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1. That the district court of the U. S. sitting as a court of bankruptcy, has all necessary chancery powers and jurisdiction for the full administration of the bankrupt act.

2. That a landlord levying, before a decree in bankruptcy, for rent due before such decree, has a lien, under the statute of Anne, of force in this state. on the property of his tenant, and such lien is undisturbed by the bankrupt act.

3. That the apprehension of the petitioning creditors, that a sale under a landlord's distress warrant will canse a sacrifice of the tenant's goods to the injury of the other creditors, furnishes no ground to enjoin the landlord's proceedings.

4. That the facts that the landlord was a preferred creditor for his rent under a vuluntary assignment of his tenant, and that he had expressed his willingness (without personally accepting the deed of assignment) that the assignee should sell and pay him his rent, did not impair his legal remedy. [Charleston Courier.

men, or miners; or any liens, mortgages, or other se-
curities or property, real or personal, which may be
valid by the laws of the states, respectively, and
which are not inconsistent with the provisions of the
2d and 5th sections of the act.

It may be proper to observe, that the term "laws
of the states" employed in the act of congress, is not
to be understood as embracing the judicial decisions,
or rules of the courts; but is limited to local statutes,
and local usages of a fixed, and permanent operation,
(Swift vs. Tyron, 16 Peters, 18-19.) The statutes
are, however, to be read in connection with the con-
structions of the highest local courts; such judicial
exposition being regarded as becoming part of the
acts by defining their true meaning. (Bank U. S. vs.
Daniels, 12, Peters 32 )

proceeding; and as creating no lien or right in respect to assets so procceded against, (1 Paine R. 531 532-2 Litt. Ken. R 222 MeFerren vs. James.)

The decision on the question of lien in this case must accordingly rest upon the provisions of the revised statutes of this state, and the construction given the act by the state courts.

The act provides that a creditor stiuated as Heckscher is may file a bill in chancery against his judgment debtor, and any other person, to compel the discovery of any property, or things in action belonging to the judgment debtor, or money, &c. due to him, or held in trust for him, and to prevent the transfer, or the payment, or delivery. thereof, to the defendant; and shall have power to decree satisfaction of the judgment out of such effects as shall be discoverI regret to find the decisions of this court do not ed by the proceedings in chancery, whether originalharmonize with the learned and forcible reasoningly liable to execution or not, (2R, S. 173, 4. Sec. of the circuit court of the first circuit: in respect to 38, 39.) the import and application of the phrase “any liens” | It is very clear that the statute does not assume used in the proviso above quoted. The term has to act directly upon the assets of a judgment debtor, Decision. Judge Monroe recently decided the fol- been understood and expounded here in several cases, to bind them specifically in the way, real or personal lowing points in a case before the United States dis- as used in a familiar sense, and as comprehending all estate is bound by judgment and execution. A power privileges and charges upon the thing recognized by is conferred upon the court of chancery to entertain trict court of Kentucky. The petitioner filed affidavit that a portion of his creditors, since the fil- local statutes, or long established usages of the prin- suit of a special character, founded upon the equity ciples of general law, and the court has not stopped therein designated. ing of his petition, had sued out execution and were about to sell his property, and asking the interfer-to weigh the qualifications or restrictions English judges have been disposed to attach to the subject. In that view it has not been deemed important to analyze and collate the decisions of the English courts of law, to ascertain to what extent hens are recognised and upheld; there the act of congress, being understood to have direct reference to the law in this respect as it exists in the particular state, irrespective of the source from which it may have been derived.

ence of the court. The court ruled:

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1st. That the decree of bankruptcy, when render. ed, relates to the time of filing the petition, and the assignee will have a right to recover, in trover, the value of any property taken and sold upon executions issuing after the filing of the petition.

2d. That the assignee will have no right to recover the value of property sold under an execution, alter the filing the petition, but which was issued and levied before the petition was filed.

3d. That whether or not the assignee will have a right to recover the value of property, taken in execution, which issued before the filing of the petition, but which was levied upon and sold after the filing of the petition, is a vexed question, and not decided.

Important decision as to attachments and previous state liens. The very important and much roote question as to the effect of attachments of the property of bankrupts prior to the institution of proceedings in bankruptcy, was decided by Judge Story on Sat urday, in an opinion of great length, in which he discussed the whole subject with his usual ability

and clearness. The result to which he came was,
that such ettachments would not hold the property, but
would, in chat be dissolved by the proceedings in bank
ruptcy. This decission is considered of more impor-
tance by legal gentlemen, than any which is likely,
to arise under the bankrupt law, and in some of the
states, it will make a vast difference in the effects of
bankrupts. Judge Story remarked, that as the deci-
sion was of great importance, he should furnish it
to the law reporter for publication, and he hoped the
council in the case would do the same with their ar-
guments.
[Boston Merc. Journal.
[See extracts from the "Boston Daily Advertiser"
under the Fiduciary head.]

From the N York Courier and Enquirer.
United States district court, southern district of New
York. In the matter of John 11. Coster, a bankrupt,
His honor, Samuel R. Betts, district judge deliver-
ed the following decision:

It is unnecessary to rehearse the facts in this case farther than to present the single point in controversy, which is, whether the choses in action, and effects of the bankrupt not subject to execution, pass to the general assignce, under the decree of bankruptcy or helong to the receiver appointed under a creditor's bill.

On the first of February, 1842, Charles A. Heck scher, a judgment creditor, filed a bill in chancery pursuant to the laws of the state of New York, against the bankrupt; and on the 9th of April obtained an order for the appointment of a receiver, and on the 25th of April a receiver was appointed by the court, to whom the bankrupt on the 27th of April assigned his choses in action, effects, &c.

On the 16th of February, the bankrupt presented his voluntary petition to this court, to be declared bankrupt, and a decree of bankruptcy, thereupon, was rendered, on the 30th day of April.

The general assignee claims, that the estate of the bankrupt, as it was when his petition was presented, became vested in him, by force of the decree in bankruptcy, and the judginent creditor insists, that by virtue of his proceedings in the court of chancery, he acquired a prior lien on the property, which is preserved to him by the bankrupt act.

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Whether this be an inherent, or only a statutary jurisdiction of the court, the legislature has pointed out plainly its officers, and the method of its exercise; and the question is, whether it be a necessary incident to such suit. that the particular property, sought to be controlled, should be definitely bound by it from its inception.

There are cogent considerations arising from the
wording of the statute against this acceptation of its
import.-First, The action essentially looks to a dis-
The common law decisions, it was thought, would closure of assets belonging to the judgment debtor:
therefore only supply evidence of the state law, in and not to the arrest of such as are patent and known,
absence of any definitive statute, or usages, existing and accordingly the court is empowered "to compel
in the state on the subject, or at most could be re-a discovery:" Until this discovery is made, the sup-
sorted to, but for illustration, or as an exponent of posed lien must be floating and in abeyance, and is,
provisions, derived from, or familiar to the common
moreover, to remain contingent without any thing
law.
to rest on, whilst the court is considering whether
the property discovered can be made subject to the
demand.

