posed; and my vote will be given with a full belief that it is best to separate this power entirely from the executive.

MR. HOGEBOOM observed, that the council of appointment had originally appeared to be a wise measure. For twenty years after its creation, it had gone on well; nor was it until the legislature had raised salaries too high, that the evil was felt. It was only the effect, not the cause, of the calamities that the community had endured. The error lay deeper than the council of appointment. But it is gone, and not a tear is shed at its departure. Mr. H. preferred an election of justices to this plan. It was a refinement of policy that he did not approve of, to make one judiciary system dependant on another. Mr. H. also thought it would give too great influence to wealthy individuals.

MR. BUEL rose to make a few additional remarks. He was in favour of having justices hold for a long time, and called the attention of the committee to the practice in other states, where they were permitted to hold for seven years, and during good behaviour. He inferred, from the experience of those states, that the plan was worthy of imitation; and he believed it was the intention of the framers of our present constitution, to have magistrates hold for a considerable length of time. He again alluded to the importance of their duties, both in civil and criminal causes, and said they possessed the power of convicting for any crime less than grand larceny. It had been urged by those opposed to the proposition, that the chief magistrate would not be acquainted with the individuals whom he would be called to appoint; but the plan appeared to him altogether preferable to the one heretofore practised, for recommending candidates to office. They would now be recommended by the official list of respectable men, whereas the appointing power had heretofore been dictated by the petitions of those incapable of advising, and unworthy of recommending.

GEN. COLLINS opposed the amendment. He said it was in effect organizing a political caucus in every county in the state, and was entirely carrying away from the people all participation in the appointing power.

Further observations were made by Mr. BACON, in opposition to the amendment, who read from Jefferson's Notes on Virginia, in support of his opinions. MR. VAN BUREN, in reply, referred to the constitutions of Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee, shewing that the principle of his amendment was recognized in each. He was, he said, surprised at the observation made by his friend from Lewis, (Gen. Collins,) that the people would have less connexion with the appointments if made in this way, than they had under the old mode. Could not the people make their wishes known to the judges of the courts of common pleas, and the supervisors, with more facility than they could to the old council of appointment?

COL. YOUNG. It was admitted, he said, by the gentleman from Albany, (Mr. Spencer,) that the justices if elected, might at first be influenced by considerations of who had opposed, and who supported them; but he contended that this influence would soon wear away; and he would ask whether it was possible that he should think the mode of selection a proper one, which would be attended with such consequences, even temporarily? The objections to the old council had not been occasioned by the abuse of their power in the appointment of justices of the peace; but with respect to higher offices, and to which greater emolument was attached. He had not, he said, ever received any appointment from them; he had neither brother nor son, who had been the objects of their favour. If they had heaped favours on him as they had on some others, he would not now reward them with scoffs and sneers. If, sir, gaid Mr. Y. this amendment succeeds, we shall not again hear of persons being appointed to office who have been guilty of arson-persons whose names are inscribed on your criminal calendars as guilty of infamous crimes: Neither the supervisors nor judges would have the hardihood to recommend to the executive any men whose characters are bad.

MR. VAN VECHTEN wished to express his views on this subject, but would not detain the committee long. It appeared to have been considered necessa sary, on all hands, to make allusions to matters calculated to excite unpleasant feelings: he did not, however, consider it commendable.

We are sent here, said he, not to complain of old sores, nor of wars that are past: We are sent here to amend our constitution for the good of the people of this state, without regard to what this man has done or may do. We have evidently arrived at a point in our business where it is difficult to determine the most advisable course to pursue. The question is, whether the proposition before the committee is worthy of adoption. On the one hand, it is contended that the appointing power ought to be in the chief magistrate; on the other, that it ought to be in the people; and it is again supposed by some, that an intermediate body ought to be intrusted with this power.

