to justices of the peace, any strong personal predilections. They feel them selves entirely open to conviction on these, and on all other points, which might be raised respecting their report; and if, on a fair and deliberate examination, it should be thought that it would be better to have the sheriffs and surrogates elected by the people, they would cheerfully acquiesce in that decision.

Having now, in a very brief manner, detailed the conduct and views of the select committee, with respect to the appointment and election of officers, he would next submit a few remarks on the subject of the tenure and duration of the several offices. The select committee, he said, had supposed that it would be well to give the militia themselves, the power of electing their officers-this course was pursued in several of the states, and it was understood, had proved beneficial. But the nature of the power to be exercised by these officers, and the necessity of enforcing discipline, and preserving a due subordination in the privates, would require that they should, when once elected, be placed beyond their further control. They thought moreover, that there was something peculiarly improper in subjecting the commissions of militia officers, in any degree, to the fluctuations of party; and they had, therefore, recommended, that they should not be removed except by a court martial, or by the senate, on the recommendation of the governor, and even then, that the governor should state the reasons for requesting the removals.

The committee were also of the opinion, that it was injurious to a due and regular administration of justice, that judicial officers, who did not hold during good behaviour, should be at all times subject to removal at pleasure and without cause; and as had hitherto been the practice, to be changed with every fluctuation of party; this instability in the administration of justice, was calculated to do permanent and serious injury to the best interests of the state. They believe they have laid the axe to the root of this evil, by rendering it necessary, that no removals should take place but for causes publicly assigned, and this they believe, would be an effectual check, to prevent their being made on mere party grounds. It would not, in their opinion, answer to go farther than this; for if they required a regular trial on all complaints, the whole time of the senate would be consumed with these investigations.

With respect to the officers, to be appointed by the legislature, and the clerks of courts, they had thought, that they might with safety, be left to be removable at the pleasure of those from whom they received their appointments.

I have now, added Mr. Van Buren, given a succinct account of the reasonings, and inducements, which governed the select committee, in making the report, they have presented to the Convention; the subject had occupied much of their serious attention, and deliberation, and all had but served to convince them, of the many and great difficulties, with which it was incumbered; and had also prepared them to look for, and expect, a great difference of opinion, among the members of the Convention, with respect to the several parts of their report. But as they were not by any means, wedded to the system they had presented, and entertaining a hope, that the wisdom of the Convention, would be able to devise something, in part, at least, less objectionable, they had endeavoured to keep their own minds, entirely open for the adoption of any alteration, or modification, which might be offered, and which should appear to them, to be better calculated to advance the public interest.

GEN. ROOT said the first section was objectionable for two reasons. 1st, it provides, that the non-commissioned officers shall be appointed by the captain. There are ten of these officers to cach company; and the selections are to be made from those who clect the officer that is to make the appointments. This would open a door for intrigue; and the old distich would be realized,

"Tickle me, Billy, do, do, do,
And in my turn I'll tickle you."

It would, in his opinion, be much better, that the non-commissioned officers should be elected by the companies.

The 24 objection was, that boys are permitted to vote. It was an established rule in all other cases, that minors should be excluded from the privilege of voting, and he saw no reason why an exception to the rule should be made

in this instance. We had often been told, in the course of our proceedings, that taxation and representation should go hand in hand. Minors are not taxed, and therefore should not vote. They are under the control of their parents, guardians, or masters; and if fined, the parent, guardian, or master, as the case may be, is responsible for the fine. The minor does not, therefore, act for himself, and if he should be invested with the privilege of voting, he would be subject to the intrigue, influence, and control of others. He hoped this section would be amended by providing that the non-commissioned officers should be elected by the companies, and that none except those who are above the age of twenty-one shall be entitled to vote.

MR. VAN BUREN was not tenacious on this subject, but thought this limitation of age would have a tendency to repress ambition, and to occasion difficulty and inequality in the mode of evidence by which the age of the minor should be tested. If they are eligible to office, it would seem proper that they should be permitted to vote; and experience had shewn, in the eastern states, that they had often made very valuable officers.

