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But certainly our experience with business and Government institutions, national and international, would afford a wealth of guidance in the development of such measures.

In the actual conduct of its operations the development organization would at all times be governed by a dual purpose, the promotion of the beneficial use of atomic energy and the maintenance of security

How could you maintain security for the United States, with 57 other nations led by Russia? And I am speaking directly, and not by innuendo-led by Russia. We can hardly get to talk to them at this time. And how would you get security for America? You might get international security for other people but you would not get it for America, in my judgment.

Mr. BARNARD. You are not going to get security for America if you cannot get this done.

Senator MCKELLAR. If we have got it, why would it not be better to destroy it?

Mr. BARNARD. Destroy what?

Senator MCKELLAR. Destroy the secret.

Mr. BARNARD. You cannot destroy the secret. It is spread around the world now.

Senator MCKELLAR. Then why not let the nations take their chances for it, just exactly like we took our chances for it? Why should we give it to other nations?

In the actual conduct of its operations the development organization would at all times be governed by a dual purpose, the promotion of the beneficial use of atomic energy and the maintenance of security. We believe that much can be done in a convention or charter to make these purpose concrete and explicit, to draw the line between the dangerous and the nondangerous, to establish the principles determining the location of stock piles and plants so that a strategic balance may be maintained among nations, to establish fair and equitable financial policies so that the contributions of nations to, and their receipt of, benefits from the organization will be justly apportioned. The most careful and ingenious definitions will be required in order to accomplish these purposes.

Now, do you intend to give this secret, without money and without price, to nations that talk as bitterly against us as the Russians? Mr. BARNARD. Not if they keep on bitterly talking and do not agree with us.

Senator MCKELLAR. Then why give it to them before we agree? Mr. BARNARD. There is no proposal that it be given to them before

we agree.

Senator MCKELLAR. This establishes an international agency. Mr. BARNARD. You have agreed, before you can possibly establish the agency. The agreement has to come first. If you have the agreement, then you have the basis for it.

Senator MCKELLAR. Would you mind reading that provision?
Mr. BARNARD. Which one?

Senator MCKELLAR. Any one that indicates you have to establish it first.

Mr. BARNARD. It is all through the report, Senator.

Senator MCKELLAR. It may be all through the report, but I am just asking you to point out where it is. You are one of the authors of the report.

Senator KNOWLAND. Does not the Baruch proposal require that certain agreements be entered into first before any of the so-called Secrets are given away, other than the general knowledge that they would have to have in order to work out some kind of an agreement?

Senator MCKELLAR. But you did not agree with the Baruch report, did you?

Mr. BARNARD. The Baruch report is this report, with only one exception, and that is the reference to the veto.

Senator MCKELLAR. It does not by name endorse the Baruch report.

Mr. BARNARD. The Baruch report was made after this report was given.

Senator MCKELLAR. Oh, it was.

Mr. BARNARD. It was prepared for the benefit of Mr. Baruch. Senator MCKELLAR. All right. Let us see what else I want to ask you.

How long have you known Mr. Lilienthal?

Mr. BARNARD. Since September 1945.

Senator MCKELLAR. Did you ever know about his operations before that time, or know him personally before?

Mr. BARNARD. I never knew him personally before.

Senator MCKELLAR. Do you know anything about it, except what you saw in the newspaper of the Tennessee Valley down there? Mr. BARNARD. No; I do not think so.

Senator MCKELLAR. You never rode in that magnificent airplane that he had to show his friends?

Mr. BARNARD. No, sir; I never rode in any airplane over the Tennessee Valley.

Senator MCKELLAR. I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions?

Senator MCMAHON. I have a question.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McMahon.

Senator MCMAHON. Mr. Barnard, there has been some testimony here to the effect that Mr. Lilienthal is a dominating kind of fellow who cannot work with other individuals. Now, this is a five-man commission. You worked with him for some period of time.

Mr. BARNARD. Yes, sir.

Senator MCMAHON. Now, what is your observation on his ability to work with his associates?

