enforcing a trading stamp statute. The chief contention was that the law violated the due process and the equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment of the federal Constitution. After conceding that the majority of the cases were opposed to the validity of the act, it was observed that the opposing cases mark a change of opinion and that "both sets of cases indicate by the statutes passed upon (23 states having attempted either to prohibit or to license the selling or use of trading stamps and coupons) a persistent legislative effort against the schemes under review or some forms of them, beginning in 1880 and repeated from time to time until the statute in controversy was passed in 1913." The more substantial reasons for sustaining the law are best stated in the following excerpt from the opinion:

"But no refinement of reason is necessary to demonstrate the broad power of the Legislature over the transactions of men. There are many lawful restrictions upon liberty of contract and business. It would be an endless task to cite cases in demonstration, and that the supplementing of the sale of one article by a token given and to be redeemed in some other article has accompaniments and effects beyond mere advertising the allegations of the bill and the argument of counsel establish. Advertising is merely identification and description, apprising of quality and place. It has no other object than to draw attention to the article to be sold, and the acquisition of the article to be sold constitutes the only inducement to its purchase. The matter is simple, single in purpose and motive; its consequences are well defined, there being nothing ulterior; it is the practice of old and familiar transactions and has sufficed for their success. The schemes of complainants have no such directness and effect. They rely upon something else than the article sold. They tempt by a promise of a value greater than that article and apparently not represented in its price, and it hence may be thought that thus by an appeal to cupidity lure to improvidence."

Continuing the court said this may not be called in an exact sense a lottery. It may not be called gaming.

"It may, however, be considered as having the seduction and evil of such, and whether it has may be a matter of inquiry, a matter of inquiry and of judgment that it is finally within the power of the Legislature to make."

State v. Pitney involved the constitutionality of the trading stamp law of this state. The defense was that the law was violative of Arts. 5 and 8 of the Constitution of the United States and of the fourteenth amendment thereof. The validity of the law was sustained, affirming this court, State v. Pitney, 79 Wash. 608.

Tanner v. Little also involved the constitutionality of the trading stamp law of this state. The law was assailed from many angles. The validity of the act was, however, upheld, the court expressing the view that the license is prohibitive and that "it was competent for the state to give it that effect."

The rule announced in the last three cases obviously marks a change of opinion. The almost unbroken line of authority, both

state and federal, was opposed to the view announced in State v. Pitney when that case was decided by our Supreme Court. These cases and the Oklahoma bank case, Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, furnish a strong basis for the statement that persistent legislative effort to strike down a business system believed to be inimical to the public welfare will, if pursued for a sufficient length of time, be upheld by the courts as a legitimate exercise of the police power. The dominant thought in the trading stamp cases appears to be this: That if the law-making body was of the opinion that the law might lead to extravagance and that it might result in a trading stamp company using one patron to coerce others engaged in a similar business to become its patrons, and hence to work injustice or oppression, the court will not say that there was no warrant for the belief.

In Northern Pacific Railway Company v. Meese, it was held that the workmen's compensation law of this state is not in conflict with the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the federal Constitution, and upon a question of practice that "it is settled doctrine that federal courts must accept the construction of a state statute deliberately adopted by its highest court."

Among the notable cases of the year decided by the Supreme Court of the state are State ex rel. Brislawn v. Meath, 84 Wash. 302, and Gottstein v. Lister, 88 Wash. 462. The Brislawn case construes Section 2 of the Act of 1915, Rem. Code, Section 6605. The sole purpose of the act was to change the personnel of the board of state land commissioners. Section 2 reads: "This act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace and safety and the support of the state government, and shall take effect immediately." The seventh amendment of the state Constitution, subdivision b, is as follows: "The second power reserved by the people is the referendum, and it may be ordered on any act, bill, law, or any part thereof passed by the Legislature, except such laws as may be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, support of the state government and its existing public institutions." Subdivision c provides that: "No act or bill subject to referendum shall take effect until ninety days after the adjournment of the session at which it was enacted." Limiting the decision to the peculiar facts, it was held that in the light of the amendment the Legislature exceeded its power in declaring an emergency. Referring to the case of Kadderly v. Portland, 44 Ore. 118, and kindred cases sustaining the validity of an emergency clause under similar constitutional restraints, the court said that none of them grasp the reason or philosophy of the recent change in the fundamental law. They are "in step with a tune that is dead." It may be said in support of the view of the court that, if emergency clauses are conclusive upon the courts upon such a state of facts, the life blood of the seventh amendment may be taken away by unfriendly legislation.

The principle questions presented in the Gottstein case are these: (a) The seventh amendment reserving to the people the right to initiate laws and the right to refer laws enacted by the Legislature to the people for their approval or rejection, could not be submitted as one amendment; (b) that the amendment was not published the length of time required by the Constitution, as shown by a stipulation of facts subject to its relevancy, and (c) that the initiative measure was not published as required by law. In support of the first proposition, it was argued that it presents two subjects, the exercise of the legislative and the veto power, and that these subjects should have been separately submitted. It was held in effect that there was but one general subject, viz., that of legislative power; that the initiative and referendum powers reserved to the people are but the means to a common end, that end being that the people themselves, through the initiative, may exercise the legislative power of the state as applied to such measures, and that they may exercise supervisory control over laws enacted by the Legislature through the means of the referendum. Considering the second question the court held that it could not take cognizance of stipulated facts of which it would not take judicial notice, and that for as much as the record facts so far as there were any pointed to a compliance with the mandate of the Constitution, full compliance would be presumed. For the reasons stated in subdivision b the same presumption was indulged as to the matters presented in subdivision c.

