preference must be viewed or estimated as the greatest good. Before the object can be viewed as the greatest good, it must be compared with other objects, as both are sources or means of good. Before this act of comparing, there must be an act dictated not by selfishness, but by self-love, in which the mind determines to direct its thoughts to the objects for the sake of considering their relative value, of forming a judgment respecting it, and of choosing one or the other as the chief good. These acts also imply under the presentation of the objects to the mind, an intellectual perception of their adaptedness to the nature of man as sources or means of happiness; and also an excitement of constitutional susceptibilities in view of the objects, i. e. involuntary propensities, inclinations, or desires, toward each object respectively.

The reality of this process of mental acts previous to an act of preference, is evinced by human consciousness. For who ever supremely loved any object, whose mind in its perceptions, thoughts, and feelings, did not more or less rapidly pass through the process now described? In this statement of mental acts, therefore, we think we have specified facts which no one, who reflects on his own experience, can deny any more than he can deny his existence.

Should any doubt or hesitation in regard to what has just been stated, respecting the process of mental acts, arise in the mind of the reader, it would probably respect the position that the acts of considering and comparing the objects of choice, are dictated not by selfishness but by self love.* To remove all doubts on this point, we deem it sufficient to say, that such an act of consideration as we have described cannot be dictated by selfishness, because the act is not fitted to subserve, but is fitted to defeat, a selfish purpose. What selfish purpose can any one propose to accomplish by thinking of God and com

*The term self-love has been extensively used as synonymous with the term selfishness, and to denote the preference of some object to the general good as the means of happiness to the agent. Since however there is a real distinction between such a preference or choice, and the general desire of happiness which fixes on no definite object but puts the soul upon finding and choosing some object as the means of its happiness, it is important to make the distinction in language. To denote the latter we know of no phrase or term so convenient as self-love, while the best usage in the ordinary language of modern philosophy” fully authorizes this import of the term. “Not only is the phrase self-love used as synonymous with the desire of happiness, but it is often confounded (in consequence of an unfortunate connexion in their etymology) with the word selfishness, which certainly, in strict propriety, denotes a very different disposition of mind. In proof of this it is sufficient to observe, that the word selfishness is always used in an unfavorable sense, whereas self-love or the desire of happiness is inseparable from our nature as rational and sensitive beings." Stewart's Philosophy-Vol. I. p. 113.

paring him with other objects of affection, for the sake of determining whether he will not henceforth choose God as his chief good instead of the world? Or what kind of selfishness is that, which prompts a man solemnly to consider, whether he will not in heart renounce all inferior good as his chosen portion, for the supreme good. That such acts, done for the sake of forming more clear, correct, and impressive views of the relative value of the objects of choice, and of choosing anew, either one or the other as the chief good, should be dictated by the selfish principle, is impossible. The reason for so directing and employing the thoughts is not that the heart is fixed on any definite object as the source or means of the highest happiness. It is not that God is loved supremely on the one hand, nor that the world is loved supremely on the other, which prompts this employment of the thoughts; for they are thus employed for the very purpose of making this choice, i. e. for the very purpose of taking by an act of choice or preference, one or the other as the chief good. These acts of consideration and comparison of the objects of choice are dictated then, not by selfishness, but by the desire of happiness or self-love, which in its own nature fixes on no definite object as the source of happiness.

This self-love or desire of happiness, is the primary cause or reason of all acts of preference or choice which fix supremely on any object. In every moral being who forms a moral character, there must be a first moral act of preference or choice. This must respect some one object, God or mammon, as the chief good, or as an object of supreme affection. Now whence comes such a choice or preference? Not from a previous choice or preference of the same object, for we speak of the first choice of the object. The answer which human consciousness gives, is, that the being constituted with a capacity for happiness desires to be happy; and knowing that he is capable of deriving happiness from different objects, considers from which the greatest happiness may be derived, and as in this respect be judges or estimates their relative value, so he chooses or prefers the one or the other as his chief good. While this must be the process by which a moral being forms his first moral preference, substantially the same process is indispensable to a change of this preference. The change involves the preference of a new object as the chief good; a preference which the former preference has no tendency to produce, but a direct tendency to prevent; a preference therefore not resulting from, or in any way occasioned by a previous preference of any given object, but resulting from those acts of considering and comparing the sources of happiness, which are dictated by the desire of happines or self-love.

Nor ought it to be overlooked, that this part of our nature is always with us, be our moral character what it may. It always longs for happiness, without including in itself the act of the will or heart fixed on any given source or object, whence we resolve to seek our happiness: for whether by an act of the will or heart we resolve to seek our chief happiness from one object or another, we still desire to be happy. Whenever we do fix upon the object, self love primarily prompts to the choice (not determines it;) and therefore exists prior to the act of will by which we fix our affections on any object as our chief good. To self-love the appeal may always be made, and feelingly made, even in the lowest stages of moral degeneracy, to produce both the conviction and impression, that there is greater good in God than in the world. To this part of our nature, all motives designed to change the governing purpose or supreme affection of the heart, must always be primarily addressed. They cannot be addressed to a holy heart, already existing in sinful man. Nor will it be pretended that God proffers gratification to the selfish principle in man as the means of winning him to holiness, since this would have no other tendency than to prevent the change. The motives fitted to destroy the selfish principle, (and such must be all the motives addressed to man to restore him to holiness,) can find nothing in that principle but resistance. If therefore there be not in man a constitutional capacity of happiness from some other source than the world; if man cannot be made to see and to feel that there is to him greater good in God, than in any other object, the motives to holiness might as well be addressed to the trees of the forest, as to men. So certain as man is a moral agent and is properly addressed by motives to holiness, so certain is it, that he has constitutional susceptibilities to that good which these motives proffer; and that, if he is led at all to prefer this good to every other, he is primarily prompted to the choice by the desire of happiness or self-love.

