unanimously forbade any registry to be made of the votes of individuals, so that they might, without reproach of observation, mutually receive and impart instruction; and they sat with closed doors, lest the publication of their debates should rouse the country to obstinate conflicts before they themselves should have reached their conclusions. (Bancroft's History of the Constitution, Vol. 2, p. 9.)

Can we find to-day an equal number of men who will surpass the members of that Council in vigor of intellect, virility of thought, in knowledge and education, in character and in purity of purpose? Is it certain that we will easily find men who will equal them in equipment for such work? Is it even probable that, considering the personnel of Congress during the last twenty years, and the kind of men we now seem in the habit of sending to that bodyeven to the lower house, considering especially the political conditions now and of late surrounding their nomination and election,

is it even probable that we will find in Congress an average capacity which will not fall far short of that of the Constitutional Convention? This is the age of the practical; but in political life the practical is too often concerned only with the present and the immediate future. This is the era of the "self-made man"; but is the self-made man,-still busy in the manufacture of himself, the best fitted to devise a theory of government which will stand the test of time and preserve the Republic to posterity?

The dissatisfaction with the present system of electing Senators seems to have had its growth within the last twenty years,-to have sprung from certain ill results all occurring within that time. The work of the men of 1787 was based on the 'knowledge and experience of more than two thousand years. Twenty years is but a short day in history. Is the experience of such a short day alone sufficient to induce us to reverse the deliberate judgment of such men founded on the experience and accumulated wisdom of twenty centuries?

Before the men of the Constitutional Convention was spread out the scroll of every government of which history had then preserved a record. True, we have the same panorama before us. To the formation of their judgment, however, was brought long, careful, discriminative and disinterested study of the origin, course and

fall of these governments, as well as their knowledge of human nature and of the needs of the people about them. Is our cry for a change for the pulling down of one of the main walls of their structure-based on a like study and want of selfish interest?

There was present in their minds not alone the evils of monarchical government, and the tyrannous oppression of an aristocracy degenerated to an oligarchy; but they saw how vain was the attempt of pure democracy to perpetuate itself, and realized that the resultant discord and anarchy were often more to be feared than absolutism. They saw that the republic, or nominal republies, of Athens, Sparta, Carthage, Rome, Venice and Genoa, the Dutch Republic and the German Federation, had each risen, flourished and fallen; and they studied the elements of strength and cause of decay in each of them. They had carefully watched the progress of the then experiment of a federation in Switzerland; the defects in their own confederacy were the very matters which had called them together; and the various systems of the individual states were well-known to all of them. They were not tyros in the science of government; and Gladstone has said that the Constitution they produced is the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of 'man.' Is there in that work such a serious flaw as we are now asked to concede?

What is the step we are now urged to take? Is it not a long stride toward the elimination of the Federal feature from our system? If it should prove to be in the direction of disaster, is it one which our children can easily retrace?

The actual work of the Constitutional Convention began on May 29th and ended on the 17th of September. The adoption or rejection of the Federal system, including the question of preserving or obliterating the state lines, the preservation or destruction of the state governments as individual sovereignities, and the necessity of doing the one or the other as an essential to the perpetuation of the Republic itself, was the question of all others the longest considered and the most carefully and earnestly debated. Montesqieu's monumental work, "The Spirit of Laws," had been published in 1748. Its preparation had occupied twenty years of his life. The book had been read throughout the civilized world. Essays and volumes had been written, and innumerable speeches and lectures

delivered, in discussion of it. Members of the Convention were thoroughly familiar with it. The expression "checks and balances" had originated in it, and even then had long been quoted from it. In this work Montesqieu had satisfactorily demonstrated to the wiser thought of the world, and especially to the men of America, that a dual legislature was indispensable to the existence of a republic, and essential to the promotion and preservation of the liberty and happiness of a people. The decision for a legislature of two houses was, therefore, early and easily reached by the Convention; but a safeguard to this duality, which would at the same time be a sure means of rendering it effective, was long and earnestly sought for.

