship duels, and the brilliant success of American privateers, made such an impression of maritime power that Great Britain accepted the favourable peace in 1814. This Treaty of Ghent provided that all territorial conquests should be restored; a separate commercial treaty was soon negotiated, which put an end to the long difficulties between the two countries; and the end of the war took away all occasion for interference with American neutral trade. On the question of impressments, no promise could be obtained, but the practice ceased and was never renewed. Three years later a convention was made (which is still in force)

[1815-1823 A.D.] giving certain fishery privileges on the coast of Newfoundland and Labrador. The long period of commercial contention with Great Britain and other European powers had come to an end.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE (1815-1826 A.D.)

At the end of the War of 1812 the only powers of the North American continent were the United States, Spain, Great Britain, and Russia, which was planting trading posts on the Pacific coast. These conditions were absolutely changed by a series of revolutions in the Spanish-American colonies from 1806 to 1822, which deprived Spain of every possession in America, except a few coast fortifications and the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico. The principal countries among these new American states were recognised as independent by the United States in 1822. The trade of these nations, at last free from the Spanish colonial system, was thrown open to the world; while a warm sympathy with struggling republics, and an unfounded belief in the perfectibility of Spanish-American human nature, led the people of the United States to take the liveliest interest in the success of the new neighbours.

After the crushing of Napoleon, the affairs of Europe passed into the control of a sort of syndicate, made up of France, Prussia, Russia, and Austria, united in a pompous and ambiguous treaty called the Holy Alliance, the real purport of which was that if revolution should break out anywhere, the combined military force of the Christian allies should be available to stamp it out. Accordingly, when revolutionists got control of Spain the allies sent a French army which conquered the country and restored the hated Bourbon sovereign (1823). An immediate result was that the Spanish government called upon the allies to extend to America their system of crushing the revolutionary spirit.

The real influence of the naval war of 1812 was now visible in American diplomacy; for George Canning, British foreign minister, was so impressed by the force of the United States that he proposed to the United States to join in a declaration against the plan. About the same time the Russian government took occasion to expound its "political system," meaning the principle that the Spanish-Americans ought to obey the Spanish government.

The man for the hour was John Quincy Adams, secretary of state, whose foresight, lively national spirit, and power of vigorous expression enabled him to carry his convictions against the hesitation of President Monroe. Instead of joining in a protest with Great Britain, which would have pledged the United States not to annex any Spanish-American territory, he drew up a declaration which was substantially incorporated into Monroe's annual message of 1823. This is the celebrated Monroe Doctrine, of which the essential principles are: that it proceeds from the United States alone; that it protests strongly against the proposed intervention of third parties in an American question not their own; that it insists that European powers have no right to take part in general American questions, because the United States takes no part in distinctly European questions; it vigorously opposes the transfer to America of the "European political system" which had been put forward by Russia; and it takes the opportunity to attack the territorial pretensions of that power by a clause declaring that the American continents are all occupied, and no longer subject to "colonisation" by any European power, though then-existing colonies should be respected.

[1823-1845 A.D.]

This is the Monroe Doctrine, intended to secure the peace of America by preventing the bringing in of new influences, new quarrels over territory, and new efforts to establish European authority. The doctrine was completely successful in all its branches. Russia hastened to make treaties, withdrawing most of her territorial claims. The plan of intervention instantly collapsed. From that day to this Europe has recognised that in all American questions, except those of the continued possession of territory occupied by European nations in 1823, and the settlement of difficulties between a single European and a single American power, the United States has a far greater interest and influence than any other power. In 1826 a congress of the Spanish-American states was held at Panama, one object being to secure from the United States a distinct pledge that it would protect them; and though Adams thought he saw an opportunity to place the United States at the head of a group of American states, congress would not support him, and our Latin-American neighbours were allowed to work out their own destinies with very little interference from the United States.

DIPLOMACY OF TERRITORIAL EXPANSION (1829-1861 A.D.)

During the thirty years from 1830 to 1860 came an epoch of the breaking down of the barriers of trade. In 1833 the United States began to recede from its protective policy, and in 1846 adopted a revenue tariff, which continued to the Civil War. This policy corresponded with a movement in Europe to remove discriminations and reduce duties. About 1830 Great Britain finally yielded the long-contested point of the West India trade in American ships, and in 1847 the last remnants of the British navigation acts disappeared. With a commercial marine second only to that of Great Britain, the United States represented throughout the world the principle of unrestricted trade; and by commercial treaties with China (1844) and Japan (1853) inaugurated our diplomatic relations with Asia.

