HISTORY OF THE WAR.

LAST month's war record was broken off on November 20th, the day on which. General Byng, commanding the 3rd British Army, opened the first phase of the battle of Cambrai, which is still in progress as these words are being written on December 18th. Whether we regard the battle from its tactical or strategical side, it is one of the biggest and most important of any which have been fought on the Western front, except the battle of the Marne, which saved Paris and deprived the Germans of the initiative:

The battle divides itself into two parts, the first beginning with General Byng's attack on November 20th, the second with Marvitz's counter-attack on the 30th. The element of surprise entered into both attack and counter-attack, and was largely responsible for the tactical situation as it now exists. The salient features of the battle will now be described under the two headings referred to above, but the account cannot be otherwise than imperfect, owing to the vague news of the official reports, which merely record facts without stating how they were accomplished. No order of battle has been. published, and the identity of divisions and their commanders has been carefully concealed. Anything like an adequate appreciation of the situation is, under these circumstances, out of the question, it being impossible to apportion either praise or blame with correct. discrimination. If the Press correspondents are allowed to see orders issued, they are forbidden to make use of their information for explanatory purposes, and have to confine their despatches to dramatic accounts of battle episodes, which are always interesting but seldom illuminating.

General Byng nominally attacked on the whole length of his 40-mile front from the Scarpe to St. Quentin, but his main attack, which was the only one pushed home, was limited to the 12-mile front between Vendhuille and Moeuvres, his objective being Cambrai, which was not actually reached, but was seriously threatened with capture on the second day of the battle. Guns were brought into.

line during the attack on November 20th, but not before it, tanks being employed to do their work for them by cutting corridors through the wire entanglements, and breaking down the trenches. No official account has been published of the tactical methods adopted for the use of these novel weapons of attack, but the Press correspondents

(1) In last month's FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW it was stated that the 3rd Army was confronted by the VIth German Army under General Otto Von Below. It should have been mentioned that Von Below's command only extended down to the north of Cambrai, where he linked up with the German IInd Army under General Von der Marvitz, who covered the front from Cambrai to St. Quentin, where Von Böhm with the VIIth German Army continued the line down to Berry-au-Bac.

described their action as being wholly effective, not only in preparing the way for the infantry, but in following up the attacking columns after they had gone through the Hindenburg defences. The tanks. are immune from rifle and machine-gun fire, but on the third day of the battle the German commander brought field-guns close up to the fighting line, and disabled many of the tanks by direct artillery fire, which is the only way of getting at them. Further experience is required before a final opinion can be expressed regarding the tactical use of these monster machines. On November 20th they were brought on to the field in large numbers, the Germans being. taken by surprise, but it is probable that when next used the enemy will be better prepared to receive them than he was on the occasion under review. In defence they have no scope for usefulness.

The result of the first day's battle was so encouraging that when Sir Douglas Haig's despatch arrived in London on the afternoon of Wednesday, November 21st, there was a flutter of excitement, and hopes were raised that the breach in the so-called Hindenburg line. would have the effect of taking us back to open instead of siege warfare.

"Our troops," said the Field-Marshal, "have broken into the enemy's positions to a depth of between four and five miles on a wide front, and have captured some thousands of prisoners, with a number of guns."

In the evening of this day the British line was established close up to the Scheldt Canal from Vendhuille to the Bois Lateau, and thence through Masnières and Marcoing to Anneux, when it turned west south of the Bapaume-Cambrai road till it joined the original line west of Mœuvres. This was a good start, and had the advance been maintained at the same rate on the following day the town of Cambrai would now be in British possession. The Germans, however, quickly recovered from their surprise and rallied on the high ground astride of the Scheldt Canal between the Bapaume-Cambrai and St. Quentin-Cambrai roads. Such reinforcements as were immediately available were hurried up and on the morning of the 21st the German commander launched a series of counter-attacks, which were repulsed but had the effect of checking General Byng's advance east of the canal. Some further progress was made, but it was not much. A slight advance was made towards Crèvecoeur and northeast of Masnières some trenches were captured, while on the north face of the salient the villages of Noyelles, Cantaing, and Moeuvres fell into General Byng's hands. During the night our troops occupied the village of Fontaine-Notre-Dame, but on the 22nd the Germans were further reinforced, and we lost the village in a counterattack. On Friday, the 23rd, after giving his troops a short rest, General Byng began his struggle for Bourlon Wood, which was stormed after some severe fighting. For three days this wood and the surrounding positions became the scene of furious hand-to-hand encounters, which ended on the evening of the 25th in leaving us

in possession of the wood, while the enemy held Bourlon Village. Another lull in the battle took place till the morning of the 27th, when General Byng made a determined attack with the intention of securing possession of the whole of the Bourlon position, including the village of that name on the east and Fontaine on the west. The Guards Division was entrusted with the attack and some battalions got into Fontaine, but, finding themselves enfiladed from the detached. hill of La Folie, 1,200 yards south-east of Bourlon Wood, they withdrew to their former position, taking 500 prisoners back with them. The left attack also failed, Bourlon Village remaining in German hands. The Guards were then taken out of the fighting line to rest.