In the existing confederacy the states as such, and not the people, had been represented. Its decrees acted only upon the states and not directly upon the people, and now it was proposed "to form a more perfect union," in order to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." Some members of the

convention now inclined to the other extreme-to a government composed entirely of representatives chosen by the people direct, and thus to retain all power as close to the people as possible. Others argued that the Republic could not long exist if the sovereignty of the states was utterly destroyed, and the states reduced to the position of mere counties; and that in order to prevent their destruction it was necessary to give them representation in the Federal Congress apart from the representation of the people.

The plan outlined by Madison and put forward by the Virginia delegation provided that the members of the first or "democratic" house ought to be elected by the people of the several states; and that the members of the second house should be elected by those of the first, out of persons nominated by the individual legislatures. Sherman of Connecticut declared that the "people should have as little to do as may be about the government; they want information and are constantly liable to be misled; the election ought to be by the State Legislatures." Said Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, "the people do not want virtue, but they are the dupes of pretended patriots." Mason, of Virginia, replied: "The larger branch is to be the grand depository of the democratic principle of government. We ought to attend to the rights of every class of

the people. I have often wondered at the indifference of the superior classes of society to this dictate of humanity and policy."

Dickinson, of Delaware, argued that

"Of remedies for the diseases of republics which have flourished for a moment only and then vanished forever, one is the double branch of the legislature, the other the accidental lucky division of this country into distinct states, which some seem desirous of abolishing altogether. This division ought to be maintained, and conerable powers left with the states. This is the ground of my considsolation for the future fate of my country. In case of a consolidation of states into one great republic, we may read its fate in the history of smaller ones." (Bancroft's History, vol. 1, p. 23.)

And again he said.

"It is essential that one branch of the legislature should be drawn immediately from the people; and it is expedient that the other should be chosen by the legislatures of the several states. This combination of the state government with the national government is as politic as it is unavoidable." (Bancroft's History,

vol. II, p. 28.)

Madison argued at great length that the safety of a republic requires for its sphere a large extent of territory, with interests so many and so various that the majority could never unite in the pursuit of any of them. "It is incumbent on us," he said, "to try this remedy, and to frame a republican system on such a scale and in such a form as will control all the evils which have been experienced." (Bancroft, vol. II, p. 28.)

Pierce, of Georgia, urged an election of the first branch by the people; of the second by the states; so that the citizens of the states would be represented both individually and collectively. (Bancroft's History, vol. II, p. 28.)

On another occasion in the course of the debate Dickinson declared:

"I wish the Senate to bear as strong a likeness as possible to the British House of Lords, and to consist of men distinguished for their rank in life and their weight of property. Such characters are more likely to be selected by the State Legislatures than in any other mode. * * * The preservation of the states in a certain degree of agency is indispensable. The proposed national system

is like the solar system, in which the states are the planets, and they ought to be left to move freely in their proper orbits." (Bancroft, vol. II, p. 30.)

Said Wilson, of Pennsylvania:

"The states are in no danger of being devoured by the national government. I wish to keep them from devouring the national government. Their existence is made essential by the great extent of our country. I am for an election of the second branch by the people in large districts, sub-dividing the districts only for the accommodation of voters." (Bancroft, vol. I, p. 30.)

"By some it was urged that not only should the states as such be represented in the Senate, but that to the larger states should be given greater representation than to the smaller. In contending for equal suffrage in the Senate, Patterson exclaimed: "The idea of a national government as contradistinguished from a federal one never entered into the mind of any of the states. (Bancroft, vol. II, p. 31.)

On the 11th or June it was resolved that the members of the first house should be elected by the people in proportion to population; and that Senators should be chosen by the State Legislatures, each state to have representation in accordance with its population except that each state should have at least one Senator. This denial to the states of equal suffrage in the Senate led New Jersey, on the 15th of June, to reopen the whole scheme of government and to present an entirely new plan. In it was provided a Congress of states in a single body, and a plural executive to be elected and to be removable by Congress. Thereupon the whole discussion began anew.

"The New Jersey system," said John Lansing, of New York, "is federal; the Virginia system, national. In the first, the powers flow from the state governments; in the second, they derive authority from the people of the states and must ultimately annihilate the state governments." (Banc., vol. II, p. 39.)

Wilson declared that "theory and practice both proclaim that in a single house there is danger of a legislative despotism." (Idem, p. 41.)

Alexander Hamilton then brought forward his outline of a Constitution. He favored a system as near as possible analogous to