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the lines, troops can be rapidly moved in large masses under cover of night, and hidden during the day in villages and woods without their presence being suspected by the opposing aviators. The German attack on Verdun in February, 1916, and the British attack on Cambrai last November, are both instances of attacks coming as a surprise to the defending troops, who were unaware of the full strength of the offensive directed against them till the leading columns had penetrated into their first lines of defence. Owing to the liability to surprise, and the impossibility of locating concentrations, front lines are only held lightly with sufficient troops to fight a delaying battle till the arrival of the reserves, and it is upon the skill with which reserve troops are distributed along the front, and brought up to the fighting line when an attack has developed, that results depend. There was nothing unusual about the German concentration on March 21st, except that it was larger and distributed along a wider front than has ever before been the case on either side in the Western theatre of war. It was owing to these causes that the Germans succeeded in breaking into our front further than we were able to break through their defences last year during the progress of the Flanders offensive.

Another question which has been on many lips during the past month is, if German soldiers could penetrate thirty or forty miles into the British front before being stopped, why could not British troops do the same in Flanders last year? The answer is that the Kaiser is master of many legions, and has no scruples about sacrificing his soldiers' lives if he can hack his way to victory. All reports of the recent battles on the Somme front go to show that if our men left their positions it was when they were overwhelmed by superior numbers. Every day we heard of German soldiers being mowed down in masses, while others driven on from behind rushed over their dead bodies in endless waves of fresh men. Heavy as was the fire of our infantry and gunners, it did not kill Germans fast enough to stop the advance of others. When reserve troops arrived to restore numerical equality the murderous slaughter came to an end, but the German casualty list must be appallingly long. Had our commanders adopted the same system of reckless tactics last year we should have achieved the same results, but at a price which, with our smaller reserve of man-power, we should have been less able to pay.

The paralysis of the defence on the extreme right of the British Army during the first days of the German offensive decided the vexed question of appointing a General-in-Chief to direct operations on the Western front. While the conduct of the campaign only involved general questions of strategical direction, the Versailles War Council satisfied all the requirements of unified control, but as soon as strategy gave place to tactics, control by a Council ceased to be practicable. This was made clear on the first day of the offensive. Von Hutier's attack, which was the most powerful of all three attacks launched on March 21st, was directed against the point where

General Gough's Army linked up with General Humbert's 3rd French Army, and where tactical responsibility was consequently divided between the two commanders, neither of whom was in a position to give orders to the other. They could get orders from their respective Commanders-in-Chief, but only after consultation between them, and when a battle is in progress personal consultation is rarely possible. Agreed co-operation is right in theory, but breaks down in practice when victory depends on the right order being given at the right time and carried out in the right place. British and French troops are now fighting shoulder to shoulder on one front, and for all the practical purposes of battle they constitute one Army. This is where the superior Commander comes in, and the only regret is that circumstances prevented him from coming in before.

The appointment of General Foch, first to co-ordinate the strategy of the Allied Armies, and afterwards as Commander-in-Chief on the Western front, was admittedly the best that could be made. There are other Commanders in both British and French Armies who are well qualified for the post of Commander-in-Chief, but none of them is quite so well fitted as General Foch for the high position to which he has been called by the unanimous consent of French and British soldiers. Apart from the confidence which he inspires in France, he is persona grata with the officers of the British Higher Command, who have collaborated with him during the war, and who have learnt to appreciate his military merit quite as much as French Generals. do. There may be political objections to placing the British Army under a French Commander-in-Chief, but they are academical rather than practical, and in any case must give place to the exigencies of the military situation. General Foch's functions are limited to strategical direction, the British and French Commanders-in-Chief retaining full control over the troops under their orders.

THE BATTLE OF THE LYS RIVER.

After compelling the Allies to concentrate on the Somme and Oise. for the defence of Amiens and Paris, Ludendorff-the whole plan of campaign is believed to be his-decided to strike another blow, this time against the British front between the La Bassée Canal and the coast. The attack had evidently been planned to synchronise with the expected capture of Amiens, when the British Army, cut off from French help, would have come under two fires, one directed from the Somme, the other from the Lys. The plan, as has been seen, failed to materialise, and the new offensive movement was undertaken as a separate operation, which had less ambitious, but not less. deadly, aims than the larger scheme which was dependent on the capture of Amiens. The battle in progress as this article goes to press on April 19th has for its object to break through the centre of the British Army covering the Channel ports, roll up the two wings, throw the right wing back on the Somme, and force the left wing either to stand with its back to the sea, or fight its way as best

it could to the Somme. If the plan failed in its entirety Ludendorff doubtless hoped it would have the effect of diverting Allied troops from the Somme, and opening the road to Amiens.

The attack which was launched on April 9th was entrusted to the 4th and 6th German Armies, the 4th Army, commanded by General Sixt von Armin, operating north of the Lys river, while the 6th Army, under General von Quast, was deployed along the front between Armentières and Givenchy. No official information has been published concerning the distribution of British troops, but it is known that the Portuguese Army held the line from Richbourg St. Vaast to Fauquissart, the left wing of the 1st Army being on the Portuguese right, while General Plumer, with the 2nd Army, had charge of the front from Armentières to Mercken, where the Belgian Army prolonged the line to the coast.

