important duties as the administration of justice would require, in the neighbourhood where all this game had been played.

Is the mode proposed by the gentleman from Oneida desirable? He proposes having nine persons chosen in each county, to constitute a council of ap→ pointment. It does appear to me, said Mr. B. that the arguments of the gentleman from Albany, (Mr. Spencer,) go most conclusively to show the perni cious effects which would result from the proposition of the gentleman from Oneida. This body of men is too numerous; it would be totally irresponsible, and therefore unfit to exercise this important power.

We have heard much said of the commotion at a governor's election. It must be admitted that it would be increased by adding that of a county election for a council of appointment-the people would all turn out in battle array-and for my part, I should much prefer the old council. The remark of the gentleman from Albany was just, that the situation of an elector would be truly odious.

We next come to the proposition of the gentleman from Otsego. In the first place, this proposition possesses one of the qualities so highly spoken of by the gentleman from Albany. It is an incidental duty, without enacting a new officer; and will not these nominating boards be as discreet as any body that you can appoint? It appears to me they will; and that they will possess the necessary independence of mind, and the necessary information respecting the personal qualifications of candidates for office. It is certainly a fair presumption, that the judges of the county court will be selected for their talents, integrity, and regard to the public good. It would be unfair to presume that they will not be men of character and good standing in society. I think I can see that since the number of the judges have been limited in the counties, the courts have become more respectable. I think they will still improve. The people are becoming convinced of the necessity of appointing men of worth and talents to that office. On the whole, I think we may safely conclude that the judges will possess the necessary independence, character, intelligence, and responsibility to be entrusted with the power of making nominations. They will be interested in making such as will be respectable, as the persons thus selected are to sit by their side in dispensing criminal justice; and I think it cannot create any additional expense.

I now come to consider the objections offered by the gentleman from Oneida. The first objection is, that it is an improper mixture of the different branches of the government-but it is no more than is to be found in many other respects. I ask whether it is a violation of any sound principle? What is this council? Is it in any way legislative, executive, or judicial? If the executive has any power, it is conferred on him by the people; and this power, as it relates to appointments, does not appear to me to be either of the three departments. In our government all offices proceed from the people, and as it is not convenient for them to manage this business personally, they are under the necessity of making agents, and they have a right to appoint agents to make other agents. There has been no difficulty arising from allowing the supreme court and court of chancery to appoint their own clerks, and this is an office of trust and honour.

The important question is, whether the plan proposed by the gentleman from Otsego will lead to corruption in the exercise of this power. What reasons have we to suppose this court of common pleas will be corrupted by the exercise of this power, any more than the other courts? Instances may occur when power will be abused, of whatever nature it may be. A chancellor may be a bad man, and abuse his power; but are we ever after to distrust all men? Experience on this subject is more satisfactory than all speculative views which can be taken. The proposition now before the committee is upon a principle adopted in one of the most respectable states in the Union, and was entitled to his cordial approbation and support.

GEN. ROOT was in favour of the proposition offered by the gentleman from Otsego, so far as it related to the appointment of justices of the peace; but the office of sheriff he was anxious to have elective: if the question on this proposition was carried, it would negative the fifth section of the report. The appoint

ment of justices was one about which there was very little agitation: the supervisors would of course bring the views of their respective towns upon the subject of their magistrates. Every supervisor would have an opportunity of consulting his neighbour on the subject of justices; but with respect to sheriffs it would be different, as there would be but one in each county, and he would not be able to consult in the different towns in the county, and would probably bring forward a candidate in his own town. After their several recomiendations, one must be selected, but not without much extraneous influence and bargaining. One would say, give me the sheriff in my town this time, and you shall have him in your town the next election. This would lead to serious difficulties, and would not be remedied by the interposition of the judges of the common pleas as they might have one candidate in view and the supervisors another; of course these candidates must take a trip to Albany either personally, or by their agents or friends, to see who can use the most influence with the governor. This is not a desirable state of things-suppose the supervisors and judges should by chance agree in the nomination of the same individual, the one who stood next on the list would also have to make a trip to see the governor.

