every free government must be, and where those laws can be brought to bear upon the people only through the instrumentality of judges, that the men who are to administer those laws should be extremely well qualified to perform those duties.

The common law, sir, is so framed as to afford a reasonable rule for the regulation of every question which can arise relative to the rights of persons and the rights of things. As it embraces all the transactions which occur in civil society, its rules must necessarily be extremely multifarious. A thorough knowledge of those laws is only to be acquired by long and laborious study; and to enable the community to enjoy the full benefit of them, it is necessary that they should avail themselves of the services of learned men. When our ancestors came to this country, although they fled from the persecutions they experienced in their native land, yet such was their attachment to the common law, that they brought it along with them, and subjected their conduct to its regulation. We have been long flourishing under it, administered as it has been by institutions similar to those under which it was nurtured. The mother country is indebted to it for whatever of liberty remains among them: and it is generally admitted, that the judicial establishments are the only sound parts of their government. By the wisdom of the founders of the English government in this state, those institutions were here established, and the consequence has been, that while other states have gone on in a course of experiments, our judicial establishments have remained firm and stable: revered by the people of this state, and admired by those of our sister states. Now, sir, with all this blaze of experience in favour of maintaining those institutions, shall we rudely prostrate them? What oracle is there among us who can afford us a sufficient assurance that we shall benefit by the change? As it respects myself, sir, I know of none : and I doubt whether any thing short of inspiration could satisfy me of the expediency of making it.

Let it not be said, sir, that the change contemplated by the report on your table, is not material. True, the supreme court is to be continued, but how is it to be with the circuits? Let no gentleman deceive himself into a belief that it is matter of trifling concern who presides there. Who, sir, I would ask, consigns your fellow beings to the gloomy recesses of your state prisons? Who dooms them to the scaffold? Under whose presiding genius is it that your juries proceed in the investigation of facts which are to regulate the disposition of your property? Is it not the circuit judges? If ignorance and stupidity there preside, what will be the consequence? I entreat you, gentlemen, while bending your minds to this subject, not to let them glance for a moment from the grand object to be obtained-the faithful and intelligent administration of the laws--the faithful administration of justice.

But it will be urged that under the contemplated system, you may have as intelligent judges upon the circuits, as you would ordinarily have under the present arrangement. But, sir, will this be the case? If this power is delegated to the legislature, they will be passed upon from time to time, by two-penny lawyers, who will confederate to secure these places. The legislature never can be induced to give adequate salaries to ten or a dozen circuit judges to command the services of suitable men, and the consequence will be, that those places will be usurped by ignorance.

Although, sir, I cannot give my consent to the adoption of the present plan, yet, sir, it is apparent that some enlargement of the judiciary is necessary to enable the courts to despatch the business. There is such an accumulation of it, and so much delay has ensued in consequence of it, that it amounts almost to a denial of justice, The system originally reported by the committee, met with my entire approbation, but that has been voted down. The plan now proposed by the honourable gentleman from Westchester (Mr. Munro) I also highly approve of. It simply contemplates the adding of three judges tothe supre me court, and vesting the legislature with the power of authorizing one half of the judges to hold the terms. Under this arrangement, ten terms could be held in New-York and in Albany, Utica and Canandaigua, and abundance of time would be left to enable the judges to hold the circuits. The advantages of this system over that proposed, of creating circuit judges, are very great. The peculiar duties of circuit judges are to investigate facts, and do not lead them to pay

that attention to the study of the laws which the public welfare requires. Judges, on the other hand, who both sit at the terms and hold the circuits, must of necessity give much of their attention to their books. By this arrangement, therefore, you will have able men, and at a much less expense than you will be subjected to by the plan reported by the committee. In the one case your laws will be administered in their true spirit, by learned and able men; and in the other, not unfrequently by ignorant men, who, from lack of knowledge, must substitute their own discretion. Discretionary power in the hands of a judge is but another term for arbitrary power; and under such an order of things, your judges might ride the circuits the terror of the land.