Judge Story in his very able discussion of the sub-
ject (Foster's case 5 law reporter 55) seems to regard
the English rule, as the controlling consideration,
and to adopt the conclusion, that, where there is no
possession of the thing, actual or constructive, there
can be no lien asserted in regard to it; and the logi-a
cal tendency of the reasoning, if not the expressed
result is, to deprive judgment creditors of priority
of payment under the bankrupt act out of the real
estate bound by their judgments, there being no pos-
session accompanying the lien claimed.

A line er vi terminies presupposes a definite object on which it acts; and laying out of view other considerations, how can it be in a legal sense asserted that

lien can subsist on the indebtedness or liability of third persons to the judgment debtor, which the creditor's bill in this case seems to have appropriated to the judgment debt?

Second. When a discovery is made, the court has power given it to prevent a transfer of every descripWithout the advantage of that decision to guide tion of property belonging to the defendant: This its judgment, this court had adopted a different con-power would be unnecessary, if the property was alclusion with respect to the meaning and operation of ready bound by the commencement of the action; the word lien, here employed by congress, and had nothing more would then be required than an order accepted it as importing any charge fixed by law upon that the specific thing claimed by the lien, should go the property, or imposed by the party, in consonance to its satisfaction. But the tenor of the section mawith existing laws and usages. nifestly denotes that the power is not conferred to uphold and effectuate a lien as such, but to detain every species of property and interest tangible, or equitable, where it may be operated upon when by the ultimate judgment of the court it shall be found liable to the applications sought for.

Should this case, or any future one present the point, so as to bring the views of this court in direct collision with the opinion of the circuit court of the first circuit, I should not assume to execute my own conclusions, but shall adjourn the point to the circuit court, having immediate supervision of the decisions of this court.

The question raised by this case, is, whether the judgment creditor, by virtue of his proceedings in chancery, acquired a lien on the property and effects of the bankrupt, so as to prevent their vesting in the general assignee on the rendition of the decree of bankruptcy?

The petition presented to the court as the foundation of the present motion, does not designate the property and effects of the bankrupt, which passed to the receiver by means of the chancery suit:-On the argument, however, it seemed to be conceded that the property consisted wholly of effects not subject to execution, choses in action, credit, &c. &c.

It has been decided by the judge of this court on an injuction bill filed in the circuit court, that the general principles of chancery law, will not sustain a creditor's bill, to secure, or act, upon property, not liable to execution at law; and also, on a review of the state decisions, the judge adopted the conclusion that no doctrine was established in the state chancery upholding such jurisdiction, anterior to the passage of the revised statutes, (Lanson, vs. Mix, 6 Hunt's Magazine 72.)

But if the point has been definitely decided by the state courts in favor of the jurisdiction, such decision within the rule declared by the supreme court, (16 Feters 18) would not become a state law, and as such obligatory upon the courts of the U. States. A bill filed by a judgment creditor independent of The proviso to the second section is "that nothing the statute, to arrest his debtors effects not liable to in this act contained, shall be constructed to annul, execution, and apply them in satisfaction of the destroy, or impair, any law ful rights of married wo-judgment, would be regarded by this court, a void

Third, The fund or property is not necessarily allotted to the prosecuting creditor, after it is acquired by the receiver. The chancellor says "the receiver is the officer of the court. and holds the fund subject to the equitable rights of all parties to be disposed of under the order of the court."

These suits are employed as inquisitions, acting upon a defendant or his supposed trustee by a searching scrutiny, to ascertain, if per chance, effects of the judgment debtor may not be brought to light. They are ordinarily merely experimental. The receiver may even be appoiuted before it is known that there is any property, and his office, when property is discovered, is nothing more than to collect and preserve it, pending the litigation. (Bloodgood vs. Clark 4 Paige 557). Even his appointment, therefore, does not indicate any devotion of particular property by the judgment of the court to the objects of the suit, nor does the commencement of a suit seem to be regarded in the state courts as settling the right of priority, as between different parties instituting these creditory actions, but the matter is open to adjustment by the court upon the general equities subsisting in the cases, and established at the hearing.(Osbern vs. Heyer; 2 Paize, 342). This power of controlling, or disposing of the fund upon considerations of the equities of al' parties, would seem to exclude the idea of a specific lien on it in favor of any one. This description of action will undoubtedly protect every subsisting lien of a judgment, or execution creditor, against subsequent assignments of the party, or those made by operation of law; (1 Paine 431) and may aid such lien in render available under it, residuary trust interests, which could not

be sold by the execution at law. (Mc Dermott vs. |lished rules of chancery or by imparting benefits The appeal, in the first instance, to the court of Strong, 4 John, Ch R 687) but that species of equita- under it to judgment creditors, beyond those admin- chancery in cases like the present, to reclaim proble jurisdiction and relief, is widely different from istered by the accustomed laws of the court, to par-perty under its custody, should be required no less one, which imposes an original lien on property by ties invoking its aid on grounds of like equity, and after a decree in bankruptcy, than before. force of filing a bill merely. The act in terms in no shall, therefore, hold, that the creditor's bill in this What might previous to the decree, be only matter way declares the existence of the suit shall have such case, created no specific lien on the property of the of precaution upon which the court of chancery would effect, and the remaining inquiry is, has it heen ad- bankrupt, and that in consonance with the ordinary act with a view to existing an possible interests of judged by the state courts that a creditor's bill by principles of the court, it only secured to the com- all concerned, would, after a decree of bankruptcy, force of the provisions of the statute imposes a spe-plainant a priority of payment out of the fund which become referred into a legal and rested right in the cific lien on the estate of the defendant, subject to the may be ultimately adjudged hable to the debts of the assignee and creditor's which that court would be proceedure? I find no such express adjudication, judgment debtor always ready to recognise and assist. nor any principle established, that necessarily invol ves that construction of the act.

The chancellor seems to consider the rule to have been so declared to Lord Hardwicke, (1 Paige 309 Beck vs. Burdett) but it is clear that the English chancery regarded a creditor's bill, es no force, different from any lis pendens respecting a particular thing which will not be so suffered during such suits to be transferred to another, and taken out of the jurisdiction of the court. (Edgell vs. Heywood, 3 Atk. 356.537.)

And it is to be remarked that the observation of the chancellor in Beck vs. Burdett, must have been offered as a mere suggestion, because the decision was, that the complainant's bill did not bind the property in that case. The repetition of like language in Edmeston vs. Hyde, 1 Paige 639 640, (propounds no different doctrine: neither the facts, or the scope of the argument requiring more than the determina tion of the point whether a single creditor was entitled to the entire fruits of the action prosecuted by him, or if he must share them ex equo bodo with other3, standing in equal relation with hisself at law, to the judgment debtor; and both these cases were decided under the general law, before the revised statutes went into operation, and are not, therefore, to be regarded as any exposition of the act in question.

The term lien does not seem to be used in the N.

This, it appears to me, is the plain and sensible
bearing of the spirit of the decisions upon the sub-
ject.