Mr. R. said his object in moving to strike out the word sheriff, was to provide for their being elected by the people. Let them hold for a given time, and then make them ineligible for the next term-make them give ample security, and you will have men worthy of the office,

GEN. J. R.VAN RENSSELAER rose to take a view of the different propositions before the Convention, and their probable effect if adopted. The Convention, he said, had unanimously agreed in abolishing the old council of appointment, from a conviction of its evil consequences and a knowledge of the desire of the people to try some other method of selecting and appointing officers. The people had for a long time been aware, that the appointments under our former council had been dictated by a few individuals at the seat of government, whe were in no shape responsible to them, and were liable to be influenced by personal interests and motives. These are the reasons which led to the abolition of that method of appointment.

The proposition of the gentleman from Otsego, (Mr. Van Buren) would first receive his attention. He was of the opinion that the same evils would attend that method which had led to the destruction of the old council.

His method proposed that the judges of the court of common pleas in each county, should make out a list of the candidates for office within their respec tive counties, and that the supervisors of such counties should make out another. These lists shall be submitted to the governor, from which he shall appoint the justices of the peace for each county.

This board of supervisors, on an average, would consist of about thirteen members, who, together with the five judges in each county, would constitute a council of eighteen, for the nomination of the justices in each town, submitting to the governor the power of appointing and rejecting, as he may think proper, from these lists.

Sir, I want to know, said Mr. V. R. where, in this whole process, the people will be able to lay their hands on a single individual for the responsibility of a had appointment? Should a person go to a supervisor, and enquire how such a man obtained his appointment, knowing him to be unfit for the office, and that in his own town he could not have obtained a nomination, the answer would be, I was opposed to that individual, still I was but one among thirteen-I was overpowered by the majority. The same would be the answer from the respective judges. When you come to the executive, and make the same enquiry, he would tell you he knew nothing about it. The constitution of the state has appointed a number of guardians over his conduct, and that he could do no other than comply with their recommendations.

Your magistrates are to hold for a considerable time, and it will be out of the power of the people to remove them.

In an early day of the session of this Convention, it was agreed to abolish the council of revision. One of the important reasons for which, was that the execntive, legislative, and judicial departments should not be mingled. This was

the principal reason which led to so unanimous a vote on that subject. Now what do you propose to do? You propose to make your court of common pleas the organ of executive power. The power of appointment is added to that of administering the laws. You take this power from the executive and cast it upon the judiciary. This is in violation of all sound doctrine, and the effect will be to make your judiciary necessarily the instruments of party. You compel them to take a part in the political squabbles of your counties. Is this wise, or is it discreet? It has been said, and truly said, that a party judiciary is the greatest curse that can be inflicted upon any community. With respect to the original proposition in the report of the select committee, and the amendment offered by the gentleman from Oneida, I am decidedly in favour of the report of the committee. I am anxious to carry home to the people the power of appointing.

But we are told one day that the people are capable of voting for governor, senators, and members of assembly; and the next day they are considered in capable of electing justices of the peace in the very towns where they live-today they are all enlightened and virtuous, to-morrow they are all ignorant and vicious, and unfit to manage the most trifling concern in which they are immediately interested--they are considered the tools of designing demagogues, and subservient to the will of pettifoggers and constables. He could not understand the force of such reasoning. He was not so great an advocate for the merits of the people as many, still he would not consent that they were unfit to manage their own trifling concerns as well as others could manage them for them. The people are honest in intention; it is true they may be deceived, and led astray by demagogues from their duty and interest, but they will soon discover their danger, and return to both.-They are as capable of electing their own justices as they are of electing their chief magistrate and members of the legislature. Show me an instance of a magistrate in the country deciding a controversy from impure motives, and I will show you an individual who is held fin universal detestation-an individual who cannot again obtain the patronage. of a single man in the community. If there is a subject in the whole train of social concerns, in which the people ought to have a voice, it is upon that of electing those who are to decide between individuals. With respect to these magistrates being elected by a political party-will not your supervisors be as likely to be elected by a party as your justices?

