peace. Whoever will examine all the testimony that exists on the subject will be convinced that some grave particulars have crept into our history, which have a slender foundation in fact, and which bestow but scanty justice on the motives, conduct, and policy of the first ally of the United States.*

JARED SPARKS.

Livingston to J. Adams.t

PHILADELPHIA, November 18, 1782.

SIR: Since my letter of the 6th, Congress have been pleased to appoint Mr. Jefferson one of their ministers plenipotentiary for nego. ciating peace. I have not yet received an answer to my letter informing him of this event, though I have some reason to believe he will accept the appointment.

I believe I mentioned to you that Congress had refused to accept Mr. Laurens' resignation. Many members have since seen with great pain the petition published in the Parliamentary debates as his. I sincerely wish that it may prove to be a forgery, since the language it speaks does not consist with the dignified character he holds. He has since informed Congress that he purposes to return to England, and come out to this country by the way of New York. I hope the determination of Congress will reach him before he leaves France, as it will have an awkward appearance to send to England for an American minister.

All the contracts we have received from you have been sent back with the ratification endorsed. Some of them have, I hope, reached you before this. So that the last hand may be put to the important business of the loan.

So much has been said of Captain Asgill, upon whom, as you have been informed, the lot fell, when it was determined to avenge the death of Captain Huddy, that I should let you know the issue of this business, which you may in part collect from the enclosed resolve, though you may be ignorant of the reasons which induced Congress to pass it, and again render abortive their determination to punish the unexampled cruelty of the enemy. Mrs. Asgill, the mother of this unfortu nate young man, had sufficient influence at the court of France to obtain its interposition in his favor; a letter was written on the subject by Count de Vergennes to General Washington, enclosing one from Mrs. Asgill to the Count, which was extremely pathetic. The minister of France had orders from his master to support this application. It was thought advisable that this should not be formally done, but that the

*For a further elucidation of this subject see the North American Review for January, 1830, No. 66, p. 15; also Livingston's letter to Jay, dated January 4th, 1783, infra.

+ MSS. Dep. of State; 3 Sparks' Dip. Rev. Corr., 689.

See Introduction, ý 173.

discharge of Asgill should be grounded upon the reasons expressed in the preamble of the resolution. Congress the more readily acquiesced in this measure, as there is ground to hope, from the late conduct of the enemy, that they have determined to adopt a more civilized mode of carrying on the war in future. They have called off the savages, and a large number of prisoners have returned on parole from Canada. We have yet no certain account of the evacuation of Charleston, though we know that the first division of the troops, and a considerable number of the inhabitants, sailed on the 19th ultimo, as is said, for Augustine; it is probably evacuated by this time.

It would give me pleasure to receive from you an accurate account of the differences which have arisen between the court of Denmark and the United Provinces, and the effects they may probably produce. We are imperfectly acquainted with facts here, and still less with the politics of the northern courts; you will sometimes extend your observations to them.

I confide too much in the wisdom of the States-General to believe that they will omit any honorable means to prevent an accession of strength to Great Britain at this critical moment.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

J. Adams to Livingston."

PARIS, November 18, 1782.

SIR: The instructions from Congress, which direct us to pay so strict an attention to the French ministry, and to follow their advice, are conceived in terms so universal and unlimited as to give a great deal of anxiety to my mind.

There is no man more impressed with the obligation of obedience to instructions; but in ordinary cases the principal is so near the deputy as to be able to attend to the whole progress of the business, and to be informed of every new fact and every sudden thought. Ambassadors in Europe can send expresses to their courts and give and receive intelligence in a few days with the utmost certainty. In such cases there is no room for mistake, misunderstanding, or surprise, but in our case it is very different. We are at an immense distance. Despatches are liable to foul play and vessels are subject to accidents. New scenes open, the time presses, various nations are in suspense, and necessity forces us to act.

What can we do? If the French minister advises us to cede to the Spaniards the whole river of the Mississippi and five hundred miles of territory to the eastward of it, are we bound by our instractions to put our signature to the cession, when the English themselves are willing

* 3 Sparks' Dip. Rev. Corr., 691; 8 J. Adams' Works,

we should extend to the river, and enjoy our natural right to its navigation? If we should be counselled to relinquish our right to the fishery on the Grand Bank of Newfoundland, when the British ministry are ready by treaty to acknowledge our right to it, are we obliged to relinquish it? If we are advised to restore and compensate the Tories, are we to comply? If we know, or have reasons to believe, that things which will have weight upon the minds of the British ministry against us upon some points will be communicated to them in some way or other, secret or open, if we communicate it to this court, are we bound to do it?

I can not think that a construction so literal and severe was ever intended to be put upon it, and therefore I see no way of doing my duty to Congress, but to interpret the instruction, as we do all general precepts and maxims, by such restrictions and limitations as reason, necessity, and the nature of things demand.

It may sometimes be known to a deputy that an instruction from his principal was given upon information of mistaken facts-what is he to do? When he knows that if the truth had been known his principal would have given a directly contrary order, is he to follow that which issued upon mistake? When he knows, or has only good reason to believe, that if his principal were on the spot and fully informed of the present state of facts he would give contrary directions, is he bound by such as were given before? It can not be denied that instructions are binding, that it is a duty to obey them, and that a departure from them can not be justified; but I think it can not be denied, on the other hand, that, in our peculiar situation, cases may happen in which it might become our duty to depend upon being excused (or, if you will, pardoned) for presuming that if Congress were upon the spot they would judge as we do.