After a debate somewhat colloquial, the section was modified, amended, and carried in the following words :—

"Captains, subalterns and non-commissioned officers (shall be appointed) by the written votes of the members of their respective companies."

MR. VAN BUREN moved to insert the words " and separate battalions"-after the word " regiment" in the first line of the second section, and also at the close of the same. Carried.

The second section was then passed, as amended in the following words"Field officers of regiments and separate battalions, by the written votes of the commissioned officers of the respective regiments and separate bat

talions."

The subsequent sections after considerable discussion relative to the settlement of their respective details, were finally passed in the manner following:

Sect. III. Brigadier generals by the respective officers of their respective brigades.

Sect. IV. Major generals, brigadier generals, and commanding officers of regiments or separate battalions, to appoint the staff officers of their respective divisions, brigades, and regiments, or separate battalions.

Sect. V. The governor to nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to appoint, all major generals.

Sec. VI. The adjutant general to be appointed by the governor.

Sect. VII. That it should be made the duty of the legislature, to direct, by law, the time and manner of electing militia officers, and of certifying the officers elected, to the governor.

Sect. VIII. That in case the electors of captains, subalterns, or field officers of brigades, regiments or separate battalions, shall neglect or refuse to make such election, after being notified according to law, the governor shall appoint suitable persons to fill the vacancies thus occasioned.

Sect. IX. That all commissioned officers of militia be commissioned by the go

vernor.

Sect. X. That the governor shall have power to fill up all vacancies in militia offices, the appointment of which is vested in the governor and senate, happening during the recess of the senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of the next session of the legislature.

Sect. XI. That no officer duly commissioned to command in the militia, shall be removed from his office, but by the senate on the recommendation of the governor, stating the grounds on which such removal is recommended, or by the decision of a court martial pursuant to law.

Sect. XII. That the commissions of the present officers of the militia be no otherwise affected by these amendments, than to subject those holding them to removal in the manner above provided.

Sect. XIII. That in case the mode of election and appointment of militia officers now directed, shall not, after a full and fair experiment, be found conducive to the improvement of the militia, it shall be lawful for the legislature to abolish the same and to provide by law for their appointment and removal: Provided two thirds of the members present in each house shall concur therein.

CIVIL OFFICERS.

The first section was read as reported by the committee in the following words:

1st. The secretary of state, comptroller, treasurer, surveyor-general, and com. missary general, to be appointed as follows, to wit:-The senate and assembly shall each openly nominate one person for the said offices respectively, after which nominations, they shall meet together, and if on comparing their respective nominations they shall be found to agree, the person so designated shall be deemed appointed to the office for which he is nominated-if they disagree, the appointment shall be made by the joint ballot of the senators and members of assembly, so met together as aforesaid.

MR. JAY moved to strike out the words, "commissary general," on the ground that he was a military officer.

GEN. ROOT opposed the motion. He thought that those who have the custody of public property and the disbursement of public monies should be appointed by, and amenable to, the legislature.

The question was then taken on Mr. Jay's motion and lost.

GEN. ROOT moved to insert the words "attorney general"-next after the word Treasurer.

MR. BACON opposed the motion. The attorney general was always a political character, and he wished to remove the appointing power as far from the legislature as was practicable.

CHANCELLOR KENT wished to confine the several departments to their appro priate duties. The attorney general was an executive officer, and his appointment should emanate from the executive department.

GEN. TALLMADGE also opposed the motion, which was then put and lost. CHIEF JUSTICE SPENCER moved to strike out the words “secretary of state.” After some discussion, in which Mr. Spencer supported, and Mr. Van Buren opposed the motion, the question was taken and carried.

