tion are the first and highest duties of a soldier, and no one knew better the truth of, and necessity for observing this maxim, than the officer in question. For the truth of this observation we have his own declaration. In his letter to the Secretary of War of the 20th of January, 1818, he says, "Your letter, enclosing your general order of the 29th ult. has been received; like yourself, I have no other feelings to gratify than those connected with the public good; and it gives me pleasure to find we coincide in those opinions calculated to produce it. Responsibility now rests where it should, on the officer issuing the order; and the. principle acknowledged is calculated to insure that subordination so necessary to the harmonious movement of every part of the military machine."

It is to be regretted, that an officer who seemed to be so perfectly acquainted with what belonged to the duty of others, should have been so totally regardless of, or unconscious of, his own and while the committee are willing to admit, that the volunteer forces called into service by General Jackson were more efficient and less expensive than the militia, had he confined himself to the usual proportion of officers; this, they conceive, should not be urged as an argument in favour of employing them, or plead in justification of the unlawful act; for if these reasons be considered conclusive, and should be acquiesced in, they will be applied with increased force (fortified by this precedent) in all future wars;

an army of regulars will be considered (as they really are) more efficient and less expensive than either the volunteers, if autho~ rized by law, or the militia; and the officer at the head of such army (acting on the principles before stated, and encouraged by the acquiescence of the nation) may dispense with the militia altogether, and increase the regular army to any extent that folly or ambition may suggest; and all this, under the plea of necessity. The committee can scarcely imagine a possible case that may occur in a future war, where the necessity will be less strong than in the present. This war was waged when the United States were at peace with all the world, except this miserable undisciplined banditti of "deluded Indians" and fugitive slaves; their whole strength, when combined, not exceeding 1,000 men, opposed to whom (previous to Gen. Jackson's taking the command) and under Gen. Gaines, were a force of 1,800 regulars and militia, besides the 1,500 friendly Indians, illegally subsidized by the lastmentioned general? What then in this state of the case becomes of the plea of necessity? And if it be admitted in this case to justify or palliate an act of military usurpation, the committee would anxiously inquire where it is to be disallowed or denied? And here the committee, having pledged themselves faithfully to disclose facts and impartially to draw conclusions, beg leave to remark, that the conduct of the commanding general, in raising this volunteer corps, was appro

bated

bated by the War Department, as will appear by the letter of the Secretary, dated the 29th day of January, 1818; and it is but justice to the department to state, that it was not until the officers that had assisted in thus officering and organizing this corps, were examined by the committee, that they were apprized of the illegality of the measure; for there is nothing to be found in Gen. Jackson's letters on this subject to the Secretary of War, of the 12th, 13th and 20th of February, 1818, from which it can be fairly inferred, that he had appointed a single officer: indeed it would seem from a fair interpretation of those letters, that the officers, at least, were of the regular militia of the States, and that the only departure from his orders by the General was, his having called on the subordinate officers of the militia, instead of the Governor of the State of Tennessee, and his preference of mounted men to infantry; and it will also appear from the letters aforesaid, that had the Department of War disapproved of this conduct, and determined to countermand the order of General Jackson in raising this force, no order to that effect could have reached him before he had arrived at the seat of war, and of course the army might have been disbanded in sight of the enemy, and the objects of the campaign thereby jeopardized, and perhaps

defeated.

The committee will next take notice of the operations of the army in the Floridas, whither they were authorized to pursue the enemy; and connected with VOL. LXI.

this authority, it was enjoined on Gen. Gaines, to whom the first order to this effect was given, that in case the enemy took refuge under a Spanish garrison, not to attack them there, but to report the fact to the Secretary at War; and the observance of this order the committee conceive was equally obligatory on General Jackson, who succeeded to the command; at least it must have clearly evinced the will of the Secretary of War on that point; and how far this injunction was observed, will be found by what followed. It appears that Gen. Jackson advanced into Florida with a force of 1,800 men, composed of regulars, volunteers, and the Georgia militia; and afterwards, on the 1st of April, was joined by Gen. M'Intosh and his brigade of 1,500 Indians, who had been previously organized by Gen. Gaines; opposed to whom, it appears from the report of Captain Young, topographical engineer, and other evidence, the whole forces of the fugitive Seminole Indians and runaway negroes, had they all been embodied, could not have exceeded 900 or 1,000 men, and at no time did half that number present themselves to oppose his march, of course little or no resistance was made.

The Mickasuky towns were first taken and destroyed; the army marched upon St. Mark's, a feeble Spanish garrison, which was surrendered without firing a gun," and then occupied it as an American post: the Spanish commandant having first by humble entreaties and then by a timid protest, endeavoured to avert the L

measure.

measure. Here Alexander Arbuthnot was found, taken prisoner and put in confinement, for the purpose, as it was stated by General Jackson, "of collecting evidence to establish his guilt ;" and here also were taken two Indian chiefs, one of whom pretended to possess the spirit of prophesy; they were hung without trial and with little ceremony.

This being done, and St. Mark's garrisoned by American troops, the army pursued their march eastward to Suwaney river, on which they found a large Indian village, which was consumed, and the Indians and negroes were dispersed; after which the army returned to St. Mark's, bringing with them Robert C. Ambrister, who had been taken prisoner on their march to Suwaney. During the halt of the army for a few days at St. Mark's, a general court-martial was called, Arbuthnot was arraigned, found guilty, sentenced to suffer death and hung.

Ambrister was tried in like manner, found guilty and sentenced to whipping and confine ment. General Jackson annulled the sentence and ordered him to be shot; and this order was executed.

