Risk and RationalityOUP Oxford, 28.11.2013 - 288 Seiten Lara Buchak sets out an original account of the principles that govern rational decision-making in the face of risk. A distinctive feature of these decisions is that individuals are forced to consider how their choices will turn out under various circumstances, and decide how to trade off the possibility that a choice will turn out well against the possibility that it will turn out poorly. The orthodox view is that there is only one acceptable way to do this: rational individuals must maximize expected utility. Buchak's contention, however, is that the orthodox theory (expected utility theory) dictates an overly narrow way in which considerations about risk can play a role in an individual's choices. Combining research from economics and philosophy, she argues for an alternative, more permissive, theory of decision-making: one that allows individuals to pay special attention to the worst-case or best-case scenario (among other 'global features' of gambles). This theory, risk-weighted expected utility theory, better captures the preferences of actual decision-makers. Furthermore, it isolates the distinct roles that beliefs, desires, and risk-attitudes play in decision-making. Finally, contra the orthodox view, Buchak argues that decision-makers whose preferences can be captured by risk-weighted expected utility theory are rational. Thus, Risk and Rationality is in many ways a vindication of the ordinary decision-maker—particularly his or her attitude towards risk—from the point of view of even ideal rationality. |
Inhalt
1 | |
1 Instrumental Rationality and Expected Utility Theory | 10 |
2 RiskWeighted Expected Utility | 48 |
3 Representation | 82 |
4 Redescription | 114 |
5 Consistency | 148 |
6 Diachronic Choice | 170 |
7 Bookmaking and Packaging | 201 |
8 Conclusion | 230 |
Appendices | 235 |
250 | |
257 | |
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affine transformation agent cares agent’s preferences Allais argue argument assume assumption axioms bets chance Chapter choice node choose chooser coherent coin-flip comoncone comonotonic consequentialist consider constructivist Deal decision problem decision theory decision-makers degrees of belief depend Dutch book argument Elvis stamp ences EU theory evaluation example expected monetary value expected utility theory fact finite gamble global properties globally neutral globally sensitive agent gloves holds indifferent individuation instrumental rationality interpret irrational Jeff Köbberling and Wakker lottery Machina norm one’s preferences option particular probability function prospect theory r-function rank-dependent rational agents reasons representation theorem resolute choice result REU maximizers REU theory REU(f REU(g risk function risk-averse risk-avoidant risk-weighted expected utility scenario sophisticated choice stochastic dominance strategy strictly preferred structural subjective probability Sure-Thing Principle Tails theorist ticket tion Tradeoff Consistency unique utility difference utility function utility value violate weakly prefers weighting function