than we thought it would be when we first took up arms to defend the cause for which we are fighting.

It is not yet possible to estimate the full effect which Russia's defection will have on the military situation, but as far as Great Britain's Eastern war policy is concerned, the cessation of Russian co-operation in Armenia and Persia will require our General Staff to recast their plans and decide how far further offensive operations in the Tigris Valley are for the present possible. If the Russians evacuate Armenia and withdraw to their former frontier in the Caucasus, General Marshall may have to remain on the defensive at Baghdad, for a further advance northwards would place his army en l'air and leave his flank and communications open to attack. Baghdad must on no account be given up, for as long as we hold the city we have the key to the gate into Persia in our hands.

AMERICA'S WAR PREPARATIONS.

On February 4th it was officially announced in Washington that General Pershing had taken over a sector of the French front in Lorraine and that American troops were fighting in the trenches. On the following day the realities of war were brought home to the American people by the news of the sinking off the coast of Ireland of the Tuscania, which was carrying American troops to France. There were more than 2,000 officers and men on board, and happily the large majority were saved, but the loss of life, 166 of all ranks, was sufficient to remind Americans of the ruthless nature of the war and of the risks which their troops incurred during their transportation to Europe. The news had a widespread effect in hardening the determination of the American people. "We must win this war," said Mr. Baker, Secretary of War, "and we shall win it. Losses like this unite the country in sympathy with the families of those who have suffered loss. They also unite us to make more determined our purpose to press on.'

Mr. Baker has latterly adopted the system of issuing a weekly bulletin at Washington giving the nation all the information he legitimately can about the progress of war preparations, the object being to associate the people as far as it is possible to do so with the Government in the great undertaking which the whole country has entered into with such steadfast purpose. According to Mr. Baker's information communicated from time to time to the Military Affairs Committee of the Senate, and published in his weekly. bulletins, there are now half a million of trained American soldiers in France organised in mobilised divisions concentrated at various. rendezvous facing the Eastern frontier and ready to take part in resisting the impending German offensive. Before the end of the year, if shipping is available, and in view of the present activity in British and American shipyards there should be no shortage of the necessary tonnage, the Army will number 1,500,000 officers and men, while in 1919 augmentation will increase at an even greater rate.

To give some idea of what his department has done to put men in the field, Mr. Baker published the following figures of strength:-COMPARATIVE STRENGTH.

These figures speak for themselves and are a characteristic indication of the whole-hearted way in which the Americans go to work when they have made up their minds to achieve a fixed purpose. If necessary they are prepared to place the whole of the 10,000,000 conscripts whose names are inscribed on the recruiting rolls in the field.

President Wilson has come prominently to the front in this great world struggle both as a statesman and an administrator. Recognising his worth, Congress has given him the powers of a dictator, and he is exercising them with an administrative energy which has secured him the undivided confidence of the American nation. There is a disposition in a certain section of the British Press to represent him as being a negotiator rather than a fighter, but his public utterances lend no confirmation to this view. President Wilson is ready to negotiate for peace, just as the Ministers of the Western Powers are, but on terms laid down by the Allies, not by the enemy. one knows better than he does the meaning of this determination. When he was striving with all his might to avert war he hoped for peace by agreement. Now he knows there can be no peace without victory. His words are so clear that they cannot be too often reproduced.

No

"Let there be no misunderstanding. Our present and immediate task is to win the war, and nothing shall turn us aside from it until it is accomplished. Every power and resource we possess, whether of men, money, or of materials, is being devoted and will continue to be devoted to that purpose until it is achieved. Those who desire to bring peace about before that purpose is achieved I counsel to carry their advice elsewhere. We will not entertain it."

There is no going behind this statement, which is the dignified expression of America's determination to fight till victory crowns her arms.

IMPENDING GERMAN OFFENSIVE.

Flushed with their Russian victory and with the Eastern frontier secure from attack, the Germans are preparing to bring all their available military strength and that of their allies to the Western

theatre of war with the intention of striking a series of decisive blows which will reduce the Allied Powers to the same degree of belligerent impotence as is the case with Russia. The German Emperor was never in a more truculent mood than he is at present. While he declares his wish for peace he at the same time warns Europe that the peace which "the Lord God wants" is a German peace, and before peace can reign on earth "the victory of the German arms must first be recognised." "The sword must decide." This is what the Emperor told the Burgomaster of Homburg, and it is in this spirit that he and his armies are preparing to attack the Allies.