In the first place, what are the objections to its being exercised by the chief magistrate? It is said by some we shall experience all the evils of the old council. In the first place, he cannot be acquainted with the candidates. When a doubtful list is presented, he cannot determine from any personal knowledge of the men recommended; he must rely on information from some one else, as was the case in our former council of appointment, and thus essentially open a door for the same cabal and secret influence as was then experienced, although perhaps not to so great an extent. The supervisors and judges may perchance agree on the candidates; if so, why send a list to the seat of government to receive this formal act of the executive? Is it for the purpose of keeping up this constant bustle, at the expense of public virtue and character? Now if your governor is to have the appointment of these officers, wherefore the necessity of this nominating power? Will not these office-seekers come here as much as before? Will they not exercise in some degree the same corrupt influence, and will it not subject the chief magistrate to the liability of being deceived and led by political motives to make appointments, disgraceful to the character of his station?

Again, it is said the governor ought to have some connection or influence over the magistracy of the state, because he is the one to see that the laws of the state are faithfully executed; but can he judge who is capable of administering the laws with justice and propriety between the individuals of this extensive community? Why is all this round-about way taken to come back to the seat of government? Is it that this is the place from whence all offices, small and great, are uniformly to flow? If the nominations are to be made for the people's good, then why send the list to Albany to be ratified?-Why not confide to some body in the county, the power of appointing?

Suppose there should be an union in the nomination of the supervisors and judges the persons thus nominated will be the candidates whom the governor inust commission-then why not give these supervisors and judges the power of appointing? We are told that this will be a salutary means of having the nominations made by one set of men, and the appointment by another man. But let us imagine who these men are: they are the judges of the court of common pleas, deriving their existence from this chief magistrate; and if political views are to enter into the consideration, it is to be supposed that party men are to be nominated; for your judges may receive their appointment from party motives, and if they are party men, what else can be expected? It would be unreasonable to suppose they will not endeavour to strengthen the chain between these magistrates, if by these means they can sustain themselves in office; experience has shown that such is the fact. I do say, then, that these judges, created as they are, will form the connecting link between the magistrates and your executive. If supervisors are respectable and honest men, as is agreed on all hands, why not let them appoint these officers? This would not do at all it is said: they would then become the very seat of corruption, as was the council which we have abolished. We abolished that council, not because it was originally corrupt, but because the manner in which its powers were carried into operation was corrupt. It was growing worse because we are less pure now than we were when that council went into operation. The same applies to our constitution. As men become more corrupt, it requires something more energetic to restrain them from vice and ambition. It was alleged, that from the manner in which the duties of that council were discharged, it ought to be abolished; and we have done so. If giving this power to the supervisors will corrupt them, it will corrupt any other set of men; and if so, let us throw it

back where it was, as that body is already corrupted. If it must go into other hands, let us endeavour to put it into such hands as we may rationally suppose will be the least likely to abuse it.

Your supervisors are the immediate representatives of the people of their county; and they are accountable for their conduct: they come together bringing all the necessary information for making a discreet selection of magistrates; and inasmuch as they are all personally and collectively interested, they will endeavour to make the wisest and best appointments. I would, therefore, give them the power of nominating and appointing: but I would, at the same time, exclude them from a participation in any other office. One tells us that it will carry party feelings into this body of men; others say it will not be corrupted by party; but I am aware that it is impossible in a government like ours, to prevent party feeling from existing in some degree: we, therefore, have only to place it in the hands of those whom we suppose to be the most upright and intelligent. It is generally conceded that the supervisors are an upright and intelligent body of men; and being immediately accountable to the people, I know of no body of men whom we might more safely entrust with this important charge; but when the judges are added, the responsibility is divided between the supervisors, judges, and executive, and thereby the purity and safety of the plan is destroyed.

Mr. Van Vechten continued his remarks by speaking of the importance of this class of officers, in the management of the pecuniary concerns of their re-spective towns, as well as in dispensing civil and criminal justice. There was no such connexion between the concerns of the chief magistrate and the justices of the peace, as rendered it important that he should be the person to appoint them. The chief magistrate was more nearly allied to the militia, as commander in chief, than to justices, still the appointment of these officers had been sent home to the people. From these considerations, with various others which he proceeded to enumerate, he was satisfied that the plan proposed was such as would keep alive party animosity and irritation, and render the engine of political faction more complicated and odious. He should, therefore, vote against the proposition of the gentleman from Otsego.

