"That in each of the towns of this state, there shall be elected at the annual town meetings thereof, one coroner, who shall be, ex-officio, a commissioner for taking acknowledgments, and who shall, before entering on the dudes of his office, take and subscribe the oath of office before the clerk of the county." Lost.

On motion of MR. BUEL, so much of the report of the committee on the legis lative department, as had not been referred to the new select committee, was referred to a committee of the whole, and the Convention thereupon resolved itself into a committee of the whole, on so much thereof as relates to the bill of rights, which had been referred to this committee.-Mr. Van Buren in the chair.

The resolution of GEN. TALLMADGE, in relation to slavery and involuntary servitude, was called up.

MR. SHELDON thought it ought not to pass. It went to authorize a master, after his slave had become old, decrepit, and useless, to throw him as a burthen on the community.

COL. YOUNG said it was too broad. It would release the apprentice from his indentures, and, in a great measure, tend to weaken parental authority.

GEN. TALLMADGE would make a few remarks explanatory of the resolution which he had the honour to submit. He alluded to the law of 1799, which enacted, that all children born of slaves after that time should be free,-males at the age of twenty-eight years, and females at the age of twenty-five. But the law of 1817, made no provision that would prevent the existence of slavery in this state until 1846, as it was to operate only prospectively. These acts, however, indicated the sentiment of the public, and were in the nature of a pledge, which ought to be redeemed by inserting this provision in the constitution. It was a mistake, he said, that slavery would, by the existing laws, cease in this state, in the year 1827; but he hoped the Convention would decide, that it should not continue after that time. In such case, the legislature would have an opportunity, before that period, to make proper provision for their support during their second infancy.

MR. SHARPE was opposed to the resolution.

GEN. ROOT had two solid objections to it, and one of minor importance. It provided that "from and after the 4th day of July, 1827," the slaves should be free. He did not know why their annual festival should be put off one day later than that of the whites. Ours is held on the 4th, but theirs is postponed to

the 5th.

But he had objections of more importance. The first was, that it was unnecessary, as the legislature had already done what this provision contemplated their doing, and there was an act of that kind, that there was no probability they would ever recal. In the second place, he did not wish to deface and blacken the constitution by any provision in which slavery should be recog

nized.

MR. RADCLIFF regarded it as a proper subject for legislation. He was not an advocate for slavery, but he thought the legislature had advanced with equal pace in the progress of public opinion, on the subject of emancipation.

MR. BRIGGS thought that posterity would find out that we had slaves here, whether we blackened the features of the constitution with them or not.

MR. BUEL was in favour of the resolution. The gentleman from Delaware is disposed to omit this provision in the constitution, and is opposed to blackening that instrument by introducing it. But our public records recognize the fact of the existence of slavery, and it had already been inserted in the constitution in the distinction between white and black votes in the exercise of the right of suffrage. It was an important provision, and the subject ought not to be left to legislative discretion. Justice required it, and public expectation would warrant its insertion.

MR. E. WILLIAMS opposed it. It was a clause in favour of common beggars. Nothing was more interesting to the people than the system of the poor laws. Work-houses had been established with salutary effect, and he believed that these slaves turned loose would become strolling paupers, and would be wil ling to remain so if they could avoid labour.

MR. BRIGGS said, that if in the work-houses they were compelled to labour, it was with their own consent.

MR. SUTHERLAND proposed to offer a substitute if this should be rejected, the purport of which was, to confirm and make unalterable the existing laws on the subject of slavery.

MR. SHARPE observed, that this resolution would turn slaves out of the warm kitchens of the farmers, where they had lived comfortably, to perish in hovels. It was injurious to the slave. Slaves had been sold on the faith of the law as now existing. Formerly, if a slave ran away, $100 dollars reward was offered for his apprehension. Now the kitchens of Long-Island are emptied upon the city of New-York, and the reward offered is SIX CENTS, but no charges!

GEN. TALLMADGE asked, in relation to the subject of work-houses, whether gentlemen intended to repeal the law providing for their liberation in 1827 ? If they did not, it was our moral duty, by a constitutional provision, to guaranty their emancipation. The law makes slaves of those children who were born of slaves after 1799, and before 1817, so that instead of a total emancipation in 1827, slavery might be continued in this state until 1846, unless this provision should be adopted.

