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which press unjustly on them? Is that state of the law equitable which renders a married woman incapable of owning or of acquiring property, and which allows her husband to deprive her even of her earnings? Is that law just which gives a married woman no legal right to the guardianship of her own children? If women were virtually represented, would they be excluded from participation in the great educational endowments of the country ? Would the door of nearly all lucrative, and, at the same time, honourable employments be shut against them? Finally, using the very same argument which has been so often applied to the working classes, is it right or just that any one should be forced to contribute to the revenue of the country, and, at the same time, debarred from controlling the national expenditure? Either this argument is good for nothing, or it applies to women as forcibly as it does to men.

Another argument sometimes urged against women's suffrage is, that a woman is so easily influenced, that if she had a vote it would practically have the same effect as giving two votes to her nearest male relation, or to her favourite clergyman. This is a very curious argument; it would be a serious thing for men as well as for women if originality were a necessary qualification for the franchise. For instance, the Times exercises an extraordinary influence over the political opinions of thousands of people. Now it may be said, following out the argument just quoted, the effect of giving all these people votes is only to multiply a million-fold the voting power of the editor of the Times, or the writers of the articles in that journal; therefore all people who take their political views from the Times ought to be precluded from exercising the franchise. By carrying out this principle, nearly every one would be disfranchised, except the great leaders of political thought, such as Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Disraeli, Mr. Bright, Mr. Mill, Lord Salisbury, and the editors of some of the principal papers. For there are very few indeed whose political opinions are not biassed by the views of some of these distinguished and able men. But perhaps this objection that women's suffrage would only double the voting power of some men, can best be answered by making way for the next argument, viz., that women are so obstinate that if they had votes endless family discord would ensue. To this it may be replied that a vote is not an opinion but an expression of opinion, so that the same objection would apply to women having any opinions on political subjects. Under the present system women cannot be prevented from having political opinions, or from expressing them; they often even now possess political influence. This being the case, surely it is well that they should have every opportunity of forming just opinions, and that they should feel that a responsibility accompanies the exercise of power. It cannot be expected that women generally will recognise their responsibility until their power is recognised by

removing their electoral disabilities. Then as to the argument that husbands and wives of different political opinions would quarrel if the wives had votes, the exclusion of women from the franchise seems a rough and ready way of securing harmony. Suppose, for instance, that in order to secure conjugal harmony on religious matters, a law were passed to prevent all women from going to church. The advocates of such a law might say, "Suppose an Evangelical married a Roman Catholic, what disagreement it would lead to if the husband went off to one place of worship and the wife to another." As a fact, such marriages seldom take place; for it is recognised that women have a right to think for themselves on religious subjects, and there is therefore a strong and most reasonable feeling against marriages between people of opposite religious opinions. Would not the same feeling come into existence against marriages between people of opposite political parties if the political independence of women were recognised? If this feeling were prevalent, I believe a higher harmony than is yet generally known, would gradually pervade domestic life.

Let us now consider the validity of the fourth objection raised against the enfranchisement of women, viz., "The ideal of domestic life is a miniature despotism, in which there is one supreme head, to whom all other members of the family are subject. This ideal would be destroyed if the equality of women with men were recognised by extending the suffrage to women." It must be at once conceded that if the truth of the premise is granted, the truth of the conclusion must be granted also. Family despotism would receive a deadly blow from the extension of political power to women. But let us inquire how and why men-Englishmen, at least-have come to consider despotic national government immoral, and then let us see whether despotic family government differs essentially in principle from other despotisms. First let us inquire why despotic national government has been so successfully opposed in this country, and why representative government has been set up in its place. It may be briefly said that despotic government has been got rid of in this country because it has been felt to interfere unwarrantably with individual liberty. The leaders of popular rights from the time of Magna Charta to this day have always insisted on the importance of preserving individual liberty. Why has the name "liberty" always had such a magic spell over men? Why has liberty been valued more than life itself by all those whose names make our history glorious? Why have our greatest poets sung the praises of liberty in words that will never be forgotten as long as our language lasts? Is it not because it has been felt, more or less strongly at all times, that man's liberty is essential to the observance of man's duty? Mr. Herbert Spencer has thus analysed the right of mankind to liberty.

He says, "If God wills man's happiness, and man's happiness can only be obtained by the exercise of his faculties, then God wills that man should exercise his faculties; that is, it is man's duty to exercise his faculties, for duty means the fulfilment of the divine will. As God wills man's happiness, that line of conduct which produces unhappiness is contrary to His will. Either way then, we find the exercise of the faculties to be God's will and man's duty. But the fulfilment of this duty necessarily supposes freedom of action. Man cannot exercise his faculties without certain scope. He must have liberty to go and to come, to see, to feel, to speak, to work, to get food, raiment, shelter, and to provide for all the needs of his nature. He must be free to do everything which is directly or indirectly requisite for the due satisfaction of every mental and bodily want. Without this he cannot fulfil his duty or God's will. He has divine authority, therefore, for claiming this freedom of action. God intended him to have it; that is, he has a right to it. From this conclusion there seems no possibility of escape. Let us repeat the steps by which we arrive at it. God wills man's happiness. Man's happiness can only be produced by the exercise of his faculties. Then God wills that he should exercise his faculties. But to exercise his faculties he must have liberty to do all that his faculties naturally impel him to do. Then God wills that he should have that liberty. Therefore he has a right to that liberty." The only limitation to perfect liberty of