JUDGE PLATT said, a "justice of the peace," in the sense of the constitution, means a judicial officer, with power to bind over or commit for crimes and misdemeanors, and to exact sureties for the peace, or good behaviour. It will be in the discretion of the legislature to clothe him with as much or as little jurisdiction as they please, in regard to civil causes.

From the course of debate on the proposition to make justices elective by the people in the towns, it seems to have been assumed, in the argument, that we are about to adopt a novel principle. We are told, that to elect judicial officers, would be an untried and dangerous experiment. Permit me, sir, to remind the Convention, that the fact does not warrant the argument. We have tried the experiment, and with perfect success. I allude to the election of aldermen in all our cities, from the origin of the colony, down to the present day. They have been always elected by the people in the respective wards. They are justices of the peace, ex officio: and I ask with confidence, whether that mode of designating those local magistrates, has not been found safe and proper? We have the plain light of experience to guide us; the theory has been reduced to practice, under circumstances most unfavourable to success; and if it be safe and wise to trust the election of those judicial officers to the motley population of our cities; can there be any danger in permitting the like officers to be chosen by the sober and discreet farmers in our country towns? I think not, sir.

The judicial functions of aldermen, are more extensive than the powers of ordinary justices of the peace. Aldermen in the city of New-York are not only conservators of the public peace; they are members of the courts of general sessions and common pleas, and also of the court of oyer and terminer. I have had occasion several times to preside in the oyer and terminer in New-York; at the trial of persons for capital offences, when the aldermen of that city were my associates on the bench. I have found them sensible, discreet, and respec⚫ table-they were men with whom I should be proud to associate any where. I

therefore feel a perfect confidence, that there is no real danger in permitting the people of the several towns to elect their own justices, according to the report of the select committee.

MR. BRIGGS replied to the suggestion, that the people of this state were incompetent to exercise the power of electing their magistrates. It would seem from the opinions expressed, not only that they were incompetent as electors, but that the moment they exercised that power, all virtue and honesty would depart from the elected. He did not believe that it was necessary to have an intermediate body to protect the people from themselves, nor that they were destitute of those characterestics that constitute discretion. There was no danger that the people would not be guided by their own interest, nor that they would be bewildered in their understandings when they came to the polls. They were to abide the consequences of their own selection, and if their choice was injudicious, they were the immediate sufferers. The amendment, in his opinion, went to show, that we had no confidence in the people; but he thought that this was an authority with which, of all others, it was most proper to entrust them.

MR. SHARPE opposed the amendment. He had seen aldermen elected in the city of New-York, and the selections had been uniformly judicious. He believed that the people could be safely trusted. He came here not to subserve party views that were fluctuating and temporary, but to make a constitution for the benefit of his children. He did not know who was to be the next governor, nor did he much care; he would never consent to give to him, whoever he might be, the power of appointment to office as was now proposed. He had, he said, come here to make a constitution without regard to party. He wished not to look at what the operation of any constitutional provision would be, with respect to party.

He was opposed to the proposition under consideration, also, because there would be no responsibility, in case of an abuse of power.

Of the one hundred and twenty-six members of which the Convention was composed, they were mostly all of one political party—a jealousy had existed that they would be influenced by party considerations in their proceedings here. Let us, said he, by our actions, prove the contrary; let us show ourselves magnanimous. There were, he said, but few counties in the state, in which their political opponents had the majority, and he would let them have the local officers of those counties to themselves.