GEN. ROOT moved to amend, by striking out the words "from and after the 4th day of July, 1827." Carried.

On the section as amended.

MR. N. WILLIAMs thought it was a matter peculiarly appropriate to legislation, but he was not willing to let slaves loose on society, without any provision for their support.

MR. JAY professed himself to be zealous in the cause of emancipation, but he thought the law, as it now stands, was more wise and expedient than an immediate freedom. The cause of humanity would gain nothing by instant emancipation.

CHANCELLOR KENT believed, that if a call for the previous question was ever proper, it was peculiarly so on the present occasion. He had no doubt that it was best, as well for the slave as the master, that the law should remain as it is. Slavery was universally reprobated, and no new constitutional provision was necessary to give that sentiment additional impulse. It would in his opinion be as proper to provide that the legislature should make no law to hang a man without a trial-or a law in favour of polygamy, or laws that might tolerate a violation of the commandments of the decalogue.

MR. RADCLIFF moved to postpone the subject to the first day of January next. GEN. TALLMADGE, thought nothing could be gained by endeavouring to flee the question.

MR. E. WILLIAMS remarked, that this was the first proposition that had been presented for the confiscation of vested rights. Masters had rights that ought not to be violated; and as to the slave it was a crusade against the last remaining hope of the miserable African. He has now a claim to support-a claim which the laws of God and man contribute to enforce. By this provision the master and the slave would be severed, and the rights of both essentially impaired.

The Ayes and Noes being called for, the question of postponement was decided in the negative as follows:

AYES-Messrs. Bacon, Breese, Carpenter, D. Clark, Collins, Dodge, Dubois, Dyckman, Fish, Frost, Hees, Humphrey, Hunt, Hunting, Huntington, Hurd, Kent, King, Lefferts, P. R. Livingston, M-Call, Millikin, Paulding, Pike, Porter, Radcliff, Reeve, Richards, Rosebrugh, Sage, Seaman, Sharpe, 1. Smith, R. Smith, Starkweather, Swift, Taylor, Townley, Townsend, Van Horne, J. R. Van Rensselaer, S. Van Rensselaer, Verbryck, E. Webster, Wendover, Wheeler, E. Williams, Woods, N. Williams, Wooster.—50.

NOES-Messrs. Beckwith, Briggs, Brinkerhoff, Brooks, Buel, Burroughs, Carver, Case, Child, R. Clarke, Clyde, Cramer, Day, Duer, Edwards, Fairlie, Fenton, Ferris, Hallock, Hogeboom, Howe, Hunter, Jay, Knowles, Lansing, A. Livingston, Moore, Munro, Nelson, Park, Pitcher, Price, Pumpelly, Rhinelander, Rockwell, Rogers, Root, Ross, Russell, N. Sanford, R.

Sandford, Schenck, Seely, Steele, I. Sutherland, Sylvester, Tallmadge, Tripp, Tuttle, Van Fleet, Ward, A. Webster, Wheaton, Young-54.

MR. RADCLIFF moved to amend by adding" and the legislature shall provide by law for their support by their present masters." Lost.

MR. N. WILLIAMS then moved the previous question, which was carried, and a division being called on the main question, it was decided in the negative, as follows:

NOES--Messrs. Bacon, Barlow, Breese, Brinkerhoff, D. Clark, Dodge, Dubois, Duer, Dyckman, Eastwood, Edwards, Fairlie, Fish, Frost, Hallock, Hees, Howe, Humphrey, Hunt, Hunter, Hunting, Jay, Jones, Kent, King, Lansing, Lefferts, P. R. Livingston, M'Call, Millikin, Munro, Nelson, Paulding, Pike, Porter, Pumpelly, Radcliff, Reeve, Rhinelander, Rockwell, Russell, Sage, R. Sanford, Schenck, Seaman, Seely, Sharpe, Sheldon, I. Smith, R. Smith, Starkweather, Steele, I. Sutherland, Swift, Sylvester, Taylor, Tuttle, Van Horne, J. R. Van Rensselaer, S. Van Rensselaer, Verbrick, Ward, A. Webster, E. Webster, Wendover, Wheaton, Wheeler, E. Williams, N. Williams, Wooster, Young-73.

