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cially, had excited great hostility to that colonial system which had been adopted by every country in Europe; and sufficient allowances were not made for the prejudices by which that system was supported.

The treaty, therefore, when exposed to the public view, found one party prepared for a bold and intrepid attack, but the other, not ready in its defence. An appeal to the passions, the prejudices, and the feelings of the nation, might confidently be made by those whose only object was its condemnation; while reflection, information, and consequently time, were required by men whose first impressions were not in its favour, but who were not inclined to yield absolutely to those impressions.

That a treaty involving a great variety of complicated national interests, and adjusting differences of long standing, which had excited strong reciprocal prejudices, would require a patient and laborious investigation, both of the instrument itself, and of the circumstances under which it was negotiated, before even those who are most conversant in diplomatic transactions could form a just estimate of its merits, would be conceded by all reflecting men. But an immense party in America, not in the habit of considering national compacts, without examining the circumstances under which that with Great Britain had been formed, or weighing the reasons which induced it; without understanding the instrument, and in many instances without reading it, rushed impetuously to its condemnation; and, confident that public opinion would be surprised by the suddenness, or stormed by the fury of the assault, expected that the President would be compelled to yield to its violence.

In the populous cities, meetings of the people were immediately summoned, in order to take into their consideration, and to express their opinions respecting an instrument, to comprehend the full extent of which, a statesman would need deep reflection in the quiet of his closet, aided by considerable inquiry. It may well be supposed that persons feeling some distrust of their capacity to form, intuitively, a correct judgment on a subject so complex, and disposed only to act knowingly, would be unwilling to make so hasty a decision, and consequently be disinclined to attend such meetings. Many intelligent men, therefore, stood aloof, while the most intemperate assumed, as usual, the name of the people; pronounced a definitive and unqualified condemnation of every article in the treaty; and, with the utmost confidence, assigned reasons for their opinions, which, in many instances, had only an imaginary existence; and in some, were obviously founded on the strong prejudices which were entertained with respect to foreign powers. It is difficult to review the various resolutions and addresses to which the occasion gave birth, without feeling some degree of astonishment, mingled with humi

liation, at perceiving such proofs of the deplorable fallibility of human

reason.

The first meeting was held in Boston. The example of that city was soon followed by New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Charleston; and, as if their addresses were designed at least as much for their fellow citizens as for their President, while one copy was transmitted to him, another was committed to the press. The precedent set by these large cities was followed, with wonderful rapidity, throughout the union; and the spirit in which this system of opposition originated sustained no diminution of violence in its progress.

On the 18th of July, at Baltimore, on his way to Mount Vernon, the President received the resolutions passed by the meeting at Boston, which were enclosed to him in a letter from the select men of that town. The answer to this letter and to these resolutions evinced the firmness with which he had resolved to meet the effort that was obviously making, to control the exercise of his constitutional functions, by giving a prompt-ness and vigour to the expression of the sentiments of a party, which might impose it upon the world as the deliberate judgment of the public.

Addresses to the chief magistrate, and resolutions of town and country meetings, were not the only means which were employed to enlist the American people against the measure which had been advised by the senate. In an immense number of essays, the treaty was critically examined, and every argument which might operate on the judgment or prejudice of the public, was urged in the warm and glowing language of passion. To meet these efforts by counter efforts, was deemed indispensably necessary by the friends of that instrument; and the gazettes of the day are replete with appeals to the passions, and to the reason, of those who are the ultimate arbiters of every political question. That the treaty affected the interests of France not less than those of the United States, was, in this memorable controversy, asserted by the one party, with as much zeal as it was denied by the other. These agitations furnished matter to the President for deep reflection, and for serious regret; but they appear not to have shaken the decision he had formed, or to have affected his conduct otherwise than to induce a still greater degree of circumspection in the mode of transacting the delicate business before him. On their first appearance, therefore, he resolved to hasten his return to Philadelphia, for the purpose of considering, at that place rather than at Mount Vernon, the memorial against the provision order, and the conditional ratification of the treaty. In a private letter to the secretary of state, of the 29th of July, accompanying the official communication of this determination, he stated more

at large the motives which induced it. These were, the violent and ex !raordinary proceedings which were taking place, and might be expect ed, throughout the union; and his opinion that the memorial, the ratification, and the instructions which were framing, were of such vast magnitude as not only to require great individual consideration, but a solemn conjunct revision.

He viewed the opposition which the treaty was receiving from the meetings in different parts of the union, in a very serious light;-not because there was more weight in any of the objections than was foreseen at first,-for in some of them there was none, and in others, there were gross misrepresentations; nor as it respected himself personally, for that he declared should have no influence on his conduct. He plainly perceived, and was accordingly preparing his mind for, the obloquy which disappointment and malice were collecting to heap upon him. But he was alarmed on account of the effect it might have on France, and the advantage which the government of that country might be disposed to make of the spirit which was at work, to cherish a belief, that the ireaty was calculated to favour Great Britain at her expense. Whether she believed or disbelieved these tales, their effect, he said, would be nearly the same.