On the morning of April 9th von Quast attacked the British and Portuguese positions along the whole front from Givenchy to Armentières, and, favoured by a thick mist, broke through the Portuguese lines early in the day, capturing the villages of Richbourg St. Vaast and Laventie and reaching the Lys between Estaires and Bac St. Maur in the evening. The Portuguese, after making a brave stand, were overwhelmed by superior numbers, and fell back behind the Lys. The 55th Division, belonging to Horne's Army, stood firm at Givenchy and resisted all the enemy's attempts to move down the road to Bethune. A British division at Fleurbaix, covering the passage over the Lys, held its ground for several hours, and it then retired to Bac St. Maur, where General Höfer effected a passage over the river in the evening. Next day the Germans crossed the Lys at several points between Estaires and Bac St. Maur, and reached the Lawe river at Lestrem. By this time British troops had arrived to replace the Portuguese, who had been taken out of the line to rest, and severe fighting took place south of Merville and Steenwerck. On this day von Armin attacked between the Lys and the Ypres-Comines Canal, captured Hollebeke, and pushed Plumer's right wing back to the Wytschaete-Messines ridge. Armentières was occupied in the evening. On the 11th, in spite of vigorous British counter-attacks, von Quast advanced towards Hazebrouck and Bailleul, and established his troops on the line Merville-Neuf Berquin-Steenwerck. General Eberhardt occupied Armentières in the evening, while on the left General Bernhardi crossed the Lawe at Lestrem and advanced to the Clarence river. On the 12th the German advance, though continued, began to slow down as opposition increased. Von Armin's troops, crossing the Messines ridge, reached the outskirts of Wulverghem, while south of the ridge other enemy troops went through Ploegsteert Wood and north of it took Rossignol Hill by storm. On this day the village of Neuve Eglise, on the Bailleul-Messines road, fell into von Quast's hands, and German troops reached the railway station on the outskirts of Bailleul. On the left, Locon was taken by storm, and the enemy's

advanced guards reached the Aire-La Bassée Canal. Next day a severe battle took place round Neuve Eglise, which was retaken by the British, but lost in a German counter-attack on the 14th, on

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which day the German advance was carried up to the outskirts of the Nieppe Wood, the villages of Vieux Berquin and Merris being occupied in the evening. On the 15th Bailleul fell into the enemy's

hands, and next day the Germans successfully assaulted Wytschaete and Meteren. After the fall of Bailleul British troops were withdrawn from the Passchendaele ridge to the Pilkem-Hooge position covering the approaches to Ypres from the east. On the 17th, Wytschaete and Meteren were recovered by British counter-attacks, but the villages were again lost in the evening. On this day the Belgians, who have been doomed so long to comparative inactivity, got a chance of paying off old scores, and made a good use of the opportunity. When von Armin ordered his troops to re-occupy the Passchendaele ridge, which had been evacuated by General Plumer's men on the 16th, some of the units advanced incautiously into the Belgian outpost line, where they thought to establish themselves. with impunity. Thereupon the Belgian Commander launched a powerful counter-attack, which inflicted heavy loss on the intruders, who were driven back, leaving 700 prisoners and forty-two machineguns in the hands of our Allies. The Belgians are reported to have fought with fine dash, and, after ejecting the Germans from their positions, defeated the reinforcements which were brought up in the afternoon.

Meanwhile French troops had arrived, and on the 18th, in spite of repeated attacks along the whole front, the Germans failed to make any further progress. The two points specially selected for attack were Mont Kemmel, a strong tactical point d'appui overlooking the road leading from Neuve Eglise to Ypres, as also the road between Poperinghe and Wytschaete, and Givenchy, which bars the road to Bethune. Both attacks were driven off with heavy loss to the attacking columns. "The struggle "-the quotation is from the British evening communiqué of April 18th-"has been particularly fierce in the neighbourhood of Givenchy, where the enemy has made determined efforts without success to retrieve his previous failures.” The 18th was a red letter day in the French and British military calendars, exemplifying the value of tactical cohesion, which can only be brought about through the instrumentality of the single command. The opposing line on the morning of April 19th, when this record was broken off till next month, ran as shown on the sketch through Pilkem and Hooge to the Grand Bois, on the extreme north end of the Wytschaete-Messines ridge, and then to the north of Wulverghem and Meteren, where it turned south, crossing the Hazebrouck-Armentières railway to the outskirts of the Nieppe Forest. The line then takes a semi-circular direction to Givenchy, where the 1st Corps is firmly entrenched.

The Lys river battle has followed similar tactical lines to the battle which was fought for the possession of Amiens in the last week of March. After a short but intense bombardment by an enormous number of batteries concentrated behind the infantry columns assembled for the attack, the infantry were let loose in dense masses, which burst through the outpost lines of the Allies, and, regardless of losses, stormed the battle positions by sheer force of numerical weight. It was a repetition of Mackensen's phalanx

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