THE CONFEDERATION OF SOUTH AFRICA.

THERE is a general consensus of opinion amidst the British public that the war in South Africa can only be terminated either by the absolute surrender of the Boers or by their complete defeat. With this opinion I am most heartily in unison. Nor do I in any way dissent from the view which forms an almost essential corollary to the above conclusion, that, till matters have settled down after the war, the two Boer Republics must be administered as Crown colonies, under a British military occupation. I am, however, unable to regard the withdrawal of the right of self-government from any part of British South Africa as anything more than a temporary postponement of the various questions at issue, which Great Britain will be called upon to decide as soon as war gives place to peace. Events move far more rapidly in a new country than in an old; and I believe myself, as I have believed throughout, that, when once the military force of Boerdom is crushed, a demand for the reconstruction of our South African possessions on the basis of British supremacy will be raised not only by the British but by the Dutch colonists. If, as I hold, the idea of a guerilla warfare being waged by the Boers after the regular warfare is over, is an utter delusion, England, at the close of the war, will be brought face to face with the issue how self-government in South Africa can best be reconciled with the sovereignty of Great Britain. Under the circumstances, it is worth while to recall an abortive attempt to solve this problem made a quarter of a century ago by the Colonial Office. Let me tell, as briefly as may be, the salient facts of this curious and little-known chapter in the history of the British Empire.

In 1875 the late Lord Carnarvon was Secretary of State for the Colonies. All persons who have had the pleasure of enjoying his lordship's acquaintance will, I think, agree with me in saying that he was a man of high culture, and still higher principle, a most painstaking and conscientious Minister, endowed with loftier aspirations than are commonly to be found amongst men engaged in political life. It is no disparagement to his singular ability to say that he was rather a student than a statesman, that he knew more of books than of men, and that he took himself, his duties, and his position, somewhat too seriously. It hardly needs remarking that, as Minister for the Colonies, South Africa probably gave him more trouble than any other portion of our Colonial Empire. This has been the case almost from the day when the Cape first came under the rule of England. In the above-named year two questions connected with

South Africa were occupying the attention of Downing Street. They were those of Griqualand West and of the treatment of the natives. Little need be said here in respect of these questions. With regard to the first, it is enough to remark that, on the discovery of the diamond fields at Kimberley, Griqualand West had been annexed by British settlers, that the Orange Free State disputed the validity of the annexation, on the ground of prior possession, and that the justice of this contention was upheld by the Boers not only in the Free State but in the Transvaal and the Cape Colony. The second issue excited more general interest both at home and in South Africa. The question whether the treatment of the natives by the Boer States was or was not the main cause of the Kaffir raids and wars was complicated by racial as well as theological animosities, while it assumed exceptional importance from the dread of an invasion of Natal and the Transvaal by the Zulus, whose military power under Cetewayo was regarded as a standing menace to the whole white population of South Africa.

As far as can be gathered, the Colonial Office, as usual, was desirous of not taking any direct responsibility in respect of either of these vexed questions. Something, however, had got to be done, and Lord Carnarvon, whether of his own initiative or on the advice of the permanent officials, determined to suggest the holding of a Conference of representatives of the different South African Colonies and States, to discuss the Griqualand West and native questions. By a "happy thought," with whose origination Lord Carnarvon must fairly be credited, it was further suggested that the Conference should be invited to consider inter alia the advisability of uniting the Colonies and States represented by its members into "a peaceful and harmonious Union" under the British flag. Lord Carnarvon had taken an active part in the Confederation of Canada, and it is intelligible enough that he should have imagined that a system which had proved so successful in our North American provinces ought to prove equally successful in our South African Colonies. In theory the idea was excellent; in practice it laboured under two defects. In the first place the time was not ripe for its realisation; in the second the mode in which the project was introduced to the South African public was calculated to secure its rejection, even if there had been, at the period in question-which there was not-a very strong popular feeling in favour of Confederation.

The despatch recommending the holding of the Conference was sent off without any previous communication either with Sir Henry Barkly, then Governor of the Cape Colony and High Commissioner of British South Africa, or with the Cape Ministry. With extraordinary want of knowledge of Colonial nature in particular, if not of human nature in general, Lord Carnarvon actually designated by name the persons who in his opinion should be chosen to represent the States

represented at the Conference, and then, taking it for granted that the proposal of a Conference was sure to be accepted in South Africa, proceeded to disclose the name of the personage who would be nominated by the Colonial Office to represent the interests of the British Empire at the Congress. That personage was James Anthony Froude, the author of The Nemesis of Faith and the eulogist of the Tudor dynasty.

I yield to no one in admiration of Mr. Froude as a man of letters, as a master of English prose-writing, and as a vigorous partisan controversialist. But to me, as to all who knew him, there is something positively comic in Mr. Froude being selected to conduct most complicated negotiations in such a country as South Africa, where his literary repute would be absolutely useless, and where his many scholarly attainments would be actually disadvantageous to the success of his mission. To the end of his life, far as he had drifted from the faiths, political, religious, and economic, of his early manhood, he preserved the unmistakable air and aspect of the Oxford don, the college tutor, and the Anglican divine. He was undoubtedly a highly cultured gentleman, but in no other sense could he be called a man of the world. His knowledge of foreign countries, otherwise than by books, was as limited, and that is saying a great deal, as his knowledge of foreign languages. In social life he was, as a rule, extremely reserved, almost shy, and, though courteous and polite, the word genial was the last epithet one would employ in any description of his outward manner and aspect. To anyone who knows South Africa, or indeed any British Colony, the idea of Mr. Froude lobbying in committee-rooms, canvassing local politicians, being hail fellow well met with Tom, Dick, and Harry, taking part with relish in rude chaff and coarse conversation, and treating, or being treated, at town bars and roadside stores, seems not only inadmissible but impossible. “Qu'allait-il donc faire dans cette galère ?" is a question to which I should find it only less difficult to find an answer than to suggest any adequate explanation for his selection by Lord Carnarvon to act as envoy of England in South Africa.