It appears, sir, from the motion made by the honourable gentleman from, Richmond, (Mr. Tompkins,) that another object in view, is so to frame the constitution as to drive the present judges from their stations. Justice to myself, and to the station I here occupy, demands from me some remarks on this subject. I have, sir, so freely and so frequently expressed myself in terms of reprehension of the political course pursued by some of those gentlemen, that my sentiments respecting them cannot be unknown to many of the members of this Convention. But, sir, I was sent here to assist in revising the constitution of this state, and to establish fundamental laws for its future government, and not to try any man or set of men for their transgressions: and I should be for ever ashamed of myself, if I could for a moment be brought to avail myself of a "little brief authority," for the purpose of gratifying any hostile feelings. You have provided tribunals, and invested them with power to animadvert upon the conduct of your judicial officers. Turn them over to those tribunals; it is not our business to pass upon their conduct. Such a proceeding would fix a blemish, a stain upon the character of this Convention. It is, to be sure, urged, that we have dismissed the senate and the first judges of the counties. But, sir, the new organization of the senatorial districts, which the public good demanded, rendered the proceeding, with respect to the senators, indispensable. As to the first judges, it was matter of general complaint, that the permanent duration of their offices, owing to the appointment of incompetent men, was a source of serious inconvenience in many of the counties. You were also led to believe, that the welfare of the state would be promoted by shortening the terms of their offices. You, therefore, made their private interest yield to the public good. But, sir, no alteration has been made in the organization of the supreme court to render this change necessary. There is not a veil to conceal the motive which induces to the adoption of this amendment. It stands naked before the world, that the motive, and the only motive, is to dismiss the judges. This cannot be concealed from the people, and it may as well be frankly acknowledged at once. I have nothing to say in justification of their conduct: but I repeat it, that we are out of the line of our duty in inflicting punishment upon them. It is unbecoming the dignity of this honourable body. You have established tribunals who are invested with the necessary power: leave it to them to do what justice may require.

MR. VAN VECHTEN said, the Convention was assembled for the purpose of amending our constitution; and no man had ever dreamed of its being for the purpose of dismissing officers from our government. We ought to confine our labours to fundamental principles. He was willing to authorize the legislature to increase the number of judges in the supreme court; because he considered it necessary, in order to get along with the business which must necessarily be done in that court. The plan recommended by the chairman of the select committee, does not at all interfere with our present established courts; but merely provides, that the legislature shall make arrangements to meet the increase of business in this growing state. It is asserted, that some of our judges have interfered too much with the politics of the state: if they have, and it is a curse, is there not a remedy at hand, without squandering our time, and encumbering the constitution with that which does not come within our jurisdiction? If these men are guilty of the charges alleged, are we prepared to go into an investigation of the subject at this time? Is it seemly, or is it consonant with the dignity of this Convention, for the purpose of driving these men from office, to insert in the constitution which we are forming for generations to come, a clause which

has no object in view but to gratify personal revenge? We have already declared by our acts, that these men shall hold till they arrive at the age of sixty years; and we have also provided that if they shall conduct in such a manner as to forfeit their claim to a continuance in office, a majority of the assembly may impeach, and by two-thirds of the same, and a majority of the senate, they may be removed. With respect to the interference of our judges in politicswho has not had to do with politics? Have we had a governor for the last fifteen or twenty years that has not been a warm partizen? and have we not countenanced it in them, and called them to our counsels? It is not till quite lately that we have heard this great outcry. Have we not chosen the judges of our supreme court as electors for president and vice-president of the United States? We have gone hand in hand with these men, approving and leading them forward, and now we are to destroy them at a blow, contrary to the rule which we have ourselves established:-leaving the stain upon our constitution, that future generations may read our disgrace with shame and confusion.

GEN. ROOT having been honoured by an appointment as a member of that committee, hoped he should be indulged in an exposition of its proceedings. They convened yesterday afternoon, and although they were not unanimous, yet a compromise was the result of the deliberations. Had the subject been referred to us individually, (said Mr. R.) or to my honourable friend from Saratoga, (Mr. Young,) we should probably have presented a report with different provisions. But this was adopted in a spirit of compromise. When we retired from the committee, we had verily supposed that the only remaining duty that devolved upon the honourable Chairman, was to condense and compress those matters in a compact form, to which the committee had assented. This morning we received a summons to attend in the committee room, and with astonishment he (Gen. Root) found that a proposition was made to re-consider the first section of the proposed report, because the honourable Chairman had altered his opinion. The Convention was then in session, and we retired from the committee to our appropriate duties, and here, when the report was presented, we found that the pen had been drawn across the first section of the report.

