but only that process issue to try the validity of the patent, on the suggestions stated in the complaint. That this process is in the nature of a scire facias at the common law, to repeal patents, and the issues of fact, if any, are to be tried, not by the court, but by a jury; that the judgment upon this process, is in the nature of a judgment on a scire facias at common law, upon which a writ of error lies, as in other cases, to the circuit court, where there is matter of error apparent on the record, by bill of exceptions, or otherwise. That the patent itself is slight but prima facie evidence, in favour of the patentee, that it ig his invention; that if it appear that he is but a joint inventor, and he takes out the patent as his sole invention, it is an obtaining of the patent upon false suggestion within the act. Stearns v. Barrett, 1 Mason's R.—21. The remaining sections of the act, (11, and 12.) contain no matter of any general importance; the eleventh being directory only as to the fecs of office, and the twelfth being a repealing clause of the act of 1790.
1. Libel under the non-importation
acts. Alleged excuse of distress
repelled. Condemnation pro-
nounced. The New-York. 59
2. Necessity, which will excuse a
violation of the laws of trade,
must be urgent, and proceed
from such a state of things as
may be supposed to produce on
the mind of a skilful mariner, a
well-grounded fear of the loss of 5.
vessel and cargo, or of the lives
of the crew. II.
68
3. Decree of restitution affirmed,
with a certificate of probable
cause of seizure, in an instance
cause. on further proof.
San Pedro,
4. Libelfora forfeiture of goods im-
ported, an alleged to have been
invoiced at a less sum than the
actual cost, at the place of ex-
portation, with design to evade
the duties, contrary to the 66th
suction of the Collection Law,
ch. 123. Restitution decreed
upon the evidence as of the cost
of the goods at the place where
they were last shipped; the form
of the libel excluding all inquiry
as to their cost at the place
where they were originally
sipped, and as to continuity of
voyage. The United States v. 150
Crates of Earthen Ware, 232
The courts of the United States
haveexclusivecognizanceof ques-
tions of forfeiture, upon all sei-
zures made under the laws of the
U.States, and it is not competent
for a state court to entertain or
decide such question of forfeit-
ure. If a sentence of condemna-
tion be definitively pronounced by
the proper court of the U. States,
it is conclusive that a forfeiture
is incurred; if a sentence of ac- 8.
quittal, it is equally conclusive
against the forfeiture and in
either case, the question cannot
be again litigated in any com
mon law forum. Gelston v. Hoyt,
246.311 9.
6. Where a seizure is made for a
supposed forfeiture, under a law
of the United States, no action
of trespass lies in any common
law tribunal, until a final decrec
is pronounced upon the proceed-
ing in rem to enforce such for- 10.
feiture; for it depends upon the
final decree of the court pro-
ceeding in rem, whether such
seizure is to be deemed right- 11.
ful or tortious, and the action, if
brought before such decree is
made, is brought too soon. IJ.
7. If a suit be brought against the
seizing officer for the supposed
trespass, while the suit for the
forfeiture is depending, the fact
of such pending may be pleaded
in abatement, or as a temperary
bar of the action. If after a de-
cree of condemnation, then that
fact may be pleaded as a bar; if
after an acquittal, with a certifi-
cate of reasonable cause of seiz-
ure, then that may be pleaded as 12.
a bar.
If after an acquittal with-
out such certificate, then the offi-
cer is without any justification for
the seizure, and it is definitively
settled to be a tortious act. If, 13.
to an action of trespass in a state
court for a seizure, the seizing
officer plead the fact of forfeiture
in his defence, without averring
a lis pendens, or a condemnation,
or an acquittal with a certificate
of reasonable cause of seizure,
the plea is bad; for it attempts
to put in issue the question of 14.
forfeiture in a state court. Id.
state previously belonged.
A plea setting up a forfeiture
under that statute, in fitting out
a slip to cruize against such new
state, inust aver such recogni-
tion, or it is bad. Id.
323
A plca justifying a seizure under
this statute, need not state the
particular prince or state by name,
against whom the ship was intend-
ed to cruize. Id.
329
The 7th section of the statute of
1794, was not intended to apply,
except to cases where a seizure
or detention could not be en-
forced by the ordinary civil pow-
er, and there was a necessity, in
the opinion of the president, to
employ naval or military power
for this purpose. Id. 331. 334
The definitive sentence of a court
of admiralty, or any other court
of peculiar and exclusive juri
diction, whether of condemna-
tion or acquittal, is conclusive,
whereves the same subjec mat-
ter comes incidentally in contro
versy in any other tribunal. IL.
315
15. Application of this principle to a
recent case in England. Note a,
16. Supposing that the third article
of the constitution of the United
States, which declares that "the
judicial power shall extend to all
cases of admiralty and maritine
jurisdiction," vests in the Uni-
ted States exclusive jurisdiction
of all such cases, and that a mur-
der committed in the waters of a
state, where the tide ebbs and
flows, is a case of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction; yet con-
gress have not in the 8th section
of the act of 1790, ch. 9. "for
the punishment of certain crimes
against the United States," so
exercised this power as to con-
fer on the courts of the Uni-
ted States jurisdiction over such
murder. The United States v.
Bevans,
336.87.
17. Quere, Whether courts of com-
admiralty and inaritime jurisdic
tion, does not extend to a cession
of the waters in which those
cases may arise, or of general
jurisdiction over the same. Con.
gress may pass all laws which
are necessary for giving the
inost complete effect to the ex-
ercise of the admiralty and ma-
ritime jurisdiction granted to the
government of the union: but
the general jurisdiction over the
place,subject to this grant, ad-
heres to the territory as a por-
tion of territory not yet given
away; and the residuary powers
of legislation still remain in the
state. Il.
389
Congress have power to provide
for the punishment of offences
committed by persons on board
a ship of war of the United
States, wherever that ship may
lie. But congress have not ex-
ercised that power in the case of
a ship lying in the waters of the
United States; the words “with-
in any fort arsenal, dockyard,
magazine or in any other place
or district of country under the
sole and exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States," in the third
section of the act of 1790, ch. 9.
not extending to a ship of war,
but only to objects in their na
ture fixed and territorial. It.
mon law have concurrent juris-
diction with the admiralty over
murder cominitted in bays, &c.
which are enclosed parts of the
sea? Id.
387
18: Congress having, in the 8th sec-
tion of the act of 1790, ch. 9.
provided for the punishment of
murder, &c. committed upon
the high seas, or in any river,
haven, basin or bay, out of the
jurisdiction of any particular
state, it is not the offence com-
mitted, but the bay. &c.in which
it is committed, that must be 24. Case of the King v. Bruce. Note
out of the jurisdiction of the
state. Id.
387
19. The grant to the United States,
in the constitution, o al cases of
VOL. III.
$90
Texts on the admiralty jurisdic-
tion. Note a, b, 357.361
Resolution of 1632, upon the
cases of admiralty jurisdiction.
Note a,
Agreement of the judges of the
king's bench and the admiralty
of 1575. Note a,
391
25. A question of fact under the non-
importation laws. Defence set
up on the plea of distress r
|