Chancellor Walworth seems to have hesitated and
struggled in his own mind with the question, whether
equity did not demand a pro rata distribution of the
debtor's estate amongst his creditors pursuant to the
course of chancery in similar administration, and in
the end yielded the point to the exclusive advantage
of the prosecuting creditor, upon the consideration
of his diligence and having incurred all the risk and
expense of the prosecution. (1 Paige 639.)
This privilege of priority of payment not only
must yield to rules of equal distribution, established
| by positive law as a bankrupt, or insolvent law, (Lu-
cas vs. Altrood, 2 Stewart 293) but is adopted by the
courts in the absence of a bankrupt law, essentially
with a view to approximate in degree to the equity
of a code which devotes all the means of a debtor
without regard to the character or situation of his
interest to the payment of his debts, (Fadden vs.
Spader 20 John R. 561)

I think, therefore, the judgment creditor in this
case, has no rightful authority over the funds of the
bankrupt, by means of this creditor's bill, which can
withdraw them from distribution in subordination to
the backrupt art, and appropriate them exclusively
to his own debts.

York or English cases, in a strict and technical sense, | Nothing more is presented by the petition and mo-
as denoting a fixed security in the thing but rather tion for the decision of this court, than the general
to express a priority of right acquired by the prose-question, whether filing a creditor's bill in the state
cuting crediter over others, standing in other re- court of chancery constitutes a lien, or other securi-
spects on legal and equitable equality with bin. ty, on the effects of the bankrupt, valid by the laws
They regard the lis pendens as over-riding all of the state, and which by virtue of the last proviso
subsequent transactions, and securing to the prose to the 24 section of the bankrupt act prevents such
cuting creditor the enforcement of the remedies he effects passing to the assignee of the bankrupt.
might claim, had the estate or means of the debtor
continued to the decree in the same situation they
were when the bill was filed. (20 John R. 564,
Hayden vs. Spader; 4 John 61, 687; Mc Dermott vs.
Stacy, 2 Stewart, (Ala.) 378; Lucas vs. Alwood, 1
Peters 209; Mechanics' Bank vs. Seton, 1 Story, Eq.
93, 396); and accordingly speak of such operation
of the suit as a lien.

I am of opinion that it does not. I apply this deci-
sion in its broader sense, and hold, that such credi-
tor's bill creates no lien, or security, on real or per-
sonal property, and do not, therefore, discuss the
point, whether any other than tangible property can
be brought within the saving of that proviso.
The delivery of the effects and property over to
the receiver, works no change that strengthens the
right of the judgment creditor.

It moreover comports more with the comity due from one independent tribunal to another, to refer to the action of each, those matters subject to its particular control, than for either to attempt to act coercively in respect to the other.

A peremptory order upon the receiver in chancery, controlling him in the execution of his trust, would be in effect, a mandate on the court:-and I am not satisfied that the bankrupt art gives any such authority to this court, nor can I suppose, if the power is unquestionable, any occasion will ever arise in which its employment can become necessary.

Should the court of chancery decline ordering the delivery of this property to the assignee, his remedy at law against the receiver would be in no respect barred or hindered thereby. 14TH. PROPERTY WHICH MAY

BE

RETAINED BY OR

ALLOWED TO THE BANKRUPT.

Late decisions in bankruptcy. Judge Story of Boston, has decided-1st. That a debtor is entitled to all his earnings from the day that he files a petition to take the benefit of the general bankrupt la v. 24. That between the date of the petition and the appointment of the assignee, the debtor is bound to take care of the property for the benefit of the creditor, and is entitled to an allowance of the same as trustee. 31. That a wife can be deprived of jewelry given her by her husband, but not of jewelry owned by her before marriage, or given her after marriage by persons other than her husband. Presents to any persons made by an insolvent, can be claimed by the assignees.

Wife's paraphernalia. The following case was decided under the bankrupt law, with reference to the legal character of jewelry:

U. States district court-Boore judge Belts.-Tucsday, March 15. The court gave its decision on the motion in the case of Kasson, as to jewelry being part and parcel of wearing apparel. This the court did not deem to be correct. The law permitted a man to retain $300 worth of furniture and stores, and the wearing apparel of himself and wife, be it such as it may, but in that was not comprehended a watch or articles of mere ornament which were The distinction, however, between a right to priority of payment, out of a given fund, or particular personal property and must be given up. The pracIf no bankruptcy existed, the question would yet! property, and a specific lien thereon, is plainly re-remain to be settled by the court of chancery on hear- tice of our equity courts was to permit a wife to ognised by the authorities, and is exemplified in ing, whether this property, or any part of it was retain the ornaments which belonged to her previous the relation of the United States and their sureties applicable to his judgment. That point has not been to marriage, (which would be properly termed pato a public defaulter or a debtor, in particular cases, decided in the state court, and the property accord- raphernalia.) This court does not feel disposed to on revenue bonds, &c., (3 Church, 73, 1 Paine 629; 5 ingly remains with the receiver as the depository of pursue a less liberal course, and feels anthorised even Mason 572; 1 Peters 586, 6 ibid 262; 4 Peters 147, the law until the rights of all parties may be settled. her friends--such as miniatures of herself or childto go further, and permit her to retain presents from 291; 12 Peters 102), and in other instances of chan- I regard it of no consequence that the steps in the cery jurisdiction; as the right of partnership credi-state court preceded a few days those in the bank ren--or even from her husband, provided his cirtors, to payment out of effects in cases of insolven-rupt court, and that the creditor perfected an assigncumstances permitted it, subsequent to her marriage. cy, before the private creditors of any separate part- ment to the receiver two days before the final decree The court alluded in terms of much cloquence to ner; (1 Story 625) and the converse in respect to se-in bankruptcy. the condition of women under various hws, and parate creditors and separate effects of the partners; | spoke of some, (Louisiana for instance), where the It was no longer a race of diligence between comwhere the right to priority of payment out of the petitor creditors, but the fiat of the act of congress personal exertions, presents, &c. in her own right.) wife is even allowed to retain the proceeds of her fund is maintained although the cases explicitly de-interposed the paramount and conclusive rule of eclare that such parties have no lien; (6 Vesey, 126; quality, shielding the property of the bankrupt from in the present case, Mr. Kasson possesses a cold 11 Vesey 3; 17 Vesey 521.) watch, which he must consider personal property, transfer or encumbrance after his bankruptcy, and and give up to the assignee. The jewelry of his Chancery in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdic-dedicating it to the common use of his creditors. wife consists of some gol! rings, a chain for the hair, tion, will give efficacy to this prior right of payment The decree of bankruptcy passes all rights of pro- and a breastpin, which belonged to her before marby injoining any transfer of the fund or property perty of the bankrupt to the assignee instanter on its pendente lite; 2 Story Ec. 190, 1) in as si ple a man-entry; and it has been uniformally held in the bank riage. These she had a right to retain. The watch ner as is authorized by the state statutes. Compar rupt courts, that every interest the bankrupt possess. This also, she had a right to keep, provided the hus was given her by her husband after their marriage. ing these familiar incidents of a chancery suit with ed when proceedings in bankruptcy were instituted hand was in such circunstances at the time as altthe proceedings authorized under the state statute, passes to the assignce by force of the decree. thorised him doing so. On this latter point the geand it would seein manifest, that nothing was conneral assignee must be the judge. templated in the latter beyond placing the judgment on a like footing with suitors in that court, pursuing a similar remedy.

If he does not come into court with a lien, by means of his judgment or execution on property sought to be made available thereto by aid of equity, his suit enures to the creation of the lien no further than on any other original bill in the court, where superior diligence would be recognized as giving right to priority of payment.

And there would seem to be no reason for extending by construction the operation of the statute in this respect, so as to confer a priority on this class of suitors, distinguishing them from other parties possessing precisely equal equities.

