it was merely the dread of a superior army that in these cases restrained their hands, not to mention that burning these towns would have been the ruin of the few secret friends they have still left, of whom there are more in those towns than in all America besides. They have not, indeed, murdered upon the spot every woman and child that fell in their way, nor have they in all cases refused quarter to the soldiers that at times have fallen into their power, though they have in many. They have also done their utmost in seducing negroes and Indians to commit inhuman barbarities upon the inhabitants, sparing neither age, sex, nor character. Although they have not in all cases refused quarter to soldiers and sailors, they have done what is worse than refusing quarter-they have thrust their prisoners into such dungeons, loaded them with such irons, and exposed them to such lingering torments of cold, hunger, and disease, as have destroyed greater numbers than they could have had an opportunity of murdering if they had made it a rule to give no quarter. Many others they have compelled by force to serve and fight on board their ships against fathers, brothers, friends, and countrymen-a destiny to every sensible mind more terrible than death

itself.

It is therefore difficult to apprehend what they mean by a change in the conduct of the war; yet there seems to be no room to doubt that they mean to threaten something more cruel, greater extremes of war, measures that shall distress the people and lay waste the country more than anything they have yet done. The object of the war is now entirely changed. Heretofore their massacres and conflagrations were to divide us and reclaim us to Great Britain. Now, despairing of that end, and perceiving that we shall be faithful to our treaties, their principle is by destroying us to make us useless to France. This principle ought to be held in abhorrence not only by all Christians, but by all civilized nations. If it is once admitted that powers at war have a right to do whatever will weaken or terrify an enemy, it is not possible to foresee where it will end. It would be possible to burn the great cities of Europe. The savages who torture their prisoners do it to make themselves terrible. In fine, all the horrors of the barbarous ages may be introduced and justified.

The cruelties of our enemies have heretofore more than once exasperated the minds of the people so much as to excite apprehensions that they would proceed to retaliation, which, if once commenced, might be carried to extremities; to prevent which the Congress issued an address exhorting to forbearance and a further trial by examples of generosity and lenity to recall their enemies to the practice of humanity amidst the calamities of war. In consequence of which neither the Congress nor any of the States apart have ever exercised or authorized the exercise of the right of retaliation. But now that commissioners, vested with the authority of the nation, have avowed such principles and published such threats, the Congress have, by a resolution of the 30th of

October, solemnly and unanimously declared that they will retaliate. Whatever may be the pretenses of the enemy, it is the manifest drift. of their policy to disgust the people of America with their new alliance, by attempting to convince them that, instead of shielding them from distress, it has accumulated additional calamities upon them.

Nothing, certainly, can more become a great and amiable character than to disappoint their purpose, stop the progress of their cruelties, and vindicate the rights of humanity, which are so much injured by this manifesto. We therefore beg leave to suggest to your excellency's consideration whether it would not be advisable for his majesty to interfere, by some declaration to the court of London and to the world, bearing the royal testimony against this barbarous mode of war, and giving assurances that he will join the United States in retaliation, if Great Britain, by putting her threats in execution, should make it necessary. There is another measure, however, more effectual to control their designs and to bring the war to a speedy conclusion; that of sending a powerful fleet, sufficient to, secure a naval superiority over them in the American seas. Such a naval force, acting in concert with the armies of the United States, would, in all human probability, take and destroy the whole British power in that part of the world. It would put their wealth and West Indian commerce into the power of France, and reduce them to the necessity of suing for peace. Upon their present naval superiority in those seas depend not only the dominion and rich commerce of their islands, but the supply of their fleets and armies with provisions and every necessary. They have nearly four hundred transports constantly employed in the service of their fleet and army in America, passing from New York and Rhode Island to England, Ireland, Nova Scotia, and their West India Islands, and if any one link in this chain was struck off, if their supplies from any one of these places should be interrupted, their forces could not subsist. Great numbers of these vessels would necessarily fall into the hands of the French fleet and go as prizes to a sure market in the United States. Great numbers of seamen, too, would become prisoners, a loss that England can not repair. It is conceived that it would be impos sible for Great Britain to send a very great fleet after the French into those seas. Their men-of-war now in Europe are too old, too rotten, too ill manned, and their masts and yards are of too bad materials to endure such a navigation. The impossibility of their obtaining pro visions, artists, and materials in that country, which would be easy to the French, makes it still clearer that they can not send a great additional force, and the fear of Spain's interfering with her powerful navy would restrain them. Whereas France has nothing to fear in Europe from them, as the number and excellence of their armies are au ample security against the feeble land forces of Great Britain.

This naval superiority would open such commerce between the United States and the French West India Islands as would enable our people

to supply themselves with the European and West India articles they want, to send abroad the produce of the country, and, by giving fresh spirit and vigor to trade, would employ the paper currency, the want of which employ has been one cause of its depreciation. The mainte nance of such a fleet in America would circulate so many bills of exchange as would likewise in a great measure relieve them from that dangerous evil; and these bills would all return to France for her manufactures, thereby cementing the connection and extending the trade between the two countries. Such a naval superiority would contribute very much to extinguish the hopes of the remaining number of persons who secretly wish, from sinister motives, to again become subjected to Great Britain, and would enable the people of the several States to give such consistency and stability to their infant governments as would contribute greatly to their internal repose, as well as to the vigor of their future operations against the common enemy. The late speedy supply and reparation of his majesty's fleet at Boston will show the advantages which this country must enjoy in carrying on a naval war on a coast friendly to her and hostile to her enemy. And these advantages will in future be more sensible, because the appearance of the fleet before was unexpected, and the harvest in that part of the country had been unfavorable. It is obvious to all Europe that nothing less is at stake than the dominion of the sea, at least the superiority of naval power, and we can not expect Great Britain will ever give it up, without some decisive effort on the part of France. With such an exertion as that of sending a superior fleet to America we see nothing in the course of human affairs that can possibly prevent France from obtaining such a naval superiority without delay. Without it the war may languish for years, to the infinite distress of our country, to the exhausting both of France and England, and the question left to be decided by another war.