It appears by the testimony, that the army had arrived at St. Mark's, on their return from Suwaney, on the 25th of April; and on the 26th, general Jackson writes to the secretary of war in the following manner:-" I shall leave this in two or three days for Fort Gadsden, and, after making all necessary arrange ments for the security of the po

The

sitions occupied, and detaching a force to scour the country west of the Appalachicola, I shall proceed direct to Nashville; my presence in this country can be no longer necessary. Indian forces have been divided and scattered; cut off from all communications with those unprincipled agents of foreign nations who have deluded them to their ruin, they have not the power, if the will remains, of annoying our frontier." It appears, however, by the conduct of the commanding general, that he had, at this time, looked to different movements; for, at the time he was writing this letter, as will be seen by the testimony of captain Call and surgeon Bronaugh, he had dispatched lieutenant Sands to Mobile, to forward on a train of artillery to a given point, to be ready to be made use of in reducing Pensacola and the fort of Barancas, should that measure be thereafter thought proper; having made these arrangements, the army marched to Fort Gadsden, on the Appalachicola river. There, as stated by general Jackson and confirmed by the testimony of colonel Butler, information was received by a private letter, written from a merchant at Pensacola to Mr. Doyle and shown to general Jackson, that a number of Indians had recently visited Pensacola, and were committing depredations on the Spanish inhabitants of that place, and were receiving aid and comfort from the garrison. On the receipt of this intelligence, the resolution seems to have been taken to garrison that place with American troops;

and

and after a march of about 20 days, having met his artillery, general Jackson, with about 1,200 men, the rest having been discharged, appeared before Pensacola, the capital of the province. The place was taken with scarce the show of resistance. The governor had escaped, and taken refuge in the fort of the Barancas; to which place, distant about six miles, the army marched, and the fortress was invested on the 25th of May; and a demand being made for its surrender and refused, the attack on the fortress by land and water commenced, and after the bombardment and cannonading had been kept up for a part of two days, and some lives lost, the fortress was surrendered, the garrison made prisoners of war, and the officers of the government, civil and military, transported to the Havannah, agreeably to the terms of the capitulation; which terms general Jackson, in his letter of 2nd June, 1818, declares were more favourable than a conquered enemy would have merited."

The civil and military government of Spain thus annulled, general Jackson thought it necessary to abolish the revenue laws of Spain, and establish those of the United States as more favourable to the commerce of the United States; and for this purpose captain Gadsden was appointed collector, and by him, under the authority of general Jackson, that department of the new government was organized. The Spanish authorities being thus put down by the sword, both civil and military, a new government was established for

this newly acquired territory, the powers of which, both civil and military, were vested in military officers. And general Jackson having declared in numerous communications to the department of war that the Seminole war was closed, and the object of the campaign at an end, he returned to his residence at Nashville, state of Tennessee. And here it would have given the committee sincere pleasure to have stated that the history of the campaign had closed; but facts which it becomes now their duty to report, require that history to be continued. On the 7th of

August 1818, more than two months after his consummation of the conquest of West, and part of East Florida, he issued an order to general Gaines directing him to take possession of St. Augustine, a strong fortress and the capital of East Florida. A copy of this order is subjoined to this .report, and his reasons for this measure are stated at large in the order, and reiterated and enforced by his letter to the secretary at war, dated the 10th of the same month, which reasons, fully and beyond the pos sibility of doubt, discover the motives of the commanding general in all his movements against Spain.

The tendency of these measures by the commanding general seems to have been to involve the nation in a war without her consent, and for reasons of his own, unconnected with his military functions.

Your committee would be unwilling to attribute improper motives, where those of a different character could be possibly in

L 2

ferred,

The constitution declares, art. 1, sec. 8. "Congress shall have power to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and to make rules concerning captures on land and water." Surely it was never designed by this provision, that a military officer should first make war, and leave it to Congress afterwards to declare it this would involve an absurdity that it is unnecessary to expose. It is sufficient to say, that the executive authority of the United States, and much less a subordinate officer, has no power to change the pacific relations of the nation. The president of the United States is bound constitutionally to preserve the peace of the country until Congress declares it in a state of war: he can only, while thus in a state of peace, use the military forces of the nation in three specified cases, that is, "to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrection and repel invasion." (See Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8; also, the act for calling forth the militia, passed Feb. 28, 1795). It will not be pretended, that

Spain had invaded the United States, or that Congress had declared war against that nation, and of course the relations of peace did exist between the two countries, at the time general Jackson took possession of the Spanish possessions in the Floridas: these facts being admitted, and they cannot be denied, the only question to decide is, whether the military conduct of general Jackson was not war against Spain; and on this subject there can be no room to doubt. The capital of a Spanish province is taken by the sword, a fortress is invested and bombarded, lives are lost and the place surrendered on capitulation, the terms of which are declared "more favourable than a conquered enemy merited;" military officers and men, as well as those in the civil departments of government are transported to the West Indies, and a new government established for the conquered country. If all these acts of hostility combined do not constitute war, the committee confess themselves utterly at a loss for its definition; or if the fact be denied, the consequence of such denial will be a proof that no war was made by the Seminole Indians on the United States, and of course, that the invasion of Florida was an unauthorized act of aggression on the part of the United States; but the committee will pursue this subject a little farther, and examine the reasons offered by the officers commanding, for taking possession of and occupying the Spanish fortresses, more especially Pensacola and the Barancas. These reasons are to be found in his numerous reports

to