This brought the first phase of this tremendous battle to a close. General Byng had driven a salient 6 miles deep into the heart of the German positions along a front of 12 miles, and was threatening Cambrai from Bourlon Wood on the west and Masnières on the south. At the latter place, and also at Marcoing, he had secured the crossings over the Scheldt Canal and had intercepted direct communications between Cambrai and St. Quentin. His outposts were within 3 miles of the outskirts of Cambrai, and people in England began to ask whether he would proceed to invest the town or carry it by an enveloping attack. He adopted neither alternative, because the enemy, for the time at any rate, has put it out of his power to do so.

Alive to the importance of holding Cambrai, which is the gateway into the Scheldt Valley, Hindenburg, when he heard that General Byng was threatening the place, decided to collect all the reserve troops he could get together and send them to reinforce the 2nd Army under General Von der Marvitz. Where he got his troops from is not known, but some divisions were located by our intelligence officers as having been recently on the Russian front, while others. were detached from different sectors of the Western front where there was no reason to expect an attack. Twenty or more divisions are believed to have been brought up with a great array of heavy guns, which were distributed round the salient Marvitz was ordered to attack. The rapidity and secrecy with which these reinforcements were brought up was truly remarkable, the full strength of the concentration not being known to our Intelligence Department till after the attack had been delivered. On November 29th General der Marvitz published the following order to his troops :

Soldiers of the Second Army.

The English, by throwing into the fight countless tanks on November 20th, gained a victory near Cambrai. Their intention was to break through, but they did not succeed in doing so, thanks to the brilliant resistance of the troops who were put into line to check their advance. We are now going to turn their embryonic victory into a defeat by an encircling counter-attack. The Fatherland is watching you, and expects every man to do his duty.

On the following day, Friday, November 30th, he launched his attack, which led to some of the most bitter fighting which has taken place during the war. The battle was fought all round the salient, the north and south faces being attacked with equal vehemence; but there was this difference. On the north our troops were prepared for the attack, while on the south they were taken by surprise. Taking the southern face first, this is what happened. Rushing over the canal north and south of Banteux in numbers described as "overwhelming," the German infantry went up the slopes of the high ground overlooking the canal and then made their way practically unopposed into the villages of La Vacquerie, Gonnelieu, and Villers Guislain, some detachments, inspired with unusual élan, and primed, as is said, with alcohol, penetrating into Gouzeaucourt, where the headquarters of a British division were established. The surprise. was complete, officers and men being either breakfasting or at their ablutions, and not suspecting the presence of Germans till they reached the outskirts of the village, which was then hurriedly evacuated. The Guards Division then came up and retook Gouzeaucourt, but the other villages are still in the enemy's hands when this article goes to press. Next day the Germans concentrated their efforts against Masnières, which was attacked from Rumilly on the north, and Lateau Wood on the south. The attacks were beaten off, but General Byng decided that the village was untenable, and withdrew the troops in the night.

All this time the troops holding the northern face of the salient, though attacked with extreme violence, remained in Bourlon Wood, unwilling to give up a position which they had won, and it was not till after the battle had raged for five consecutive days that the order was received to retire to prevent further loss of life. The troops then fell back south of the Bapaume-Cambrai road to the high ground covering Flesquières on the north and east. The retirement took place on the night of December 4th, and was so cleverly managed that the Germans knew nothing about it till the afternoon. of the 5th, when their patrols discovered that their guns were shelling the deserted villages of Graincourt and Cantaing, through which the retiring troops had passed in the morning. On the 6th Marcoing was given up, having been left en l'air after the abandonment of Noyelles and Masnières.

The sketch drawn for this article shows the original line from which General Byng started on November 20th, the line his troops were holding when Marvitz launched his counter-attack on November 30th, and the line we were holding on December 17th after the German attack had worn itself out. If General Byng did not do all he wanted to do, he has a good deal to show for his initial victory on November 20th. He broke through Hindenburg's line on a front of 9,000 yards, and has retained his hold of the captured defences, as well as of from 12 to 13 square miles of territory wrested from the invader. The Germans have been made to pay a high price