It is undoubtedly laudable for gentlemen to alter their opinions after a night of repose. After consulting his pillow, the Chairman thought it was dishonourable this morning to report what was honourable last evening. I have not, (said Mr. Root) from consultation with my pillow, or with any individual, found cause to change my opinion.

It has been said by honourable gentlemen, that it would be a stain upon the constitution to send forth to the people such a provision. What? To organize our courts of justice, a stain? To submit to the representatives of the people the question, whether there shall be three, four, or five members of the supreme court-is this a stain? If it be a stain, let that instrument be stained.

But, sir, there are other stains if this be one. It is already provided, that your present corps of senators shall be disbanded. The honourable gentleman from Queens, (Mr. King) has told us that it is necessary that they should be reduced to the ranks, and the Convention has acted accordingly. I made a proposition that was calculated to retain twenty-four of them; but it was voted down, and both the gentleman from New-York, (Mr. Edwards) and the gentleman from Albany, (Mr. Van Vechten) thought it was necessary to begin anew, and dismiss the present incumbents. The first judges of the courts of common pleas also, who, under the present constitution, held their offices by the same tenure as the judges of the supreme court, are now reduced to the term of five years, and made removable both by address of two-thirds of the the assembly and a majority of the senate, and also by impeachment: and this is no stain. The gentleman from New-York, (Mr. Edwards) thinks this to be proper, because some of the judges of the courts of common pleas are incompetent to the discharge of their duties, and therefore we ought to get rid of them. And yet in the next breath he proudly says, that he has not come here to get rid of official incumbents, but to lay the foundation stone in the great political edifice. [Mr. Edwards explained, and denied that he had either advocated that principle or voted for it.] Mr. Root said it was immaterial to him how the gentleman voted. The first judges of the courts of common pleat were stripped

of their offices, because they have been alledged to be incompetent, therefore they must be removed. That honourable gentleman did not come here for any other purpose than to rear a stupendous fabric on the corner stone of his own laying. He could try judges of the court of common pleas, but not the chancellor and judges of the supreme court. He could try justices of the peace too, and pass sentences of incompetency and villany upon them, but not upon the great judges of our land.

The gentleman from New-York had gloried in the common law. It was, in his opinion, the boast of this country, and of that from which we had derived it. But yet he would violate the common law, by having eight judges instead of four, which that law had prescribed. He would also have their term of office during good behaviour. But it will be remembered that the term quamdiu bene se gescerint was not in operation until the sturdy commons of England had wrested it from Charles I. The gentleman from New-York (Mr. Edwards) seemed to be more familiar with the history of Connecticut than with that of England. In the latter country, after the star chamber was abolished, and the infamous Jefferies had doomed to the block the most virtuous patriots of the realm, it was then, and not till then, that such commission issued. The coinmon law number was four. The council of revision said it was five, and the gentleman from New-York would extend it to eight.

The gentleman from Albany (Mr. Van Vechten) has besought us not to disgrace ourselves, and the constitution, by pronouncing judgment on the judges for their interference in politics. The fact of their interference is admitted. But we are called upon to spare these political judges, because their offence is palliated by our encouragement. We have encouraged them, says the gentleinan. We needed their help. If this plural pronoun we is intended to apply to all in this assembly, I beg to be excused for one. I have never encouraged them in their political career, nor am I responsible for their perseverance in it. On the contrary, I have witnessed it with dismay and disgust; and from time to time have raised my feeble voice in vain against politico-judicial domination. The task I undertook was calculated to appal the stoutest heart. The situation in which that resistance placed me, is known. But I do not shrink from the conflict. The attack has been made, and the citadel must open its gates to the people, or shake to its foundations.

But, sir, on this occasion, and in this place, I am not disposed to try those judges. Let them be left, like the first judges of the courts of common pleas, senators, justices of the peace, and other officers of the government, to the appointing powers, to say whether they have so behaved in their official stations, as to entitle them to a re-appointment. They have certainly a better chance for it than any other men of equal worth and talents. Their learning and ability have been blazoned from one end of the state to the other, and if they have nerited public confidence, their elevation and reinstatement will be sure. But suppose that the governor and senate should think the present incumbents unworthy of a re-appointment-ought not their names in that case to be omitted? Should not that question be decided by the peoples' representatives? Are gentlemen afraid that those judges will be found unworthy and wanting when weighed in the balance?

