its ornaments; but all unite in producing one regular and proportioned whole. If, then, different employments are neceffary, of courfe different degrees of wealth, honour, and confequence, muft follow; a variety of diftinctions and obligations; in fhort, different ranks and a fubordination must take place. Again, in a moral light, the difproportion of wealth, and other worldly adjuncts, gives a range to the more extenfive exercife of virtue. Some virtues could but faintly exift upon the plan of an equality. If fome did not abound, there were little room for temperance: if fome did not fuffer need, there were as little for patience. Other virtues, again, could hardly exist at all. Who could practise generofity where there was no object of it? Who humility, where all ambitious defires were excluded? Since, then, Providence, in fcattering thefe various gifts, propofes ultimately the good of man, it is our duty to acquiefce in this order, and " to behave ourselves lowly and reverently" (not with fervility, but with a decent refpect)" to all our fuperiors." Before I conclude this fubject, it may be proper to obferve, in vindication of the ways of Providence, that we are not to fuppofe happiness and mifery neceffarily connected with riches and poverty. Each condition hath its particular fources both of pleasure and pain, unknown to the other. Those in elevated stations have a thousand latent pangs, of which their inferiors have no idea; while their inferiors, again, have as many pleasures, which the others cannot tafte. I fpeak only of fuch modes of happiness or mifery as arife immediately from different ftations. Of mifery, indeed, from a variety of other caufes, all men of every station are equal heirs, either when God lays his hand upon us in fickness, or misfortune; or when, by our own follic and vices, we become the minifters of ou own diftrefs. Who then would build his happiness upd an elevated station? Or, who would envy th poffeffion of fuch happiness in another? W know not with what various diftreffes th station, which is the object of our envy, ma be attended.-Befides, as we are accountab for all we poffefs, it may be happy for us the we poffefs fo little. The means of happinet as far as station can procure them, are com monly in our own power, if we are not wan ing to ourselves. Let each of us then do his duty in the ftation which Providence has affigned him ever remembering, that the next world wi foon deftroy all earthly diftinctions.-Or diftinction only will remain among the for of men at that time-the diftinction betwee good and bad; and this diftinction it is wort all our pains and all our ambition to acquire Gilpin § 55. Against wronging our Neighbour b injurious Words. We are next inftructed" to hurt nobod by word or deed-to be true and just in al our dealings-to bear no malice nor hatred in our hearts-to keep our hands from picking and stealing-our tongues from evil-speaking lying, and flandering." The duties comprehended in these word are a little tranfpofed. What should claf under one head is brought under another "To hurt nobody by word or deed," is the general propofition. The under parts fhould follow: First," to keep the tongue from evilfpeaking, lying, and flandering;" which is to hurt nobody by word." Secondly "to be true and just in all our dealings;" and "to keep keep our hands from picking and ftealing;" which is, "to hurt nobody by deed." As to the infraction," to bear no malice nor hatred in our hearts," it belongs properly to neither of thefe heads, but is a diftinct one by itfelf. The duties being thus feparated, I fhall proceed to explain them. And, firft, of injuring our neighbour by words." This may be done, we find, three ways; by "evil-fpeaking, by lying, and by flandering." By evil-fpeaking," is meant fpeaking ill of our neighbour; but, upon a fuppofition, that this ill is the truth. In fome circumfances it is certainly right to fpeak ill of our Beighbour; as when we are called upon in a court of justice to give our evidence; or when we can fet any one right in his opinion of a perfon in whom he is about to put an improper confidence. Nor can there be any harm in fpeaking of a bad action, which has been determined in a court of juftice, or is otherwife become notorious. pleasure in spreading the flame of an offending brother. We can do no good; and we may do harm: we may weaken his good refolutions by expofing him: we may harden him against the world. Perhaps it may be his firft bad action. Perhaps nobody is privy to it but ourselves. Let us give him at leaft one trial, Let us not caft the first stone. Which of our lives could ftand fo ftrict a fcrutiny? He only who is without fin himself can have any excufe for treating his brother with feverity. Let us next confider "lying;" which is an intention to deceive by falfehood in our words. To warn us againft lying, we should do well to confider the folly, the meanness, and the wickedness of it. The folly of lying confifts in its defeating its own purpofe. A habit of lying is generally in the end detected: and, after detection, the lyar, inftead of deceiving, will not even be believed when he happens to speak the truth. Nay, every fingle lye is attended But, on the other hand, it is highly dif- with fuch a variety of circumftances, which allowable to speak wantonly of the characters lead to a detection, that it is often discovered. of others from common fame; because, in a The ufe generally made of a lye, is to cover a thousand inftances we find, that ftories, which fault; but as the end is feldom anfavered, we have no better