In the absence of a clear and settled interpretation of the statute by the state trouals giving the effect demanded in the present case, I ain no way inclined to execute it by innovating up on the estau

This doctrine has been re, catedly declared in this court, and with great strength and fullness in the Massachusetts district, (5 Law Reporter, 24 ibid 56).

The relief sought in this instance is an order on

the receiver to deliver the effects in question to the
general assignee.

were selected in order to present the various points to [The petitions of Mr. Kasson and Mr. Zarega the court, so that a general decision might be obtained. The parties themselves were perfectly wailing to conform with the full requirements of the law.] This application, as a mere motion, in my judg [New York Tribune. ment ought to have been addressed to the court of Right minded persons will always be willing to chancery. The receiver is the officer of that court, Live up all they have, to pay their debts. But when and detains this property in that capacity. This court has, on several occasions, declined to interferet sound to be taken from a wife the little ornaments, we come to the laws of forcible collection, how would with, and arrest, the property of a bankrupt pending of whatever kind, which are associated with the his voluntary application and prevent its seizure on friends and scenes of more prosperous days? We go execution or delivered in chancery to a receiver, on for placing the entire property of a woman under the ground, that, until a decree of bankruptcy, there her own disposal, and giving her husband no more was no exclusive power over the property vested in [Cin. Chron. this court, and also that the state courts would be right in it than she has in his. controlied in their proceedings by the act of congress, and would deny porties any advantages or remedies, which might contravels the spirit of that law.

It will be recollected that judge Betts recently decided in the matter of Kasson, that the jewelry of a bankrupt's wife, if belonging to her before her mar

riage, do not vest in the assignee, but may be held by her. On the other hand, the last number of the Law Reporter, (for May) contains the original opinion of jude Story, in which he goes into the subject at lent, and rules, among other things, that the busband becomes entitled to all the personal property belonging to the wife at the time of her marriage unless his marital right is excluded by some express or implied trust, and his creditors may take it in execution or satisfaction of their debts; so that, ordinarily, the wife's jewelry must pass to the creditors, in case of the bankruptcy of the husband.

United States Circuit Court..--On Saturday, judge Story gave decisions on several points in bankrupt cases, which had been referred to him from the dis

trict court.

On the petition of Jonathan H. Cheney, setting forth that he was imprisoned at the suit of a creditor but that since his arrest he has been declared a bankrupt, and asking whether he is lawfully held in jail, judge Story decided that this court has no jurisdiction in this case, as the proceedings and arrest under the state laws were prior to the declaration of bankruptcy under the United States law.

The petition of B. R. Grant set forth that he claimed the allowance of a certain sum of money which had been expended for the necessary support of his family; that his wife has a watch which he gave her some years ago, and other articles of jewelry given to her by other friends, but which the assignee claims as the property of his creditors; that his two sons each of them have a gold watch purchased as a keepsake with money presented to them by a friend-that he contributed twenty-eight dollars each to the purchase of these watches, over and above the money presented by their friend, but that the assignee also claims these watches.

Judge Story decided that in the first point the sum claimed might be taken into consideration by the assignee in setting apart the $300 allowed a bankrupt by law to be retained out of his estate, or that it might, with the approval of the district judge, perhaps, be allowed as part of the necessary expenses incurred in protecting and taking care of the property before it was finally transferred to the assignee. With respect to the watch of his wife, as it was bought with his money, it formed a part of the personal estate, like any personal property which she might have had previous to her marriage, and, of course, if the creditors claimed it, they were entitled to it and must have it. But that gifts presented to her by her personal friends for her own ornament and use, were not his to dispose of, could not be attached by his creditors, and she could hold them. With respect to the watches of his sons, they were the property of the sons, but as the money with which they were bought came in part from him, his creditors had a pro rata interest in them, and if the creditors insisted, on proper notice being given, the interests of those creditors might be sold to the sons or to a third person. Neither of these points involved any great amount of property, and there was no doubt they could be satisfactorily settled without this reference to the court, but they were so referred in order to establish principles by which assignees and bankrupts might be governed.

manity prompts that it should be held sacred. It | This was a case certified from the district court
decided that the tomb must not be considered as a upon a point arising in bankruptcy. The petition
portion of the assets.
stated that on the ninetceuth of April. 1842, the pe-

At the district court. in Hartford, Conn., a bank-titioner filed his petition in the district court, pray-
ing that he might be declared a banki pt, pursuant
cut petitioner was opposed on the ground that he to the statute; that prior to the filing of said petition
owned two sets of tools-one for jomer's work, and and on the fourteenth day of February, 1842, Chas.
another for moving buildings. The judge promptly Arnold and Henry Adams, merchants and partners,
decided that he had a right to retain both sets.
under the name of Charles Arnold & Co. of Boston,
U. States Circuit Court-Boston.-Cows and Silver being creditors of the petitioner and Hamlin, his
Spoons protected in Bankruptcy.—In this court, on Sa- late partner, to the amount of upwards of fourteen
turday, judge Story made an interesting decision in hundred dollars, caused certain property to wit: the
relation to the amount of property which the assignee stock in trade of the petitioner, of the value of about
twenty-seven hundred dollars, to be attached and
of a bankrupt may allow to him, under the law.-
The bankrupt in this case was Ziba Williams, and taken into the possession of the sheriff of the county
his assignee, being under the impression that he could of Essex by virtue of a writ sued out by them against
allow him only actual necessaries, refused to permit the petitioner on the fourteenth of February 1842,
him to retain the following (among other) articles, and made returnable at the court of common pleas
viz: one clock, a set of silver tea spoons, one silver for the county of Suffolk. then next to be holden in
table spoon, one silver watch, and one cow-the total Boston in April, which said suit was still pending and
undecided; that on the 12th day of March, 1842, and
value of which was $33.
P. W. Chandler. Esq., for the bankrupt, took ex-prior to the filing of said petition, being unable to
ceptions to this allowance, and when the case came pay his debts, the petitioner applied to David Roberts
before judge Sprague he adjourned it into the cir- esq., a master in chancery, of the county of Essex,
cuit court, where judge Story gave a decision on for the benefit of an act entitled "an act for the re-
Saturday, in which he held that the assignee was lief of insolvent debtors, and the more equal distri-
right as to the clock and the silver watch, and that bution of their assets," enacted by the authority of
they ought not to be allowed to the bankrupt. But the state of Massachusetts. on thr 23d day of April,
in regard to the silver spoons and the cow, the assig- 1838; supposing the said law to be unrepealed and
nee was not bound to take them from the bankrupt, in full force at the time of his said application for
nor was he bound to allow them to him. He might the benefit thereof; that upon said application a war-
or might not, under the circumstances of the case. rant was issued and publication made and other pro-
He was to exercise a reasonable discretion, and he ceedings had, pursuant to the act last named, and
might permit the bankrupt to retain them, if he that on the twenty eighth day of March, 1842, John
Ayres, of Boston was duly appointed the assignee
thought they were necessaries.
of the goods and estate of the petitioner, and accep-
ted said trust under the act aforesaid; that after the
appointment of said assignee, he was informed that
doubts were entertained respecting the validity of
said proceedings under the said insolvent act, and that
he was advised by counsel that the same had been
repealed, from and after the first day of February,
1842, by force of the statute of the United States,
establishing a un form system of bankruptcy, and
was recommended, in behalf of his creditors, to file
said petition in this honorable court, for the purpose
of protecting the property aforesaid for the benefit of
all his creditors, if the assignment aforesaid should
be adjudged invalid; that said Arnold & Co. were
seeking and intended to secure payment in full of the
debt due to them from the petitioner and his partner,
out of the property aforesaid, and to levy an execu-
tion thereon, by means of the suit and attachment
aforesaid, to the great injury and detriment of the
other creditors of the petitioner, and contrary to law
and equity; that said Ayres was seeking to obtain
possession of said property under his said appoint-
ment as assignee as aforesaid, and that if, as the pe-
titioner had reason to apprehend, the proceedings un-
der said act of the state of Massachusetts should
prove to be invalid, or if said Arnold & Co. should
levy any execution upon said property, the assignee
of the estate of the petitioner, who might be appoin
ted upon the said petition, would be put to great
trouble and expense in recovering said property, or
its value, for the benefit of all the creditors of the
petitioner under the said statute of the United States.
Wherefore he prayed, that an injunction might issue
to restrain said Arnold & Co. from prosecuting fur-