GEN. TALLMADGE then moved to strike out the word "comptroller." The duties of that officer were connected with the treasury. The comptroller and treasurer should be checks upon each other, and therefore ought not to be de pendant for their offices on the same power.

MR. E. WILLIAMS opposed the motion. The comptroller, he said, was the efficient treasurer. On his warrant the treasurer was bound to disburse the public monies. The comptroller has now the power that the treasurer had, at the formation of the constitution. The office of the latter was rather ministerial than otherwise.

A few additional remarks were made by Messrs. Fairlie, Tallmadge, Spencer and Van Buren, when the question was taken and lost.

MR. FAIRLIE moved to strike out the word "treasurer." Lost. MR. SPENCER moved to strike out the words "surveyor general." Lost. MR. VAN BUREN moved to insert the words "secretary of state,' next before the words "attorney general." Carried.

GEN. TALLMADGE moved to strike out the words "by and with the advice and consent of the senate."

His object was to try the important question, whether the legislature should be connected with the general or supreme appointing power.

He said he made the motion with no querulous disposition, nor with the view of leading to any personal remark or reference to the existing council of appointment. And should the committee of the whole think with him, that it was expedient to sever the legislature entirely from the appointing power, it would probably be necessary to send back the subject to a select committee, for the purpose of devising a substitute.

The great principle is, that the legislature shall have no other important duties to call away their attention from the performance of their legitimate functions. Mr. T. was aware of the supposed analogy to the constitution of the United States. It would be remembered, however, that the extent of territory over which those offices were to be scattered, was so great, and so disconnected,

that no local or individual excitement could reach them; but no man could say the same of this state, who was acquainted with the history of our lobby. Here the door was opened for contracts and combinations, which will force and blend themselves with the concerns of legislation. The same unity of design and action which could be brought to bear on our senate, could not approach that of the senate of the United States, on account of its more extended scale of operation.

But there was another reason for the motion. The great objection to the present council, consists in its irresponsibility. But surely that responsibility would be greatly diminished, when divided among thirty-two persons instead of four, as the council of appointment now exists. By referring this power to the senate, the expenses of the government would also be greatly increased by the necessary procrastination of the legislative sessions.

But there was another objection to connecting the senate with the appointing power, still more important. We have now extended the elective franchise so far as to amount substantially to universal suffrage, and the senate would be the offspring of this wide-spread vote. It is expected to retain the power of a court of errors to give construction to our laws. Shall those, then, who construe the laws, be also the fountain of official appointment to those who execute them? Might not a suitor in that court of dernier resort, under cover of making interest for a friend in the obtainment of an office, introduce the subject of his cause, and thus essentially obtain an ex parte hearing and decision? Does it not open an avenue by which an improper approach may be made to the highest tribunal in the state? It has been imputed to our elections, that they have been made with a special reference to official appointments: and there is great reason to fear that should this motion be defeated, the same imputations may still be made, and the appropriate duties of the legislators be lost sight of in the more interesting exercise of the appointing power.

MR. VAN BUREN remarked, that the section of the report under consideration was doubtless liable, in a greater or less degree, to the objections of the honourable gentleman from Dutchess, (Mr. Tallmadge) except that he did not think that the session of the legislature would be necessarily protracted by imparting this power to the senate. But he thought that if gentlemen were opposed to the report, it was incumbent upon them to offer a distinct substitute, so as not only to move to strike out, but also to insert. The gentleman who would offer a better substitute, should receive, not only his thanks, but his support.

MR. BUEL thought there was a wide distinction between the character of the powers vested in the members of the existing council of appointment, and of those which it is contemplated to give to the senate. Each member of the existing council has a positive power of nomination-an original appointing power. But the report contemplates clothing the senate with an approving power only. That body cannot, by their united force, appoint a single officer in the government. Of course the responsibility, instead of being diffused among thirty-two, is concentrated in the governor, and rests on him alone. And hence, also, if there is any bargaining, it will not be in the lobby of the senate, but in the mansion of the governor.