As to the effect to be produced by this method-you will produce the same party feelings in two distinct bodies of men in each county, and perpetuate it at the seat of government in your chief magistrate. These two lists of candidates are to be sent to the seat of government, where the same intrigue will be practised, and where the same irresponsibility exists as has been so much de precated in our former council---and it would not be anticipating too much, to expect more deplorable consequences to result from such a plan, than had resulted from the former council.

MR. KING considered the appointment of this class of magistrates to be as important, in relation to the general welfare, as any other branch of the judiciary power. It was desirable, therefore, to adopt some plan which would secure to the people a due administration of justice, and exempt them from the evils which had existed under the present council. He believed it would be more satisfactory were these appointments completely local; and it was much to be wished, that the appointing power, instead of being concentrated in one place, should be diffused through the whole community. Instead of bringing up to the central power all the authority in the state, he thought it more safe, more prudent, and satisfactory, to carry it down to the people.

Originally, justices were only conservators of the peace-prescrvers of tranquillity among neighbourhoods. In the course of time, their jurisdiction was extended over property, and had probably been carried farther here than in any other state in the Union. In England, they were originally elected by the people-not by the freeholders, not by the liberi homines, but by the inhabitants at large. So were coroners, and some other officers allied to that department. It would seem strange, then, that in this country, where no ranks of nobility, and no privileged orders exist, and where there is so much intelligence and vir

tue in the people, that we cannot elect these magistrates without going up to the governor. The amendment under consideration begins with the people-the nomination proceeds from among them, so far, especially, as it relates to the supervisors. Why, then, could it not be decided nearer home?

Mr. K. would prefer, if no better plan could be devised, that the nomination should be made by the board of supervisors, and that the county courts should have the power of appointment, rather than carry it up to the executive. But what hinders the people from collecting and electing by ballot? There was no greater danger of controversy, than in the selection of other officers. Mr. K. did not fear extending the power of election, with proper reserves, to the coroners and to other higher officers. The plan under consideration was calculated to bring all under the control of the central authority; and although it had been stated that much had been cut off from the powers of the existing council, yet there would still be enough remaining for solicitation and intrigue.

JUDGE VAN NESS said, as there were a number of different propositions be fore the committee, he felt it a duty to submit to their consideration his views on the subject generally.

It will be useful, said he, before I proceed, to go back for a moment and see what has already been done, and extract from the votes which have been given, some principles which they appear to have established. When the question was taken on the council of appointment, we voted unanimously for its abolition. After this, an honourable gentleman from Eric (Mr. Russell) presented a proposition, which was in effect to reanimate the old council of appointment. I imagine it was so considered; and by another vote, we almost unanimously pronounced the inutility of establishing another council upon principles so similar to the one which we had just abolished. I will not go into the reasons which influenced these votes; but it is obvious, that our former council as it existed, was not such an one as was satisfactory to the people, and they were therefore willing to abolish it. Indeed, I cannot be mistaken, when I say, that the people, from Suffolk to Niagara, called loudly for the abolition of the council of appointment, and the substitution of some other plan. And I believe, that if the public opinion could be ascertained, it would be almost unanimously in favour of giving the appointment of town and county officers in some shape, directly, or indirectly, to the people; and I have no doubt, that every member of this committee, if he will examine his own mind candidly, will find that this was the prominent cause which led to the calling of this Convention. They expected that this power would be given to them, and I fear we shall disappoint their just expectations in case we withhold it. The great principle, which in my judgment actuated this Convention in abolishing the old council of appointment, was to accomplish this object, by sending home to the people, as far as it can be done with safety, the right which they claimed.

