He should not be hampered by boards of fire commissioners or police commissioners, or boards of public works. A man fit to be mayor is as well qualified to select a superintendent of water-works, as a superintendent of streets, or an inspector of buildings. They have no functions in common. each is as distinct as the fire department or the police department.

An exception might be made in the case of a board of health, because the questions arising under that department, call for a more technical knowledge in determining policy as to sanitation measures, but the mayor should be a member of that body and should be responsible for the appointment of its administrative officials.

The mischief of dividing responsibility has made itself notoriously active in the administration of affairs of every city of the first class in this state. It has led to extravagance, to evasion of blame and to inefficiency.

I dare not go as fully as I would like into details, but I ask your attention to the pressing need of a better system of accounting. The office of comptroller is one of the most important in the city-in any city. He should be the bookkeeper for all the city business, each department having only a clerk to keep its separate accounts, entirely distinct from the treasurer's office, which should merely receive money and pay it out on warrants signed by the mayor and comptroller.

Uniformity in keeping the accounts of all cities would afford means of comparison of the expenditure per capita, and provide other data of statistical value.

To those seeking a more thorough discussion of the subject of government of cities, I would recommend, besides Dillon's admirable text book, Bryce's American Commonwealth.

The law of municipal corporations is yet in an unsettled condition, especially in the new states, and I submit with all deference to our learned judiciary that it is due to an attempt to govern the wild and woolly west by rules of Puritan jurisprudence. As a matter of fact the law of gradually growing communities is not adapted to the rap

idly developing cities of the West.

I know of no more

decided proof of this than the matter of street improvement. In New England, self protection taught that towns should be closely peopled. When the common law began to grow in Massachusetts Bay, there were no wild-cat additions. Streets were short and compact. They were made and repaired at the general cost and added to from time to time. There, a general tax was just. Such a tax in a city like Seattle or Tacoma or Pasco would open the doors to the rankest jobbery. The system of local assessment districts is absolutely necessary. Even with that precaution we find that in boom times a pull has been successful in securing the grading of streets far beyond necessities, and solely for the purpose of booming remote additions. The rush and hurry of fast developing cities resulted in the election of incompetent officials, and these have left a legacy in nearly every city in the state which will plunge almost every corporation in a great debt, unless the courts, recognizing the folly of attempting to keep new wine in old bottles, to quote an authority older than Blackstoneshall modify and adjust equitable rulings to prevailing novel conditions.

The law of assessment and re-assessment of property for street improvements is now being made by the chief tribunal of this state, and the legal profession has already experienced difficulty in harmonizing the standard authorities with the modern demands.

I shall not attempt to frame a model decision for the supreme court, but content myself with these few cursory suggestions. I shall, however, take this opportunity to ask every attorney to lend his aid in amending the state law so that cities may extricate themselves from a difficulty in which they are stranded, first by the incompetence of officials and secondly by an absence of remedial provision for acts of omission. An admirable provision occurs in the Seattle Charter of 1886, drawn, I believe, by the able and upright jurist, Judge Hanford. It is that where an assessment for street grading is contested, and suit is.

brought by the city: "if it shall appear to the court on the trial that work has been done, or materials furnished, in making improvements authorized by the council, for which, under the provisions of this act, special assessments may be levied; the court shall decree against the premises and in favor of the city, or any other party plaintiff, to the extent of the proportion of the reasonable value of such work or materials justly chargeable to such premises, notwithstanding any defect, informality or irregularity in the proceedings."

Unfortunately, however, there is no provision of means by which the reasonable value can be determined, nor is the city provided with the machinery by which it can make up to the contractor any deficiency created by judgment for less than the full amount.

A distinguished member of the Pierce county bar, F. H. Murray, is the author of a law which provides for re-assessment in case of a failure of the first attempt at assessment, but I suggest that it is capable of improvement by the addition of a power to cities, in cases calling for re-assessment through invalidity, to assume a portion of the cost of improvement.

In many cases a city has ordered very expensive grading to be done much of the value of which is to the city generally and not only to the adjacent property. Here a portion should be borne by the general street fund. In other cases negligent officials have permitted entirely unnecessary expense to property owners, and by other acts, vitiated the assessment. Here, also, the city should not suffer entire loss, but the cost should be divided between the property owners to the reasonable value of the work done, and the city at large, as a penalty for having negligent officials. In no other way can justice be done, the assessment be collected and, at the same time, the claims of innocent warrant holders be made good.

This paper is, I know, fragmentary and suggestive only. So vast a field in which the committee has directed me to graze allows me time only to nibble here and there, and I

have endeavored to pick out a few choice spots upon which the lawyer who takes an interest in civic legislation may find rich material for rumination.

APPENDIX "F."

Paper read by Charles S. Fogg, of Tacoma.
Subject: EVIL OF THE PROMISCUOUS APPOINT-
MENT OF RECEIVERS.

As the subject on which I am asked to read a paper indicates, there is undoubtedly cause for serious protest against the too common custom that appears to have grown up under existing laws in this state to appoint Receivers.

We have at this time in the state of Washington a great army of Receivers; Receivers appointed in all sorts of cases; Receivers appointed with notice, and Receivers appointed without notice; Receivers appointed in meritorious cases, and Receivers appointed in cases of doubtful merit. Indeed, we seem to have a mania for the appointment of Receivers; Receivers for banks, Receivers for corporations, Receivers for partnerships, Receivers for property of all sorts and in all conditions. As a necessary consequence instances of great hardship and wrong are not wanting to show that courts, lawyers and litigants have gone too far in this direction, and that it is time to call a halt. In the language of Chief Justice Fuller, "That whatever temptation to leave the beaten path, the record of a particular case may be supposed to afford, it is not for the courts of justice in the exercise of unregulated discretion to remove the settled land marks of the law." It should be remembered that the appointment of a Receiver to take possession of property is a harsh and extraordinary remedy and ought to be invoked only in cases where it is absolutely necessary to attain the ends of justice. The simple statement of the effect of a receivership by a learned author, shows that the greatest caution should be exercised in its