The START Treaty: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Second Congress, Second Session, Teil 1U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992 |
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Andere Ausgaben - Alle anzeigen
Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
ABM Treaty administration agree agreement Ambassador STRAUSS arms control arsenals attack ballistic missile BARTHOLOMEW Belarus capability CHAIRMAN cold war committee Commonwealth Commonwealth of Independent Congress cooperation countries defense democratic deployed deployment dismantling economic effective elimination facilities fissile materials former Soviet Union going Gorbachev heavy bombers heavy ICBMs implementation important inspections issue Kazakhstan launch launchers limits LPARs LRNA ment military MIRVed mobile ICBMs mobile missiles Moscow nations negotiations NON-DEPLOYED nuclear forces nuclear warheads Party plutonium political President Bush President Yeltsin problem production proliferation proposal question ratified reductions regime RHINELANDER Russia SALT II scientists Secretary Senator BIDEN Senator CRANSTON Senator SARBANES side SLBM stability START II START Treaty statement strategic forces strategic nuclear strategic offensive submarines successor tactical nuclear weapons target tegic territory Thank things threat throw-weight tion Ukraine unilateral United verification
Beliebte Passagen
Seite 446 - States involved in intelligence activities shall — (1) keep the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives...
Seite 446 - Joint Statement Of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms...
Seite 520 - If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Matthew Pickford, who can be reached at 226-2860.
Seite 221 - The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research.
Seite 504 - For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this treaty, each party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with the generally recognized principles of international law.
Seite 443 - Congress recognizes the difficulty of maintaining a stable strategic balance in a period of rapidly developing technology; the Congress recognizes the principle of United States-Soviet Union equality reflected in the antiballistic missile treaty, and urges and requests the President to seek a future treaty that, inter alia, would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union...
Seite 306 - States" means the date upon which the successor State replaced the predecessor State in the responsibility for the international relations of the territory to which the succession of States relates ; (f) "newly independent State" means a successor State the territory of which immediately before the date of the succession of States...
Seite 305 - State continues to exist: a) any treaty in force at the date of the succession of States in respect of the entire territory of the predecessor State continues in force in respect of each successor State so formed...
Seite 308 - States, unless it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that the application of the treaty to that territory would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty or would radically change the conditions for its Operation.
Seite 447 - Significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive arms; 2. Qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms, including restrictions on the development, testing and deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms and on the modernization of existing strategic offensive arms; 3.