matter. It behoves them, for instance, to bear in mind that resources to be of value must be intelligently employed, that means potentially efficacious are worthless unless properly adjusted to the end, that opportunities are unavailing unless seized in time, that sacrifices of blood and treasure, however lavish, are of no avail unless duly fructified, in short, that strength, without the light of intelligence to guide it, has as poor a chance against strength combined with judgment as has the furious bull in the ring against the wiles of the cool-headed torero.

Of those self-evident propositions the Coalition has had ample demonstration. Its potential advantages have been constantly forfeited to the enemy by the incapacity of honest marplots acting as leaders, missing opportunities, wasting time, estranging friendly neutrals, turning would-be allies into covert or open adversaries, playing into the hands of the Teutons, and keeping its own peoples from the goal. This, I take it, was the kernel of the ominous message which the British Premier wrapped up in his ornate Paris confession. From him the masses learned that the main cause of our disasters is that insidious blight of bad leadership which strikes the most superb efforts of the Entente peoples with barrenness, and reduces a feasible task to a Sisyphus labour.

In the circumstances, then, outsiders, like myself, must make the best of the available data for a study of the relative positions of the belligerents with a view to determining to what extent the Coalition, with its resources and limitations, can still modify them to its advantage. In a former article I showed that the Allies. might score a brilliant success, drive the Germans out of France and Belgium, end the war, and yet fail to secure the essential aims for which they are fighting. This curious position would be reached if peace should leave the Central Empires militarily more powerful, territorially greater, or economically better off than they were four years ago. And it may be worth while to inquire whether there are any foretokens of that unsatisfactory ending to be discerned in the relative positions of the belligerents to-day. It requires some moral courage to start such an inquiry after President Wilson's inspiriting message, but I, at any rate, can moot the matter without inconsistency.

If, then, we glance at the Eastern front we find that the Central Empires are victors all along the line. In the Balkans, Roumania, and Turkey, in a large part of Persia, Poland, and Curland, they have become the permanent overlords. Russia being definitely ousted from European politics, the "protectorate" of the Balkans falls naturally to the Teutons, irrespective of our

peace terms, unless, indeed, we contrive to pull the Central Empires to pieces. The loss of Russia to us, even though the Teutons fail to draw it into their orbit, augments their strength considerably. But that is not all. The once mighty Slav State is itself being reduced to a sort of dependency in which German influence tends to become paramount. Thus, so far as one can now look ahead, it seems as though the North-east as well as the South-east of Europe were permanently ranged on the side of our enemies. And it is of primary importance that all the bearings of this tremendous change should be realised by the politicians who personify the Western Coalition. Those who grasp them understand that the main objects for which the Coalition was formed are no longer attainable unless it can and will break up the Central Empires and keep them dismembered until a new spirit takes possession of their populations. That is the master-fact of the situation. If we are not able and willing to demolish the German and Austrian Empires, there is but one alternative. . . .

The pristine formal object of the war was to defend Serbia against the inordinate ambition of the Central Empires, which were planning to exclude Russian influence from the Balkans. For it was felt that if they succeeded in establishing the masked protectorate for which they were striving, the balance of European power would be upset to the detriment of the Entente States and German hegemony become a grim reality within a few brief years. And the inference was correct. And it is selfevident that if the future peace were to give them not only that protectorate, but also, over and above, paramount influence in Russia, they would have gained all their ends, and the Allies would have been baulked of theirs. Russia then-autocratic, reactionary, and backward though she was-became by the force of circumstance our friend and ally. For she was the sluice-gate that hindered the inrush of the German floods in the East. That sluice has now been thrown open and the waters are rushing in. It was for the purpose of contributing to prevent this catastrophe that I have been working in public and in private for the last quarter of a century.

The delusions that inspired and the fitfulness that characterised the attitude of the Entente towards their ill-starred Slav ally during this war awaken pity rather than resentment-pity for the myriads of brave men whom they doomed to an untimely end. In spite of repeated endeavours, I have never been able to get the people in power to realise how surely and how wantonly they were courting disaster from Russia. They had their own

little theories and were content. Even recently they brushed aside serious warnings and told me that Kerensky would surely remain in power and probably resuscitate the army and co-operate with the Entente. Yet it was Kerensky who abolished capital punishment and preached the gospel of peace with Germany which Lenin and Trotzky are now carrying out. I am in constant communication with Russians of Petrograd, Moscow, Odessa, Kieff, and since the war began the information I have drawn from trustworthy sources there has never been belied by events. These data, then, convince me that Kerensky, had he remained in office, would have concluded a separate peace just as Lenin is doing, doubtless with less of bitterness against France and Britain, but with the same consequences to the Entente. Nay, the Cadets themselves, if they could seize the reins of power, would either set to work on the same lines or else be compelled to resign. For it is not this party or that, but the bulk of the Russian people who, freed from all checks, are weary of the war and clamour for immediate peace. The Revolution, to which these things are chiefly due, should and would have been foreseen and canalised by competent statesmen. The hatred of Englishmen and Frenchmen which is now being displayed in Russian towns and cities is in a great measure the fruit of the ridiculous and provocative missions sent to the Russian capitals by our Ritzonian politicians.