Mr. BARNARD. Out of an experience of, I suppose, some hundreds of conferences of long duration, I never found anybody at any time or place who worked as easily as Mr. Lilienthal did with this committee. An eavesdropper could not have told, day after day, who was the chairman. And sometimes I was irritated with him, because I thought if he might take hold of it a little stronger, we would make a little better progress.

I am speaking now only of my experience with Mr. Lilienthal on this board of consultants. That was the experience.

Senator MCMAHON. Up until the beginning of these hearings, do you know of anybody in this country who objected to or criticized the proposals we have made for international controls of atomic energy?

Mr. BARNARD. I do not. We expected that there would be. We thought that out of the criticism of this report there would, as usually is the case, develop different plans, of which some one or more might have been better. But there have been no different plans suggested. And it has been singularly free from criticism from most people who studied it; singularly free.

Senator MCMAHON. I suppose, Mr. Barnard, it may be well to emphasize every chance we get, though that may not be necessary,

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that it is the theory of this report that we are not in any danger from the bombs we have ourselves.

Mr. BARNARD. That is right.

Senator MCMAHON. But we would be in danger if other countries had the bomb.

Mr. BARNARD. Yes, sir.

Senator MCMAHON. And this is an effort to keep other countries from having the bomb.

Mr. BARNARD. Yes, sir.

Senator MCMAHON. Is that not it?

Mr. BARNARD. It is that, and it is something more, Senator. It is an effort to eliminate international competition for uranium and thorium, which would be the greatest breeder of war that we could have.

Competition for oil would be nothing as compared with competition for uranium and thorium. That international control, with the unequal distribution of uranium and thorium throughout the world, you have constant foci of potential war before you. This report and the scheme that it outlines is intended not only to control the bomb and the explosives but to eliminate that kind of international competition.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Connally?

Senator CONNALLY. Mr. Barnard, I apologize for asking this type of question, but I have not been here continuously.

How came you to be selected on this committee?

Mr. BARNARD. I do not know. I asked Mr. Acheson about it, and he said: "You have been on our list." I represented the Treasury at Lend-Lease conferences when Mr. Acheson represented the State Department on those conferences.

Whether it had anything to do with that, I do not know. I know that Mr. Acheson at one time was asking to see if he could get me down to help on reorganization work in the State Department. So beyond that, I have no knowledge.

Senator CONNALLY. Were you put on because you are a scientist? Mr. BARNARD. No; because I am a student of organization, as well as a practical administrator.

Senator CONNALLY. You do not regard yourself as a scientist? Mr. BARNARD. I do not regard myself as a scientist, but I have been associated with scientists all my life and regarded by many as a social scientist all my life.

Senator CONNALLY. As a Socialist?

Mr. BARNARD. No; no.

Senator CONNALLY. I beg your pardon.

You say the State Department authorized the publication of this report?

Mr. BARNARD. The President of the United States authorized the publication of the report.

Senator CONNALLY. Did the committee make a recommendation about that?

Mr. BARNARD. No, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. You just made your report and filed it?

Mr. BARNARD. We made our report. The report went to the general committee that had been appointed by the President. They endorsed it unanimously. It is the unanimous selection of a super

visory committee and went to the President for whatever action he saw fit to take. He saw fit to publish it.

Senator CONNALLY. How important do you regard the use of atomic energy for purposes other than military?

Mr. BARNARD. In the long run, I think it would be very important. Senator CONNALLY. Is that our chief aim, in making it available for industrial uses, or is our chief aim in a military way?

Mr. BARNARD. I think our chief aim should be industrial and to eliminate it from the military use.

Senator CONNALLY. Why are we concerned about it now? Is it military or industrial?

Mr. BARNARD. We are concerned now to take it out of military use, for the peace of the world.

Senator CONNALLY. Our concern is that we are fearful that, from a military standpoint, if other nations had it, it would be a great threat to United States security?

Mr. BARNARD. Even the fear of it.

Senator CONNALLY. Is that not much more important than the so-called industrial use?