I presume not to dictate, nor to advise, but I may venture to give my opinion, as I do freely, and with much real concern for the public, that it would be better if every instruction in being were totally repealed which enjoins upon any American minister to follow, or ask the advice, or even to communicate with any French or other minister or ambas sador in the world. It is an inextricable embarrassment everywhere. Advice would not be more seldom asked nor communication less frequent. It would be more freely given. A communication of informa tion, or a request of council, would then be received as a compliment and a mark of respect; it is now considered as a duty and a right. Your ministers would have more weight and be the more respected through the world. Congress can not do too much to give weight to their own ministers, for, they may depend upon it, great and unjustifiable pains are taken to prevent them from acquiring reputation, and even to prevent an idea taking root in any part of Europe, that any thing has been or can be done by them. And there is nothing that humbles and depresses, nothing that shackles and confines-in short, nothing that renders totally useless all your ministers in Europe so

much as these positive instructions to consult and communicate with French ministers upon all occasions and follow their advice. And I really think it would be better to constitute the Count de Vergennes our sole minister, and give him full powers to make peace, and treat with all Europe, than to continue any of us in the service, under the instructions in being, if they are to be understood in that unlimited sense which some persons contend for.

I hope that nothing indecent has escaped me upon this occasion. If any expressions appear too strong, the great importance of the subject and the deep impression it has made on my mind and heart must be my apology.

I am, sir, your humble servant,

Dana to Livingston.

No. 11.

JOHN ADAMS.

ST. PETERSBURGH,

November 18, (November 7, O. S.,) 1782.

SIR: When I was informed by Mr. Adams that Mr. Jay had written to him from Paris that "the British commissioner there had received full powers to treat of a peace with the commissioners of the United States," I waited upon the French minister to consult him on this special occasion upon the expediency of communicating my powers to this court. It would be imprudent, through this channel, to go into the reasons he assigned against it. It may be sufficient to say I found him strong in the opinion that all attempts made prior to a peace would be fruitless. As his opinion is the rule by which I am to be governed in this case, nothing can be attempted till the period arrives when we shall not feel ourselves under strong obligations to any sovereign in the world, who should even make advances to form political connexions with us, or acquire much éclat from any such connexions. I thought the opportunity favorable when the only power which had any pretence of right to contest our independence, had consented by so formal an act to treat with us upon the footing of a sovereign and independent State. The con sideration we should acquire by a political connexion with the illustrious sovereign of this empire during the war, and the advantages we might reasonably expect to derive from it in our negociation for a peace (for I have never considered independence as our only object), have ever made me desirous, if possible, to effect it during the war. Scarce any political measure of great importance can be undertaken with "an absolute certainty of success." If, therefore, upon mature deliberation the state of things is found to be such that success is not improbable and the benefits of it great and permanent, while the disadvantages of a failure, comparatively speaking, are small and of a transient nature, in

* MSS. Dep. of State; 4 Sparks' Dip. Rev. Corr, 650.

such a case it should seem that the measure should be hazarded. Though I do not believe this to be the very moment in which her Imperial majesty would wish to form any political connexion with the United States, but, on the contrary, she would wish to postpone it till the conclusion of the war, and be well pleased that no advances should be made on our part till then, because this would afford her opportunity to claim much merit of the court of London, in having withheld any encouragement to us, when, at the same time, not only any offence to the United States would be avoided, but she might allege, without a possibility of contradiction, that if an earlier application had been made by them, she would have been happy to have had an occasion to manifest her respect for them and the early interests she took in their concerns.

Nevertheless, there is room to suppose that if our propositions were communicated while the British King is in fact treating with the United States as with an independent sovereign power, that they would not be rejected. And if they were received, this circumstance might be productive of great benefit to our permanent interests. It would, in all probability, bring on a declaration of our independence by some other very considerable powers of Europe, particularly Sweden and Russia. The neutral maritime powers would extend the protection of their commerce and navigation to America, and no longer suffer their flags to be insulted on our coasts. The court of London would treat of peace with more zeal and good faith. They would the more readily give up certain claims and pretensions which they will doubtless make upon the United States, and would be exceedingly cautious how they broke off any nego ciations which they had opened. In a word, we should stand on a more advantageous and independent ground of treaty.

For the attainment of objects like these, had any discretionary power been left me, I should have thought it clearly my duty to have made the attempt here in this moment, as I now consider it to be my duty to wait for the conclusion of the war, the period which is pointed out to me as the only proper one, and when most certainly nothing will remain to be hazarded.

If the present negociations for a peace should happily succeed, I shall have occasion for the money mentioned in my letter No. 5, of September 5th, before I can expect an answer from Congress on that subject, and I shall apply to Dr. Franklin and Mr. Adams to advance it between them. It may not be amiss again to inform you that by the express allowance and order of her majesty, there is to be paid by every power entering into any treaty with her, six thousand roubles to each of her ministers signing the same; and it is now understood that there shall be four signatures on the part of her majesty, viz., that of Count Ostermann, the Vice-Chancellor; Count Woronzow, the President of the College of Commerce; M. Bakournin, Vice-President of the College of Finances; and M. Besborodko, Secretary of the Private Affairs or Particular Cabinet of her majesty. Matters of this sort were formerly