"To sum up the whole,” he added, “in a few words, I have never, since I have been in the administration of the government, seen a crisis which, in my opinion, has been so pregnant with interesting events, nor one from which more is to be apprehended, whether viewed on one side or the other. From New York there is, and I am told will further be, a counter current ;* but how formidable it may appear I know not. If the same does not take place at Boston and other towns, it will afford but too strong evidence that the opposition is in a manner universal, and would make the ratification a very serious business indeed. But as it respects the French, even counter resolutions would, for the reasons I have already mentioned, do little more than weaken, in a small degree, the effect the other side would have."

In a private letter of the 31st of July to the same gentleman, aster repeating his determination to return to Philadelphia, and his impression of the wisdom, the temperateness, and the firmness for which the crisis most eminently called; he added, " for there is too much reason to believe, from the pains that have been taken before, at, and since the advice of the senate respecting the treaty, that the prejudices against it are more extensive than is generally imagined. How should it be otherwise? when

* The chamber of commerce in New York had voted resolutions expressing their approbation of the treaty.

no stone has been left unturned that could impress on the minds of the Deople the most arrant misrepresentation of facts: that their rights have not only been neglected, but absolutely sold: that there are no reciprocal advantages in the treaty that the benefits are all on the side of Great Britain and, what seems to have had more weight with them than all the rest, and has been most pressed, that the treaty is made with the design to oppress the French republic, in open violation of our treaty with that nation, and contrary too to every principle of gratitude and sound policy. In time, when passion shall have yielded to sober reason, the current may possibly turn; but, in the mean while, this government, in relation to France and England, may be compared to a ship between Scylla and Charybdis. If the treaty is ratified, the partisans of the French (or rather of war and confusion) will excite them to hostile measures, or at least to unfriendly sentiments;-if it is not, there is no foreseeing all the consequences that may follow as it respects Great Britain.

"It is not to be inferred from hence that I am or shall be disposed to quit the ground I have taken, unless circumstances more imperious than have yet come to my knowledge, should compel it; for there is but one straight course, and that is to seek truth, and to pursue it steadily. But these things are mentioned to show that a close investigation of the subject is more than ever necessary; and that there are strong evidences of the necessity of the most circumspect conduct in carrying the determination of government into effect, with prudence as it respects our own people, and with every exertion to produce a change for the better with Great Britain."

In a letter of the third of August, written to the same gentleman, in which he stated the increasing extent of hostility to the treaty, the President added:

"All these things do not shake my determination with respect to the proposed ratification, nor will they, unless something more imperious and unknown to me, should, in the opinion of yourself and the gentlemen with you, make it adviseable for me to pause."

In the afternoon of the 11th of August the President arrived in Philadelphia; and on the next day, the question respecting the immediate ratification of the treaty was brought before the cabinet. The secretary of state maintained, singly, the opinion, that, during the existence of the provision order,* and during the war between Britain and France, this step ought not to be taken. This opinion did not prevail. The resolution was adopted to ratify the treaty immediately, and to accompany the

* Previous to the reception of the account of this order, the opinion of the secretary had been in favour of ratifying the treaty.

ratification with a strong memorial against the provision order, which should convey, in explicit terms, the sense of the American government on that subject. By this course, the views of the executive were happily accomplished. The order was revoked, and the ratifications of the treaty were exchanged.

The President was most probably determined to adopt this course by the extreme intemperance with which the treaty was opposed, and the rapid progress which this violence was apparently making. It was obvious that, unless this temper could be checked, it would soon become so extensive, and would arrive at such a point of fury, as to threaten dangerous consequences. It was obviously necessary either to attempt a diminution of its action by rendering its exertions hopeless, and by giving to the treaty the weight of his character and influence, or to determine ultimately to yield to it. A species of necessity therefore seems to have been created for abandoning the idea, if it was ever taken up, of making the ratification of the treaty dependent on the revocation of the provision order.

The soundness of the policy which urged this decisive measure was proved by the event. The confidence which was felt in the judgment and virtue of the chief magistrate, induced many, who, swept away by the popular current, had yielded to the common prejudices, to re-examine, and discard opinions which had been too hastily embraced; and many were called forth by a desire to support the administration in measures actually adopted, to take a more active part in the general contest than they would otherwise have pursued. The consequence was, that more moderate opinions respecting the treaty began to prevail.

In a letter from Mount Vernon of the 20th of September, addressed to General Knox, who had communicated to him the change of opinion which was appearing in the eastern states, the President expressed in warm terms the pleasure derived from that circumstance, and added: "Next to a conscientious discharge of my public duties, to carry along with me the approbation of my constituents, would be the highest gratification of which my mind is susceptible. But the latter being secondary, I can not make the former yield to it, unless some criterion more infallible than partial (if they are not party) meetings can be discovered as the touchstone of public sentiment. If any person on earth could, or the great power above would, erect the standard of infallibility in political opinions, no being that inhabits this terrestrial globe would resort to it with more eagerness than myself, so long as I remain a servant of the public. But as I have hitherto found no better guide than upright intentions, and close investigation, I shall adhere to them while I keep the VOL. II.

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