We understand that the assignee (W. G. Stearns, Esq.) under this decision, immediately determined to allow the bankrupt to retain the cow and the spoons.

Boston Post.

15th. INFLUENCE OF THE BANKRUPT LAW ON THE

STATE INSOLVENT LAWS.

"Taking the benefit." There is an important diffe-
rence in the operation of our state insolvent law, and
that of the national bankrupt law, which has just
gone into operation.

Those who avail themselves of the benefits of the
state law, are free from arrest for the debts they may
be owing at the time they declare their insolvency;
but the property they may thereafter acquire by heirship,
will be held liable for their old debts. Of course they
are kept "under the harrow" till their old debts are
paid.
Those who avail themselves of the benefits of the
national bankrupt law, are not only free from arrest,
but they may wash themselves clean of every debt, new and
old, under which they may be laboring; and their earn-
ings, after they receive a discharge, cannot be touched
by any creditors for a debt existing at the time of such dis-
charge. The reader will at once perceive the diffe-
rence between the operation of the two laws.

Massachusetts insolvent law. The Massachusetts insoivent law has been suspended by the legislature during the continuance of the bankrupt act; but the proceedings in all cases commenced before the act takes effect are to be continued, as if no such act had In another case, in which the right to dispose of passed. No day is fixed for the suspending act to 50 farm without waiting for the further settlement of into operation, hence it takes effect in thirty days bankrupt's estate was asked, judge Story decided from its passage. The insolvent law may then be ther their said suit, and to restrain them and said that in bankrupt cases the court was a court of equity considered in full force until the second day of April Ayres from farther intermeddling with said proper

a

a

as well as a court of law, and had power as such to order, with the consent of parties interested, the sale of property for the benefit of the whole, or in the case of perishable property without such consent. In this case, as the sale before the season of planting should be over might make a great difference to the bankrupt and to all the creditors, he decided that order of notice might be published a sufficient time for all persons to come forward and object, previous to a certain day, and if no opposition should be made, or no good and sufficient reason be offered against it, the district judge might order a sale.-Boston Cou

rier.

In New York two important decisions have recently been made by judge Betts. The first in a ease where the petitioner had entered into an engagement with a house as clerk and general agent, at a salary of $1500 a year, and one third the net profits of the establishment, should any accrue. This the creditors claim to be property, and insist that it thould have been placed in the schedule. The court held otherwise, deciding that the prospective proceeds of a man's labor cannot be claimed by a credi tor in bankruptcy. The other is where a petitioner owns half a family tomb in the marble cemetery, which the assignee has requested to have placed in his bands as the property of the bankrupt. The court held that a family burial place belongs rather to the dead than the living, and every feeling of hu

next.

ty; and for general relief.

A correspondent furnished us last week with a no- Upon the hearing in the district court, the followtice of an important decision made by Judge Story, of ing question was ordered to be adjourned into the Massachusetts, the effect of which was that the bank-circuit court: "Whether, by law, an injunction can rupt law of the United States, upon going into opera- be issued as prayed for in the said petition." tion, in February, 1842, ipso facto, suspended all ac- The case was now submitted by Dehon for the petion upon future cases arising under state insolvent titioner, no council appearing on the other side. laws, where the insolvent persons are within the purview of the bankrupt act; in other words, that the bankrupt law has superceded state legislation on the subject. We have since met with a full notice of the case in which this decision was made, and now publish it for public information: [Balt. Amer. United States circuit court, Massachusetts. In the maller of Lucius Eames.

STORY, J.-The question for the decision of this court is, whether by law an injunction can be issued against Ayres, the assignee of Eames, under the insolvent act of Massachusetts, as prayed for in the petition of Eames; and this involves the simple consideration, whether the bankrupt act of the United States of 1841, ch. ix., when it came into operation in Feb. last, suspended the operation of the insolvent act of Massachusetts, as to persons within the purview of the bankrupt act, who might afterwards become insolvent. If it did, then the injunction ought to be granted; if it did not, then should be refused.

The bankrupt law of the United States, upon going
into operation in February, 1842, ipso facto suspend-
ed all action upon future cases arising under state
insolvent laws, where the insolvent persons were
within the purview of the bankrupt law.
My opinion is, that, as soon as the bankrupt act
Where A. took advantage of the insolvent law of went into operation in February last, it, ipso facto,
Massachusetts after the bankrupt law of the Unit suspended all action upon future cases arising under
ed States went into operation, and an assignee was the state insolvent laws, where the insolvent persons
duly appointed in pursuance of the law of Massa- were within the purview of the bankrupt act. I say
chusetts, and A. subsequently petitioned to be de- future cases, because very different considerations
clared a bankrupt under the law of the United would or might apply, where proceedings under any
States, it was held that an injunction ought to issue state insolvent laws were commenced, and were in
against B. (the assignee) to restrain him from in-progress before the bankrupt act went into operation.
termeddling with the property of A.
It appears to me that both systems cannot be in ope-

ration or apply at the same time to the same persons; and where the state and national legislation upon the same subject, and the same persons, conie in conflict, the national laws must prevail, and suspend the operation of the state laws. This, as far as I know has been the uniform doctrine maintained in all the courts of the United States.

Indeed, I consider the whole matter in effect disposed of by the reasoning of the supreme court in the case of Sturgis vs. Crowninshield, (5 Wheaton R. 122.) Mr. Justice Washington and myself were of opinion in that case that the power to pass a bankrupt law was exclusively vested in congress by the constitution of the United States, and that no state could pass a bankrupt law, or an insolvent law, having the effect of a bankrupt law, where it discharged the debtor from the obligation of his prior contracts. Mr. Justice Todd was absent from indisposition, and there fore did not sit in the cause. The other four members of the court (constituting the majority) concurred in the decision, which was pronounced by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall. But all the court were agreed, that when congress did pass a bankrupt act, it was supreme, and that the state laws must yield to it, and could no longer operate upon persons or cases within the purview of such act. The enactment of such an act suspended the state laws on the same subject, and created a visibility in the states to exercise powers of the like nature. The court went farther; and asserted that the bankrupt act of 1800, ch. xix, had that very operation, except so far as the sixty-first section of the act modified or allowed the exercise of the powers by the states.

