« ZurückWeiter »
W. L. COURTNEY.
VOL. LXVII. NEW SERIES.
(vol, LXXIII. OLD SERIES.)
[The Right of Translation is rescrved.]
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
AFLALO, F. G.
BAILEY, J. C.
The Coming Afghan Crisis
COUBERTIN, Baron Pierre de. The Possibility of a War between England
DALE, J. A.
GARRETT, F. Edmund .
GREEN, E. M.
Our Military Needs
HERFORD, Prof. C. H. A Scene from Ibsen's “Love's Comedy 191
JACKSOX, N. L.
The Army and the Administration. By “Administrator
Baillie-Grohman, W. A. One Cause of our Defeats, the Service Rifle 714
No. CCCXCVII. NEW SERIES. JANUARY 1, 1900.
THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.
The criticism of military operations in progress, while the issue of momentous events still hangs in the balance, is not to be commended. Conclusions arrived at upon insufficient data may be falsified in the strong light of later, more exact knowledge. Moreover, the notorious uncertainty of war, with its disappointments and surprises, still further complicates the task. It is unwise to justify, ungenerous to condemn while facts and details are more or less imperfectly known. But, conversely, we are surely entitled to deal with matters altogether beyond dispute, and there are many such matters already thrown up into sharp relief by the present war. The manner in which it was undertaken ; the counsels that were paramount among those at the helm; the general principles which were to govern proceedings, and which have been unhappily modified under stress of circumstances; finally, the manifest departure from accepted rules in war, strategical and tactical, all these come legitimately under discussion even at this early stage.
However much the present serious situation in South Africa may have been emphasised and accentuated by recent deplorable misadventure, there can be no sort of doubt that it had its origin in the persistent refusal of the British Government to believe in the nearness of a breach with the Transvaal. They hoped to the last, and with honest conviction no doubt, that diplomacy might still avert the necessity for a last appeal to arms. So, while they still played with protocols and paper arguments, they shut their ears to the urgent and repoated warnings of those who were better informed. There is a general impression that the formidable armed strength of the Boers, which has lately made itself so unmistakably evident, was not fully known to our authorities. But this is not quite the case. Our Military Intelligenoe Department may not have been fully informed on all points, and more particularly as to the presence in the Transvaal ranks of leaders of such undoubted military skill, but the facts as to numbers,