The lingering notion that Kaledin, Korniloff, or some other chief may yet arise, overturn Lenin's party, and immobilise German forces on the Eastern front is another delusion. You cannot reorganise an army which, besides having lost the spirit of discipline, lacks the all-important element of officers. For a corps of officers which has almost vanished one cannot improvise substitutes. It is calculated that over forty thousand Russian officers were killed or wounded during the first two years of the war and their places taken by officers of the reserve, students, and other intellectuals. Of these, too, a large percentage was subsequently mowed down by the enemy's fire. Then there were the famous "Battalions of Death" composed only of heroic officers determined to set an example to the privates who were hobnobbing with the enemy. They, too, sustained such losses. that before the great break-up at the fronts the officer class had dwindled almost to vanishing-point. The last hope of the army then centred in the military schools until the Maximalists decimated their inmates. Large numbers of young cadets had their lives snuffed out by the party now in power. In November these youths defended the Cadet Corps in Petrograd for several hours against the Leninites, but at last, hard pressed and dis

appointed of Kerensky's reinforcements, they surrendered, whereupon many were shot or stabbed on the spot, others flung into the Neva, and some thrown into prison.

No mere change of Premier or of Cabinet would now suffice to reconstitute the elements and revive the spirits of the Russian army. There is no Russian army to reorganise. General Alexeieff said: "Its discipline is destroyed. Our officers are martyrs. If they do not die on the field of honour they are cut down in hundreds by the bullets of their subalterns. And I can do nothing to better their lot. Heart-broken I take my departure."

To sum up: We have not only lost Russia, but lost her to the enemy. The armies she held on her long front are being set free for action against France and ourselves. If not her whole navy, then her fleet of destroyers, may find their way into German waters, there to be manned by German crews. Her Teuton prisoners will be sent home to swell the forces to be dispatched against us. Her faithlessness involves the gallant Roumanian army in disaster and threatens Sarrail and his expedition. The German army will be supplied with corn and other necessaries. And it would not surprise me if Germany undertook to re-establish order and something more in the country for her own benefit.1 It is maddening for the Allied peoples to garner in such a harvest after a series of superb efforts which, if properly directed, would have given them a decisive victory long ago.

Their patience is subjected to a severe strain when those responsible for having neglected opportunities, wasted time, misapplied resources, and thus unwittingly aided the enemy, announce in lordly Ritzonian tones that they will continue the war for an indefinite number of years-forgetting that they are drawing cheques on the nation's blood and substance for which they are unable to secure an adequate, or indeed any, return. Even the resources of the Coalition have limits, whereas squandering incompetence has none. The Ministerial confession uttered in Paris may deserve and obtain forgiveness, but it will not improve the situation. And the new situation has affected the issues that depended on the utilisation of the old one, however deftly the fact may still be disguised.

Already the Germans are laying the foundations on which they will reorganise all Eastern Europe unless the Coalition can. drive them out for good. They have likewise secured their war aims, unless the Entente can step in and reorganise Russia on a wholly new basis, or else touch the soul of the Teuton race and

(1) “Germany has no reproach to make to regenerate Russia. On the contrary, she will behave as a good neighbour should, and help her to rebuild her house." (Kölnische Zeitung, November 28th, 1917.)

Wessex was ever the resort of the Sylvan Muse. Blow, then, the war clarion in verse! Touch the lyre of coming peace! We may see a Byron, a Shelley, a Wordsworth soon!

Drawn by a happy family event, I have just visited London, after an absence of five years, which I never thought to have seen again. What a change through war, and not entirely by war! Hardly a trace of the ruin and fires of which the great Liar brags! Much "as usual" in many things! And yet, how odious is the rush, the scramble, the roar of the main streets-far worse even than in 1912, when I left them, as I thought for ever, to find a little rest in my last years. It shocks, wounds, disgusts me, as if, with the poet, I were in one of the circles of his Inferno. Modern mechanism has brutalised life. And in this rattle and crash and whirl, wild luxury, games, shows, gluttony, and vice work their Vanity Fair with greater recklessness than ever. As I walked about streets blazing with gems, and gold, and every form of extravagance, I asked myself-and is this the war for very life of a great race? If the Kaiser could come and see it all, he would say "I shall conquer yet, for all they threaten me!"

Bath.

FREDERIC HARRISON.