The case of Ogden vs. Saunders, (12 Wheaton R. 2, 3, 264, 273 276, 278, 296, 311, 314,) fully recognised, and has always been understood to confirm and settle the same principle. It seems to me, therefore, that nothing remains, upon which an argument can be founded, that the insolvent laws of Massachusetts are not as to persons and cases, within the provision of the bankrupt act, completely suspended. Each system is to act upon the same rights, and upon the same persons-creditors as well as debtors. Both cannot go on together without direct and positive collision; and the moment, that the bankrupt act does or may operate upon the person or the case, that moment it virtually supercedes all state legislation.

I shall, therefore, direct it to be certified to the district court, that in this case, by law an injunction can be issued against the said Ayres, as prayed for in said petition of Eames.

ed."

At the April term, 1842, the following rule was adopted:

"That so much of the rule passed the 21st of April, 1836. as relates to individuals who have been released from imprisonment under the insolvent laws of the state of Maryland, be and the same is hereby restricted to the cases of persons discharged under said laws, prior to the second day of February, 1842, (the day when the bankrupt act went into operation) and so much of said rule as is inconsistent herewith, be and the same is hereby rescinded."

The effect of this decision is this: If a party is arrested, on process from the circuit court, and is unable to give bail, he must be imprisoned, and cannot be discharged from imprisonment, by applying for the benefit of the state insolvent laws, for no discharge under them will be respected by the Marshall Nor can he be discharged by applying for the benefit of the bankrupt law, until he has complied with all its requisitions, which will require a period of at least ninety days. P.

touching the influence of the U. States bankrupt |
law upon the insolvent law of this state, was made
by the judges of the court of common pleas yester-
day. The sheriff being in doubt as to the operation
of the general bankrupt law, recently gone into ope-
ration, upon the old insolvent law of the state, and
how far he was justified in continuing to discharge
prisoners from custody upon their filing their usual
insolvent bond in the office of the prothonotary of
the court of common pleas, and wishing to clear
himself of all personal responsibily, in consultation
with the U. States district attorney, took the neces-
sary steps to have the question decided by the pro-
per tribunal. That it might come before them in a
tangible form, he refused to discharge an individual
from custody who had, in conformance with the act
of assembly for the relief of insolvent debtors, filed
an insolvent bond in the office of the prothonotary
of the court of common pleas, and sent him to pri-
son. The prisoner was brought before the honora-
ble judges of the court of common pleas yesterday
upon a habeas corpus, before whom, sitting in bank,
the question was fully argued-the opposing counsel
assuming that the United States law does, upon con-
stitutional principles, supercede the law of a state.
The court decided that the prisoner was entitled to
his discharge, he having previously given the bond
required by the insolvent law of this state, to appear
at the next insolvent court, to comply with the re-exclusive."
quirements of said law. It was, moreover, the opi- Now a communication appeared in the American,
nion of the court that congress, in framing the gene- apparently the production of some very indiscreet
ral bankrupt law, never contemplated the annul- person, calling attention to the mere "notice of an
ment of the insolvent laws of the states, and that opinion recently pronounced by Judge Story," alleg
such an operation of it in Pennsylvania would be ing that "Story J. was clearly of opinion, that, as soon
fraught with the most serious consequences. It as the bankrupt act went into operation, it did ipso
would be extremely oppressive to the poor, and facto suspend all action upor future cases arising un-
those whose estates are completely exhausted, inas-der the state insolvent laws," and intimating that
much as the proceedings under it are not only more Judge Taney and Judge Heath are "of the same opi-
complicated and expensive, but relief could only be nion," and hazarding the assertion that "nothing can
offered at one place of sitting in the eastern and be more certain than that all the discharges granted
western judicial districts of the state, instead of in by the commissioners of insolvent debtors, under the
every county, as at present, so that insolvents would state insolvent system, since the 20 day of February,
be obliged to travel from the most remote part of 1842-the day on which the bankrupt law took effect
the state, to Philadelphia or Pittsburg, for relief, at a
ruinous and oppressive expense and delay.

Maryland-State insolvent system. We understand that the commissioners of insolvent debtors for this city, believing that their offices are superceded by the bankrupt law, have declined to receive any new applications for the benefit of the insolvent laws of The Charleston Courier in republishing the above this state. The bankrupt law as we understand it, decision remarks:-"Should this decision be well abrogates entirely the insolvent laws of this as well founded, all discharges from debts under state laws, as every other state in the union, and the decision of since the passage of the bankrupt act, will be nugato- Judge Marshall, when the state insolvent laws were ry; and it may even be questionable whether the pri- is to this effect. We have not the decision at hand. the subject of investigation before the supreme court, vilege of the prison bounds, which is an incident of most state insolvent laws, may not be seriously affect but our impressions are that the opinion goes to this extent. Such being the case, there may be found, in the practice under the bankrupt law, some inconveNew York-Bankrupt. Decisions in bankruptcy niences which congress may find it necessary to corcases are constantly occurring in New York, by which rect at its present session. Among these, we have open questions under the law are becoming settled. heard one that the court has no power to discharge A debtor under arrest claimed a discharge on giving from arrest a person applying for the benefit of the bond to take the benefit of the insolvent law. The law, until the day of final hearing; and, it is supposed sheriff, being in doubt whether the bankrupt did not under this, that an insolvent debtor might be kept in supercede the state act, refused to take bond. On a writ of habeas corpus the question of the operation of the former upon the latter was argued before all the judges of common pleas, who after due deliberation gave their opinion that with regard to voluntary bankrupts the bankrupt law did not take away the right of discharge under the insolvent law.

Pennsylvania-insolvents and bankrupts. The judges of the court of common pleas have decided that the bankrupt law of the United States does not super cede the state laws on insolvency, but that both may exist together, and applications be made for the benefit of either, voluntarily, at the choice of the debt

or.

As we understand this decision, it is that a discharge from the insolvent laws of this state will exonerate from personal arrest in Pennsylvania, while a discharge under the bankrupt law, will exonerate throughout the whole union. For example, a man may be pressed in Philadelphia on a debt of a few hundred dollars, which bonding, he may pay in time, or not paying, get rid of, by taking the benefit of the state law; while he may nevertheless feel altogether indisposed to become a bankrupt in a general sense, and avail himself of the immunities of the national law. [Phila. Inq.

Highly important decision. U. S. bankrupt law vs. the state insolvent laws. A highly important legal decision, says the Philadelphia Chronicle of Saturday,

*See Mr. Justice Washington's oponien 'n Ogden vs. Saunders, [12 Wheaton R 263 264

+Sturgis vs. Crowningshield, (4 Wheaton R 196.) tId. 9. 101, 102.

Messrs. Editors. Please lend me the use of your columns for one moment. It is a fact that, in the case of Ogden vs. Saunders, before the supreme court, (12 Wheaton 213,) Judge Story assented to the judg ment which was entered for the defendant in error, the opinion of that court being that the powers given to the United States to pass bankrupt laws is not

-are void and worthless.