The Brislawn and Gottstein cases seem to conflict in this: In the Brislawn case the court took judicial notice of the fact that none of the facts recited in the emergency clause of the act in fact existed; while in the Gottstein case the court thrust aside stipulated facts showing that neither the seventh amendment to the Constitution nor the measure under review had been published for the length of time required by the Constitution. With great respect to the court I have not been able to free my mind from the conviction that the Gottstein case was decided right but predicated upon wrong reasons. While neither the seventh amendment nor the act there under review was published for the length of time required in the Constitution, it is a well-known fact that the amendment and the act itself were the most widely discussed matters presented to the people at the time they severally were under consideration. The prohibition law was discussed in the columns of the press, from practically ever pulpit in the state, in public halls, and from the platforms in country school houses. Hence it may be said that, while the people did not have the notice prescribed in the Constitution, they had actual notice of the submission of the measure upon which they voted. I am not unmindful of the fact that the Constitution in terms prescribes that its provisions are mandatory. I cannot follow the courts in their distinction between a mandatory provision in a constitution and a mandatory provision in a statute. Law is law from whatever

source it may spring, whether it proceeds from the constitution, the principles of the common law, or from the statute. I cannot understand why any greater sanctity should flow from a right guaranteed by the Constitution than from a right guaranteed by a statute against which there is no constitutional objection, or guaranteed by the principles of the common law. This view is not in accord with the weight of authority, but it seems to me that it is in accord with common sense. Blackstone in his Commentaries has said that law is the essence of reason, and that which is not reason is not law.

There will be upon the ballot at the November election a proposed amendment to the Constitution of the state and four referred measures, Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6, respectively, which I shall now consider.

Briefly stated, the proposed amentment to Section 1 of Article 6 of the Constitution limits the right to vote upon the question of issuing public bonds and incurring public debts to those who pay taxes in the district or community where the debt is imposed. It does not fix the amount of taxes one must pay in order to vote on the question. It merely provides that the voter must pay some sort of tax, either real or personal. A tax is a first lien upon all property upon which it is imposed. There is no good reason why one who does not pay a tax may vote to impose the burden of a tax upon the property of his neighbor.

The distinction between an initiative and referendum measure is this: Under the Constitution there are two law-making bodies in the state the legislative body, consisting of the Senate and House of Representatives, whose members are chosen by the people at a general election, and the people themselves who may enact laws by means of initiative measures. The referendum is a veto power reserved to the people. When the Legislature has enacted a law, it may, under the Constitution, be referred to the people, who may approve or reject it. So we have two law-making bodies, the Legislature and the people, and two powers which may exercise the veto, the governor and the people.

It follows from what we have said that the referendum measures have been enacted into laws by the Legislature and have been approved by the governor or have been passed over his veto by a twothirds vote of both the Senate and House of Representatives. I think it is generally conceded that the state has never in its history had a stronger or better legislative body than it had at the last sessionthe one that enacted the measures in question. The state was peculiarly fortunate in having in the last Legislature many members of uncommon ability in both houses. That as a body both houses were devoted to the advancement of the public welfare no thoughtful or patriotic person will have the temerity to question. If the postulate is sound, it follows that the voter should presume that all referendum measures are both wise and just and should vote to sustain them in the absence of some compelling reasons for voting against them.

Referendum Measure No. 3 was enacted by the Legislature at the last session to facilitate the operation of the provisions of the Constitution relating to the initiative and referendum and to prevent fraud. It requires all initiative and referendum petitions to be deposited with the registration officer of the city, town or precinct and provides that such petitions may be signed only at such offices. Its purpose is to guarantee the integrity of the petitions and the signatures and to prevent such fraud as was shown in the seven sisters cases which were before the Supreme Court and which may be found in 81 Wash. reports at page 623. In these cases the petitions were so honeycombed with fraudulent signatures that with such signatures eliminated there were not sufficient names on the petitions to satisfy the mandate of the Constitution and to authorize the secretary of state to place them on the ballot. The court held that inasmuch as the signatures had been certified, it had no power to purge them of their fraud and strike out the fraudulent names. To remedy the evil, this law was enacted.

The initiative and referendum have become an integral part of our governmental system. It is of the utmost importance therefore that reasonable safeguards shall be thrown around them to the end that every name signed to such a petition shall be signed by a legal voter. In no other way can we maintain the purity of our lawmaking and law-vetoing bodies. None but a registration officer has the data to check the signatures to such petitions. He has the detailed record of the voters and all opportunity to commit fraud will be eliminated if the registration officer does his duty.

The law has another virtue: Unless the constitutional number of legal voters take sufficient interest in a measure to step into the proper registration office and sign a petition the taxpayer should not be burdened with the expense of having the measure placed upon the ballot.

Referendum No. 4 was enacted for the same purpose as No. 3 last referred to and should be sustained for the same reason.

Referendum No. 5 provides for holding county and state conventions. Its object and purpose is to authorize the holding of county and state conventions for the purpose of adopting a party platform. It requires a candidate for other than judicial office to declare in his declaration of candidacy that he accepts and endorses generally the platform of the party under which he files as adopted at its last state convention and such platform binds him, if elected, to support the same generally and "to endeavor to have enacted into law the principles" enunciated in the platform.

The act provides that every county convention shall select the number of delegates to the state convention fixed in the call of the state committee and that it shall select one member of a state advisory platform committee. It makes it the duty of the members of the advisory committee to meet in advance of the date fixed for