We are the more earnest in representing these things to your excellency, as all our correspondence from England for some time has uniformly represented that the intention of the cabinet is conformable to the spirit of the manifesto; that all parties grow more and more out of temper with the Americans; that it has become fashionable with the minority as well as the majority and administration to reproach us both in and out of Parliament; that all parties join in speaking of us in the bitterest terms and in heartily wishing our destruction; that great clamors are raised about our alliance with France as an unnatural combination to ruin them; that the cry is for a speedy and powerful reenforcement of their army and for the activity of their fleet in making descents on the seacoast, while murdering and desolating parties are let loose upon the frontiers of the Carolinas, Virginia, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, and New England, and that very early in the year they will carry all these projects into execution. The whole system may, as we conceive, be defeated and the power of Great Britain now

in America totally subdued (and if their power is subdued there, it is reduced everywhere) by the measure we have the honor to propose. We submit the whole merely as our opinion to your excellency's superior wisdom.

And have the honor to be, etc.,

B. FRANKLIN.

ARTHUR LEE.

JOHN ADAMS.

Franklin, Lee, and Adams to Sartine.*

PASSY, January 2, 1779.

SIR: We had the honor of receiving your excellency's letter of the 22d, and are much obliged to you for the interest you take in what concerns the unhappy prisoners who may escape from England. We have not been inattentive to that subject. There are persons who supply them at Bordeaux, Brest, L'Orient, Nantes, and Dunkirk. A gentleman at Calais has voluntarily done this service, for which we have directed him to draw on us for his disbursements; and we shall as readily dis charge what may have been disbursed by your commissaries when we have their accounts.

As there is very little probability of prisoners coming to other ports, we will not give your excellency the trouble you are so good as to offer to take.

The regulation your excellency proposes relative to the prisoners we may take from the enemy and bring into the ports of France is entirely agreeable to us; and we shall direct our agents accordingly, who will readily deliver such prisoners to the persons your excellency may ap point to receive them, having already requested us to procure written orders from you, without which your commissaries were unwilling to take charge of them.

We have the honor to be, etc.,

B. FRANKLIN.
ARTHUR LEE.
JOHN ADAMS.

A. Lee to Vergennes.

CHAILLOT, January 3, 1779. SIR: I have the honor to send to your excellency the copy of a letter which I received yesterday. It is from the same person as the other which I had the honor of communicating to you through Mr. Grand. It is

* 1 Sparks' Dip. Rev. Corr., 371.

MSS. Dep. of State; 1 Sparks' Dip. Rev. Corr., 534. See infra, Vergennes to Lee, Jan. 4, 1779; Lee to Berkenhout, Jan. 7, 1779.

fourteen months since the writer has been proposing a rendezvous with Mr. Franklin and myself for the purpose of arranging the conditions of an accommodation. This gentleman, who is named Berkenhout, has since that time been sent to America with the British commissioners. He has been imprisoned in Philadelphia on suspicion of the object of his mission and released for want of proofs. He has again, as you see, returned to his country, and to his endeavors to seduce, by offers of emoluments and titles of honor, which we call in our language honors.

If your excellency is of opinion that it would be of any utility to endeavor to obtain proofs of authority for what he offers I will answer him accordingly; if otherwise, I will not return him any answer. This is also the opinion of my colleagues.

I have the honor to be, etc.,

ARTHUR LEE.

Vergennes to Arthur Lee."

[Translation.]

VERSAILLES, January 4, 1779.

SIR: I did not find annexed to the letter you did me the honor of writing to me yesterday the one from England which you mentioned, and which you say is from Dr. Berkenhout who rendered himself suspected at Philadelphia. But without seeing his letter I think, sir, that after what has passed between Congress and the English commissioners, it would be unbecoming the dignity of your commission to grant a rendezvous to agents who did not bring the palm of sovereign independ-, ence in their hands. My opinion would be, therefore, that you should answer in plain terms to this agent that, unless he assures you of the most entire acknowledgment of your independence, and brings you propositions conformable to the fidelity with which your nation and Government glory in fulfilling their engagements, that you can not consent to any interview with him or with any other emissary. You and your colleagues both perceive that these people wish to negotiate with you, not for the purpose of granting you suitable conditions, but to hold up an appearance that there is little agreement between you and us, by means of which illusion the purse of the Euglish is drained. I have the honor to be, etc.,

*MSS. Dep. of State; 1 Sparks' Dip. Rev. Corr., 535. See supra, Lee to Vergennes, Jan. 3, 1779; infra, Lee to Berkenhout, Jan. 7, 1779. For notice of Berkenhout, see Introduction, §§ 150, 204.