Charity for the writer in the American may not consider his remarks both "void and worthless; but "nothing can be more certain" than that three respectable judges in Maryland, Judges Archer, Purvi ance and Magruder-well informed lawyers-have unanimously decided, in the matter of a certain application for the writ of habeas corpus, that the personal discharge of the commissioners of insolvent debtors entitled a party confined in jail to his liberty, notwithstanding the 2d day of February had gone by. Story, or Heath, entertain any opinion like that asI do not believe that those eminent judges, Taney, cribed to them by the writer in the American. bankrupt law is bad enough, but not altogether as terrible as the writer in question may infer. TRUTH. [Baltimore Clipper.

The

in the American of Saturday, in which it was staWe noticed yesterday an article which appeared ted, that Chief Justice Taney and Judge Heath concurred in opinion with Judge Story, that the bankrupt law annulled the state insolvent laws.

We

duress from the time of his application to the day learn that the only question decided in the circuit
when he is declared a bankrupt. A liberal, if not a
just construction of the law, may authorise the court, of the bankrupt law, which was determined at-
court of Maryland, was as to the constitutionality
as was the practice under the insolvent laws, to take
security for the personal appearance of the insolvent firmatively. In Baltimore county court the question
on the day fixed for his hearing, and this construc. Maryland were still in force, and, after an able argu-
was directly made, whether the insolvent laws of
tion may be adopted by the courts, when the ques-ment by learned council, the court unanimously de-

¡ion comes before them.

Other difficulties have been suggested, but, under to be only the imaginings of the exuberant fancy of a wise administration of the law, these may be found some of our lawyers, and to have no other founda[Baltimore Pat.

tion.

cided that they were annulled by the bankrupt law. From this decision there has been no appeal; and of by the superior court, the insolvent laws will contincourse, until a different decision shall have been made ue to operate. It is a matter of great importance to insolvents to have the question authoritatively deterTo the editor of the Baltimore Patriot. Sir:-Al- mined; because it is possible that, after having been though there has been no decision in the circuit court released from their debts by the state law, they may of the United States for the district of Maryland, have to resort to the bankrupt law; by which they involving the important question whether the insol- would be greatly harrassed and have to incur consivent laws of the state have been abrogated by the derable additional expense. Great anxiety prevails passage of the bankrupt law, yet that enlightened on the subject, and existing doubts should be remov court, of which, it will be recollected, the chief jus-ed by taking a case up for decision. [Clipper. tice of the United States is the presiding judge, has We learn from the Westminister Carrolltonian, just adopted a rule, which is quite as significant of its opinion as if the question had been formally decided upon argument.

that the judges of Carroll county court have declined to grant discharges to insolvent petitioners. They have withheld their assent until the question is deAt April term, 1836, that court adopted the follow-cided by a higher tribunal, whether the national ing rule: bankrupt law does not supercede the state insolvent laws entirely. The importance of this question, not "That, if the defendant, upon a capias does not give sufficient appearance bail, he shall be commit-only to the people of that county, but to those of the ted to prison to remain until discharged by due course cision by the competent authority. whole state, should ensure it a prompt and final deof law; but under neither original, mesne, nor final process, shall any individual be kept imprisoned, who, under the insolvent law of the state, has for such demand, been released from imprisonment.

We understand that Frederick county court, ju 'ge Thomas Buchanan, presiding, decided, that a certifi cate of a party against whom a suit had been brought,

Π

53

ad applied for the benefit of the bankrupt law, entled his special bail to have an exoneratur entered pon the bail picce, and the bail was accordingly ischarged.

OPPOSITION TO THE TARIFF.

Such was the mo

Had revenue been the main object, the duties would not so far have transcended those levied during the early and pure days of the government. By the first tariff of 1789, most of the duties were as low as As faithful chroniclers of passing incidents and as On Saturday last an argument was made before indicating the probable course of coming events, it five and ten per cent. Then revenue was much heir honors the judges of Baltimore county court, becomes our duty to register proceedings which needed to defray the current expenses of the governull bench present, on the validity of the insolvent threaten the permanence of the existing laws regu-ment, and discharge the debt contracted during the aws of the State of Maryland, in their application lating trade or levying dutics upon imports. That war of the revolution. From 1789, to the war of to the personal discharge of a debtor from arrest and an attempt will be made even at the ensuing session 1812, the tariff was altered from time to time, and deration with which the taxing power was exercised, mprisonment, since the bankrupt law has gone into of congress, to repeal the tariff act passed at the last yet scarcely an instance can be found in which the operation. A writ of habeas corpus being sued out, a session, is highly probable;-that a most formidable duty exceeded twenty per cent. debtor was brought from the jail as an applicant for attempt is to be made at the session after the next,¦ his release from imprisonment in virtue of the au- to effect its re: eal there is no doubt. That we might at a time when the national debt greatly exceeded thority vested in the insolvent commissioners. The expect the law to be assailed by the combined influ-its present amount. During the last war, commerquestion was argued at considerable length by messrs. ence of every foreign interest, and by the indefatiga-cial intercouse was suspended, and an impulse was Nelson, Walsh and Gill, and this morning the court ble efforts of diplomatic skill of every commercial thereby given to our domestic manufactures. When so much stability to our manufactures, as to enable delivered their decision in favor of the applicant, country in Europe, and through the more insidious the tariff of 1816 was passed, it was then thought, that them, successfully, to encounter foreign competition. thereby establishing the efficiency of the insolvent medium of foreign agencies in all their millions of moderate protection, for a few years, would impart law to secure the personal discharge of the debtor. ramifications throughout our trading avenues we The case at bar did not involve any other of the have repeatedly signified. The question is strictly In this opinion Mr. Clay concurred; and he then repoints which belong to the subject, though the pre-American interests, in opposition to foreign interests, marked, that "three years would be sufficient to place our manufactures on this desirable footing." But he sent decision may be considered as virtually covering though we have no immediate prospect of foreign the whole ground, and confirming the legality and hostilities, we have infallible testimony of foreign knew not the extent of manufacturing cupidity, and, validity of the insolvent system as it has been hith- demonstrations against the interests of our trade and in 1824, he zealously supported the high tariff of To such an extent was the policy erto administered, thus affording the citizen the right our manufactures,-both of which they are avai of protection pushed, that the preservation of the of becoming a bankrupt in a manner most agrecable cious of monopolizing for their own profit. Nor is that year. This was followed by the tariff of 1828, to his taste, according to the old or the new fashion, this the only, nor the chief point of danger. The and that o' 1832. American tariff is to he assailed by political parti- : The passage of the compromise allayed the state or the national.-Clipper. of "REPEAL" "REPEAL," was hoisted the very day gered. United States bankrupt law and the Maryland insol- Zans for local and political party objects. The flag union and the peace of the country were endanThat there is to be an agitation, and restored tranquillity. This act was We give below a decision of Baltimore that the bill passed congress. garded as a compart between the agricultural county court in relation to the effect the bankrupt organized effort for that object the following article the result of mutual consession, and may be relaw of the United States, passed at the late extra and oder tot-mandeturing interests on the one session, upon the state insolvent law, which we beand, and the manufacturing interest on the other, lieve to be interesting. It guarantied protection to the manufacturing interest for nine years, with the understanding, In the matter of the petition of H. Schutz, for a hamade by their respective representatives in conthat the duties should be reduced to twenty per cent. beas corpus. The petitioner, it appears, is detained in gress. on the 30th of June, 1842, and that, thereafter, ducustody by the warden under a commitment for debt by a justice of the peace, although he has a Buckingham has struck the first ball against the ties should be laid not for protection, but "for the personal discharge granted by the commissioners of insolvent debtors. If there be any case in which tariff, in favor of a state convention. The report, purpose of raising such revenue as may be necessa the commissioners have power to grant a personal which we have the pleasure of laying before our ry to an economical administration of the governdischarge, we must give validity to the discharge readers this morning, from the democracy of that ment." Revenue was the only object, according to now before us, as, not having any thing before us but the personal discharge, every presumption would county, is worthy of public attention. Its principles the compromise, for which duties were to be imposbe made in favor of the order of the commissioners. are true-its statistics are valuable. Pass the balled after the first of July last. This measure carried It cannot, we think, be doubted, that an individual who has committed no act of bankruptcy may, if he please, apply by petition to the state tribunal, and by complying with the terms of the state law, be entitled to his discharge.

vent law.

