intervention is stated in a despatch written' by Sir Michael HicksBeach to Lord (then Sir Garnet) Wolseley: " neither by the Sand River Convention, nor at any other time, did Her Majesty's Government surrender the right and duty of requiring that the Transvaal should be governed with a view to the common safety of the various European communities." To-day, not the common safety, but the common prosperity, of South Africa is threatened by the unreasonable attitude which the Boer Government has assumed towards the mining and commercial population within its borders.

This attitude is not only unreasonable, it is illegal, for it is contrary both to the letter and the spirit of the Convention of London. This Convention, which is a modification of the Convention of Pretoria (1881), gives the Boers the right of self-governnent upon certain terms, which are set out at length. It was never intended that the Transvaal should be closed against European emigrants, nor that such emigrants, when admitted, should be subjected to any political inequality or any commercial disadvantage. On the contrary, Article XIV. (which is identical with Article XXVI. of the Pretoria Convention) expressly provides for the contingency of immigration.2

Fate has decreed that the great centre of the gold industry should lie within the territory of the Boers; but the present prosperity and the future progress of South Africa as a whole is concerned in the fortunes of that industry. England, therefore, as paramount power, has the right and the duty of requiring that the Transvaal shall be governed in such a manner as to promote, and not to check, the development of this chief source of the common prosperity. If Mr. Chamberlain will frankly recognise that duty, and fearlessly exercise that right, he will earn the gratitude alike of England and of South Africa.

(1) November 20th, 1879.

W. BASIL WORSFOLD.

(2) It runs:-" All persons other than natives, conforming themselves to the laws of the South African Republic (a) will have full liberty, with their families, to enter, travel, or reside in any part of the South African Republic; (b) they will be entitled to hire or possess houses, shops, and premises; (c) they may carry on their commerce either in person or by any agents they may think fit to employ; (d) they will not be subject in respect of their persons or property, or in respect of their commerce or industry, to any taxes, whether general or local, other than those which are, or may be imposed upon citizens of the said Republic."

REFLEX ACTION, INSTINCT, AND REASON.1

THE older psychologists were not acquainted with the as yet undiscovered truths of evolution, and studied mind without their aid. Practically they dealt only with the fully developed thing as manifested in man. From that point of view, by "introspection," by observation of their own conscious states, they sought information regarding their own minds, and by "legitimate inferences" information regarding the minds of other men, and to a much less extent, information regarding the minds of lower animals. "Introspection and "legitimate inferences" are still our only sources of information, but the legitimate inference" that there is kinship between the human and the brute intellect, and that in the brute we may see the beginnings of that which we observe in man, enables us to make a better use of our available information. By observing mind at its beginning, and tracing it during its evolution, we are enabled, to an extent undreamed of by former generations, to understand of what it is compounded, to analyze it.

"

To Mr. Herbert Spencer, beyond all others, is due the credit of having applied the doctrine of evolution to the study of psychology, with the result that this science, which was formerly notoriously sterile, as Buckle observed, is now prolific in new achievement. But to this branch of biology, even more than elsewhere, has Mr. Spencer applied the doctrine that acquired variations are transmissible that is to say, since mental evolution depends on structural evolution in the nervous system, he supposes that the nervous systems of man and other animals have arisen through the accumulation of acquired variations. It would be vain to discuss his writings in detail. The arguments already set forth against the theory that acquired traits are transmissible, apply in full force in this particular case. A priori, the transmission of acquired changes in nervous tissue seems impossible; it is unbelievable that acquired changes in nervous tissue can so affect the germ-cell as to cause it after fertilization to proliferate into an organism with inborn variations similar to the acquired variations in the parent; à posteriori, though we frequently see psychical traits acquired, yet we never see acquired psychical variations transmitted, or So very rarely that such apparent transmissions may be set down as mere fortuitous coincidences.

The study of psychology is extraordinarily difficult, owing to the complexity and obscurity of the subject. We deal here with the

(1) A chapter from a forthcoming book on The Present Evolution of Man. (Messrs. Chapman ni Hall.

intangible, non-material products of the functional activity of an organ, concerning which, in nearly all essential details, we are in ignorance. Though we are sure that every mental phenomenon has its physical side, yet we cannot express mind in terms of matter, and probably never shall be able to do so. Differences of structure in the nervous system, so minute as to be inappreciable to us, have commonly for their concomitants enormous psychical differences. Compare, for instance, the nervous systems on the one hand, and the mental traits on the other, of two allied species of insects, e.g., ants. Often, when the nervous systems appear precisely similar, we find that the mental traits as manifested in the actions of the animals differ vastly. Changes in nervous tissue seem magnified a thousandfold when examined through their psychical concomitants. But however obscure and difficult the subject, two facts may be made out: (1) That acquired psychical changes are never transmitted, and (2) that, just as regards their corporal structures, so as regards their mental traits, the action of Natural Selection has been to develop in higher animals an immense power of varying, of individually acquiring variations, whereby the organism is brought into completer harmony with its complex enrironment.

In animals low in the scale, such as the cœlenterates, almost all the reactions to stimulation from the environment are of the kind known as reflex. In them natural selection has brought about the evolution of particular reactions, whereby particular and generally oft-recurring events in the simple environment are provided against; the power of making these appropriate responses to particular stimuli being obviously inborn and transmissible. Higher in the scale occurs that kind of response to stimulation which is known as Instinct, and which Mr. Spencer has defined as "compound reflex action," but which Professor Romanes rightly insists is something more—is action into which has been imported the element of consciousness.