The Versailles War Council has been busy collecting information about the enemy's movements since the conclusion of the armistice with the Russian Government, and the following may be regarded as the approximate distribution of the hostile forces in the various theatres of war. Along the British and French fronts there are now concentrated approximately 175 German divisions, 112 of which are in first line with sixty-two in reserve. Of these twenty fresh divisions sixteen are believed to have come from Russia and four from Italy. Other divisions are in process of transportation from the Eastern frontier, and before long we must expect to be confronted by 200 German divisions, each comprising nine battalions of 1,000 men, giving a total of 1,800,000 rifles.

On the Russo-Roumanian front the enemy is believed to have ninety-eight divisions-sixty-one German, thirty-three Austrian, two Bulgarian, and two Turkish. The Bulgarian and Turkish troops are of good quality, but the German and Austrian divisions are mostly composed of men who are either too young or too old to send to the Western front, where all the best remaining men are being concentrated. Forty-four Turkish divisions are available on the Asiatic front, but none of these divisions are believed to be up to strength. In Italy, according to present information, there are forty-two Austrian and three German divisions, while in Macedonia seventeen divisions have been located, twelve Bulgarian, three German, and two Austrian.

It is not possible to publish even an approximate estimate of the strength of the Allied troops on the Western front, or of their distribution in divisions, but we have the authority of Sir Auckland Geddes, who spoke in the House of Commons on January 14th with the latest available data at his disposal, that on the date of his speech the strength of the Allied troops was "at least equal" to that of the enemy, and that with the reinforcements which we and the Americans are about to put into the field numerical superiority will be established on the side of the Allies during the year after allowing for all additional enemy troops which the cessation of hostilities on the Eastern front will release for service in the West. What the Americans are doing has been brought to notice in another part of this article. In this country a second Military Service Act has been passed through Parliament giving the Director-General of

National Service power to withdraw any certificate granted by the local recruiting tribunals exempting men on occupational grounds, either under the Military Service Act of 1916 or when they have been voluntarily attested. This hitherto untapped source of manpower will yield between 420,000 and 450,000 men in the prime of life,

who when trained will bring a valuable reinforcement of strength to the British armies in the field. Another source of supply is found in the Home Army reserves, from which men are being rapidly sent out to fill the cadres of Sir Douglas Haig's armies which were depleted by the casualties due to last year's offensive. Since recruiting was transferred from War Office to civil control the arrange

ments have been completely reorganised, Great Britain being now divided into ten regions, each under an officer responsible for the recruiting in his own region. We have the assurance of Sir Auckland Geddes that the new system is working smoothly and is ready for any emergency which may arise. There is still a large reservoir of reserve man-power in the country, but, as Sir Auckland Geddes points out, National Service in time of war is not a question of only raising men to fight, but one of maintaining "an even poise and balance between all the State activities which are essential to winning the war."

Where and when will the impending blow be delivered? There are no data available for answering these questions, and it is doubtful if the Versailles War Council is any better informed than the public on the point. From neutral sources we learn that large concentrations of German troops are taking place in both Belgium and Alsace, pointing to the likelihood of simultaneous attacks being directed against the two strategical flanks of the Anglo-French Armies. The temptation to make another bid for the ports on the northern French littoral is naturally great, and may have the same determining influence on German strategy as it had in the autumn of 1914. The possibility of a surprise attack coming across the Yser with the intention of enveloping the Belgian Army watching the flooded zone near Dixmude must not be lost sight of, but the Allies' left flank rests on the sea and cannot be turned without naval co-operation, which, if attempted, will give Admiral Beatty the chance he has been so long denied.

The skeleton sketch drawn for this article may help to illustrate the various possibilities in front of the Germans when their offensive plans are matured. The position of neutral Switzerland midway along the Allies' front, jutting out to the west, and tending to isolate General Diaz, favours German offensive strategy and acts as a clog on the combinations of the Allied commanders, interrupting as it does lateral communications between the Italian and French Armies and complicating the arrangements for mutual co-operation. Hindenburg is, of course, well aware of his geographical advantage and will make the best of it. As on the northern flank of the AngloFrench front, so on the southern, the Allies must be prepared for a German attempt to force a way through the trouée de Belfort with the intention of seizing the Dijon-Mont Cenis-Turin railway and intercepting General Fayolle's communications with France. These and other possible strategical situations have doubtless been the subject of profound study by the Versailles experts, and arrangements made for the utilisation under the best conditions of those "Armées de Manœuvre" of which the eminent Paris expert commentator, Colonel Rousset, is so zealous a champion.

Having discussed German possibilities, it would be an interesting task to compare them with those in front of the Allies when their time comes, as surely it will, to throw back the invaders for the