Democracy, Accountability, and RepresentationAdam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, Bernard Manin Cambridge University Press, 13.09.1999 - 351 Seiten This book examines whether mechanisms of accountability characteristic of democratic systems are sufficient to induce the representatives to act in the best interest of the represented. The first part of the volume focuses on the role of elections, distinguishing different ways in which they may cause representation. The second part is devoted to the role of checks and balances, between the government and the parliament as well as between the government and the bureaucracy. Overall, the essays combine theoretical discussions, game-theoretic models, case studies, and statistical analyses, within a shared analytical approach and a standardized terminology. The empirical material is drawn from the well established democracies as well as from new democracies. |
Inhalt
Elections and Representation | 29 |
Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance | 55 |
What Do Policy Switches Tell Us about Democracy? | 98 |
Accountability and Authority Toward a Theory of Political Accountability | 131 |
Accountability and Manipulation | 154 |
Party Government and Responsiveness | 197 |
Democracy Elections and Accountability for Economic Outcomes | 222 |
The Structure of Government and Accountability | 251 |
Accountability in Athenian Politics | 253 |
Government Accountability in Parliamentary Democracy | 279 |
Mixing Elected and Nonelected Officials in Democratic Policy Making Fundamentals of Accountability and Responsibility | 297 |
Overview | 327 |
Situating Democratic Political Accountability | 329 |
345 | |
350 | |
Andere Ausgaben - Alle anzeigen
Democracy, Accountability, and Representation Adam Przeworski,Susan C. Stokes,Bernard Manin Keine Leseprobe verfügbar - 1999 |
Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
actions Adam Przeworski adverse selection agency agent Alberto Fujimori American Political anticipation Assembly Athenian Athenian democracy bad types behavior believe bureaucracy cabinet Callixeinus Cambridge University Press campaign candidates Chapter choose citizens coalition constitution decision democratic democratic accountability economic effect elected officials electorate electorate's equilibrium ernments ex ante ex post expected Ferejohn formance Fujimori González graphe paranomon ideal point implement incentive incumbent induce induce representation institutions interests interview leaders liberal majority mandate Manin mechanisms of accountability Menem ministerial monitoring moral hazard NATO neoliberal observe outcomes parliament parliamentary democracies party performance Peronist policy preferences policy switches political accountability Political Science politicians position presidential prime ministers principal promises Przeworski PSOE Public Choice public opinion punish reelected regimes relationship rents representation representative responsibility retrospective rule rulers sanctioning Senate sense shirking Stokes strategies term limits variable vote voters welfare