foundation, are mifreprefented. only aggravate what we wish to conceal. They are perhaps only half-told-they have In point even of prudence, an honeft confeffion been heard through the medium of malice or would ferve us better. easy-fome favourable circumftance hath been The meanness of lying arifes from the ited-fome foreign circumftance hath been cowardice which it implies, We dare not added-fome trifling circumftance hath been boldly and nobly fpeak the truth; but have exaggerated the motive, the provocation, or recourfe to low fubterfuges, which always arperhaps the reparation hath been concealed-gue a fordid and difingenuous mind. Hence a fhort, the reprefentation of the fact is, it is, that in the fashionable world, the word fame way or other, totally different from the lyar is always confidered as a term of peculiar fact itself. reproach. But even when we have the best evidence of a bad action, with all its circumstances before us, we furely indulge a very ill-natured The wickedness of lying confifts in its perverting one of the greateft bleffings of God, the ufe of fpeech, in making that a mischief to mankind, which was intended for a benefit. Truth is the great bond of fociety: falfehood, of course, tends to its diffolution. If one man may lye, why not another? And if there is no mutual trust among men, there is an end of all intercourfe and dealing. An equivocation is nearly related to a lye. It is an intention to deceive under words of a double meaning, or words which, literally fpeaking, are true; and is equally criminal with the most downright breach of truth. When St. Peter asked Sapphira (in the 5th chapter of the Acts) "whether her husband had fold the land for fo much?" fhe answered, he had and literally fhe fpoke the truth; for he had fold it for that fum, included in a larger. But having an intention to deceive, we find the apostle confidered the equivocation as a lye. In fhort, it is the intention to deceive, which is criminal: the mode of deception, like the vehicle in which poifon is conveyed, is of no confequence. A nod, or fign, may convey a lye as effectually as the most deceitful language. Under the head of lying may be mentioned a breach of promife. While a refolution remains in our own breafts, it is fubject to our own review: but when we make another perfon a party with us, an engagement is made; and every engagement, though only of the lightest kind, fhould be punctually obferved. If we have added to this engagement a folemn promife, the obligation is fo much the ftronger and he who does not think himself bound by fuch an obligation, has no pretenfions to the character of an honeft man. A breach of promife is ftill worfe than a lye. A lye is fimply a breach of truth; but a breach of promife is a breach both of truth and trust. Forgetfulness is a weak excufe: it only fhews how little we are affected by fo folemn an engagement. Should we forget to call for a fum of money, of which we were in want, at an appointed time? Or do we think folemn promife of fefs value than a fum of money? Having confidered evil-fpeaking and lying, let us next confider flandering. By flander ing, we mean, injuring our neighbour's character by falfehood. Here we ftill rife higher in the fcale of injurious words. Slandering our neighbour is the greatest injury which words can do him; and is, therefore, worfe than either evil-fpeaking or lying, The mifchief of this fin depends on the value of our characters. All men, unless they be paft feeling, defire naturally to be thought well of by their fellow-creatures: a good character is one of the principal means of being serviceable either to ourselves or others; and among numbers, the very bread they eat depends upon it. What aggravated injury, therefore, do we bring upon every man, whofe name we flander And, what is still worse, the injury is irreparable. If you defraud a man, reftore what you took, and the injury is repaired. But if you flander him, it is not in your power to fhut up all the ears, and all the mouths, to which your tale may have accefs. The evil spreads, like the winged feeds of fome noxious plants, which fcatter mischief on a breath of air, and disperse it on every fide, and beyond prevention. Before we conclude this fubject, it may just be mentioned, that a flander may be fpread, as a lye may be told, in various ways. We may do it by an infinuation, as well as in a direct manner; we may fpread it in a fecret, or propagate it under the colour of friendship. I may add alfo, that it is a fpecies of flander, and often a very malignant one, to leffon the merits, or exaggerate the failings of others; it is likewife to omit defending a mifreprefented character, or to let others bear the blame of our offences. Gilpin. § 56. Against wronging our Neighbour by injurious Actions. Having thus confidered injurious words, let us next confider injurious actions. On this head we are enjoined" to keep our hands from picking and stealing, and to be true and juft in all our dealings." and the bad man confifts in this: the good man will do nothing but what his confcience will allow; the bad man will do any thing which the law cannot reach. It would, indeed, be endless to defcribe the various ways in which a man may be dishonest within the limits of the law. They are as various as our intercourfe with mankind. Some of the most obvious of them I fhall curforily mention. this In matters of commerce the knave has many opportunities. The different qualities of the fame commodity-the different modes of aduteration-the fpecious arts of vending-the As to theft, it is a crime