action is the equal liberty of all. "Liberty is not the right of one, but of all. All are endowed with faculties. All are bound to fulfil the divine will by exercising them. All, therefore, must be free to do those things in which the exercise of them consists. That is, all must have rights to liberty of action. Wherefore we arrive at the general proposition that every one may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties, compatible with the possession of like liberty by every other person." (Social Statics.) Never has the basis of individual liberty been more clearly explained than in this passage. It proves conclusively that despotism being antagonistic to the principle of the "perfect freedom of each, limited only by the like liberty of all," is at variance with the divine will. How then can the ideal of family life be despotism, when despotism is proved to be antagonistic to the divine will? If the importance of recognising the real basis of the rights of man has been dwelt upon at some length, it is not to prove that these rights exist-few in the present day deny that men have some rights-but to show that the "rights of women must stand or fall with those of men; derived as they are from the same authority; involved in the same axiom; demonstrated by the same argument."

Much more could be said in defence of the assertion that despotic family government is very far removed from the ideal state. If

space permitted it could be shown that command is blighting to the affections, and that where anything approaching the ideal of domestic happiness at present exists, the subjugation of all members of the family to the husband and father is not enforced. But it is necessary to pass to the consideration of the next objection to the extension of political power to women, viz., that women are intellectually inferior to men. It is unnecessary to enter upon the vexed question whether the mental powers of men and women are equal. It is almost impossible from want of evidence to prove whether they are or not. It may be very interesting as a philosophical discussion, but it is quite irrelevant to the present subject-i. e., whether women ought to have political power. Suppose it could be proved beyond the slightest doubt that on the average the intellectual powers of women were inferior to those of men. If this were fully and satisfactorily established as a fact, it would not furnish the slightest justification for depriving women of electoral power. Suppose it were also proved that the intellectual powers of the inhabitants of the North of England are superior to those of the inhabitants of the South of England. It is often asserted that this is the case. Would any one recognise that as a reason why the inhabitants of the South of England should be deprived of electoral power? Would the people of London be willing to relinquish their right to the franchise if it were proved to demonstration that on the average, and taking them altogether, they were intellectually inferior to the inhabitants of Edinburgh? It is ridiculous to suggest such a thing, and yet this absurdity is exactly similar to what is really urged against allowing women to exercise the franchise. But th question may be looked at from another point of view. It is said that women, on the whole, are not the intellectual equals of men. Whether this is true, I neither affirm nor deny; but even the most ardent asserters of the inferiority of women have never yet said that all women are intellectually inferior to all men. Let us hear what Mr. Spencer has to say on this point. Granting, for the sake of argument, that the intellect of woman is less profound than that of man, he adds, "Let all this be granted, and let us now see what basis such an admission affords to the doctrine that the rights of women are not co-extensive with those of men :

"I. If rights are to be meted out to the two sexes in the ratio of their respective amounts of intelligence, then must the same system be acted upon in the apportionment of rights between man and man.

"II. In like manner, it will follow, that as there are here and there women of unquestionably greater ability than the average of men, some women ought to have greater rights than some men.

"III. Wherefore, instead of a certain fixed allotment of rights to all males, and another to all females, the hypothesis involves an

infinite gradation of rights, irrespective of sex entirely, and sends us once more in search of those unattainable desiderata- -a standard, by which to measure capacity, and another by which to measure rights. Not only, however, does the theory thus fall to pieces under the mere process of inspection; it is absurd on the very face of it, when freed from the disguise of hackneyed phraseology. For what is it that we mean by rights? Nothing else than freedom to exercise the faculties. And what is the meaning of the assertion that woman is mentally inferior to man? Simply that her faculties are less powerful. What then does the dogma that because woman is mentally inferior to man she has less extensive rights, amount to? Just this, that because woman has weaker faculties than man, she ought not to have like liberty with him to exercise the faculties she has!"

We will now pass to the consideration of another objection to women's suffrage-that the family is woman's proper sphere, and if she entered into politics she would be withdrawn from domestic duties. It may be mentioned in passing-it is a fact not calling for any special importance or regret that there are some million or so of women in this country without families and without domestic affairs to superintend. The number of women is constantly in excess of the number of men, and so there must always be a certain percentage of women unmarried, and who therefore have no families to be withdrawn from. It is all very well to tell a woman that her sphere is to be a wife and a mother, when there must always be a considerable number of women unmarried, owing to the simple fact that there are more women in the world than men. But let us look at the case of women who are married, and see whether the objection that politics would withdraw them from domestic duties, is valid. It would be a great assistance in deciding this question to know the average number of hours in the year which an elector employs in discharging his political duties. Is an hour a week a fair estimate? But surely an elector would not, unless he is engaged in some particular work, such as superintending the registration, or as secretary to a political society, devote as much as an hour a week-no, nor half an hour a week-to duties which the franchise imposes upon him. Then what does this objection, that the right to vote at Parliamentary elections would withdraw women from domestic duties, really come to? Why soon it will be objected that women should not go to church or out for a walk, because so doing withdraws them from their domestic duties. It may, however, be urged that it is not merely the exercise of the franchise, but all that an interest in political questions involves the reading of newspapers, the attending of meetings, and the like-that would have a mischievous influence in withdrawing women from their domestic duties. But surely the wife and

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