a Confederation by common consent between two or more South African Colonies or States. The Bill need, therefore, have only consisted of one single empowering clause. But, as a matter of fact, the Bill contained a long schedule of the conditions subject to which any South African Confederation could, in the opinion of the Colonial Office, be formed to advantage. The most important of these conditions were the following: The establishment in South Africa of a Privy Council whose members were to be nominated by the Governor-General, and whose function it should be "to aid and advise the Government of the Union." The command of the naval and military forces of the Union was to be vested in the Queen, as represented by the Governor-General. Her Majesty was also entitled to select whatever locality she deemed best for the seat of Government of the Union. The Parliament was to consist of two Houses, the Upper House to be so constituted, both as to numbers and electoral divisions, as the Queen might direct; the Lower House was to be composed of elected members, States comprising the Union to have the right of returning a number of members to the Federal Parliament proportionate to their population. Any Bill passed by the Federal Parliament was not to become law till it had received the assent of the Governor-General. In the event of such assent being refused an appeal was to be made to the Queen in Council, or in other words, to Her Majesty's Privy Council. To this rule there was, however, one important exception: "All laws relating to the natives, or native affairs, were to be reserved by the Governor-General for the signification of Her Majesty's pleasure thereon." To put the matter plainly, the Union of South Africa, even if formed, was not to possess the power of regulating the legal status of the native population. All legislation with respect to natives, which formed, and must form, the most important of the functions of any South African Government, was, therefore, to be reserved to the British Ministry of the day, subject, of course, to the approval of the British Parliament.

There is no object in discussing the expediency or inexpediency of these regulations. The South Africa Act was only passed for five years, and therefore lapsed in 1882. It is obvious, however, that the laying down beforehand of elaborate provisions by an Act of Parliament must enormously increase the difficulties attending any serious attempt to confederate South Africa. The initiative of Confederation must come from below, not from above-from the Colonies, not from the Mother Country. The Colonies have first got to determine whether it is for their own interest to combine together, and, if so, upon what conditions. It will then remain for the Imperial Government to decide whether a Confederation of South Africa, upon the conditions specified, would or would not be for the advantage of the Empire.

It is noteworthy that the opposition to the South Africa Act in Parliament was led by Mr. Courtney. His main objection to the Bill appears to have been that it contemplated the entrance of the Orange Free State into a Confederation under British hegemony, and was, therefore, detrimental to the development of South Africa under Afrikander rule. This academic point of view, whether reasonable or unreasonable, was not of a kind to attract British Parliamentary interest, and the opposition of Mr. Courtney would probably have met with no support if it had not been taken up by the Home Rule Party. The Nationalists, under the guidance of Mr. Parnell, then at the height of his power, chose to consider that to pass a Bill granting, under certain hypothetical conditions, autonomy to South Africa was, so long as Ireland was denied Home Rule, an insult to the Irish people. The debate on the South Africa Act was protracted night after night by all the resources of obstruction available before the introduction of the Closure, and though the arguments of the speakers turned mainly on the wrongs of Ireland, and hardly at all upon the interests of South Africa, the Bill did not pass Parliament till almost the last days of the Session. Whether any further steps would have been taken by Lord Carnarvon to carry out the policy of which he was the principal, if not the sole author, must always remain an open question. At the opening of the Session in 1878 Lord Carnarvon resigned his post as Minister for the Colonies on the ground of his disagreement with Lord Beaconsfield as to the despatch of the British Fleet to the Dardanelles during the Russo-Turkish War. After his resignation no further effort was made by the Colonial Office to continue the policy which had dictated the enactment of the permissive Confederation Bill.

During Mr. Cecil Rhodes's Premiership of the Cape Colony he made an attempt to establish a Customs Union between the South African States, but this attempt was baffled by the absolute refusal of the South African Republic to entertain any proposal for a South African Zollverein. When the Transvaal and the Free State become as there is every reason to expect they will become before long-British possessions, similar attempts are certain to be made. Believing, as I do, that Confederation is essential to the welfare and progress of South Africa, I have thought it worth while to recall the story of Lord Carnarvon's ill-advised and abortive attempt to force Confederation upon South Africa in order to point the moral that any scheme for Union must be initiated by South Africa, carried out in accordance with South African ideas, and based upon the fundamental principle that British Supremacy throughout the whole of South Africa is to be acknowledged, not as a matter of favour but of right. EDWARD DICEY.

THE LATE CAMPAIGN IN NATAL.

THE campaign in Natal practically closed when the siege of Ladysmith was raised. To relieve the beleaguered town was the sole object of Sir Redvers Buller when he abandoned his prepared plan of invasion of the Orange Free State, in order to go to Sir George White's assistance. With the accomplishment of this object the raison d'être of the campaign ceased to exist. There may be further rearguard fighting before the Boers finally retreat over Laing's Nek, but for the present, at any rate, it is improbable that General Buller will follow them into Transvaal territory along a line of advance which presents great geographical difficulties, and was never contemplated in the original plan of campaign. The intention was always to enter the Transvaal from the western side of the Drakensberg Mountains, and but for the "entanglement" of Ladysmith, this intention would have been carried out.