AYES-Messrs. Beckwith, Briggs, Brooks, Buel, Burroughs, Carpenter, Carver, Case, Child, R. Clarke, Clyde, Collins, Cramer, Day, Ferris, Hogeboom, Huntington, Hurd, A. Livingston, Moore, Park, Pitcher, Price, Richards, Rogers, Root, Rosebrugh, Ross, N. Sanford, Tallmadge, Tripp, Van Fleet, Woods-33

The committee thereupon rose and reported: and on motion, in Convention, the report of the committee on the Judiciary Department was made the order of the day for to-morrow. Adjourned.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1821.

The Convention assembled as usual, and the President took the chair at 9 o'clock, when the minutes of yesterday were read and approved.

THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT.

On motion of MR. N. SANFORD, the Convention resolved itself into a committee of the whole on that part of the unfinished business of yesterday, relating to the Legislative Department. Mr. Van Buren in the chair.

The question was stated to be on the fourth section of the report of the select committee, on the bill of rights, which had been referred to this committee, and which was as follows:

4. Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right, and no law shall ever be passed to curtail, or restrain the liberty of speech, or of the press; and in all prosecutions, or indictments, for libels, the truth may be given in evidence, if it be made to appear, that the matter charged as libellous, was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends; and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact."

MR. BRIGGS called for the consideration of his amendment to that section which was, to insert after the words, "the truth shall be given in evidence,” the words" and shall be a justification."

The question on the amendment was taken and lost."

MR. N. SANFORD offered the following amendment :

Strike out all after the word "evidence," and insert the following: "to the jury, if it be made to appear to the jury that the matter charged as libellous, was published from good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted."

Mr. E. WILLIAMs inquired whether it was intended that the truth might in

all cases be given in evidence? Whether personal defects and private misfortunes were to be dragged before the public for malicious purposes, and the truth plead in justification?

MR. DUER made a few remarks to shew that the amendment went no farther than the statute.

CHANCELLOR KENT said there were cases, in which the truth ought not to be heard in evidence; he would suppose for instance, that a publication had been made, charging a female with some personal defect, which might subject her to ridicule and wound and harass her feelings, and the feelings of her family; the injury might be so gross, as to require a resort for legal redress; and he would ask, whether it would be proper, that in such a case, a court and jury should be compelled to hear evidence, which must necessarily be very indecent and indelicate, and such as must tend to vitiate the public taste, and to corrupt the public morals. The truth in such a case, so far from being a justification, ought to be considered an aggravation. Libels of that description could not possibly be published from a good motive or for any justifiable end; the publishers could have no other object in view, than to gratify the vile passions of envy or malice; and to permit them to give the truth in evidence, would be to degrade courts of justice into vehicles, for propagating most effectually, the most detestable slanders. Mr. K. referred to a case, which had happened in England. A suit had been brought on a wager, relating to a French minister at the English court, the Chevalier D'Eon; the case was noticed for trial before Lord Mansfield, and it was proposed to enter into an examination, to prove before the jury, that the minister was a female. The judge threw the record from him with indignation, and declared that he would not permit the sanctuary of justice to be profaned with a proceeding so indecent.

To permit the truth to be given in evidence in such cases, would be affording to malice an opportunity to glut its vengeance; a defendant who had libelled a female of a family, would call as witnesses perhaps the mother and sisters; and would degrade them, by an examination, which could not be listened to, without shocking the moral sense of all decent people.

Ile had, he said, always been opposed to what was once considered the law of libels, to wit: that on indictments for libels, the truth could not, under any circumstances be given in evidence; and gave the history of a case which bad been tried in this state in 1804. It was an indictment for a libel against Mr. H. Croswell. The trial was had before the then Chief Justice Lewis. The defendant offered to give the truth in evidence the judge decided, that it could not be received. The question was brought up for argument before the supreme court of this state, and was argued for the defendant by the late general Hamilton, and a more able and eloquent argument was perhaps never heard in

any court.