I should suppose, said Mr. R. that the chancellor and judges would not feel themselves under very strong obligations to those gentlemen who had presented this view of the case to the public, and who were unwilling that their offices should be the reward of approved and investigated merit. It would seem to betray a consciousness that the judges are so unworthy, that the people are anxious to pull them from the bench. The argument certainly does not bestow a very high compliment upon the integrity and worthiness of those officers. Are they so sensitive as to recoil at the touch? The honourable chancellor has told you, and doubtless with truth, that he has no fear of such investigation. And if others have an equal security in the consciousness of rectitude, they are in no danger of being injured by the indignation of the people. Gentlemen, however, have come forward, unasked, at least it is charitable to presume so, as their champions to defend them, when nothing appears to hinder their immedjate re-appointment!

MR. EDWARDS commenced by tendering his acknowledgments to the hoaourable gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Root) for his kind intentions in endeavouring to sit him right with respect to his trivial faults, and although he had never made the assertions which the gentleman imputed to him, yet he would indeavour to reciprocate the favour intended. The gentleman has stated that Jeffreys was Chief Justice of England, in the reign of Charles the First. This is not the fact. He was appointed during the reign of Charles the Second, and continued under the reign of James the Second. He has also stated that the judges were made independent of the crown by Charles the Second. Here be has again fallen into an error. They were not made independent till the reign of William the Third. I would admonish the honourable gentleman, hereafter, before he undertakes to correct the errors of others, to pay some attention to his own. The gentleman, finding it impossible to assail my arguments, has conjured up the phantoms of his own brain, and after imputing them to me, has most valiantly demolished them. In this he has betrayed a consciousness that ny arguments were invulnerable, and defied the batterings of his artillery.

MR. VAN BUREN sa:1, as he was a member of the committee whose report was under consideration, and to the proceedings of which such frequent reference had been made, some explanation of his views became a duty. He did not think that this committee could receive much advantage from a detail of the particular proceedings of the select committee, and he would not therefore follow his colleagues, in the examination of those proceedings. What had already transpired, superseded the necessity of saying that there had been much warmth and altercation among them; there had, in truth, been that unprofitable, as well as unpleasant excitement, which he had anticipated yesterday, when he made an unsuccessful application to the Convention to be excused from serving on it.

The true and only question presented by the amendment offered by the president, was, whether this committee were prepared to insert an article in the constitution, for the sole purpose of vacating the offices of the present chancellor and judges of the supreme court, to separate them from the other officers in the state, and to apply to them a rule, which had not as yet been applied in a single instance. Gentlemen might attempt to disguise the matter as they would; it was in vain to hope that it could be understood by the people in any other light. A moment's consideration must satisfy gentlemen, that such was the case. If the Convention had changed the organization of the courts, there would be a propriety in providing for the re-appointment of the judges-but this they had not done. The court of chancery was placed by the amendment on precisely the same footing as it now stood in the constitution. How, then, could it be gravely contended, that its introduction into the amendment was for any other purpose than to get rid of the incumbent? The only alteration made in the supreme court, (if that could be called one,) was the authority given to the legislature to reduce the number of judges. This, he said, was a power they now possessed, by withholding salaries from all above the number they desired. But assuming that it was in fact an alteration, can the gentlemen from Delaware and Saratoga, flatter themselves with the hope, that this trifling alteration can possibly, with an intelligent public, exempt the amendment they support from the imputation of being a mere personal measure, having, and being intended to have, a personal bearing, and no other? But to put this matter at rest, let the gentlemen give to their proposition the shape of their argument. If, say they, the legislature should alter the number, then a re-appointment will be proper; and to meet such a case, they submit a proposi tion which requires a re-appointment at all events. Let them say, in their amendment, that if a change of the number of the judges is ultimately effected, then the offices of the present incumbents shall be vacated. Then, and then only, will they be entitled to the benefit of their argument. That, however, he knew would not answer their views. But why reason upon this subject? The gentlemen have, as in the select committee, thrown off all disguise, and say these offices ought to be vacated; and it is their desire that the constitution should be made to bend to that purpose. Mr. Van Buren said he had stated that the amendment went to apply this rule of vacating commissions, exclusive