At the close of the war, Dr. Burnet returned to his family, and devoted himself to agricultural pursuits. He was soon after appointed presiding judge of the court of common pleas, by the state legislature. He was also chosen President of the State Medical Society, of which he had formerly been an active member. Being a fine classical scholar, and desirous of reviving the practice of delivering the annual address in the Latin language, which had fallen into disuse; on taking the chair, he read an elaborate essay, in Latin, on the proper use of the lancet in pleuritic cases.

While in the enjoyment of his usual health, a violent attack of erysipelas in the face and head, suddenly terminated his life, on the 7th of October, 1791, in the sixty-first year of his age.

His sixth son, the writer of these notes, was born on the 22d of February, 1770-was educated at Nassau Hall, under the presidency of Dr. Witherspoon, and graduated in September, 1791. Before he had finished his collegiate course, he determined to settle himself in the Miami country, where his father had made a considerable investment. In the mean time he completed his professional studieswas admitted to the bar by the Supreme Court of the State, in the spring of 1796-and proceeded without delay to Cincinnati, with a full determination of making it his permanent residence, and of rising or falling with it.

Whatever there may be of interest in his professional, or political life, will be sufficiently developed, by the facts connected with the settlement and improvement of the North-western Territory, in which he bore an early, and an active part; and in which he endured a full share of the exposure, privation and suffering, which necessarily attend such an enterprise.

NOTE. The losses of the American army on Long Island and York Island, succeeded by the disastrous battle of the

White Plains, and the surrender of Forts Washington and Lee, with their numerous garrisons, of about a thousand each, compelled General Washington, late in the fall of 1776, to cross the Hudson, followed by a victorious enemy; and, after a rapid retreat, place his exhausted army in a situation of temporary safety, on the west bank of the Delaware. That retrograde movement, with the losses which preceded it, produced a general opinion, that the war was at an end. Despondency took the place of hope, and, under its influence, multitudes, both in East and West Jersey, submitted to their fate-renewed their oaths of allegiance, and took protections from the British commander, as the only expedient to save their lives and secure their property.

But the despair which those events were fast spreading over the country, was of short duration. The American commander, who had adopted the maxim, nil desperandum, and had carried it into practice through life, did not yield to the alarm which was paralizing the hopes of the bravest of his officers. When their lengthened visages indicated the feelings which harassed their minds, after they had pitched their tents on the frozen banks of the Delaware, he very pleasantly remarked, that "the darkest part of the night was just before the dawn of day." At the time he uttered that sentiment, he was projecting a plan to resume offensive operations, by a simultaneous attack on the enemy at Trenton and at Bordentown.

Although the attempt against the latter place failed, in consequence of the floating ice in the river, yet the main attack on Trenton, which was led by Washington, in person, was signally successful.

The courage, and military talents, indicated by that brilliant enterprise, attracted universal attention; as did the more hazardous movement which speedily followed, when he crossed the Delaware a second time-eluded the vigilance of the enemy at Trenton, and by a midnight march,

took the enemy by surprise at Princeton, broke through their line, captured many prisoners and much baggage, and placed the remnant of his army in secure and comfortable quarters in the high lands of Jersey.

Those masterly movements changed the aspect of the war, and verified the adage, that "all is not lost that is in danger." They convinced the commander of the British troops, that he had at least, an equal to contend with; and that the conquest of the colonies, which but a few days before, he believed to be on the point of consummation, was more remote than he had supposed, at the beginning of the

contest.

Those desperate and successful achievements, confirmed the confidence of Congress and the people, in the prudence, bravery and skill of the American commander, and gave fresh hope and energy to the friends of liberty, in every part of the country. A short time before, they were in a state of despondency, and almost prepared to desist from further effort to oppose the oppressions of the mother country, and to establish the independence of their own.

Notwithstanding these brilliant achievements, individuals were found, ready to depreciate the character of the Commander-in-chief. A very formidable effort of that nature was made by some of the officers, under the influence of General Gates, immediately after the capture of Burgoyne. A little band of conspirators was then formed, who concerted a plan to supplant General Washington, and elevate Gates to the chief command in the army.

Although that attempt proved to be a miserable failure, yet the persons engaged in it, became the inveterate, irreconcilable enemies of Washington, and never afterwards permitted an opportunity, to question his talents or injure his military fame, to pass unimproved. The achievements at Trenton and Princeton, in the winter of 1776-7, were as distinguished for military skill, as for personal bravery; and were devised by himself, while his associates in arms, en

camped on the banks of the Delaware, were indulging in hopeless despair. At that time, not a pen nor a tongue had ventured to question his wisdom or prudence, nor was any attempt of that nature made, prior to the conspiracy in the military family of General Gates. That plot soon exploded, and was put down; yet the persons engaged in it, still cherished their hostility, and suffered no opportunity of inflicting a wound on the feelings, or the fame of the Commander-in-chief, to pass unimproved. They awarded to others the credit of his plans, whenever it could be done with the least plausibility. It is remarkable, that this disposition to injure the standing of General Washington, was most active after General Gates, for whose benefit it was got up, had been defeated by Lord Cornwallis at Camden, and his army scattered to the winds; and after he himself had deservedly sunk into oblivion.

A manifestation of this spirit is found in the Memoirs of General Wilkinson, written after the close of the war, in which he gives General St. Clair the credit of proposing the night march on Princeton, as the most advisable expedient to save the army from impending ruin. It may also be found in a more recent attempt to award to General Mercer the honor and glory of originating the same proposition. On the interesting occasion of removing to Philadelphia the remains of that lamented officer, from Princeton, the field of his glory, and the battle ground on which he fell; the eloquent gentleman who delivered the eulogical address, exultingly affirmed, that in the council of officers convened in the American camp, on the evening of the 2nd of January, the gallant Mercer first advanced the bold idea of ordering up the militia from Philadelphia, and by a night march, attacking the enemy at Princeton.

These conflicting claims for the laurels of Washington, destroy each other; but if either be well founded, we cannot escape the conclusion, that the Commander-in-chief was the weakest officer in the army. He knew that the

British outnumbered him, seven to one-that they were well disciplined and provided with every thing necessary for their comfort; and that his own troops were undisciplined and destitute of almost every thing. He was at the time occupying a position of comparative safety, on the west bank of the Delaware. He knew that the enemy were so situated, that they could be united and brought to bear on any point in New Jersey, in forty-eight hours; and yet it is more than insinuated, that he deliberately abandoned the protection afforded by the river-changed his position without necessity; and placed his little band of half naked troops, the last hope of liberty, in a situation from which they could not retreat, and in which they could not sustain themselves twenty-four hours-without having any specific object in view, or having formed any plan for the government of his subsequent movements. In other words, that he plunged into imminent danger, unnecessarily regardless of consequences.

If such had been the case, he could not escape the charge of imbecility or infidelity. He must have been an impostor or a traitor; but he was neither-he saw and felt his situation to be desperate-his companions in arms were disheartened his life, his fortune and his character were at stake, as well as the liberty of the nation. He therefore assumed the responsibility of forming his own plan, which was done before he crossed the Delaware and abandoned the protection it afforded. He knew that the enemy occupied Amboy, New Brunswick, Kingston, Princeton, Trenton, and Bordentown. The presumption, therefore, was, that they must be weak at some one or more of those points. That consideration suggested his plan, which was, to surprise them by a night march-break through their line at the point he might ascertain to be the most vulnerable, and place his army where they might rest in safety, through the residue of the winter.

In accordance with that arrangement, he crossed the