The states, independent of the bankrupt law, possessed full power to discharge imprisoned debtors from confinement, and of consequence, to impose the terms and conditions upon which such discharge) shall be granted. And notwithstanding the bankrupt law, it is competent for them to discharge from confinement the debtor, if in doing so, they do not conflict with the bankrupt law. In the case supposed, we cannot conceive how any conflict would arise-certainly none exists in the fact of discharge, nor could it well arise, for if the insolvent, notwithstanding his application to the state courts, should afterwards apply by petition for benefit of the bankrupt law, the property of the petitioner would either pass to the assignee in bankruptcy, or it would not. In neither event would the personal discharge create any conflict. There might be a conflict of title as to the property, and if such should arise, the law of congress must prevail. But it is not believed there would be a conflict of title, because the conveyance to the trustee is for the benefit of all the creditors, and such conveyance could scarcely be deemed fraudulent and void under the bankrupt law. If the applicant in the courts of the United States be found guilty of fraud, and do not obtain his certificate, while in the courts of the state he should be acquit ed, still there would be no conflict, so far as the discharge of the person is concerned, for, as to the validity of the personal discharge the courts of

the state would have to decide that.

It must be observed, that we are not called upon in this case to decide any question as to the final discharge, under the insolvent laws, so far as the same may effect any contracts which he has made subsequent to the law, and that inquiry not arising here, the question being simply as to the efficacy of the personal discharge.

Upon this question we mean to intimate no opinion. Nor do we mean to give any intimation of an opinion on the question how tar, where an act of bankruptcy has, in fact, been committed, it is within the power of the state tribunals, to discharge the person-this question not necessarily arising in the We abstain, also, from expressing case before us. any opinion how far, as to all cases not covered by the bankrupt law, our state insolvent laws are in The petitioner is discharged. [Balt. Clipper.

force.

1

demonstrates:

The Richmond Enquirer of the 21st nlt. contains the proceedings of a meeting of the mocratic party" of Buckingham county Virginia,hich the editor attracts attention to by the following endorsement.

around!"

"The First Ball.

BUCHINGHAM COUNTY.

At a meeting of the democratic party of the county of Buckingham held at the tavern of Mr: Edward Puryear, at Buchingham court house, on the evening of the 10th October, 1812-on motion, Major Charles Yancey was called to the chair, and col. Joseph Fuqua, appointed secretary.

The object of the meeting was explained by Robert T. Hubard, esq. in a few remarks, who concluded by saying that, as it was late, he would offer to the meeting the following preamble and resolutions, which were adopted, to wit:

with it a pledge between the conflicting interests of the country, as solemn as any which could be imposof amity and peace," which no statesman could dised by legislation-Mr. Clay spoke of it as a "treaty turb; and General Harrison said, "I am for support

"to alter

nufacturing interests faithfully observed it. They the compromise, and never will agree to its bedid more: Such was their liberality and magnanimiing repealed." The agricultural, and other non-inaly, that they abstained from an earlier reduction of duties than actually occurred, a right clearly sustained by the compromise,-the 6th section of either of excess or deficiency of revenue," which authorized congress "in the coningency We, the democratic party of Buckingham, con- the duties prior to the 305 June, 1542, and “advened in primary assembly, deem it important to just the revenue to either of the said contingenour interests and our rights, to make known our opi- cics." There was au excess of revenue in 1835, and nions of the new tariff bill-a law, in relation to twenty-eight millions were loaned to the several which, longer silence might be construed into appro- states. Then, the anti-tariff party had a right to reval or acquiescence. Efforts have been made to quire a reduction of the duties and in forbearing to create the impression, that the public sentiment of do so, they evinced towards the manufacturers a liVirginia has undergone a radical change upon the berality not likely to be reciprocated. subject of a protective tariff. Although many of the southern people had thus acted, when the benefits of whigs of this state, who were formerly clamorous the compromise were about to enure to them by a against a tariff for protection, are now its advocates, return, not to free trade, but to a 20 per cent, standwe are confident that a large majority of the people ard of duties, the manufacturers, eager for gain, will be found consistently and faithfully adhering to thankless for past favors, heedless of past dangers, their principles. it devolves upon the people of other and in utter violation of every thing like good faith, counties to decide, whether they will remain silent called for renewed protection. In his speech in supand permit their views to be misrepresented, or co- port of the compromise, Mr. Clay said, "give us operate with us in publicly condemning this obnox- time; cease all fluctuations and agitations for nine tain themselves against foreign competition. They have ious measure, and urging a reduction of the duties to years, and the manufacturers in every branch will sus

a fair revenue standard.

After the

To a tariff, honestly framed for the purpose of rais-had protection again and again during the last twening revenue sufficient for an economical administra- ty-six years and instead of being able now to sustion of the government, we are friendly; but we are tain themselves against foreign competition, we find decidedly hostile to any tariff which is nominally for them visiting Washington, appealing to congress, and "Who" (said revenue, yet substantially for protection. Taxation, like sturdy beggars imploring protection with an when moderate, uniform and really necessary to meet earnestuess worthy of a better cause. the exigencies of an economical administration, will J. B. Say) are the classes of the community so imnot arouse the indignation, or call forth the remon-portunate for heavy import duties? The producers strances of freemen. It is when the taxes are ex- of the particular commodity, that apply for proteccessive, or unequally levied and particular interests tion from competition, not the consumers of that thereby fostered to the prejudice of others, that op- commodity. The public interest is their plea, but position and remonstrances are becoming and justifi- self-interest is evidently their object. Well, but, say able. Equality of benefits, and equality of burdens these gentry, are they not the same thing? Are not are essential attributes of a just and wise adminis- our gains national gains? By no means-whatever tration. Had not the present tarif imposed unequal profit is acquired in this manner, is so much taken and excessive burdens, we should have remained out of the pockets of a neighbor and fellow citizen: *Mr. Webster, in his late speech at Boston alluded silent; but the present law is in our opinion, highly beneficial to one branch of industry, and oppressive upon others. In several instances the duty is from to be compromise, and sat first was on act which 50 to 150 per cent., and the average duty is estimat-in effect, proposed to restrict future legislatures from rais ed at 36 per cent upon the aggregate of imports.-ing the duties beyond 20 per cent., after 1842.

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