Mr. Van Buren was perfectly willing that the gentleman last up, should show his magnanimity; but that the credit he received might equal his deserts, he would take the liberty to explain the extent of it, farther than the honourable gentleman had done, he would show the height, and breadth, and depth, of the magnanimity recommended; and he hoped he would have ample opportunity, before they got through with this subject, of proving by his votes, the reality of his magnanimity. He would, however, remind him, that the concession he was about to make to his political opponents, would not be limited to a few counties; the proposition was not to elect by counties, but by towns, and for that the gentleman had yesterday voted. By a recurrence to the result of the last spring's election, it would be found, that the honourable gentleman, in the plentitude of his magnanimity, would yield to his political adversaries, if not a majority, certainly a moiety of the whole magistracy of the state. [Mr. S. here interrupted Mr. V. B. and stated that he was perfectly willing that the supervisors of the several counties, or those bodies in conjunction with the courts of common pleas, should appoint the justices. He was opposed to having the appointments made at Albany.] And what, continued Mr. V. B. will you do with the minorities in those counties? Are they to be abandoned? His magnanimity, he said, would not carry him so far. The republican party were predominant in the state, and he did not believe that magnanimity, or justice, required that they should place themselves ander the dominion of their opponents. While they continue to be the majority, it was no more than right that they should exercise the powers of the government. That the majority should govern, was a fundamental maxim in all free governments; and when his political opponents acquired the ascendancy, he was content that they

should have it in their power to bestow the offices of the government. It was true, as the honourable gentleman had said, that we had not come here to make a constitution for a party; but it was equally true, that we had not been sent here to destroy one party and build up another. He was not, however, in favour of a system of utter exclusion of the minority. He thought they ought to participate, and he had no doubt they would. He thought it at best but equivocal magnanimity in those who, by their residence, were safe from the control of their adversaries, to disregard the wishes and interests of such of their friends as were differently situated.

MR. FAIRLIE stated, that the election of aldermen in the city of New-York, could have no great bearing on this question, inasmuch as they possessed no civil jurisdiction. He thought, however, that it might be expedient to reflect further on the subject before the question, and with that view moved that the committee rise and report. Lost.

MR. DODGE observed, that the great object with all the members of this body was, that good and suitable men should be selected to fill the offices of justice of the peace. He thought that the practical effect of the plan under consideration would be, that the best men in the community when collected together, would go to the supervisor, and consult with him, and recommend the most proper persons for that office. The same course would also probably prevail in relation to the judges of the county court. Hitherto the nominations have been really made by a caucus assembled in the centre of the various counties, or perhaps by county conventions, which were liable to the same objections: as the selections in both cases were made by political partizans, and with reference to party objects. He was opposed to the election of magistrates, for reasons that had been already stated, and for another which had not been hitherto assigned. It would increase the number of the elections--for if a magistrate should move away or die, the people must be assembled from time to time to supply the vacancy. He was also opposed to it, because he thought that uniformity was desirable throughout the state, and it was well understood that distinct appointing powers would be created for the cities of New-York and Albany, even if the general purpose of election by the people should ultimately prevail for the country. If the system of election were adopted, he feared the question of the fitness of the candidate would be made to depend, not upon his qualifications and merit, but upon his popularity and probable success. Mr. D. observed, that the justices' was emphatically the poor man's court, and he should regret to see it placed under the influence of the rich. Suppose a large manufactnrer in a town had the control of a hundred votes in the election of a magistratewhat would be the chance for justice of a poor man in a controversy with him? Would you, said Mr. D. permit a suitor to elect exclusively his arbitrators? Certainly not; and yet, by the system of election, you would virtually give effect to that principle, by disposing of the choice of these magistrates to the influence of the rich. Mr. D. further illustrated his sentiments in relation to the subject, and replied to the objections that had been urged against the amendment; and remarked that, believing it to be the least objectionable measure, he should give it his vote.

CHANCELLOR KENT objected to the amendment proposed by the honourable member from Otsego, (Mr. Van Buren.) The supervisors of each county were to propose one list of justices, and the judges of the county court another, and out of these two lists the governor was to select and appoint the justices. How was it possible that the governor at the seat of government could select several thousand magistrates with discretion, when he could have no local knowledge of characters? He would be obliged to elect by ballot or by guess, or if he resorted for advice it would be to men who would communicate it in secret, and who would not be responsible to the community for ill-advice. If he was a governor who stood at the head of a great political party, he would naturally be led to adopt the one list or the other, as would best meet party views and wishes, There was a great objection, also, in requiring the judges of the county courts to select the justices of the county. He had listened with pleasure to the gentleman from Schoharie, who had just sat down, (Mr. Sutherland,) and who was in favour of the amendment. That gentleman always spoke with can