not those means, whatever they are, and in whatever body vested, be subject to the same inconveniences of expense, delay, obstruction of good intentions, &c., which are objected to the present executive ?

II. THE DURATION OF THE APPOINTMENT.

"This should be governed by the following principles, the independence of the magistrate, and the stability of his administration; neither of which can be secured but by putting both beyond the reach of every annual gust of folly and of faction.”

On this it may be asked, ought it not also to be put beyond the reach of every triennial, quinquennial, or septennial gust of folly and faction, and, in short, beyond the reach of folly and of faction at any period whatever? Does not this reasoning aim at establishing a monarchy at least for life, like that of Poland? or to prevent the inconveniences such as that kingdom is subject to in a new election on every decease? Are the freemen of Pennsylvania convinced, from a view of the history of such governments, that it will be for their advantage to submit themselves to a government of such construction?

III. ON THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH.

"A plural legislature is as necessary to good government as a single executive. It is not enough that your legislature should be numerous; it should also be divided. Numbers alone are not a sufficient barrier against the impulses of passion, the combination of interest, the intrigues of faction, the haste of folly, or the spirit of encroachment. One division should watch over and control the other, supply its wants, correct its blunders, and cross its designs, should they be criminal

or erroneous. Wisdom is the specific quality of the legislature, grows out of the number of the body, and is made up of the portions of sense and knowledge which each member brings to it."

On this it may be asked, May not the wisdom brought to the legislature by each member be as effectual a barrier against the impulses of passion, &c., when the members are united in one body, as when they are divided? If one part of the legislature may control the operations of the other, may not the impulses of passion, the combinations of interest, the intrigues of faction, the haste of folly, or the spirit of encroachment in one of those bodies obstruct the good proposed by the other, and frustrate its advantages to the public? Have we not experienced in this State, when a province under the government of the proprietors, the mischiefs of a second branch existing in the proprietary family, countenanced and aided by an aristocratic council? How many delays and what great expenses were occasioned in carrying on the public business; and what a train of mischiefs, even to the preventing of the defence of the province during several years, when distressed by an Indian war, by the iniquitous demand that the proprietary property should be exempt from taxation! The wisdom of a few members in one single legislative body, may it not frequently stifle bad motions in their infancy, and so prevent their being adopted? whereas, if those wise men, in case of a double legislature, should happen to be in that branch wherein the motion did not arise, may it not, after being adopted by the other, occasion long disputes and contentions between the two bodies, expensive to the public, obstructing the public business, and promoting factions among the people, many

tempers naturally adhering obstinately to measures they have once publicly adopted? Have we not seen, in one of our neighbouring States, a bad measure, adopted by one branch of the legislature, for want of the assistance of some more intelligent members who had been packed into the other, occasion many debates, conducted with much asperity, which could not be settled but by an expensive general appeal to the public? And have we not seen, in another neighbouring State, a similar difference between the two branches, occasioning long debates and contentions, whereby the State was prevented for many months enjoying the advantage of having Senators in the Congress of the United States? And has our present legislative in one Assembly committed any errors of importance, which they have not remedied, or may not easily remedy; more easily, probably, than if divided into branches? And if the wisdom brought by the members to the Assembly is divided into two branches, may it not be too weak in each to support a good measure, or obstruct a bad one? The division of the legislature into two or three branches in England, was it the product of wisdom, or the effect of necessity, arising from the preexisting prevalence of an odious feudal system? which government, notwithstanding this division, is now become, in fact, an absolute monarchy; since.

**, by bribing the representatives with the people's money, carries, by his ministers, all the measures that please him; which is equivalent to governing without a Parliament, and renders the machine of government much more complex and expensive, and, from its being more complex, more easily put out of order. Has not the famous political fable of the snake, with two heads and one body, some useful instruction contained in it? She was going to a brook to drink,

and in her way was to pass through a hedge, a twig of which opposed her direct course; one head chose to go on the right side of the twig, the other on the left; so that time was spent in the contest, and, before the decision was completed, the poor snake died with thirst.

"Hence it is that the two branches should be elected by persons differently qualified; and in short, that, as far as possible, they should be made to represent different interests. Under this reason I would establish a legislature of two Houses. The upper should represent the property; the lower, the population of the State. The upper should be chosen by freemen possessing in land and houses one thousand pounds; the lower, by all such as had resided four years in the country, and paid taxes. The first should be chosen for four, the last for two years. They should be in authority coëqual."

Several questions may arise upon this proposition. 1st. What is the proportion of freemen possessing lands and houses of one thousand pounds' value, compared to that of freemen whose possessions are inferior? Are they as one to ten? Are they even as one to twenty? I should doubt whether they are as one to fifty. If this minority is to choose a body expressly to control that which is to be chosen by the great majority of the freemen, what have this great majority done to forfeit so great a portion of their right in elec-. tions? Why is this power of control, contrary to the spirit of all democracies, to be vested in a minority, instead of a majority? Then, is it intended, or is it not, that the rich should have a vote in the choice of members for the lower House, while those of inferior

property are deprived of the right of voting for members of the upper House? And why should the upper House, chosen by a minority, have equal power with the lower chosen by a majority? Is it supposed that wisdom is the necessary concomitant of riches, and that one man worth a thousand pounds must have as much wisdom as twenty who have each only nine hundred and ninety-nine; and why is property to be. represented at all? Suppose one of our Indian nations should now agree to form a civil society; each individual would bring into the stock of the society little more property than his gun and his blanket, for at present he has no other. We know, that, when one of them has attempted to keep a few swine, he has not been able to maintain a property in them, his neighbours thinking they have a right to kill and eat them whenever they want provision, it being one of their maxims that hunting is free for all; the accumulation therefore of property in such a society, and its security to individuals in every society, must be an effect of the protection afforded to it by the joint strength of the society, in the execution of its laws. Private property therefore is a creature of society, and is subject to the calls of that society, whenever its necessities shall require it, even to its last farthing; its contributions to the public exigences are not to be considered as conferring a benefit on the public, entitling the contributors to the distinctions of honor and power, but as the return of an obligation previously received, or the payment of a just debt. The combinations of civil society are not like those of a set of merchants, who club their property in different proportions for building and freighting a ship, and may therefore have some right to vote in the disposition of the voyage in a greater or less degree according