differed on most points, they agreed in this, that it is not nature, but art, which determines the question, as to who shall participate in the exercise of political power, or constitute a PEOPLE, in the political sense of the word. Even "the impious Rousseau" is sometimes right, and nearly, if not quite, always so when he agrees with Edmund Burke.

In his attempt to show that the Constitution was adopted by the people, and not by the States, Mr. Justice Story deceives himself by means of the ambiguities of the term people, and repeatedly contradicts his own positions. "The States never, in fact," says he, "did, in their political capacity, as contradistinguished from the people thereof, ratify the Constitution."* This is very true, if by States in their political capacity, he means, as he seems to do, the State governments. But this is not to the purpose. Every one admits, that the Constitution was ratified, not by the Governments, but by the people of the States. Nor does any one deny, that the term State is sometimes used to signify the government of a State. Thus, we often say, that the State does so and so, when the thing is done by its Government. But the question is, may we not say, that the Constitution was ratified by the States, as well as by the people of the States? Or, in other words, are not the terms State and People properly used as equivalent expressions? These words were, as we have already most abundantly seen, habitually used as convertible terms by the Convention of 1787.

We may truly say, indeed, with Judge Story, that the Constitution was not ratified by the States, as contradistinguished from the people; because it is not very easy to distinguish a thing from itself. In assuming this position, Mr. Justice Story forgets what he had said in the preceding Book of his Commentaries, namely, "the State and the people of the State, are equivalent expressions."+ "Nay, the State," he again says, "by which we mean the *Vol. i., page 330. † Vol. i, Book ii, p. 198.

perque composing the State, a divide its sovereign DOWIES LIDIES TADI İLeizais fa* Here the term 29 B BASg met ar mande coly the qualified voters, de those who share the sitemig power: and, in this SON, DEŢIN ejel the State." It is precisely in this sus, that the Ciastaza vas raided by the peoples, o the States. Vi may, and indeed skrald, distinguish Jerved. The ILLIUS AĆ THE Term See when it is figuraLTAY IN SCLT the govemment of a State, and VÌCI Z IS USAẺ of signify the State But we shall New Barish the people of a State from the State 12 mm we can find a State which is not composed of

But the attempt is made to show, that, in adopting the Constitution, the States acted as mere districts of people, and not in their sovereign political capacity. But if this were so, then the different districts would have been considered together in making up the final result, and the majority of the one grand. national whole would have. ordained the Constitution. The fact. however, the undenied and the undeniable fact, is quite otherwise. Each State, with all its own laws, and institutions and government, either went in, or remained out, at its own sovereign will and pleasure. In the words of the Federalist, it was "only to be bound by its own voluntary act.” No other State, nor all other States combined, nor the whole people of America, had the least authority to control its decisionThis was an absolutely free, sovereign and independent act of each State. It may be doubted, indeed, if there was ever a more superficial gloss, or a more pitiful subterfuge, than the assertion of Judge Story, that the States adopted the Constitution, not as States, but only "as districts of people" composing one great State or nation. It is at war with facts; it is at war with his own repeated admissions; and it is at war with the plainest dictates of truth,

* Ibid. p. 194. †Story's Com. on the Constitution, vol. 1, p. 330.

as well as with the unanswerable arguments of the Federalist. Sad, indeed, must have been the condition to which the great sophist was reduced, when he could stoop to so palpable a gloss on one of the plainest facts in the history of the Constitution!

CONCLUSION.

Mr. Justice Story has, I am aware, as well as Mr. Webster, laid great stress on the fact, that the Constitution addresses the language of authority to the States. "The language of a compact is," says he, "I will, or will not do this; that of a law is, thou shalt, or shalt not do it."* This is what the act of entering into a compact signifies, but it is not usually the language of the instrument itself. On the contrary, the Articles of Confederation, which are universally admitted to form a compact, use precisely the same style as the Constitution. Both say what shall, and what shall not, be done by the States. Precisely the same style is also employed in the formation of compacts or treaties between wholly separate and independent powers. Nay, in the most ordinary articles of co-partnership, it is usual to say, in the same manner, what shall, and what shall not, be done by the parties thereto. Yet all such instruments rest upon the agreement of the parties, and derive their binding force from their voluntary act.

There is a very simple law of language, which seems to have escaped the attention of these great expounders of the Constitution. The language of written contracts usually speaks of the parties in the third person, and not for them in the first person. Hence, they necessarily assume the imperative style; laying down what shall, and not saying what will, be done by them. It would have been ridiculous, indeed, if the Constitution had said, No State will emit bills of credit, or coin money, and so forth, instead of saying, as it does, that no State shall do such acts. *Vol. i, p. 308.

* In compacts” was Judge Strek we onsetes detertermine and promise, wiki tha te drue bedice we are Mogatu do 2" X: virs said more simimbly suit OR STORE or the ducts I de se For each State apped to the empun of the Consumimia, which pre

e - Mas be free" before it was bound by it. That Has State $0.75 en büs of media” and so forth. is precisely the myle which weering to Jaire Story himself at me at according to all usare wield be employed in anicles of agreement between the States: and hence, to argue for the the of will instead of rth that the Constitution addresses the language of authority from the people of America to the States is simply risks. In compasta," says Story, "we ourselves determine and promise what shall be done, before we are chiged to do it.” And yet, in the face of this obvious fact he argues from the use of shall in the Constitution, that it is not what the State "determined and promised." but what they were commanded to do! that it is not, and cannot be a compact between the States at all!

A and B enter into articles of agreement. These articles, according to good usage, say what A shall do, and what B shall do. What shall we say, then, of these articles? Shall we say, that they do not form an agreement, or contract at all? Shall we say, that A commands B, or "addresses to him the language of authority," as a law-giver speaks to a subject? If so, then B also commands A, and each is evidently the master of the other! Precisely such is the profound logic of Mr. Justice Story!

CHAPTER XVI.

Arguments in favor of the Right of Secession.

In the preceding chapters, it has, I think, been clearly demonstrated, that the Constitution of the United States was a compact to which the several States were the parties. This, as we have seen, was most explicitly the doctrine maintained by the fathers of the Constitution, and was unequivocally set forth by the Federalist in submitting that instrument to the people, and that it is confirmed by all the historical records of the country. If any proposition, indeed, respecting the Constitution can be considered as unanswerably established, it is the doctrine of the Federalist, that the act by which it was ordained was not a national, but a federal act;" having been ratified "by the people of America, not as individuals composing one nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States to which they belong;"* that the Constitution, "the compact," was established by "the States regarded as distinct and independent sovereigns."† It is, then, on this clear, broad, immutable foundation, that the argument in favor of secession rests.

Argument in favor of Secession from the doctrine of reserved rights.

It is frequently asked, by the opponents of secession, where is the right of a State to withdraw from the Union set forth or contained in the Constitution? But this

* Federalist, No. XXXIX.

† Ibid, No. XL.