It may be defined as "the faculty which is concerned in the conscious adaption of means to ends," by virtue of inborn inherited knowledge and ways of thinking and acting. For example, the young alligator or the young turtle instinctively seek the water on emerging from the egg, i.e. they seek it by virtue of their inborn and inherited knowledge and ways of thinking and acting. Instinct also is clearly transmis

sible.

Highest in the scale, and notably in man, occurs that kind of response to stimulation which is known as reason, and which may be defined as "the faculty which is concerned in the conscious adaption of means to ends," by virtue of acquired non-inherited knowledge and ways of thinking and acting. Though powers of acquiring reason are transmissible, reason itself is obviously never transmitted.

I am aware that the above definitions of instinct and reason are

very different from those ordinarily accepted, but I think it will be found on consideration that they are more accurate, that they more completely include within their limits all cases of instinct and reason respectively, and that they more clearly separate that which is instinctive from that which is rational than any other definition as yet advanced. Professor Romanes, for example, defines reason as

"The faculty which is concerned in the conscious adaption of means to ends. It therefore implies the conscious knowledge of the relation between means employed and ends attained, and may be exercised in adaption to circumstances novel alike to the experience of the individual and to that of the species."Mental Evolution, p. 318.

But it appears to me that reason so defined includes nearly all those actions which we commonly term instinctive. For instance, by what term shall we designate the action of the spider when he builds his web? Does the animal not know for what purpose he constructs it? Was there ever a web building in which there were not "circumstances novel alike to the experience of the individual and to that of the species"? Or, when he runs along a thread to capture his prey, or cuts loose a dangerous captive, does he not consciously adapt means to ends, just as much as a man who runs to secure a snared bird, or who builds a "golden bridge" for a flying enemy? I think that Professor Romanes would have designated the actions of the spider as instinctive, and the actions of the man as rational. Yet, in what respect do they differ? Only in that the actions of the spider result from knowledge which is inborn and inherited, whereas the actions of the man result from knowledge which is neither inborn nor transmissible, but has been acquired. Again, in what particular does the action of the young alligator, that seeks the water and snaps at an opposing walking-stick, differ from the actions of a man who seeks a refuge and strikes at an intervening enemy? Only, I think, in that the one acts by virtue of inborn transmitted knowledge, whereas the other acts by virtue of acquired, non-transmissible knowledge. If we take the words "exercised in adaption to circumstances, novel alike to the experience of the individual and to that of the species," as separating that which is instinctive from that which is rational, by what term shall we designate the action of a man who speaks, or even of one who builds a hut, actions novel neither to the experience of the individual nor to that of the species? Wherein do such actions differ from those of a bird, which utters cries of rage or fear or warning, or which builds a nest? Once again, only, in that the man acts by virtue of acquired, non-inherited knowledge, whereas the bird acts by virtue of knowledge which is inborn and inherited.

In very low animals, such as the coelenterates, almost all actions are apparently reflex. Higher in the scale reflex action becomes mani

festly associated with instinct. Higher yet, reflex action and instinct become associated with reason. But though reflex action and instinct successively lose their positions of commanding importance as factors in survival, yet even in the highest animals, e.g. in man, for whom the environment is most complex and heterogeneous, both are present as essential factors of survival. In them reflex action by means of particular reactions still provides against particular and generally oftrecurring events, of such a kind as, if not provided against, would result in the destruction of the organism or of the species. As examples of such reflex actions present in man may be quoted, the movements of various hollow viscera, the acts of breathing, swallowing, and coughing, and in infants, that of sucking. Instinct is represented by various emotions, the existence of which is necessary for the preservation of the individual, or of the race, e.g. sexual and parental love, love of life, jealousy, rage, fear, hate, &c.1 Generally speaking, reflex action and instinct provide reactions against such events as invariably happen to every individual, and are of such a nature as, if not provided against by unfailing machinery, would lead to destruction of the individual, or at any rate to cessation of the race; and this machinery, as I have said, is obviously inborn and transmissible.

But reason is obviously neither inborn nor transmissible. It is obviously acquired anew by every individual, only the power of acquiring it being inheritable; and the extent to which it is acquired in each organism depends (1) on the organism's power of varying, of developing mentally in response to appropriate stimulation, and (2) on the amount of appropriate stimulation supplied-as is clearly the case in man, in whom beyond all other animals there has been an evolution of this power.

In higher animals, therefore, the power of individually acquiring reason, of varying, of developing mentally, in response to appropriate stimulation, is strictly analogous to their power of individually acquiring corporal traits, of varying, of developing physically in response to appropriate stimulation. But just, as in lower animals, such as the sponges and cœlenterates, the physical structures develop in the absence of all stimulation other than that of sufficient food, so also do such mental traits as they exhibit, reflex action and even instinct, develop in higher animals in the absence of all other stimulation; and therefore the development of the reflexes and instincts is

race.

(1) Sexual and parental love, fear, and love of life are clearly necessary for the preservation of the race or of the individual, on whose preservation depends that of the As regards hate, that individual that has not the instinct is less likely to survive and have offsprings than the individual who, having it, seeks to injure or destroy those that seek to injure and destroy him; so also with the instinct of rage; as regards jealousy, an individual, who views with indifference the advances made to his mate, or mates, by individuals of his own sex, is likely to have a smaller share in continuing the race than an individual who resents such advances.