Mr. Hamilton, counsel for the defendant on that occasion, contended that the truth might be given in evidence, provided the matter charged to be libellous was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, and such was his (Mr. Kent's) opinion. There were only four judges on the bench at the time, and being equally divided, the matter rested there. It was, he said, in consequence of this trial, that the statute was passed on this subject, permitting the truth to be given in evidence under the above restriction. He wished, he said, to preserve the principles of this statute, but considered the amendment of the gentleman from New-York as going much farther.

If a way could be devised by which the jury could be enabled to judge of the motives from which the publication had sprung, without a previous examination of the witnesses, he would have no objection to leave it to them. But that, he said, could not be done. And the only way in which such indecent and indelicate examinations could be excluded, was to leave with the judge to say, whether the testimony could be received: He did not believe that this power would be abused; it was necessary for the duc administration of justice, that confidence should be placed in them. If such enquiries were permitted, there would always be some unworthy members of the bar, who would press them upon courts and juries: He hoped, therefore, that the amendment wou'd not prevail.

MR. DUER was sorry to differ on a question of this kind with a gentleman for whom he entertained so high a respect as he did for the gentleman from Albany (Mr. Kent.)

Mr. D. said all that was wished, was to preserve the law as established by the statute to which the gentleman had alluded. The guilt or innocence of a party, he said, depended on his motives, and they could only be properly and correctly judged of by a jury after they had heard the evidence. If the section should be adopted as reported, it would give the whole power to the courts, to judge of the motives, and to shut out all enquiry if they thought proper-this would never do; it would be a most dangerous power, and might be exercised with great oppression and injustice. A party would never be safe, however honest and upright his intentions might be.

He admitted that there might be cases where the rule would operate injuriously; but the evil which would thereby be occasioned, would be partial, and would by no means authorize the vesting of such an arbitrary power in judges, which might be so extensively abused: when this subject was under discussion before, continued Mr. D. it was admitted by the chief justice, that this section as reported, varied the law, as established by the statute. The amendment under consideration was the same in principle with that statute; it was more explicit and definite and removed all doubts as to its construction.

MR. DODGE thought that the gentleman form Orange, (Mr. Duer) must have mistaken the meaning of the Chief Justice on this subject, if he supposed his object was to give to the court the power of deciding the law and the fact.This was not his intention.

Here Mr. D. related the circumstances of a case of libel, in which he had the honour of being counsel, before the present Chief Justice, at a circuit court in Montgomery; in which he urged the propriety of giving the truth in evidence as a justification, but it was rejected by the Chief Justice, upon the ground that the publication could not have been for good motives and justifiable ends. Mr. D. then contended that the jury ought to determine whether the motives were justifiable or not, to which the court would not consent, alleging that he possessed the power, and was bound to exercise it, in rejecting the testimony which should go to prove the fact, as long as the publication, in his judgment, could not have been for good motives or justifiable ends. If he possessed this arbitrary power in one respect, he must in another, and of course judgment must go against the defendant, the truth not being allowed to be given in evidence.

We have been told by the honourable Chancellor, that such a case may be brought up to the supreme court and court of errors. He would ask, whether he could make a case under such circumstances that might be brought up? This question was put to the Chief Justice in the case alluded to, which he answered in the negative, leaving no remedy whatever.

The question before the committee was, whether this power should be still exercised by the court, or whether it should be left to the jury to determine upon the motives, as well as the fact?

With respect to this question, his opinion had changed within a short time, and he was satisfied, that there were circumstances, when it was proper that the truth should not be given-when there could be no possible satisfaction, and when an exposition of the facts could only serve to injure the feelings of the person libelled. He thought this power might be safely entrusted to the court, without the fear of its being by them abused. There might be many cases enumerated, where a publication could have been for no other than malicious motives and unjustifiable ends, and when a proof of the facts might serve only to injure the plaintiff in feelings and character, without benefiting the defendant. On this account, he thought the court ought to possess the power of determining.

Some authorities were cited by Messrs. Kent and N. Sanford, when GEN. ROOT said a mistaken notion had arisen in this country, from the strong predilection which the judges and lawyers feel for the law of England. In England it was a maxim that the king can do no wrong. That maxim and law night do in a monarchical government, where the ministers are subjects of the