While the campaign was in progress and its object unaccomplished there was a general disposition to abstain from criticism; but after Generals Buller and White had joined hands, and sufficient time had elapsed for information to reach England, there was no reason for postponing an inquiry which the conduct of the campaign had rendered inevitable. The fact that generals have difficulties to overcome does not absolve thom from the fullest examination into their actions. Like other public servants placed in positions of honour, trust, and peril, they must answer for their conduct, and accept the praise or blame of their fellow-countrymen according as they succeed or fail in gaining their approval. What on their side they have a right to demand is that there should be no hasty judgment of their conduct, but that it should be examined by the light of trustworthy testimony, and with due regard to those local considerations which have influenced their motives.

"Two forces have, during the last few months, striven with conspicuous gallantry and splendid determination to maintain the honour of their Queen and country. By the exhibition of the truest courage, the courage that burns steadily besides flashing brilliantly, the forces have accomplished their object, and added a glorious page to the history of the British Empire."1

No more truthful words than these were ever uttered by a British commander; every adjective used was more than deserved. As far as the conduct of the troops is concerned, the campaign will be remembered without a single regret, and the courage and discipline of both the besieged and relieving forces has covered all ranks with imperishable honour.

(1) General order by General Sir Redvers Buller, Ladysmith, 5th March, 1900.

With regard to the "entanglement" itself, public opinion has already acquitted Sir George White of any blame. The original occupation of Ladysmith-the junction of the railways from the Transvaal and Free State-was settled in 1896 for military reasons, and Sir George White's determination not to abandon a point of such obvious strategical value has been justified by all that has happened. A retirement behind the Tugela would have transferred the "entanglement" to Pietermaritzburg, an event which must have had a disastrous effect on British prestige in Natal. By holding the main Boer army round Ladysmith General White not only gained time for troops to arrive from England, but localised the invasion, and compelled the enemy to waste their strength in a fruitless endeavour to capture it. "If I had the last five months over again I would not, with but one exception (Nicholson's Nek) do anything but what I have done." This was Sir George White's deliberate view after the siege had been raised, and the course of events has proved his original decision to be correct.

1

Foresight was undoubtedly wanting in not preparing Natal for defence during the three years preceding the war; but this was before the arrival of Sir George White, who had to make the best of the situation as he found it. Considering the proximity of Ladysmith to the frontier, and the fact that the Boers were known to be preparing for war, common prudence should have suggested the conversion of the British camp into a place d'armes, constituting it an advanced base and rallying-point for the force defending Natal. Had this been done, and a circle of redoubts constructed round the camp, Bulwana Hill, Lombard's Kop, and other positions of 'vantage being defended, the complete investment of the place with the force at General Joubert's disposal would have hardly been possible, and no effective bombardment could have occurred. This is being wise after the event, but those whose business it was to study the possibilities of the campaign from every point of view, should have provided for all contingencies, including the not very remote chance of a Boer incursion into Natal before the arrival of reinforcements.

Let us pass now to the landing of Sir Redvers Buller at Cape Town at the end of October. The first news heard was the defeat of Sir George White on the 30th, and the subsequent investment of Ladysmith. On receiving this intelligence, General Buller took the immediate decision to change the whole plan of campaign. Correctly premising that the main Boer attack was being directed on Natal, and that Sir George White's force was outnumbered, he decided to land the bulk of the Army Corps (two divisions and a cavalry brigade) at Durban; but owing to the investment of Kimberley he detached Lord (1) Conversation with Mr. Winston Churchill at Ladysmith.-Morning Post, 8th March.

Methuen, with 12,000 men, for the purpose of relieving that town. Small forces were at the same time ordered to land at East London and Port Elizabeth, and proceed by rail to check the enemy's threatened incursions into the northern territory of Cape Colony by way of Bethulie and Norvals Pont.

The wisdom of these dispositions has been much debated. It is considered by most authorities that if the original plan of campaign had been carried out the effect would have been to draw off the Boer force from Ladysmith and indirectly cause the siege to be raised. Unquestionably, and admittedly by the Boers, the result of Lord Roberts's movement into the Free State has done this; and if General Buller had not abandoned this line of operation it is reasonable to conclude that Bloemfontein would have been occupied, and Ladysmith relieved, before the end of last year.

The course actually taken involved the division of the army into four columns-Buller, Gatacre, French, Methuen operating from widely separated bases without common action or unity of control. "An army should have but one line of operation, which should be carefully preserved, and abandoned only as the result of weightier and overbearing considerations." This was one of Napoleon's most cherished maxims, from which he departed on only very rare occasions. The result of disregarding this maxim during the present campaign is within recent public recollection-fragmentary defeat all along the line. The various local reverses sustained by the British in December may be partly attributable to tactical errors, but the primary reason of the impasse which confronted Lord Roberts on his arrival in South Africa was the fact that the British army was dispersed in scattered bodies throughout the theatre of war, instead of being concentrated in one direction for the purpose of striking a decisive blow.

The determination, moreover, to carry the war into Natal allowed the Boer leaders to choose their own battle-ground. The northern part of Natal is specially suited for Boer defensive tactics, while the nature of the Free State territory favours British methods of fighting. The time lost in transferring the Army Corps from Cape Town to Durban, and in reorganising the transport arrangements, would have been better spent in forwarding the troops with the utmost despatch to the Orange River. General Buller would probably justify his decision on the ground of the risk that would have been incurred by leaving Natal to be overrun by the Boer invasion. So long, however, as General White's force remained in occupation of Ladysmith there was no real danger of this. Sufficient time existed to place Pietermaritzburg in a state of defence, and a brigade could have been sent to reinforce its garrison. The further General Joubert advanced into Natal, the longer the line he would have to retrace when compelled (1) Napoleon's Maxims.