mother of a family ought to be something more than a housekeeper or a nurse, how will she be able to minister to the mental wants of her husband and her children if she makes the care of their physical comforts the only object of her life? Physical comfort is not to be despised, but if there is no moral and intellectual sympathy between a husband and wife, or between a mother and her children, a permanent and life-long injury is inflicted upon them all, which no amount of physical comfort can in the slightest degree compensate. It is, however, quite erroneous to suppose that an attention to domestic duties and to intellectual pursuits cannot be combined. There is no reason why wives and mothers should not cultivate their minds, and at the same time give proper attention to their domestic affairs. A hundred instances could be given to show that the notion that a woman, in order to manage her house and family well, must devote her whole time and mind to it and do nothing else, is quite incorrect. It cannot, therefore, be maintained that the plea that the franchise would withdraw women from their domestic duties is a valid objection to their enfranchisement.

We now pass to another objection-That the line must be drawn somewhere, and if women had votes they would soon be wanting to enter the House of Commons. The selection of a fit person to serve them in Parliament may safely be left to constituencies. At the present time there is no necessity to pass a law that a man wholly immersed in the conduct of a large business, should not offer himself as a candidate for a seat in Parliament; nor is it necessary to enact that no man of a serious constitutional delicacy should ever have a seat in Parliament. All these things are settled by candidates and constituencies without any legislative interference. As Mr. Mill very justly says, there is no necessity to pass laws to forbid people doing what they cannot do. There is no Act of Parliament needed to enact that none but strong-armed men should be blacksmiths. And so it would prove if all the disabilities of women were swept away. The would-be witty caricatures of sickly women fainting in the House of Commons under the weight of their legislative responsibilities, would lose their brilliancy and point in the cold light of stern reality. No constituency would deliberately choose a representative who would be quite incapable of serving it faithfully and well. All questions about who should or who should not have seats in Parliament may safely be left to constituencies.

Another objection to women's suffrage is that women do not want votes. Notwithstanding the obvious reply that a considerable number of women do want votes, and are continually petitioning Parliament to remove their electoral disabilities, it must be confessed that there is something more formidable in this objection than in any of the others which have been considered. Of course it makes no difference at all so far as abstract justice is concerned; but still,

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in practical politics, abstract justice does not usually weigh much with statesmen, unless it is accompanied by an urgent and pressing demand for the amelioration of the law. The existence of the Irish Church Establishment was as much opposed to abstract justice in 1769 as in 1869, but disestablishment did not take place until the demand for it was so urgent that it could not longer be disregarded. The demand for the extension of the suffrage to women is daily growing more earnest and more general. The bill now before Parliament has been supported by petitions from every part of the kingdom, signed by many tens of thousands of men and women. In the presence of such facts it cannot be said that there is no demand on the part of women for the suffrage. There is also this very strong argument, which is sometimes overlooked by those who consider that the suffrage should not be extended to women, because the majority of women do not desire to exercise electoral rights. No one proposes that women should be compelled to vote. Any woman who thinks that voting would be unfeminine or injurious to her health, would be quite at liberty to refrain from taking any part in an election. But it seems very unfair that those who do not wish for political power should be enabled to deprive those who do wish for it, of the right to exercise the franchise..

The Spectator says that people who do not demand the franchise, would, if they had votes, use them corruptly. I have endeavoured to prove that the franchise is the right of all, not the privilege of a select few. Two hundred years ago Oliver Cromwell, writing to the Governor of Edinburgh Castle, said, "It will be found an unjust and unwise jealousy to deprive a man of his natural liberty on a supposition that he might abuse it. When he doth abuse it—judge."

This sentence seems to indicate precisely two amendments most urgently required in our electoral system. In the first place, large classes of people are now excluded from the franchise on the supposition that they might abuse it; and in the second place, large classes of people, who are admitted to the franchise, do abuse their freedom, and legislation is almost powerless to visit them with the swift and severe punishment they so justly merit. Surely it would be more in accordance with the principles usually advocated by the Spectator, if it used its influence in promoting such an alteration of the law as would facilitate the punishment not only of the bribed, but of the bribers, instead of indulging in what Oliver Cromwell calls the "unjust and unwise jealousy" of depriving people of their natural liberty on the supposition that they might abuse it. The Spectator would be the last to say that all workmen ought to be deprived of the right of combination, because some workmen have abused this right. Yet this is a case in which the abuse of power is an actual fact, not a possible fact, such as the abuse on the part of women of the suffrage.

Another objection sometimes urged against women's suffrage is that most women are Conservatives, and that their enfranchisement would consequently have a reactionary influence on politics. But this is an objection, not so much to women's suffrage, as to representative government. Do those who object to the enfranchisement of women, on the ground that they are usually Conservatives, think that all Conservatives ought to be disfranchised? Surely representative institutions require that all differences of opinion should have their due and proportionate weight in the legislature. No class of persons should be excluded on account of their political opinions. What would be thought of a Conservative who gravely asserted that all Dissenters should be disfranchised because they are generally Liberals? It would be almost dangerous even to suggest the hard names which such a misguided person would be called by the very people who oppose women's suffrage because most women are Conservatives. And yet the two cases are exactly parallel, and equally antagonistic to the fundamental principle of representative government. A representative system which excludes half the community from representation surely is a farce. The question ought not to be, “How will women vote if they have the franchise ?" but, “Is representative government the best form of government that can be devised?" If the answer is in the affirmative, the exclusion of women from electoral rights can in no way be justified.