It is obvious to anyone who can read between the lines, that Lord Carnarvon's despatch was received with disfavour both by Sir Henry Barkly and Mr. Molteno, the then Premier of the Colony. They both felt, not without reason, that such a proposal should not have been sprung upon them without their opinion as to its expediency being first ascertained. They also felt aggrieved at the selection of Mr. Froude as envoy of the Imperial Government without their being previously consulted. The envoy, I may remark, had already started on his voyage to the Cape before the arrival of the despatch recommending the formation of the Conference at which he was appointed to assist.

The despatch in question arrived on the 2nd June, 1875, and was

discussed at a Cabinet Council on the 7th June. After a brief deliberation the Ministry decided that "without entering upon a discussion as to the extent to which the many important questions touched upon in this despatch may affect this Colony, Ministers are of opinion that its interests would not be promoted by pressing forward at the present time such a Conference as the Secretary of State proposes." Sir Henry Barkly, as Governor, was bound to accept without demur the decision of his Ministers, whom he justly describes as his "responsible advisers." He waited, however, before communicating their refusal to the Colonial Office, to ascertain how far the Ministry had the support of Parliament in declining to entertain the idea of a Conference. Any doubts he entertained were speedily removed, for on the 11th of June Mr. Sprigg, now Sir Gordon Sprigg, moved a resolution in the House of Assembly approving the action of the Government, and this resolution was carried by 32 to 23. Sir Henry Barkly seems to have considered that the attitude of the Cape Colony knocked the Conference project on the head, as a South African Conference from which the Premier Colony stood aloof would be like Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. He therefore decided not to transmit Lord Carnarvon's invitations to the other States, whose co-operation at the Conference was requested, till such time as he could hear from home.

It is hardly to be wondered at if Lord Carnarvon felt keenly the summary rejection of his scheme, whose acceptance he had obviously deemed a foregone conclusion; but for a long time he seems to have clung to the belief that the rejection was due to want of zeal on the part of the Cape authorities, and that wiser counsels would prevail when once popular opinion in the Colony had pronounced itself, as he was certain it would, in favour of Confederation. In a despatch dated 18th July, 1875, after expressing his regret and disapproval of the action of Sir Henry Barkly, as High Commissioner, in not having already sent out the invitations addressed to States other than the Cape Colony, he ordered this to be done at once, and gave it as his opinion that the refusal of the Cape Colony to join the Conference, even if persisted in, furnished no reason why such a Conference should not be held. His Lordship remarked also, "that there are, at the present moment, some very important matters more immediately affecting the Transvaal Republic and Natal as to which I should anticipate much benefit from an interchange of opinion, such as the result of the arbitration respecting Delagoa Bay, the course to be taken in consequence of the award, and the hostile attitude of the Zulus.” He appears to have been convinced that if only any two of the South African States could agree to meet in conference to discuss matters of common interest, the advantages of such a meeting would be so manifest that the Cape Colony would desire to join the Conference. The Cape Ministry, however, justly or unjustly, assumed that this modifi

cation of the original proposal was tantamount to the complete withdrawal of the Confederation project.

Before the letters announcing the modification of the initial despatch had been received Mr. Froude had arrived in Cape Town. Greatly to his surprise, he received a very cold reception. Sir Henry Barkly, both as Governor and High Commissioner, could scarcely be expected to be pleased with the unexpected arrival of an envoy who had been appointed, without his opinion being consulted, to represent the British Government at a South African Congress, who possessed the complete confidence of the Colonial Minister at home, and who apparently had a right to consider himself as Lord Carnarvon's mouthpiece. I see no reason to doubt that Mr. Froude was perfectly loyal in his dealings with the official representatives of the Imperial Government. But no man in Sir Henry's position could well avoid taking umbrage at the appointment of a private gentleman, with no official experience, and with a very slight knowledge of South Africa as compared with his own to assist him in conducting negotiations which naturally should have been conducted by himself as High Commissioner. Mr. Froude had also relied confidently upon the personal support of the Prime Minister, Mr. Molteno, with whom, on a previous visit to South Africa, he had been in friendly relations. Mr. Molteno, however, who was a type of the average Afrikander politician before the era when Mr. Rhodes became a power in Cape politics, completely ignored his previous intimacy with Mr. Froude. He gave the envoy to understand that his mission could not be recognised by the Cape Government, that he himself could only deal with the recognised official representatives of the British Empire in South Africa, and he distinctly told Mr. Froude, to use this gentleman's own words, that "if I accepted any invitation to speak in public I should be committing a constitutional offence."

The truth is that neither Lord Carnarvon nor Mr. Froude seem to have realised the true character of South African public opinion with regard to Confederation. Till a much later period there was no strong general desire for Confederation. Both the Dutch and the British were willing to establish some sort of Federal Union, but only on condition that the Union so formed should promote the ascendency of their own nationality. The Afrikander ideal was that Confederation should be brought about by the incorporation of other South African States with the Cape Colony. The ideal of Natal-then as always the headquarters of British influence in South Africa-was the formation of a confederacy under which the various component States should remain politically separate communities, while the British supremacy should be upheld by the Imperial Government exercising a virtual, if not a nominal control, over the action of the proposed Union. At Downing Street a delusion prevailed that Boer and