In this period also two very perplexing and protracted boundary questions were settled with Great Britain. The northeastern, or Maine, controversy depended on the construction of the treaty of 1782, for it described a division line which could not be laid down upon the actual ground. It was happily settled in 1842 by a compromise in the Webster-Ashburton Treaty. At the other extremity of the continent difficulty arose from the rival claims of England and the United States to Oregon, a region hitherto unoccupied by any civilised nation. A convention was made with England in 1818 for the joint occupation of the disputed belt, pending a later settlement, and in 1819 Spain withdrew any claims north of the forty-second parallel; in 1825 the Russians ceased to claim south of 54 degrees and 40 minutes. As the natural wealth of the coast and its importance as a Pacific point of departure became evident, the boundary controversy grew fiercer; but in 1846 it was adjusted by a compromise on the forty-ninth parallel.

Though ready to come to a reasonable accommodation on the northern border, the government of the United States put forth very different principles in the southward. Texas, California, Central America, and Cuba became objects of eager diplomacy. Americans in considerable numbers made their way to Texas, then a province of Mexico, and formed a community, which in 1835 secured its independence by force of arms. The Texans were anxious to enter the American Union, but they were staved off, because likely to bring a powerful reinforcement to the slave power within the United States; not till

[1845-1872 A.D.] 1845 was Texas at last admitted by the then novel process of incorporation into the Union through a joint resolution of congress. President Polk came into office in 1845 with the purpose of annexing California, with its splendid port of San Francisco. He took advantage of outstanding quarrels with Mexico, and of a preposterous claim of the Texans to the whole territory as far as the Rio Grande, and made war on Mexico (August, 1846). In a few months California was taken, and New Mexico, a necessary land-bridge between the east and the Pacific coast, was also occupied. These conquests were confirmed by the Peace of 1848 with Mexico. The beginning of a distinct policy of annexation of Cuba was an attempt of Polk to purchase the island in 1848. Then followed a series of filibustering expeditions, and in 1854 the Ostend Manifesto announced the open and avowed purpose of annexing it by force, a purpose with some difficulty prevented by the pressure of anti-slavery sentiment.

The annexation of California showed the need of rapid and secure communication across the isthmus; the consequence was a treaty with the United States of Colombia (1846) giving the United States equality of use and large powers of control over any canal that might be constructed across the isthmus of Panama. The only other available isthmus route, the Nicaragua, was flanked by the so-called "Mosquito Protectorate" of Great Britain. To remove that exclusive influence, the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 provided for a joint guaranty of the Nicaragua route, and for the principle of neutrality over any other route. Though that treaty was ambiguous and gave rise to ten years' dispute, it destroyed any exclusive claim of Great Britain, and prevented other nations from assuming any responsibility for the canal.

DIPLOMACY OF THE CIVIL WAR PERIOD (1861-1877 A.D.)

The outbreak of the Civil War in 1861 for a time threw American diplomacy into the background; but old questions reappeared and new questions arose, which taxed to the utmost our skilful secretary of state, Seward, and our ministers abroad. Questions of neutral trade and of privateering looked very different when we were at war and England was a neutral; and the status of a community which had revolted seemed very different to Northern statesmen from what it seemed to the fathers of the revolution. Hence the overturning of cherished precedents; hence protests because foreign powers recognised the Confederacy as a belligerent; hence the search of the British ship Trent on the high seas; hence the capture of vessels not bound to Southern ports, but having on board military supplies. Gradually Seward's diplomacy was triumphant. He prevented the recognition of the independence of the Confederacy by Great Britain or France, and stopped the fitting out of Confederate cruisers in England.

The war, however, left a crop of difficult questions. The United States set up the Alabama Claims for the fitting out of the cruisers in England. English statesmen saw that they had set a precedent very difficult for themselves in later wars; they therefore took the unusual step of an apology for their action in the Alabama case, and they entered into an arbitration at Geneva (1872), of which it was the foregone conclusion that they must pay an indemnity. The Alabama claims were thereby settled by the payment of fifteen and a half million dollars.

The question of the allegiance of the emigrant, which had caused the war of 1812, came up again when Germans and others, naturalised in the United