Perhaps the most forcible objection consists in its alledged connection with the judiciary power. This objection becomes less formidable when it is recollected, that the committee on the judiciary department have proposed in their report, that the court of errors shall not hold their sittings at the same time with the legislature. Another provision may also be introduced, that no appointment shall be made during the session of the court of errors.

It has been objected that the contemplated provision would increase expense, by protracting the session of the legislature. The mere confirmation of the nominations of the governor could take but little time, and experience has shewn that the senate is always in advance of the assembly in the transaction of business.

MR. VAN BUREN rose merely to call the attention of the committee to the fact that the whole number of offices contemplated to be appointed under this section, after the diminutions proposed, could not exceed sixty-probably rot over fifty.

CHIEF JUSTICE SPENCER asked whether the mover intended merely to strike out, and leave this power solely to the governor ?

GEN. TALLMADGE said that such was not his intention, and yet it would be necessary, if his motion prevailed, that a distinct provision should be made, which could not be done by insertion-and hence he had suggested a recommitment to a select committee.

Mr. T. was aware that the power of the senate was only confirmatory; but still he thought it presented too many and too great opportunities for intrigue and bargaining. Give me my bank, and I will give you your sheriff, was a language that might be held in the depository of the appointing power. Although its present operation might be convenient, he feared it would be ruinous in its future consequences.

MR. KING. This proposition stands in connexion with other parts of the report. The military offices are disposed of; and those reserved to the supreme appointing power, though few in number, are important in their character and station. The committee have assured us of the difficulties in the way of a per fect system, and have presented this as the best they were able to offer. It would seem, then, that those gentlemen who are dissatisfied with it, should ac company their objections with substitutes.

Experience goes to show, that to deposit this great power and patronage in the executive only, would be unsafe. The example of the great state of Pennsylvania proves that it would be impolitic. [Mr. T. explained, and said that such was not his intention.]

As it now stands, the governor is to have the exclusive nomination of these officers, and the whole power of the senate is of a negative character.

In the experience of the senate of the United States, which is in analogy with this provision, the sole, uncontrolled and exclusive power of nomination, is in the President. When his nomination comes before the senate, they never inquire into the comparative merits of the person nominated, or whether a better man could not have been found. They only inquire whether there is evidence of his positive disqualification: for no member of that body can expect. by objecting to the person named, to introduce his friend in his stead. This shows that where there is only an approving power, there can be no danger of a combination, for it would be without a motive. It would be impracticable: certainly unless your governor was too much enfeebled by the short tenure of his office, to resist the weight of improper influence. If he suspected a combination, he would be bound as a man of honour to break it up; and when known in the senate that combinations could not be effectual, they would cease to be formed. The power proposed to be confided to the senate is only as a check to the indiscretion of the governor. The responsibility rests on him alone, and until a better plan was devised, he should support and approve of this.

MR. BACON was in favour of the section as reported, principally on the ground of the small number of offices that were confided to this supreme appointing power.

MR. RHINELANDER. As a member of the select committee to which this subject was referred, I would solicit your patience while I make a few remarks, in order to explain, as briefly as may be in my power, the principles upon which I acted in concurring with that part of the report which is now under consideration. I consider the governor and senate, organized as the general appointing power of the state, on the same plan as the president and senate of the United States are organized for a similar purpose under the general government, to constitute a safe depository of that important power, and at the same time one that is well calculated to promote the substantial interests of the state, by the assurance which it holds out of the exercise of discretion and integrity in the selection of proper persons to fill the offices of government. When I declare, however, that I consider the governor and senate a safe depository of the appointing power, I am led to express this sentiment, not because I think that in their hands this power will be incapable of abuse, that they may not abuse it, but because I much believe that in all human probability it seldom will be abuscause in all human probability it cannot often be abused with impunity. dividual responsibility of the governor, for every nomination as well pointment to office, upon which I depend, as a sufficient security