We now proceed to say,

II. That no acts of the sinner, done while the selfish principle remains active in the heart, constitute using the means of regeneration.

It will be admitted, that those acts which constitute using these means, are acts which respect divine truth. Since however all such acts do not fall under this denomination, it becomes important to distinguish those which do not, from those which do, by some sure criteria. We say then, that those acts which constitute using the means of regeneration, must have either some tendency to produce regeneration; or

some necessary or real connexion with it; or must at least be such as will not infallibly prevent it. By these several tests we propose to show, that the acts above specified, do not constitute using the means of regeneration.

In the first place, they have no tendency to produce regeneration; their exclusive tendency being to subserve the selfish purpose of the heart. There is no law of human action more obvious or more universally admitted in the intercourse of life, than that a man's supreme affection or governing purpose, while active in the mind, will dictate and control all his specific voluntary actions. Indeed, to suppose that man, with his heart or will fully set on a given object as his chief good, should voluntarily perform any action which in his view is fitted to defeat his purpose of acquisition and enjoyment, or which is not in his view fitted either directly or indirectly to subserve this purpose, is to suppose him to act voluntarily against his will; to choose and not to choose a given object at the same time, and thus in the strictest sense to be 'divided against himself; an absurdity sufficiently palpable to silence even Jewish cavil.ng.

It is not however an uncommon opinion that the sinner, while his supreme affections are actively fixed on the world, often acts not from the selfish principle or worldly purpose of the heart, but simply from constitutional propensities. So indeed it might be, did this principle respect some specific worldly good compared simply with other worldly good. He whose supreme object compared with other worldly good should be honour, might eat and drink, might promote the happiness of kindred, or perform any other voluntary acts which are not incompatible with the pursuit of his chief object, from merely constitutional propensities. But such is not the nature of the selfish principle. It involves not merely a preference of worldly good in one form to worldly good in other forms; but a preference of the world in all its forms of good, to the God who made it. Nor is it merely a passive preference of this object; but in all circumstances of the practicable attainment of the object, becomes an active principle, and constitutes the governing purpose of the man. The object of this principle or purpose, is of course a complex object, comprising all that we include under the term world: all that from which man is capable of deriving happiness, and which can come into competition, as an object of affection, with his Maker. This principle then may subserve itself in many forms; i.e. it may seek its gratification, or considered as a purpose, its accomplishment, in a great variety of specific objects, and by a great variety of specific actions. Be the nature how

ever of the good proposed what it may-be it wealth or honor, kindred or friends, or even life itself-be this good insulated or combined in the objects of the action,-be the actions performed what they may, in all that is done there is a preference of the world to God going out into voluntary action, to secure the object of the preference. Such is, and such must be, the universal law of voluntary action while the selfish principle remains active in the heart. Of all specific voluntary action, the happiness of the agent in some form is the ultimate end; and since all the happiness known to man is comprised in God, or in the world, one or the other must be the object of supreme affection, if any object be thus regarded. To the sinner, therefore, while his affections are actively, and of course, exclusively given to the world, there is no good in God-none in doing his will and promoting his glory, which can move him to action. Preferring the world as his chief good, he looks to it for happiness with ever-wakeful affection, and performs no action which is not exclusively designed, and, in his view, fitted to subserve his purpose of worldly enjoyment. Whether he is occupied with the employments of business, the pursuits of pleasure, or the study of divine truth, the end proposed is still the same. Indeed, to the sinner while performing those acts by which he places himself in the light and amid the realities of divine truth, this universal law of voluntary action has its most alarming application; for he now stands as a subject of the living God, in the very sanctuary of his glories, hears his prohibitory mandate, and yet makes self his idol.

In further confirmation of this view of the subject, we appeal to the nature of those acts, which may be supposed to constitute exceptions to our general remark. The possibility of some acts of attention to divine truth, dictated by the selfish principle will not be denied. It will be readily conceded, that he who gives his contemplations to divine truth that he may assail the testimony of God with ridicule and contempt, and that he who perverts the doctrines of Christianity that he may escape their practical power, and that he who studies the sacred oracles merely that he may promote projects of ambition, pride, or other worldly advantage, acts from the selfish principle. But it is to be remembered, that acts so flagrantly selfish, are not the only acts in respect to divine truth, that may be dictated by this principle. The sinner may perform such acts with the design to increase his knowledge of the truth, and to feel its power in excited emotion, and yet aim exclusively at a selfish end. In the knowledge of divine truth, and in that mental excitement which respects simply the natural