We have now before us two or three propositions, the first of which I shall proceed to examine; I mean the one introduced by the gentleman from Otsego, (Mr. Van Buren.) He proposes that the supervisors and judges of each county shall make out two distinct lists of candidates for the office of justice of the peace, and present them to the governor, from which he is to appoint such as he shall think proper. Another proposition has been suggested by the honourable gentleman from Queens, (Mr. King,) that the appointments be made by the supervisors; and a third is presented by the report of the select committee, providing for their election by the people. I shall confine myself, at present, to the subject of justices of the peace, as the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Root) has anticipated me, by submitting a proposition that sheriffs be elected by the people. If the plan proposed by the gentleman from Oneida, (Mr. Platt,} of creating local councils of appointment, should not succeed, I shall give my support to the proposition of the gentleman from Delaware.

Should the proposition of the gentleman from Otsego succeed, it will be recollected, that not a single, solitary office, either in the town, county, or state, will be given directly to the people, except in the militia. I do not mean by this, to set myself up as a clamorous advocate for the people, nor to contend that they ought to have the election of all the officers of government; but if they

are worthy of the privilege of electing any of their officers, they certainly are most fit to elect their own magistrates within their respective towns.

The first objection which I have to this proposition, (Mr. Van Buren's,) is this--It is delusive; it holds out to the people, that the supervisors and judges are to make their appointments, when in fact, it is the governor alone who will make them.

One portion of this power of nomination is given to the judges of your court of common pleas, and another portion to your supervisors. Let us look at these two bodies of men separately. Those gentlemen who come from the country will recognize, that the supervisors are less a political body than any other in the community; one reason for which is, that the people are so deeply interested in the faithful discharge of the duty devolving on them, that they very frequently lay aside political feelings in the selection of these men. These officers have to determine how much money shall be drawn from the county treasury for town and county charges, and for what purposes it shall be appliedthey apportion the taxes among the different towns-they say how much shall be paid to support their county prison, and how much for all other town and county purposes. They are very cautious to impose no greater burthens than the people ought to bear. It is from such causes, that the interests of the people have overcome their personal enmities and political feelings, in electing supervisors; and that being the case, has brought into office a class of men, as respectable as any body of men congregated for public purposes in the community. Is it not highly important, then, that this character be preserved? Shall we extend to them any greater appointing power than they now possess, which is that of appointing their clerk and county treasurer? The moment they have a right to say, who shall be the magistrates of their county, (and by multiplying the number of towns in each county by four, you will see the number that they will have to appoint,) will not the people at their town meetings be diverted from that steady and prudent course, which they have heretofore pursued in the election of their supervisors? Will not these anxious justices of the peace (and if it should be extended so as to include the sheriff, he may be carried to the account) use great exertions to carry their points, by electing a supervisor who will favour their appointment? In a greater or less degree it will be the

case.

Another objection is this:-You cannot expect unanimity among them, wher there are from ten to thirty, or more, collected together. What will be the consequence, should we continue to have parties as we now have? · Instead of their nominations being unanimous, they will be made by a bare majority; and I ask if it is not highly probable, that two or three wealthy, influential, or cunning members of that board, will control all the appointments that are to proceed from these nominations? It will in effect be a nomination of a majority of these supervisors.

These are, in my opinion, substantial reasons why we should not put this power into their hands.

With respect to giving it to your judges, are there not unanswerable objections? In the first place, how are these judges appointed? It will be readily perceived, that you unite with your supervisors a set of men not at all dependant on the people for their offices-they are appointed by your governor and senate. What were the objections to the old council of appointment? It was thought inexpedient that the whole appointing power should be at the seat of government; and notwithstanding we have condemned that mode, we are to permit the judges of your court of common pleas to be appointed by the general appointing power-the governor, in substance, appointing them himself. What is the present duty of our judges? It is to administer justice. And we are now called upon to convert them into a political junto, by giving them the nomination of all the justices of the peace in the state. I agree, that the character of these county courts has been improved, by limiting the number of judges. We may naturally expect, these judges will be selected by the governor to answer his own party feelings; if so, they will become a political body, and if a political body, will not their usefulness as judges be destroyed?

But this is not all. It is proposed to give the judges, together with the su