Sometimes it is said that the indulgence and courtesy with which women are now treated by men, would cease if women exercised all the rights and privileges of citizenship. Let it be granted that women would no longer be treated with exceptional courtesy and indulgence if they had electoral power; and then let us inquire, what this courtesy and this indulgence really amount to. They certainly are not valueless, but let us see of what sort of things they consist. Women are usually assisted in and out of carriages; they take precedence of men in entering and leaving a room; the door also is frequently opened for them; they are helped first at dinner; and they are always permitted to walk on the inside side of the pavement. Besides these there are more substantial privileges, such as being allowed to monopolise the seats in a room or a railway carriage in those cases where some of those present are obliged to stand. It would be unwise to underrate these little amenities of social life; they are very harmless, and perhaps even pleasant, in their way; but it must be confessed that their practical value is small indeed, especially if the price paid for them consists of all the rights and privileges of citizenship. If the courtesy of men to women is bought at this price, it must not be forgotten that the sale is compulsory, and can in no case be regarded as a free contract. But would women really lose all the politeness now shown to them if their right to the franchise were recognised? At elections it is not

usually the case that those who have votes are treated with the least consideration; but, apart from this, how would the courtesy of every-day life be affected by the extension of the suffrage to women? Some of the mere forms of politeness, which have no practical value, might gradually fall into disuse; but surely true politeness, which is inseparably associated with real kindness of heart, would not suffer any decrease from the extension of the suffrage to women. It is sometimes said that the physique of a woman is so delicate, that she could not stand the excitement of political life. This argument would be more comprehensible if women were entirely debarred from mixing with the outside world; but, as it is, there is nothing to prevent women from sharing the general excitement caused by an election. It is notorious some women do share it. But suppose it were satisfactorily proved that the health of some women would be injured by the excitement caused by taking part in elections, is that a reason why all women should be excluded from political power? The health of many men is frequently injured by excessive political work and excitement. Instances of such cases must occur to every one. The illness from which Mr. Bright is now suffering, and the extreme exhaustion of the Prime Minister at the end of last session, were both, doubtless, produced by the mental strain attendant on too much political work. But such facts furnish no argument against the exercise of political power by these eminent persons. We all hope that the only practical result of their maladies will be to make them more solicitous of their own health than they have hitherto been. It may safely be left to the inhabitants of a free country to take the necessary precautions for preserving their health; and if any woman found that the excitement of elections endangered either her mind or her body, no Act of Parliament would be required to induce her to withdraw from political strife.

Perhaps the objection to women's suffrage which operates most powerfully with the majority of people is, that the exercise of political power by women is repugnant to the feelings, and quite at variance with a due sense of propriety. In Turkey, a woman who walked out with her face uncovered would be considered to have lost all sense of propriety; her conduct would be highly repugnant to the feelings of the community. In China, a woman who refused to pinch her feet to about a third of their natural size would be looked upon as entirely destitute of female refinement. We censure these customs as ignorant, and the feelings on which they are based as devoid of the sanction of reason. It is therefore clear that it is not enough, in order to prove the undesirability of the enfranchisement of women, to say that it is repugnant to the feelings. It must further be inquired to what feelings women's suffrage is repugnant, and whether these feelings are "necessary and eternal," or, "being the result of custom, they are changeable and evanescent." There

seems to be little difficulty in proving that these feelings belong to the latter class. In the first place, a feeling that is necessary and eternal must be consistent; and the feeling of repugnance towards the exercise of political power by women is not consistent; for no one feels this repugnance towards the exercise of political power by the Queen. In the second place, it has been previously shown that the equal freedom of all is a necessary pre-requisite of the fulfilment of the Divine will, and that the equal freedom of a part of the community is destroyed if it is deprived of political power; and can it be asserted that the Supreme Being has implanted in man necessary and eternal feelings in opposition to his own will? Again: the state of popular feeling as to what women may and may not do is constantly changing in the same country, and even in the mind of the same individual; the feelings on this subject also differ in different classes of the community; it is consequently quite impossible to say that these feelings are necessary and eternal; they are, therefore, the result of custom, changeable and evanescent, and are destined to be modified by advancing civilisation.

It may be that a great deal of the repugnance which undoubtedly exists against women taking part in politics, arises from the disturbance and disorder which are too often the disgraceful characteristics of elections in this country. The adoption of the ballot and the abolition of nominations which will almost certainly take place before the next dissolution, will in all probability cause elections to be conducted with order and tranquillity. But the danger of women proceeding to polling places under the present system is greatly exaggerated. This is a point on which a small amount of experience is worth a great deal of theorising. At the general elections of 1865 and 1868, I went round to many of the polling places in several large boroughs. On most of these occasions I was accompanied only by a young girl, and no incident whatever took place which could have alarmed or annoyed any one. My experience on this point has always been the same, and it is corroborated by the experience of all ladies with whom I am acquainted, who, like myself, have tested by personal experiment whether it is either unpleasant or unsafe for a woman to go to a polling place. There are surely few men so unmanly as wilfully to annoy a well-conducted woman in the discharge of what she believed to be a public duty.

Many thousands of women have recorded their votes at the poll of the municipal elections. There is frequently quite as much bribery, drunkenness, and excitement at these elections as at the parliamentary elections, and yet I do not remember hearing of any instance in which a woman was subjected to insult or roughness in recording her vote at the municipal elections.

MILLICENT GARRETT FAWCETT.