Mr. BARNARD. At this time, certainly.

Senator CONNALLY. Well, that is what we are talking about at this time, right now.

As a matter of fact, do you know anything about the costs of making this stuff for industrial purposes? Would it be greater than the present outlay for industrial purposes that we have, or less?

Mr. BARNARD. The estimtes that I have seen up to date indicate it would be somewhat greater.

Senator CONNALLY. I think so.

Mr. BARNARD. But not enough greater so that it could not easily be less, and some think it would be less. There are industrial concerns that are very much interested in it from a practical standpoint. Standard Oil of New Jersey, for instance.

Senator CONNALLY. Your company is not interested in it?

Mr. BARNARD. No, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Well, it seems to me that our chief concern is from the military standpoint. I am not very much interested in this theory that we must help out and give it to all these other nations and to individuals and companies for industrial use.

It seems to me that the important thing is the military use, and that that is where we are trying to put the controls if we have any controls.

Mr. BARNARD. That is the fundamental thing.

Senator CONNALLY. And as far as I am concerned, I am in favor of keeping this bomb until we have an international agency, through treaties that are watertight and atomic bomb-proof, and all sorts of things, before anybody gets a thing.

Mr. BARNARD. I think we have agreement on that.

Senator CONNALLY. I think it is important that we recognize that it is unfortunate that we have published all these reports to the world. They stimulate the interest of all other governments. They are all beginning now to look into it seriously and see if they cannot devise something about it. We are out on the front porch talking about it and boosting it and giving other nations a tremendous urge to see if they cannot do something about it.

Do you agree with that?

Mr. BARNARD. I have the same feeling, Senator. The basic thing that was given out was the Smyth report.

There is nothing in this report that is not in the Smyth report, except the poisoning of uranium derivatives.

Senator BRICKER. What do you mean by the poisoning of uranium derivatives?

The neutralization of it?

Mr. BARNARD. Yes; how you poison plutonium is a secret.
Senator BRICKER. Is that effective, do you know?

Mr. BARNARD. Yes; but it is not surely effective for an indefinite period. It cannot be guaranteed, and therefore scientists would have to be alert all the time.

Senator BRICKER. There is no way, then, of segregating the industrial and the military uses?

Mr. BARNARD. Oh, yes; there is.
Senator BRICKER. In what way?

Mr. BARNARD. If you give to industrial users only poison plutonium, there is no way you can make explosives out of it, except through very elaborate and costly processes, so far as is now known.

Senator CONNALLY. One other question, and I am through:

Mr. Chairman, what I was trying to say awhile ago was that from my standpoint, the military use of this is of paramount, superlative importance. I am not concerned about it so that somebody can make a dollar out of it. There are certain groups in this country who, every time anything comes up, want to see how many dollars they can make out of it.

All this industrial stuff is just, as I review it, a chance to make some money out of it.

Mr. BARNARD. I think that is a short-haul view of it.

Senator CONNALLY. What is the long-haul view of it?

Mr. BARNARD. The long-haul view of it is that anything which is a cheaper substitute

Senator CONNALLY. You just said it was not cheaper; that the estimates were that it was more expensive.

Mr. BARNARD. I thought that was true up to the present time. But this thing is very new, and it is going to be produced much more cheaply.

Senator CONNALLY. You are going against the estimates, then. You said you are not a scientist. How do you acquire the ability to discount all the estimates by scientists, while you are not a scientist? Mr. BARNARD. We have an experimental pile, I understand, out at Oak Ridge right now trying to find the most effective ways to use this. Senator CONNALLY. You say they are trying?

Mr. BARNARD. I think they are.

Senator CONNALLY. But you rather stress the industrial use of it; is that right?


Senator CONNALLY. You are more concerned about making some money out of it than you are in the security of the Nation?

Mr. BARNARD. No; that is not the point. The point is that in order to keep the military controls a live thing, the development of constructive uses of uranium is a highly desirable thing. It gives everybody, the whole people, an interest in the use of this thing for

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