circumstances which enabled him to destroy the local independence of all subordinates, to put an end to anarchy, and constitute himself the heir of all the Georgian and Circassian Mamlooks, and the sole oppressor of the Egyptian population. The Arab empire he is supposed to be creating, is a mere Parisian delusion. He rules Egypt by a set of Mamlooks, but these Mamlooks are a set of ill-looking Turkish and Albanian revenue officers, as hostile in spirit and in act to the whole Arab race, as any of the brilliant warriors the Pasha exterminated. The Arab empire which the Parisians have supposed that Mohammed Ali had founded in the East, is nothing but a countinghouse of Turkish clerks. No one knows better than the Pasha of Egypt this inherent vice in his government; but his ideas, like those of every Turk for the last century, are purely fiscal, and his conceptions of statesmanship go no further than the improvement of the share of revenue he draws from the countries he governs. His great political study is to transfer as much of the specie circulating in his dominions from the pockets of his subjects into his own treasury, as he possibly can in the shortest space of time.

The government of Mohammed Ali is, consequently, a personal and not a national affair. It reposes solely and exclusively on force, and it avails itself of science and education only as means of augmenting its power, not with the idea of regu

lating that power by the principles of justice to the governed. Still, though it be a bad, it may yet prove a durable species of government. The duration of political bodies does not depend on their excellence. The Byzantine empire, the empire of Morocco, and the regencies of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, were all governments conducted on the worst possible principles of government, and yet they existed, or seem likely to exist, until overthrown by foreign attacks. Those who argue that the Egyptian pashalik must soon fall to decay, because its system is radically bad, show little knowledge either of history or of the state of the Egyptian population.

The administration of Egypt is characterised by a vulpine intelligence and cunning, which leads it to avoid as carefully as possible any very close contact with those European powers who can look into its social as well its political organization. Russia is too distant to be a cause of perpetual alarm. France has persuaded the Egyptian government that she occupies an isolated position in Europe, as if she were a semi-Mohammedan state, and is, consequently, the natural ally and protector of Mohammed Ali. England is, consequently, the grand object of the Pasha's fear and jealousy. Nor is his fear unfounded; the occupation of Aden, the war in Syria, and the hostile demonstration against Alexandria, are not likely to be forgotten; while the constant solicitation of Englishmen to be in

vested with a monopoly of the transit to India tend to nourish jealousy.

It need not, therefore, be a matter of wonder, that the Pasha views our communications with India

through Egypt with an unfavourable eye. There can hardly be a doubt that if he dared to do it, he would close the route to-morrow, and willingly sacrifice all the pecuniary advantages that may be derived from it. Even our diplomatic gentlemen admit that he has a great aversion to facilitate our communications, and as little desire to invite any other nation to become our rivals in the transit, though this has been frequently suggested to him as a means of "humbling proud Albion." Our transit company gives him misery enough. Every increase in the number of the Indian passengers gives him a fresh alarm, and he sees danger to his government from every proposition which would make his country the high road to India. He knows that the whole Arab population of Egypt is treated by him as a conquered people, and he fears that they would eagerly solicit any strangers who might appear in sufficient numbers to relieve them from their present sufferings.

It is not, therefore, to be expected that the present Pasha of Egypt will give any assistance to the projects of forming a ship canal from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, or a railroad from Cairo to Suez. Such works may in his opinion be useful to Austria and England, but would be dangerous

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to him. Even the formation of the two navigable branches of the Nile to Alexandria and Suez, will be a natural and inevitable consequence of the completion of the barrage, and not a part of the project, according to the Pasha's conception.

It is fortunate that the Egyptian government cannot at present venture to throw any obstacles in the way of the establishment of a weekly mail to India. But the British Government ought to lose no time in establishing a weekly post, if it study how to advance its interests in Egypt as strenuously as the Pasha watches for an opportunity to thwart them. If the day should ever come that the Pasha or his French counsellors, can venture to interrupt our communications with India either by force or fraud, we may rest assured the attempt will be made. His moderation during the Syrian war marks rather the judgment and intelligence of the man than the policy of his government. He waited his time to strike a serious blow, but the opportunity never came. The East India Company ought not to confine its preparation for future contingencies merely to presenting Mohammed Ali with a silver fountain, nor the British Government consider that it has enslaved the astute old Pasha by the present of her Majesty's portrait.

Hostility between French and English Policy in

Egypt.

Ever since the celebrated rupture between France and England in 1840, which drove the troops of Mohammed Ali out of Syria, and destroyed the hopes the Parisians had indulged of ruling the destinies of the East by means of the fancied Arabic empire of the Egyptian Pasha, France has been the avowed enemy of England in the Levant. In Egypt, in Syria, in Persia, in Turkey, and in Greece, she has assailed the influence and thwarted the policy of Great Britain by every means she could venture to use short of an open declaration of war. Nor has she affected to conceal that she is steadily engaged in preparing her naval forces for a war, which she announces must occur at no very distant period. To conceal from ourselves the imminence of the danger, is to be both blind and deaf.

It is not the purpose of this work to glance at the proceedings of the French Government, either in Turkey, Syria, or Greece; but her policy in Egypt is so intimately connected with the maintenance of our communications with India, by the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, that it is necessary to offer a few remarks on the subject.

We have already remarked that France has filled the Mediterranean with her steamers, which visit every port of consequence in the Levant three

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