of fo odious and frequent ignorance in purchafing and a vavile a nature, that one would imagine no per-riety of other circumftances, open an endless fa, who hath had the leaft tincture of a field to the ingenuity of fraud. The honeft virtuous education, even though driven to fair dealer, in the mean time, has only one neceffity, could be led into it.I fhall not, rule, which is, that all arts, however common therefore, enter into a diffuafive from this in bufinefs, which are intended to deceive, are erine, but go on with the explanation of the utterly unlawful. It may be added, upon other part of the injunction, and fee what it head, that if any one, confcious of having is to be true and juft in all our dealings. been a tranfgreffor, is defirous of repairing his Juftice is even ftill more, if pottible, the fault, reftitution is by all means neceffary: fupport of fociety, than truth; inafmuch as a till that be done, he continues in a course of man may be more injurious by his actions, injustice. than by his words. It is for this reafon, that the whole force of human law is bent to retrain injuftice; and the happiness of every fociety will encrease in proportion to this re ftraint. Again, in matters of contract, a man has many opportunities of being dishonest within the bounds of law. He may be ftrict in obferving the letter of an agreement, when the equitable meaning requires a laxer interpretation: or, he can take the laxer interpretation, when it ferves his purpose; and at the loophole of fome ambiguous expreffion, exclude the literal meaning, though it be undoubtedly the true one. We very much err, however, if we fuppofe, that every thing within the bounds of law is justice. The law was intended only for bad men; and it is impoffible to make the meshes of it fo ftrait, but that many very great enormines will efcape. The well-meaning man, The fame iniquity appears in with-holdtherefore, knowing that the law was not made ing from another his juft right; or in putting for him, confults a better guide-his own him to expence in recovering it. The moveconfcience, informed by religion. And, in- ments of the law are flow; and in many cafes zed, the great difference between the good cannot be otherwife: but he who takes the E3 advan vantage of this to injure his neighbour, proves himself an undoubted knave. It is a fpecies of the fame kind of injuftice to withhold a debt, when we have ability to pay; or to run into debt, when we have not that ability. The former can proceed only from a bad difpofition; the latter, from fuffering our defires to exceed our station. Some are excufed, on this head, as men of generous principles, which they cannot confine. But what is their generofity? They affift one man by injuring another. And what good arifes to fociety from thence? Such perfons cannot act on principle; and we need not hesitate to rank them with those who run into debt to gratify their own selfish inclinations. One man defires the elegancies of life! another defires what he thinks an equal good, the reputation of generofity. Oppreffion is another fpecies of injuftice; by which, in a thoufand ways, under the cover of law, we may take the advantage of the fuperiority of our power, either to crush an inferior, or humble him to our defigns. Ingratitude is another. A loan, we know, claims a legal return. And is the obligation lefs, if, instead of a loan, you receive a kindnefs? The law, indeed, fays nothing on this point of immorality, but an honeft confcience will be very loud in the condemnation The malice and hatred of our hearts arise, in the first place, from injurious treatment; and furely no man, when he is injured, can at firft help feeling that he is fo. But chriftianity requires, that we should fubdue thefe feelings, as foon as poffible; "and not fuffer the fun to go down upon our wrath." Various are the paffages of fcripture, which inculcate the forgiveness of injuries. Indeed, no point is more laboured than this; and with reafon, because no temper is more productive of evil, both to ourselves and others, than a malicious one. The fenfations of a mind burning with revenge are beyond defcription; and as we are at these feafons very unable to judge coolly, and of course liable to carry our refentment too far, the confequence is, that, in our rage, we may do a thoufand things which can never he atoned for, and of which we may repent as long as we live. Befides, one act draws on another; and retaliation keeps the quarrel alive. The gofpel, therefore, ever gracious and kind to man, in all its precepts, enjoins us to check all those violent emotions, and to leave our cause in the hands of God. Vengeance is mine, I will repay, faith the Lord;" and he who, in oppofition to this precept, takes vengeance inte his own hands, and cherithes the malice and hatred of his heart, may affure himself that he has not yet learned to be a Christian. Thefe precepts, perhaps, may not entirely agree with modern principles of honour: but let the man of honour fee to that. The maxBut it would be endlefs to defcribe the vaims of the world cannot change the truth of rious ways in which injuftice difcovers itself. the gofpel. In truth, almost every omiffion of duty may be refolved into injustice. of it. We may be unjust alfo in our refentment; by carrying it beyond what reafon and religion prefcribe. The next precept is, "to bear no malice nor hatred in our hearts." Nay, even in recovering our just right, or in purfuing a criminal to juftice, we thould take care that it be not done in the fpirit of retaliation and revenge. If thefe be our mo |